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Abstract
The principal objective of this thesis is to determine why, how and with 
what outcomes means tests for 'non-income-replacement' benefits were 
adopted in England and Wales from the mid-1960s to the mid-1990s. The 
approach taken is to explore four benefits: free prescription medicines; 
free school meals; student grants; and civil legal aid. I use documents to 
identify the objectives, administrative details and design of the benefits 
which are the focus of this thesis. The method used to find out how many 
and what sorts of people were eligible under the means tests is 
microsimulation with micro-data.
There was no high point of generosity in the mid-1970s for these benefits, 
as the historiography often suggests. These four benefits had very 
different objectives. There was also incoherence in objectives over time, as 
governments struggled with spending constraints rather than following a 
welfare ideology, which serves to undermine theories which assume that 
welfare states are a unified institution. The changing income levels for 
entitlement for benefit show that who was deemed to be 'in  need' of a 
particular benefit shifted over time. The results show little support for the 
theory of middle class 'capture' of the welfare state, which implies that 
the influence of pressure groups on welfare state change is more subtle 
than that theory suggests.
Although the intention of restricting entitlement for all the benefits was 
achieved, they were not very well targeted on those with the lowest 
incomes, especially in the 1990s. This finding shows that the outcome did 
not meet all the stated objectives, with implications for the design of 
future policy. I also find that means tested benefits have embodied 
values, which are not necessarily made explicit as policy objectives. This, 
along with the failure to target effectively, demonstrates that the way a 
means testing policy is implemented does matter.
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1 Introduction
The principal objective of this thesis is to determine why, how and with 
what outcomes means tests for 'non-income-replacement' benefits have 
been adopted in England and Wales, and to determine what general 
lessons can be derived from past experience. The research makes use of 
economic concepts and theories developed to analyse the means-testing 
of income replacement benefits, and will apply these to the historical 
analysis of non-income-replacement benefits.
Means tests are compared through time, an historical approach to current 
concerns being justified by the longevity of the debate and the knowledge 
that policy-makers can be assisted by an understanding of the lessons of 
past experience. I find some results which clarify our thinking on this 
issue and are seen as relevant to w hat policy-makers are doing today. 
Historians are vital contributors to many social policy debates. The 
importance of historical understanding of the roots and development of 
social policy ideas and practice is recognised. As Deacon and Bradshaw 
pointed out: "The importance of the means test within British social policy 
cannot be understood without reference to the past'1 and their work has 
already set a precedent for locating the pressing social policy concerns of 
our times firmly in their historical context, as a means to better 
understanding of the issues at stake. I hope I have achieved a synthesis of 
the two perspectives of history and social policy, each informing and 
enriching the other.
1.1 Research context
Governments face the dilemma that there are deficiencies in service 
provision by the welfare state, but also limits on spending. The way out
1 Deacon, Alan and Jonathan Bradshaw, Reserved For The Poor: The Means Test in British 
Social Policy (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983) p.3.
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of this conundrum is greater selectivity: provide for those in greatest 
need and let the rest provide for themselves. As a government document 
put it: 'the Government's aim in the overall social security programme is 
increasingly expressed in terms of targeting resources effectively on the 
most needy in society'.2 The difficulty is identifying those most in need. 
Usually this is achieved by some form of means test. It is taken for 
granted that means tested benefits target the needy. But do they? That is 
the question which motivates this research.
There are other ways in which resources are channelled to the poor such 
as housing subsidies and special subsidies to schools in deprived areas. 
But these policies are not applied to individuals and do not give rise to the 
same problems and issues as personal means tests.
Means tests had a pivotal position, both practically and ideologically in 
the development of the welfare state in Britain in the twentieth century.
In the 1930s means testing of public assistance created an enduring 
resistance to both the theory and practice of rationing benefits according 
to income. As a consequence, when Beveridge produced his plans for the 
post-war welfare state, one of the central principles was universal flat rate 
contributions and flat rate benefits. However, it proved actuarially 
impossible to provide benefits generous enough to live off on this basis. 
There have been strong financial pressures to introduce greater selectivity 
in benefits and the response has been to restrict access according to 
income.
There have been ideological influences on policy towards means testing 
as well as financial ones. Advocates of strict means testing have been 
particularly influential within the Conservative party. This was translated 
into policy in the 1980s, when the government tightened up on eligibility
2 Department of Health and Social Security, Reform of Social Security: Programme for 
Action (London: HMSO, 1985) Cited in Corden, Anne, Changing Perspectives on Benefit 
Take-Up (London: HMSO, 1995) p .l.
criteria. The trend towards means-testing continued into the 1990s, but 
was not uncontroversial. This was demonstrated by the passion aroused 
in the debates surrounding the means-testing of disability benefits in 
1999.
Means tests have been the rule, not the exception, in the social services. 
The exceptions were free school education and free health services and 
"even these exceptions are explicable rather on historical than logical 
grounds'.3 Means-tested income replacement benefits became more, not 
less, important, a trend continued in the 1990s. In the mid-1990s about 15 
per cent families were on Income Support, a benefit for those considered 
to be in poverty. As has been pointed out: 'Over the past two decades or 
so the scale and the scope of means-testing within social security 
provision in the UK have been growing inexorably. This is a well-known 
policy trend; but it is none-the-less an important one'.4 To conduct a 
discussion about the direction of future policy without serious 
consideration of current and past experience in a society riddled with 
means tests makes a nonsense of considered social policy.
The history of the means-testing of income replacement benefits is well 
known, from the Victorian Poor Law then to National Assistance, to 
Supplementary Benefit, and to Income-Based Jobseeker's Allowance and 
Income Support in the 1990s. There exists a substantial historical and 
theoretical literature on means testing in relation to such 'subsistence' 
benefits for those out of work.
Means-tested benefits can attempt to serve as a general safety net, 
meeting all economic necessities, but on the other hand they can be
3 Macleod, Iain and Enoch Powell, The Social Services: Needs and Means (London: 
Conservative Political Centre, 1952) p.10.
4 Alcock, Pete and Sarah Pearson, "Raising the poverty plateau: The impact of means- 
tested rebates from local authority charges on low income households," Journal of Social 
Policy 28, no. 3 (1999): 497-516 p.497.
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restricted and directed towards one specific item of consumption. There 
exists a parallel, yet largely unknown, history of means-testing relating to 
such non-income-replacement benefits. These 'non-subsistence' benefits 
serve to decide whether a person should be exempted from, or have 
refunded, all or part of a particular charge or levy. I refer to these as 'non- 
income-replacement' benefits to distinguish them from the main means 
tested social assistance benefits.5
There is a whole raft of such benefits. Access to legal aid, 
pharmaceuticals, optical and dental treatment, university education, 
housing grants, relief from local taxes, subsidised public transport, social 
care and school meals have been subject to occasional or enduring means- 
testing in the twentieth century. These means tests have been operated 
according to widely differing principles and with different rules by a 
diversity of public and quasi-public authorities, and they have been 
applied to people with very different socio-economic characteristics. 
Indeed, variety is the keynote of this kind of means test.
The standard applied for poor relief, national assistance and its 
successors was to maintain the applicant at or just above subsistence 
level. But, it was argued, it is not reasonable that a person should have to 
reduce himself to subsistence level in order to educate his children, get 
treatment for sickness and so on. This led to the view that: 'In other social 
services, another standard is appropriate. ... From the first, therefore, 
entirely separate means tests have been operated for these other 
purposes'.6 One might argue that non-income replacement benefits 
would not matter if social assistance was more generous, and brought 
people above subsistence level. Although one can make arguments in
5 Income maintenance benefits, namely National Assistance, Supplementary Benefit, 
Income Support, Family Income Supplement and Family Credit.
6 Macleod, Iain and Enoch Powell, The Social Services: Needs and Means (London: 
Conservative Political Centre, 1952) p.15.
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favour of raising the level of the safety net benefits, that approach does 
not address the treatment of non-recipients of social assistance or the 
issues relating to means testing which exists much higher up the income 
distribution.
Diversity has been a long-standing feature. In the early twentieth century 
the Minority Report o f Royal Commission on the Poor Laws noted the sheer 
variety of means tests undertaken by various bodies for exemption from 
or reduced charges for services:
'These powers differ from service to service and from 
Authority to Authority, alike in the amount or proportion of 
expense that is chargeable, in the discretion allowed to the 
Authority to charge or not to charge as it sees fit, in the 
conditions attached to the charge or exemption from 
payment, in the degree of poverty entitling to exemption, in 
the degree of relationship entailing payment for dependents, 
and in the process of recovery and its effectiveness. This 
chaotic agglomeration of legal powers, conferred on different 
Authorities at different dates, for different purposes, but all 
alike entailing on the individual citizen definite financial 
responsibilities, proceed upon no common principle'.7
In 1954 a survey of means testing for local authority provided services 
noted diversity too:
'The local authorities covered in this survey have widely 
differing methods of assessment and there is little uniformity 
either between authorities or between different departments 
of the same authority/8
And also suggested a cause:
'The various services have grown independently and the 
assessment and collection procedures that have been evolved 
have often been determined by rule of thumb methods which
7 Wakefield, H. Russell et al., Royal Commission on the Poor Lazos: M inority Report (1905)
p.286.
8 Institute of Municipal Treasurers and Accountants, An Investigation into the Problem of 
Assessment Scales (London: Institute of Municipal Treasurers and Accountants, 1954)
p.12.
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appear inequitable when comparisons are made between 
services and authorities/9
The largest means-tested benefit, known as public assistance in the 1930s, 
and going through many subsequent modifications to become today's 
Income Support or Jobseekers' Allowance, has received by far the most 
attention in the literature. The other major means-tested benefits are 
Housing Benefit and Family Credit (and its relations), and they have also 
been thoroughly analysed by social policy experts. There is a much 
smaller pool of literature devoted to the specific means-tests which this 
thesis intends to cover. The Minority Report mentioned above noted how 
little was known about such means tests:
' ... this jungle of personal liabilities and w hat are in fiscal 
science technically called "special assessments" is practically 
unexplored. In no branch of our subject have we found it so 
difficult to ascertain the exact facts'.10
It still remains the case that this important area is relatively under­
researched. Debate about non-income-replacement benefits has been 
driven by ideological arguments about w hat these benefits should (or 
should not) be doing rather than by sociological interest in finding out 
what these benefits are doing and why.
In general, understanding of the major transfers has been aided by the 
development of economic concepts and theories which have not so far 
been extended to the more 'marginal' benefits. For example, incentives to 
labour market behaviour, savings, retirement behaviour and family 
formation are all affected by means tests, and this has long been 
recognised in relation to subsistence benefits. This has given rise to
9 Institute of Municipal Treasurers and Accountants, An Investigation into the Problem of 
Assessment Scales (London: Institute of Municipal Treasurers and Accountants, 1954) 
p.47.
10 Wakefield, H. Russell et al., Royal Commission on the Poor Laws: M inority Report (1905)
p.286.
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concern about how means tests may create a 'poverty trap'. It is clear that 
non-income-replacement benefits may also create disincentives and traps, 
either when working on their own, or when layered on top of benefits 
providing a subsistence income. The poverty trap and other disincentives 
are not new problems, but have taken on a new political and policy 
profile. In particular, the problem is: '...taking on new and more complex 
practical forms, because of the rapidly growing use in the 1990s of means- 
testing to determine access to an ever wider range of benefits and services 
by local, as well as central, government'.11 This research will attempt to 
identify the incentives created by various types of non-income- 
replacement benefits.
Means tests are used to distribute millions of pounds worth of cash and 
in kind 'non-income-replacement' benefits every year. Whilst the sums of 
money involved may be relatively small in the context of the 
government's budget, whether a person is found eligible for a specific 
type of help or not can have a far-reaching effect on the ability of that 
person to participate in society and consequent risk of social exclusion. 
For instance, the CP AG 'regards the provision of basic legal services as 
being almost as important to the poor as the guarantee of a minimum 
income'.12 As another example, in a recent survey13 about indicators of 
poverty, 90 per cent of people identified receiving 'all medicines 
prescribed by a doctor' as a necessity, which suggests that 
pharmaceutical benefits are perceived as important for preventing living 
standards dropping from dropping too low. The receipt of 'fringe' 
benefits can make a significant difference to effective disposable income
11 Alcock, Pete and Sarah Pearson, "Raising the poverty plateau: The impact of means- 
tested rebates from local authority charges on low  income households," Journal of Social 
Polio/ 28, no. 3 (1999): 497-516 p.498.
12 Field, Frank, "Establishing a free legal service for poor people," Poverty 24 (1972) p.9.
13 Gordon, D. and P. Townsend, Breadline Europe (Bristol: Policy Press, 2001) Table 4.5.
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at the margin for some individuals and deserves to be integrated into our 
knowledge of budget standards and distribution. Non-income 
maintenance benefits are an important element of the 'social wage', the 
concept that non-cash benefits are a significant part of a government's 
policy on income and living standards. Moreover, research shows that 
receipt of a small amount of benefit is a common experience in societies 
with a well-developed welfare system.14 Therefore these benefits need to 
be taken into account in studies of how welfare benefits have affected 
incomes. A comparison of how well different schemes compensate for 
income barriers to participation will be informative.
Nevertheless, the amounts of money involved in these schemes are small 
in relation to that spent on income support. This perhaps explains why 
correspondingly less effort has so far been dedicated to understanding 
what the social objectives of these schemes have been, how these were 
translated into principles on which to base a means test, how the outcome 
of the means-testing process is related to the objective desired at the 
outset and finally, how they interact with the major income-replacement 
benefits.
Policy on means-tested non-income-replacement benefits has been made 
by individual departments seeking solutions to particular problems, 
rather than made collectively at a high level. The introduction of non- 
income-replacement benefits has generally been a chaotic and 
contradictory process, with different departments pursuing different 
principles and practices. Incrementalism in policy has resulted in a messy 
system. Furthermore, the narrow day-to-day nature of the concerns of 
each separate means-testing organisation has had the consequence that 
there is no documented understanding of how schemes compare and
14 Shaver, S., "Universality or Selectivity in Income Support to Older People? A 
comparative assessment of the issues," Journal of Social Policy 27, no. 2 (1998): 231-254 
p.243.
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contrast between one another or over time and how they all "fit together'. 
It is therefore useful to bring together and compare different policies, as I 
do in this study.
1.2 Research aims and approach
Previous histories have concentrated mainly on the administrative 
history and changes in the law, government policy, and the amounts of 
money which were spent on welfare services. But they have not explored 
the impact of the administration and legal regulations on the clients they 
were attempting to help. The chief justification for means tests is that they 
target the resources on the most needy. But did they? I focused on the 
outcomes, as opposed to the inputs into welfare services. In other words, 
did changes in the administration and formal regulations make a 
difference to people 'on the ground'? Maybe the means tests had 
unintended effects. A deficiency of previous studies is that information 
on outcomes over a period of time was not available. Previously we had 
little information on who were the winners and losers. Survey evidence 
suggests that British people are concerned that the benefits system is 
poorly targeted. In 1994, 72 per cent agreed that 'many people falsely 
claim benefits', but on the hand, 80 per cent agreed that 'many people fail 
to claim benefits they are entitled to'.15 There is little point in having 
welfare measures in place if they have no substantive effect.
Selectivity by income testing can be achieved either at the point of 
consumption, or at the point of financing (where the role of taxation 
becomes critical). What seems to be selectivity on the consumption side 
can be undone by counteracting policy on the taxation side. However, 
this thesis will only consider the consumption side. A project for future
15 Williams, Teresa, Maxine Hill, and Rachael Davies, Attitudes to the Welfare State and the 
Response to Reform: A report of qualitative and quantitative research on attitudes to the welfare 
state and to proposals for reform (Leeds: Corporate Document Services, 1999) p.38.
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research could be to integrate information about the receipt of these non- 
income-replacement benefits with what is known about the distributional 
effect of the tax system.
A problem for this research is that sorting out the objectives and effects of 
means tests is a complex subject. "Need7 is central to means-testing 
systems. As with the concept of 'poverty7, so too 'need7 is an elusive 
concept. The aim of means-testing is to 'target7 benefits on the most 
'needy7 cases. Targeting of transfers can be discussed in relation to the 
distinction between vertical efficiency and horizontal efficiency 
developed by Weisbrod: 'Two issues are involved, having to do with the 
accuracy of the program in assisting only the "target" group, and the 
comprehensiveness of the program in assisting all of that group7.16 But in 
the real world when trying to identify deserving recipients for a benefit 
there are many issues to consider. Although it can be agreed that there 
should be no discrimination between 'equals' (horizontal equity), 
defining who is horizontal with whom is a problem, and how it has been 
resolved in practice may be revealing. Some examples of difficulties in 
identifying deserving cases are:
- Over what time period to measure income?
- Which family members' income to take into account?
- How to distinguish those with high needs from those with profligate 
expenditure?
Clearly 'need' is a slippery concept. Deciding who is needy and 
operationally targeting that group is difficult. Sorting out the objectives 
and effects of means tests is complex. Arguably, it is not for the analyst to 
say who are the needy. Yet central to the study of means tests is need and
16 Weisbrod, B.A., "Collective action and the distribution of income: a conceptual 
approach," in Haveman, R.H. and J. Margolis, eds., Public Expenditure and Policy Analysis 
(Chicago: Markham, 1970) p.125. Cited in Atkinson, A.B., Incomes and the Welfare State: 
Essays on Britain and Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) p.228.
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the effectiveness of responses to it, with the aim of producing theory on 
the concept of 'need' in relation to non-income-replacement benefits.
Therefore the approach taken is to explore just four benefits and adopt 
more manageable research questions: Who was thought to be needy? 
(Chapter 5) What means tests were used to try and reach the needy? 
(Chapter 6) What was the outcome? (Chapters 7-8) Emphasis on a few 
specific non-income-replacement benefits will let me address sub­
questions not explored in the existing literature such as: Has the British 
welfare state evolved in a coherent way? Was the pattern in eligibility for 
subsistence benefits mirrored by that for non-income-replacement 
benefits? (Chapter 9)
1.3 The means tested benefits studied
Every selective measure involves highly specific problems. To some 
extent therefore each measure requires separate discussion. The focus of 
this study will be on four benefits used in England and Wales from the 
1930s to the 1990s: free prescription medicines; free school meals; student 
grants; and civil legal aid. I intend to concentrate on these benefits while 
relating them to each other and complementing the extensive literature 
on subsistence benefits.
A simplistic distinction can be made between those benefits which are 
available to people whose resources are below a certain level (such as 
Income Support) and those which in contrast are conditioned on other 
characteristics, such as falling into a certain category (e.g. the 
unemployed) or having specific needs (e.g. the disabled). Rationing of 
some services, like day nurseries and home helps is mainly according to 
professional judgement of need. However, in practice, eligibility for the 
benefits to be considered in this study is subject both to status/need and 
the testing of means.
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Why were these four benefits in particular chosen? Limits of time and 
efficiency dictated that only a limited sample of means tests could be 
studied. There is no established methodology for choosing a sample of 
case-studies. Often, historians try to argue that their case study is 
'representative' of a town, an industry, or whatever. Actually, every case 
is unique, and it is very hard to prove 'representativeness'. This sample 
was selected to include benefits which have a long history, back to the 
early twentieth century. Their eligibility levels have all been the subject of 
public controversy at one time or another. Two of the benefits - 
pharmaceutical benefits and free school meals -  were aimed at lower 
income groups. As a contrast, the other two benefits - student grants and 
civil legal aid -  have at times been available to the middle classes. In 
addition, a range of government departments have been involved in the 
administration of these benefits, which means that such comparison of 
them has not been done previously.
Free prescription medicines were provided to defray the cost of prescription 
medicines. Benefits apply to medicines prescribed in the community, as 
distinct from hospital in-patient prescriptions or preparations obtained 
over-the-counter.
Free school meals were midday main meals for primary and secondary 
school-children. Free milk and provision for pre-school children are not 
considered here.
Student grants were maintenance grants given towards the living costs of 
undergraduate students on certain degree courses.
Civil legal aid existed to defray the cost of legal fees. This was a different 
scheme from criminal legal aid which is not examined in this study.
Under the 1974 Act advice and assistance were separate systems from 
'legal aid'. Under the 1988 Act, 'legal aid' became a generic term for the
12
provision of publicly funded legal services, and the different aspects were 
known as 'advice', 'assistance', and 'representation'.17 This thesis is 
concerned with representation only. The legal profession in England and 
Wales is split into two separate bodies -  solicitors and barristers. The 
client first consults a solicitor, who handles his case from start to finish 
and with whom his is in direct contact. In practically all the higher courts, 
however, barristers (counsel) have sole right of audience and the client's 
instructions are passed to the counsel chosen through the solicitor. 
Recipients of civil legal aid had to satisfy a merit test as well as a means 
test to determine whether they have a reasonable case, but only the 
means test element is considered in this study.
1.3.1 Value of the means tested benefits
The purpose of this section is to present data which establish the 
importance over time of the non-subsistence benefits that are the subject 
of this study. This statistical analysis shows that although school meals, 
pharmaceutical benefits, student grants and civil legal aid formed a very 
small proportion of government spending, they were valuable to those 
who received them.
The combination of the value of the benefit to the recipient and the size of 
the eligible population gives a means tested benefit its distinctive 
character of giving 'm uch to the few' or Tittle to the many'. The size of the 
population covered will be investigated in subsequent chapters.
However, this section examines the value of the income-tested benefits, 
not only in absolute terms, but also in relation to the family income.
The intellectual arguments for providing in-kind goods (such as means 
tested free school meals and free prescriptions) are based on theories of 
merit goods and positive externalities. These arguments are not captured
17 Matheson, Duncan, Legal Aid: The New Framework (London: Butterworths, 1988) p .7.
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in the practice of calculating cash equivalents in order to determine their 
contribution to the distribution of income and real welfare levels. It is not 
clear how to value non-transferable in-kind income according to the 
exchange value which money income is. Thus attributing cash values to 
in-kind benefits perhaps under-values their worth. Table 1-1 shows the 
value of the benefit to the applicant at the four dates which are used for 
comparison in this study. The amounts of student grant refer to the 
grants for an academic year following 1965,1975,1985 and 1995 
respectively, because the means test assessed income in the previous 
financial year, rather than current income. Thus, income in mid 1985, for 
example, would determine eligibility for a student grant starting in 
October 1986.
For the benefits which were provided in-kind (free school meals, free 
prescriptions, civil legal aid), 'value7 in this context refers to the cost of 
the item had the beneficiary to pay for it. By value I mean how much the 
rebate was worth. For example, people who pay for an NHS prescription 
medicine still get a subsidy, but a lower subsidy than people who get 
their medicines free.18 But here I am referring to the value of the 
exemption from the charges one would otherwise pay, rather than the 
cost of the drugs on the open market.
18 Some prescription medicines cost less than the NHS prescription charge to buy 
privately. However, on average, a free prescription received a subsidy considerably 
greater than the prescription charge, even after the prescription charge was greatly 
increased in the 1980s. Similarly, school meals received a subsidy greater than the cost of 
paid-for school meals.
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Table 1-1 Nominal value of means tested benefits
Free school 
meals
Prescription
medicines
Student 
grants (min)
Student grants 
(max)
Civil legal 
aid
Per week Per item on 
prescription
Per year Per year Per case (net 
cost)19
1965 5s. (25p) per 
week.
N /A . No
prescription
charge.
£50 From £50 to 
£340 (£370 in 
London and 
Oxford and 
Cambridge 
Universities).20
£42.44
1975 £0.75 per 
week.21
£0.20 per item 
on
prescription.
£50 From £50 to 
£875 (£955 in 
London).22
£82.40
1985 Approx £2.50 
per week, 
but
dependent 
on nature of 
meal
provided.23
£2.00 per item 
on
prescription.24
N /A . No
minimum
grant
From nil to 
£1,901 (£2,246 
in London).25
£409.34
1995 Approx £5.50 
per week, 
but
dependent 
on nature of 
meal
provided.26
£5.25 per item 
on
prescription.27
N /A . No
minimum
grant
From nil to 
£1,710 (£2,105 
in London).28
£1,723.00
19 Calculated from Legal Aid Board annual reports.
20 Academic year 1965/1966, in respect of residence in college, hall, hostel or lodgings 
(i.e. not in parental/husband's home) not including additions for mature students and 
dependants or additional payments for vacation study, travel and instruments.
21 From April 1975.
22 Academic year 1976/1977, not including additions for mature students and 
dependants.
23 Estimated from Bradshaw, Jonathan, "Tried and found wanting: the take-up of means- 
tested benefits," in Ward, Sue, ed., DHSS in Crisis: Social Security - under pressure and 
under review (London: CPAG, 1985).
24 From 1 April 1985.
25 Academic year 1986/1987, not including additions for mature students, dependants or 
additional requirements. For comparison, in 1983/8-4,3.2% of students got the addition 
for mature students, 1.7% got the addition for dependents, and 0.4% got the additional 
allowance. This amounted to 2% of the total expenditure on mandatory student grants. 
(Calculated from Hansard, v. 81,27 June 1985, Written Answers, col. 461).
26 Estimated from figure of £1.28 per school meal in 2000 from CPAG.
27 From 1 April 1995.
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A note of caution is necessary before interpreting these figures: one needs 
to bear in mind whether the nature of the benefit has remained the same 
over time when comparing the changing monetary value of the benefit 
an d / or eligibility figures. For example, from 1962, any student who was 
in principle eligible for a grant was entitled to have his or her tuition fees 
paid regardless of parental income or the student's own income. Another 
example: school meals, which, it was alleged, had deteriorated in 
nutritional value since minimum nutritional standards were scrapped in 
1980. In the case of prescription medicines, a 'limited list' was introduced, 
which restricted the medicines which doctors could prescribe on the 
NHS.
The value of civil legal aid was nil to some beneficiaries because the legal 
aid fund had a claim on any 'winnings' of a funded client, so legal aid 
represented a grant of money to a litigant who was unsuccessful, but a 
loan to one who won. In the 1970s about one-third of all contributions 
paid were ultimately returned to assisted litigants.29 For personal injury, 
this figure was as high as 77 per cent. In addition, some recipients of legal 
aid had to make a contribution towards the cost of their case from their 
own resources. In some cases contributions were returned because it 
turned out to cost less than the maximum contribution assessed. In both 
these circumstances legal aid enabled an applicant to pay by instalments 
over an extended period, but it was of no financial benefit to the client. In 
both of these two scenarios, civil legal aid acted as an insurer rather than 
a hand-out, taking away the risk of the case becoming very costly.
Another example again is the civil legal aid scheme, which was 
introduced gradually, with courts for which legal aid was available
28 Ordinary maintenance for academic year 1996/1997, not including additions for 
mature students, dependants or additional requirements.
29 Partington, Martin, The Legal A id Means-Tests: Time for a Reappraisal (London: Child 
Poverty Action Group, 1978) p.15.
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gradually being extended. For example, only from January 1956 was civil 
legal aid available in county courts. So the number of applications for 
civil legal aid was related to exogenous changes in the law and the courts 
in which legal aid was available, as well as changes in the financial 
conditions for eligibility.
Another aspect of the nature of a benefit is any restrictive condition, other 
than income, which was attached to its receipt. In fact, I have not found 
evidence of any behavioural conditions, such as work-seeking behaviour, 
which affected eligibility. The restrictions attached were in connection 
with the purposes for which the benefit could be used. For instance, 
pharmaceutical benefit was only available against NHS prescription 
medicines, not over-the-counter remedies or private prescriptions.
Table 1-2 Real value of means tested benefits (1995 prices)30
Free school 
meals
Prescription
m edicines
Student 
grants (min)
Student 
grants (max)
Civil legal 
aid
Per week Per item on 
prescription
Per year Per year Per case (net 
cost)31
1965 £2.52 N /A . No
prescription
charge
£503 £3420 £427
1975 £3.27 £0.87 £218 £3820 £359
1985 Approx £4.00 £3.15 N /A . No
minimum
grant
£3000 £645
1995 Approx £5.50 £5.25 N /A . No
minimum
grant
£1710 £1723
Sources: Gordon, Chris, The Welfare State: Sources of Data on Government Expenditure (London: 
Suntory-Toyota International Centre for Economics and Related Disciplines, London School of 
Economics, 1988) Table 2 Retail prices: general index of retail prices: All items; Employment Gazette, 
January 1989,6.4 Retail prices: General index of retail prices: All items; Labour Market Trends, June 
2000, H.14 Retail prices: General index of retail prices: All items.
Table 1-2 shows the real value of the means tested benefits at various 
points in time. Minimum and maximum values for student grants are 
given because from 1962 to 1982, however high was parental income or 
the student's own income, any student who was in principle eligible for a
30 Calculated using the Retail Price Index
31 From Annual Reports of the Legal Aid scheme published by LCD and LAB.
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grant was entitled to the 'm inim um  grant'. The minimum grant was also 
paid where the student an d /o r parent chose not to undergo assessment.
In interpreting the table, one should bear in mind that the value of free 
prescriptions depends on how many a person has. In 1985, if a person 
had the average number of prescription items per year (6.8 per capita), 
then free prescriptions would be worth £21.42 a year, or 41 p a week (1995 
prices). In 1995, the average number of prescriptions items per person per 
year had gone up, and if a person had the average number of prescription 
items per year (8.8 per capita), then free prescriptions would be worth 
£46.20 a year, or 89p a week.
Chart 1-1 Real value of exemption from payment for school meals, 
per week (1995 prices)
£6.00
£5.00
£4.00
£3.00
£2.00 ^
£1.00
£0.00
£5.50
£3.94
£3.27
£2.52
1965 1975 1985 1995
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Chart 1-2 Real value of exemption from payment for NHS prescriptions, per item 
(1995 prices)
£6.00
£5.25
£5.00
£4.00
£3.15
£3.00
£2.00
£0.87
£1.00
£0.00
1965 1975 1985 1995
Chart 1-3 Real value of max. and min. student grant, per annum (1995 prices)
£4,000 - £3'818
£3,000
£2,000 
£1,000 
£0 -\
£3,422
£503
1965
£218
£2,996
£1,710
1975 1985 1995
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Chart 1-4 Real value of civil legal aid, net expenditure per case (1995 prices)
£ 2 ,0 0 0  -I
£1,723
£1,500 -
£1,000
£645
£427 £360£500
1965 1975 1985 1995
What drove the changes in the real value of the benefits? In the case of 
school meals and pharmaceutical benefits, the increase in the value of the 
benefit over time does not indicate increased generosity. Instead, higher 
charges for prescriptions and school meals for those who paid for them 
meant the associated means tested benefits for these became more 
valuable: The actual in-kind benefit remained the same. The in-kind 
benefit also remained the same for legal aid. Only with student grants 
was there a change to the monetary value of the benefit (a cut).
Table 1-3 shows the value of the means tested benefits in relation to 
averaee earnines. Student erants were of significant value ta  w orkers  on
earnings were probably not eligible for school meals or prescriptions 
anyway: of greater relevance is the value of those whose income was low. 
The following four charts (Chart 1-5 to Chart 1-8) give a guide to how 
much the means tested benefits were worth to a family whose income 
was about subsistence benefit level.32 5 per cent or so of weekly benefit
may sound a small amount, but it makes a difference to someone on this 
low level of income.
Table 1-3 Value of means tested benefits as a proportion of average earnings
Free
school
meals
Pharmaceutical
benefits
Student grants 
(minimum)
Student
grants
(maximum)
Civil 
legal aid
Per week Per item on 
prescription
Per year Per year Per case
As a % of 
average 
weekly 
earnings33
As a % of average 
weekly earnings34
As a % of 
average annual 
earnings35
As a % of 
average 
annual 
earnings36
As a % of 
average 
annual 
earnings37
1965 1.3% N /A 5% 35% 5%
1975 1.4% 0.4% 2% 32% 3%
1985 1.5% 1.2% N /A 21% 5%
1995 1.6% 1.6% N /A 10% 10%
Sources: Calculation from Bradshaw, Jonathan and Tony Lynes, Benefit Uprating Policy and Living 
Standards (Social Policy Research Unit, 1995), Table 3.1; Employment Gazette, August 1977, Table 
126 Earnings and hours: Great Britain: manual and non-manual employees: Average weekly and 
hourly earnings and hours (New Earnings Survey estimates), All industries (excluding those 
whose pay was affected by absence) Males and females 18 years and over; Employment Gazette, 
January 1989,5.6 Earnings and hours: Average weekly and hourly earnings and hours: manual 
and non-manual employees, All industries and services (excluding those whose pay was affected 
by absence) Full-time males and females on adult rates; Labour Market Trends, June 2000, E.14 New 
Earnings Survey: Average earnings and hours of all full-time employees by industry group, All 
industries, All weekly earnings. Note: the value of civil legal aid appears low, but the net costs per 
legally aided case were indeed low up to the mid-1980s.
The value of the benefit as a proportion of subsistence benefit varies 
according to family composition. I investigated the value of the means 
tested benefits to families of different compositions: single householders 
and couples, and families with between one and four children of various 
ages. I have charted in Chart 1-5 the value of the benefit to the family 
type which would receive the highest amount of benefit relative to their 
usual income and the family type which would receive the lowest amount 
of benefit relative to their usual income. I have also indicated the mean
33 Rounded to nearest 0.1%.
34 Rounded to nearest 0.1%.
35 Rounded to nearest 1%.
36 Rounded to nearest 1%.
37 Rounded to nearest 1%.
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value (the average of the value of the benefit to those two family types). I 
have used this approach to indicate the spread of the value of the benefit, 
and to avoid the pitfalls trying to choose a 'typical' family composition.
Chart 1-5 Value of free school meals as a proportion of the main income replacement 
benefit, per week (during school term)
□ max: single parent, 4 children age 5-10 all getting free meals
■ mean
■ min: couple, 1 child age 5 at school getting free meals and 3 children under 5
1965 1975 1985 1995
Year
Chart 1-6 Value of prescription medicines as a proportion of the main income 
replacement benefit, per item on prescription
□ max: single parent, 1 child under 5 ■ mean □ min: couple, 4 children age 18
1965 1975 ' 1985 1995
Year
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Chart 1-7 Value of the minimum student grant as a proportion of the main income 
replacement benefit, per year
□ max: single parent, no other dependent children
■ mean
■ min: couple, 4 other dependent children age 18
1965 1975 1985 1995
Year
Chart 1-8 Value of the maximum student grant as a proportion of the main income 
replacement benefit, per year
□  max: single parent, no other dependent children
■ mean
■ min: couple, 4 other dependent children age 18
1965 1975 1985 1995
Year
people with fewer rather than more children (with the exception of 
school meals when all children were eligible for them).
One might argue that benefits are actually "worth more" to families with 
more children, because their outgoings are higher than families with 
fewer children. However, the analysis here rests on the assumption that 
the subsistence benefit is at a level fully adequate to cover the necessary 
expenses of each type of family, and a marginal pound of extra income 
over and above that has the same value to each type of family.
1.4 Research questions and method
This study describes various different means tests and analyses how they 
operated. It demonstrates the consequences that follow from choosing a 
particular form of test, and how well they meet the desired outcome. In 
this section I describe the method used to investigate each of the sub­
questions addressed in this thesis.
1.4.1 Theory and historiography (Chapters 2-4)
The next chapter briefly outlines the theory and historiography of the 
welfare state. In the next chapter, Chapter 3 ,1 explain why means testing 
acquired such a bad reputation in the 1930s. I also identify the possible 
alternatives to a policy of means testing, but find that there were political 
constraints on implementing these alternatives. Then, in the same 
chapter, I propose what I consider to be the remaining problems with a 
policy of means testing. The following chapter, Chapter 4, relates the 
broad political and administrative context in which welfare policy 
evolved between the 1930s and the 1990s to the specific benefits which 
are the focus of this study. It describes the timing and nature of the major 
changes to the specific non-income-replacement benefits which are the 
focus of this thesis and tries to identify general patterns in the 
development of means tested non-income-replacement benefits. This 
kind of account, which pulls together several non-income maintenance
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benefits, is not available in any single published source. Therefore, in 
Chapter 4 I fill in the gaps left by existing accounts of the development of 
the welfare state.
It is not my purpose to explain the growth of means testing: I take that as 
a 'given'. Nor do I try to explain why governments have rejected the 
alternatives to means testing. There are other works that answer that 
particular question.38 Discussion in this thesis is limited to specific 
benefits which it had already been decided would be means tested. In 
other words, I do not discuss in depth the merits of providing a particular 
service on a means tested basis rather than free of charge for all. Nor do I 
discuss the most desirable balance in the overall welfare system between 
means tested and non-means-tested benefits. I also assume a given level 
of resources has been allocated to provision of the service and therefore I 
do not consider in depth how the means test adopted may affect taxpayer 
support for provision of the service.
The main body of the study examines in detail the structure and 
operation of each means test at several points in time. The central 
question can be broken down into its distinct elements. Considering each 
means test the following points are addressed.
1.4.2 W hat were the objectives of means tested benefits? (Chapter 5)
This chapter answers the 'why?' of means testing -  what were the 
intentions behind it? The method at this stage is to use documents to 
identify why means tests existed, the underlying principles and the issues 
that means-testing was thought to raise. In other words, who did 
politicians, civil servants, interest groups, 'experts', professionals and 
potential claimants think was needy?
38 For example Deacon, Alan and Jonathan Bradshaw, Reserved For The Poor: The Means 
Test in British Social Policy (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983)
25
Policies in this area have been made incrementally in response to day-to- 
day pressures, rather than to a co-ordinated plan. Means testing schemes 
have been introduced, abandoned, amended or extended in a series of ad 
hoc bargains between individuals in government departments and by 
lengthy horse trading. Pressure groups such as the Child Poverty Action 
Group and interest groups such as the Law Society are also stakeholders 
who have tried to influence these means tested programmes. Therefore in 
some instances it is hard to determine what the social objective was 
because none was stated or there was there was disagreement among the 
interested parties. Indeed, disagreement or lack of clarity about social 
objectives might be central to the problem of designing appropriate 
means tests. The previously mentioned Minority Report found that there 
was:
"no common or consistent principle discoverable in the 
medley of clauses in the different statutes of the past three 
centuries, defining the pecuniary obligations of individual 
citizens for services rendered by the Local Authorities to 
themselves or to their relations7.
And so recommended that:
7The first need appears to be the adoption by the Legislature 
of some definite principle according to which these special 
assessments should be made, and its uniform application, by 
express enactment, to all these various kinds of services7.39
Were such principles ever adopted? And did the same principles apply 
across the range of benefits? At this stage I identify the economic 
concepts employed by the means tests, or determine whether the 
concepts of the existing theory are adequate for explicit formulation of 
the problem.
39 Wakefield, H. Russell et al., Royal Commission on the Poor Laws: M inority Report (1905) 
pp.308-309.
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1.4.3 W hat were the operational designs of the means tests? (Chapter 
6)
The aim of this chapter is to use documentary evidence to identify the 
administrative details and operation of the means test - and what were 
the practical rules. This answers the 'how?' aspect of means test design. I 
propose that the 'how?' of design is value-laden. I also look at the overall 
complexity of the means tests in terms of the number of pieces of 
information they require from the applicant, and assess in which year 
means testing was the most complex and demanding in terms of the 
amount of information the applicant needed to give.
1.4.4 W hat were the outcomes of means tested benefits? (Chapters 7-8)
I next examine at the micro-level the outcomes of these benefits. By 
'outcome' in this context I mean the numbers and kinds of people 
eligible. 'Micro-level' refers to looking at how different types of families 
fared, rather than average effects. The method used to find out how many 
and what sorts of people were eligible under the means tests was 
microsimulation with micro-data. This is a technique that uses survey 
data, and was not available to policy-makers at the time because the then- 
available computers were inadequate. In this case, the use of the 
microsimulation technique enabled outcomes to be investigated, and I 
believe that to ask 'w hat were the outcomes of the means tests?' is a 
legitimate question, and one that affects our understanding of the history 
of the welfare state. It focuses on the changes that were happening from 
the perspective of benefit recipients, rather than the legislative changes. 
Previous historical research tended to concentrate on administrative 
changes by the bodies charged with running the means test. There was 
only speculation as to how the population would be or had been affected
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by them 40 But I can relate administrative changes to any changes in 
outcome, a different way of assessing the history of means tested benefits.
1.4.4. How many people were eligible?
The first issue I address is the actual levels of eligibility for the means 
tested benefits. I looked at actual eligibility in 1975,1985 and 1995. This 
answers the direct factual question: "how many people were eligible?71 
chose to look at this question since the size of the population covered by 
an means-tested benefit is an important aspect because it defines what the 
benefit is as a social phenomenon: the combination of coverage and value 
of the benefit gives a benefit its distinctive character of giving "much to 
the few7 or "little to the many".
It used to be the case that there were few estimates of eligibility for the 
benefits which are the subject of this study. Even as late as 1982, a Child 
Poverty Action Group pamphlet about free school meals admitted that 
"the numbers of children eligible is simply not known".41 As another 
example, in 1971 a Parliamentary Answer regarding the numbers eligible 
for free prescriptions could not be provided because "it is very difficult to 
make an estimate of those eligible for exemption from charges and those 
in receipt of them, because many people who are eligible are never sick, 
and therefore there is no record of their ever claiming".42 Now, however,
40 The exceptions were publications produced by campaign groups, such as the Child 
Poverty Action Group and Legal Action Group, which contained evidence from their 
experience of how the regulations were working in practice. These were not historical, 
but social policy orientated papers. How policies worked in practice has been a 
relatively new concern even to social policy. The trend seems to have been encouraged 
by the emphasis the government now places on monitoring outputs and outcomes 
against 'value for money' criteria and in an effort to direct resources towards 'what 
works'. There is a journal Evaluation (Sage publications) dedicated to 'evidence-based 
policy making'. The very existence of this journal shows that policy evaluation is 
complex. But the evaluation of policy approach has had hardly any impact on welfare 
state history.
41 Bisset, Liz and Jean Coussins, Badge of Poverty: a new look at the stigma attached to free 
school meals (London: Child Poverty Action Group, 1982) pp.14 and 26.
42 Hansard, v.826 15 November 1971, col. 180.
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such estimates can be made using techniques that were not available to 
policy-makers at the time. In Chapter 8 I compare my eligibility estimates 
with the scarce other estimates of eligibility that are available.
To examine the numbers eligible for these benefits I used the technique of 
microsimulation modelling, an established method routinely used in 
government for analysing the distributional effect of tax and transfer 
policies.43 Microsimulation models use micro-data on persons (or 
households, or other units) and simulate the effect of policies on each of 
these units. Tax and benefit policies will often have unexpected, as well 
as the expected, consequences. Microsimulation is an excellent method 
for detecting otherwise unanticipated outcomes. Most commonly, 
microsimulation modelling uses micro-data from representative 
household surveys or administrative data. Often a policy change is 
modelled so that the impact on individuals and households before and 
after the change can be analysed.44 The results can be aggregated to show 
the overall effect of the change or can be analysed at the micro-level. For 
example, the number of gainers and losers from a particular policy can be 
calculated and who those gainers and losers are can also be identified. 
This is an advantage because some kinds of policy change could lead to 
an increase in average family income, but the increase in average income
43 For instance Lewis, Gordon H. and Richard C. Michel, eds., Microsimulation Techniques 
for Tax and Transfer Analysis (Washington D.C.: Urban Institute Press, 1990) looks at 
TRIM2, DYNASIM2, MAPSIT, PRISM, and MDM, some of the microsimulation models 
in use by both U.S. and Canadian government policy offices. Giannarelli, Linda, An  
Analyst's Guide to TRIM2: The Transfer Income Model, Version 2 (Washington, D.C: Urban 
Institute Press, 1992) is a descriptive guide to the TRIM2 model, a comprehensive 
microsimulation model widely used by US government and academic analysts for 
simulating the effects of different policy, economic, and demographic scenarios.
44 This is a type of simulation called a static simulation model. There are other types of 
microsimulation models: dynamic population models and dynamic cohort models. For a 
full account of the different types of microsimulation models see Falkingham, Jane, Ann 
Harding, and Carli Lessof, "Simulating Lifetime Income Distribution and 
Redistribution," in Falkingham, Jane and John Hills, eds., The Dynamic of Welfare: The 
Welfare State and the Life Cycle (Prentice Hall/Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1995) or Harding, 
Ann, Lifetime Income Distribution and Redistribution: Applications of a Microsimulation Model 
(Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1993).
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may conceal that there exist some families which actually lose income. 
The use of microdata brings to light that kind of outcome, and therefore 
enables the consequences of policies to be estimated much better than 
used to be possible. I used the technique to estimate eligibility for actual 
means tests for historical dates (as opposed to modelling a proposed 
future policy change), which is an uncommon way to use this type of 
modelling. Microsimulation models have been used in this way for 
comparative social policy across countries, but much less so for historical 
analysis within one country.45
It is not the modelling of tax and transfer policy changes which 
distinguishes microsimulation models as a technique. Rather, 'it is the 
dependence on individual information from the micro-data at every stage 
of the analysis that distinguishes microsimulation models from other 
sorts of economic statistical or descriptive m odels '46 Surveys of the 
various designs and uses of microsimulation models are available 
elsewhere 47 However I would highlight here that simulation using 
micro-data has been established as a methodology for investigating the 
outcomes of actual and hypothetical means tests48 including non-income
45 For an example of use of microsimulation models for comparative social policy across 
countries see descriptions of EUROMOD in Sutherland, Holly, Policy Simulation at the 
European Level: A  Guide to EUROMOD  (Cambridge: Microsimulation Unit, Department 
of Applied Economics, April 1997) and Bourguignon, F. et al., Technical Description of 
Eur3: A  Prototype European Tax-Benefit Model (Cambridge: Microsimulation Unit, 
Department of Applied Economics, May 1998).
46 Mitton, Lavinia, Holly Sutherland, and Melvyn Weeks, "Introduction," in Mitton, 
Lavinia, Holly Sutherland, and Melvyn Weeks, eds., Microsimulation Modelling: 
Challenges and Innovations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) p.l.
47 See for example Harding, Ann, "Introduction and Overview," in Harding, Ann, ed., 
Microsimulation and Public Policy (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1996) Also Harding, Ann,
Lifetime Income Distribution and Redistribution: Applications of a Microsimulation Model 
(Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1993).
48 For example in Percival, Richard and Simon Fischer, Simplicity Versus Targeting: A  
Legal A id Example (Canberra: National Centre for Social and Economic Modelling, 1997) 
and Citro, C.F. and E.A. Hanushek, eds., Improving Information for Social Policy Decisions: 
The Uses of Microsimulation Modeling, vol. II (Washington D.C.: National Academy Press, 
1991). For examples of other, established, microsimulation models see Giles, Christopher
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maintenance benefits,49 and it has been applied to the historical analysis 
of social security systems.50
The advantages of this type of analysis are that:
- The outcome of a means test can be studied (rather than simply 
administrative changes to the means test).
- Overall numbers of people eligible in the population can be calculated.
- Results can be analysed at the micro-level to see what kind of people 
were eligible.
The output of microsimulation being outcomes makes it an ideal method 
for answering my question about eligibility levels. My results on the 
proportion (i.e. numbers) of people eligible in the population are 
presented in Chapter 7. My results on kinds of people eligible are given 
in Chapter 8.
What did my model for the historical analysis of means testing consist of? 
Eligibility for means-tested benefits was not recorded in the original 
survey data which provides the micro-data set. The idea was to construct 
information that was missing from the original data source. In other 
words, eligibility was calculated for every family in the data set on the 
basis of the variables on income and household characteristics in the data 
set and using the means test rules. Any variables which were needed to
and Julian McCrae, TAXBEN: the IFS microsimulation tax and benefit model (Institute for 
Fiscal Studies, 1995) on TAXBEN, Redmond, Gerry, Holly Sutherland, and Moira 
Wilson, POLIMOD: an outline, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Microsimulation Unit, Department 
of Applied Economics, July 1996) and Redmond, Gerry, Holly Sutherland, and Moira 
Wilson, The Arithmetic of Tax and Social Security Reform: A  User's Guide to Microsimulation 
Methods and Analysis (Cambridge: CUP, 1998) on POLIMOD and Sutherland, Holly, 
Policy Simulation at the European Level: A  Guide to EUROMOD  (Cambridge: 
Microsimulation Unit, Department of Applied Economics, April 1997) on EUROMOD.
49 Schofield, Deborah, "The Distribution of Pharmaceutical Benefits in Australia" (paper 
presented at the 25th Conference of the International Association for Research in Income 
and Wealth, University of Cambridge, UK, 1998)..
50 Johnson, Paul, "The measurement of social security convergence: the case of European 
public pension systems since 1950," Journal of Social Policy 28 (1999): 595-618.
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calculate eligibility and were not in the data set had to be imputed. For 
example, income from investments was not recorded in the data set but it 
was required in some of the means tests I studied. So I estimated 
investment income from the family's capital assets, which were recorded. 
Next, eligibility was calculated for every family in the data set. Using a 
very large data set enabled me to estimate the relative impact of the 
means tests on households with different structures and levels of income. 
Then the results were weighted to make them representative of the whole 
population of England and Wales.
In Chapter 7 ,1 present the actual numbers eligible under the means test at 
several points in time, namely 1975,1985 and 1995/6. A comparative 
static approach was necessary if the impact of the means test on different 
households was to be evaluated with quantitative data. The date chosen 
to model the means tests was 1st October in 1975,1985 and 1995. This was 
the mid-point of the financial year, so can be seen as representative of the 
financial year. It was also a relevant date to use for free school meals and 
student grants, for which eligibility is usually determined at the start of 
the academic year.
Microsimulation models depend on having good survey or 
administrative data. A lack of suitable data is one reason why 
microsimulation modelling is an unusual method to use in a historical 
context. However, in this instance the detailed household income data 
was provided by the Family Expenditure Survey (FES), which goes back 
to 1961.51 The FES is an annual survey of private households in the UK, in 
which participants are asked detailed questions about their incomes and
51 The quality of the information contained in the FES is discussed elsewhere. See, for 
example Atkinson, A.B. and J. Micklewright, "On the reliability of the Income Data in 
the Family Expenditure Survey 1970-1977," Journal of the Royal Statistical Society 146 
(1983); Banks, James and Paul Johnson, How Reliable is the Family Expenditure Survey ? 
(Institute for Fiscal Studies, 1998). The FES is widely used for social policy analysis in 
and outside government as it contains detailed information on income, expenditure and 
demographic characteristics of a broadly representative sample of UK households.
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expenditures. The Office for National Statistics (formerly the Central 
Statistical Office) collects and processes the data annually, primarily for 
the construction of weights for the RPI. Households are asked to 
complete a diary of their spending over a two-week period. Participants 
are also asked a series of detailed questions about their incomes, and this 
is the information which forms the basis of our research. Participation in 
the survey is voluntary and the data is only available to academic 
researchers after it has been made anonymous, so there is no chance of 
researchers being able to identify survey participants. My sample size for 
1975 was 8162 benefit units, 8062 for 1985 and 7258 for 1995/ 6.52 The 
sampling frame for the FES does not include people living outside private 
households (e.g. in institutions, in hospital). As the survey is voluntary 
there is a problem of non-response, and there is reason to believe that 
those who refuse to participate may be different in important respects 
from those who do participate. This "non-response bias' is dealt with by 
the use of 'grossing factors', which are discussed later in this chapter.
I applied the 1975 means tests to 1975 survey data, the 1985 means tests to 
1985 survey data, and the 1995 means tests to 1995/ 6 data. A general 
principle followed in the modelling procedure was to build up the model 
on a step-by-step basis, cumulatively adding refinements after the basic 
structure had been tried out. Variables had to be picked from the FES 
data for modelling the means tests, and this involved making a number 
of fine judgments. For instance, there was a choice of income variables: 
'current earnings' or 'normal earnings' or 'earnings last time paid'. Where 
there was such a choice, I decided to choose a variable based on what an 
applicant for benefit would be most likely to state as his or her earnings. I 
therefore chose 'current earnings'. Once entitlement of each family in the
52 England and Wales only.
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FES sample had been calculated, the results were weighted to give 
eligibility figures for the whole population.53
1.4.4. What were the income thresholds for eligibility?
One way to look at generosity of the means tests is the income thresholds 
for entitlement. Did the income limits tighten or loosen? This is difficult 
to work out. The means tests are extremely complicated and apply 
differently to families with earnings and different numbers of children. 
One solution is to find the numbers of people eligible as a way of 
comparing the generosity of the means tests.
I therefore had to look at the generosity of the means tests by applying 
the rules to micro-data because the structure of the means test changed so 
substantially from year to year that it is impossible to tell which was 
more generous by looking at the rules. The fact that some types of 
families benefited from changes in the rules, while other types of families
53 The purpose of the weighting is to scale each 'benefit unit' in the FES data so that the 
survey is representative of the population as a whole. The FES is roughly a 1 in 3000 
sample of UK private households from 1967 onwards. If there were no problems of 
differential non-response, the results could simply be multiplied by 3000 to obtain 
estimates for the population as a whole. However, it is known that certain types of 
household are under-represented in the sample and others are over-represented. To 
compensate, different weights are applied to the results for different types of family. 
These weights are called 'grossing factors'. A separate grossing factor is given to each 
benefit unit in the household. The grossing factors were derived based on seventeen 
different family unit types. The UK private household population each year can be 
divided up into these seventeen different benefit unit types using census data, OPCS 
population estimates, and Child Benefit administrative data. The populations totals thus 
estimated are then compared to the number of each of these benefit unit types occurring 
in the FES. A different set of grossing factors has to be used for each year because the 
pattern of under-and over-reporting varies from year to year. The weights for the 
1995/96 FES data were kindly provided by Holly Sutherland. The weights for the 1965, 
1975 and 1985 data were derived from the weights used in the IFS's Households Below 
Average Income Dataset, 1961-1991 Data Archive study number 3300.1 could not use 
the IFS's weights directly because IFS had deleted some households (with absent 
spouses or recently self-employed). Further, the IFS data set makes an adjustment called 
the 'SPI adjustment' to account for the under-response of very high income households 
in the FES. It also ensures that the mean income in the dataset is correct and not affected 
by outliers However, I did not make this SPI adjustment, as I was primarily concerned 
with lower income households and the adjustment does make much difference to the 
median household income (it affects the mean income).
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lost out, also makes it difficult to tell what was actually happening on the 
ground without doing the simulations against micro-data.
What I did was to look at the outcome of the mid-1960s, 1975 or 1995 
means test had it been in force in 1985, as a way of isolating changes in 
the means test rules from changes in the underlying population 
characteristics. This was one way of answering the questions: 'how  has 
the definition of "need" for a means tested benefit has changed over 
time?' and 'w hen was the means test was most generous in terms of 
income threshold for eligibility?' This choice of dates enabled me to 
examine long-run changes under the 'classic welfare state'. The different 
years I chose for analysis are like 'natural experiments' which shed light 
on how changes in administration relate to the outcomes of means tested 
benefits. The year of means test used from the 1960s is 1965 for free 
prescriptions, although prescriptions were free to everyone between 1965 
and 1968.1 used the 1964 means test for student grants because I could 
not find documentary evidence of the means test in force in 1965. The 
exact date chosen to model the means tests was, as before, 1st October in 
each year: mid-1960s, 1975,1985 and 1995. As before, this was because it 
was the mid-point of the financial year, so can be seen as representative 
of the financial year. It was also a relevant date to use for free school 
meals and student grants, for which eligibility is usually determined at 
the start of the academic year.
I chose the 1985 FES data as the base year for comparison. My approach 
to answering the question: 'w hat would have been the outcome of the 
mid-1960s, 1975 or 1995 means test had it been in force in 1985?' was to 
use modelling to apply the mid-1960s, 1975,1985 and 1995 rules to the 
same data year: 1985. If overall numbers eligible show an increase against 
1985 data, it's not that the numbers o f poor people increased, but that the 
threshold for eligibility, but the net income level for entitlement, 
increased.
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The financial criteria for the mid-1960s, 1975 and 1995 means tests had to 
be translated into their '1985 equivalent'. This meant making a judgment 
about what the 1985 values of the financial values of the means test 
would have been in the absence of external, conscious changes to policy. I 
had to make a choice between different indexing techniques to find out 
what the 1960s, 1975 and 1995 means tests would have looked like in 
1985. This was achieved by uprating the monetary values in the means 
tests by relevant indices. Three different approaches were tried:
- Retail Prices Index (RPI). RPI would make the means-test thresholds 
constant in relation to prices.
- Average Earnings Index (AEI). AEI would make the means-test 
thresholds constant in relation to average earnings. This was tried 
because prices and earnings have increased at different rates. Prime 
Minister Thatcher controversially removed the link between benefits 
and earnings, and it is alleged that this made benefits less generous.
- Indexing by the same increases as were made in supplementary 
benefit/income support (SB/IS).
The choice of index can have an effect on the results, as can the choice of 
base year for indexing. I found that the index used for SB/IS was roughly 
half way between the other two. The Average Earnings Index (AEI) and 
Retail Prices Index (RPI) produced upper and lower boundaries of the 
financial conditions for the means test. Using both these indexes gave me 
two equivalents of the means test in 1985 and a range of eligibility. I used 
the average (mean) of these two eligibility calculations. The sensitivity of 
the results to the index used varies, but in no case does it reverse the 
direction of the result or the conclusion drawn. Chart 1-9 shows the 
indices I used. The base year I chose was 1985.
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Chart 1-9 Indices for adjusting means tests (1985=100)
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The outcome of a means-testing system will depend on the means test 
used and the income characteristics of the population subjected to the 
means test. As previously indicated, section 7.2 considers the impact of 
the means test used, in isolation from changes in the population to which 
the means test was applied. All the results in section 7.2 are based on 
survey data from 1985. That is, the base population has been held 
constant. Thus, the results (other than for 1985) show the impact of 
changes in the means test only. The procedure I carried out is like 
assum ing that there is an absolute eligibility threshold, regardless of the
in the means test rules from decade to decade were calculated, and who 
those potential gainers and losers were also identified.
1.4.4. What drove changes in numbers of people eligible?
The historical thrust of this work is to identify is what forces have driven 
change. Microsimulation modelling also captures the interaction between 
policies and social and economic life. Demographic and social 
characteristics have changed significantly since the mid 1960s, and such a 
technique allowed me to determine the extent to which changes over time 
in the incidence of these non-income-replacement means tests was due to 
changes in administrative rules, and how much due to changes in 
exogenous socio-economic conditions.
I had already applied the means test rules from different years to same 
base population in section 7.2. As previously explained, this procedure 
isolated changes in rules on entitlement from any changes in underlying 
socio-economic conditions. The population was kept constant (1985) and 
this process just isolated the absolute standard of the means test. 
Combining this result with my calculations of the actual numbers of 
people eligible enabled me to break down the changing eligibility from 
decade to decade into that which was accounted for by changes in the 
means test regulations, and that which was due to socio-economic 
change.
1.4.4. In which year was the means test most generous?
Critics often argue that means testing is a device which enables 
governments to argue cynically that their welfare policies are generous, 
whilst simultaneously ensuring that in practice expenditure on them does 
not rise too high. It is interesting to know in which year the means tests 
were most generous because writing on the welfare state in general 
usually suggests that 1975 was the high point of generosity, while the
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1980s witnessed cut-backs. Does this thesis apply to non-income 
replacement benefits?
One way to examine generosity is to look at the value of the benefit. These 
results are discussed in greater detail in section 1.3. However, it is the 
combination of the value of the benefit to the recipient and the income 
level for eligibility which gives a means tested benefit its distinctive 
character of giving "much to the few' or Tittle to the many'. I therefore 
constructed a 'generosity index' based on the value of the benefit and the 
income threshold for eligibility. As always, the base year chosen affects 
size of year-to-year change, although not the sign of the result.
1.4.4. What was the nature of interaction among means tested benefits?
I then go on to discuss how these means tests relate to each other. The 
great strength of microsimulation based on micro-data is that the full 
range of variation in family circumstances is captured. This makes it is a 
powerful tool to examine the interaction between policies of different 
types. Thus, a benefit of microsimulation modelling is that it enabled me 
to determine how (and for whom) these means tests interacted with 
means-tested income maintenance, so assessing the means tests in 
relation to the wider social security structure.
1.4.4. What was the distribution of eligibility by income?
The rationale for this question is that it is legitimate to ask of the means 
tests: did they achieve the objective of helping the poor? To achieve this is 
one of the justifications for means testing. One of the reasons for the 
enduring support of the British people towards the welfare state was its 
ability to cater to the middle class as successfully as the poorest, in 
particular in relation to education and health provision.54 Beveridge's
54 Abel-Smith noted early on in the development of the welfare state the extent to which 
the major beneficiaries were the middle classes. See Abel-Smith, Brian, "Whose Welfare 
State," in MacKenzie, Norman, ed., Conviction (MacGibbon & Kee, 1958). More recently
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approach to social policy rested on an appeal to the self-reliant classes, 
who were previously excluded from statutory measures. The "middle 
class capture theory' suggests that the social policy areas least likely to 
experience cuts are those where the middle class are users or suppliers.55 
It can be inferred from this theory that means-tested benefits which were 
primarily for the poor were most likely to be subject to cuts. Does this 
theory apply to non-income-replacement benefits?
I look at the distributional breakdown of eligible and non-eligible 
households in Chapter 8. The results of the microsimulation model were 
broken down and examined by family income. This helps to answer the 
question: 'w ho benefited from means tested benefits'? Within 'who 
benefited?' I was interested in whether they reached those on the lowest 
incomes, and whether they reached the middle class.
The results were based on income after housing costs (AHC). The 
measure of income AHC I used is simply income after deduction of rent, 
mortgage payments (interest and capital), ground rent, service charges, 
structural insurance, water and sewerage charges and rates or council tax. 
A justification for calculating income in this way is that income after 
housing costs have been met is thought to be a relatively good guide to 
living standards. In addition, all the means tests I was concerned with 
took account of the actual cost of outgoings on housing and rates/council
Le Grand has also demonstrated how the middle class benefits from the welfare state. 
See Le Grand, ]., The strategy of equality: redistribution and the social services (London: 
George Allen & Unwin, 1982).
55 The originators of this theory were Le Grand and his collaborators. See Le Grand, 
Julian and D. Winter, "The Middle Classes and the Welfare State under Conservative 
and Labour Governments," Journal of Public Policy 6 (1987): 399-430 and Goodin, Robert 
E. and Julian Le Grand, eds., Not Only the Poor: The Middle Classes and the Welfare State 
(London: Allen & Unwin, 1987).
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tax. Discussions of the relative merits of measuring income before 
housing costs and after housing costs are available elsewhere.56
In order to measure living standards it is not just total income matters but 
income relative to the numbers of people that income has to support. One 
approach would be to look at income per head. The problem with that is 
it assumes that the cost of maintaining an infant in the household is the 
same as that for an adult. The way this is usually taken into account is by 
use of an 'equivalence scale'. I used the McClements scale, which 
expresses the needs of different sorts of family relative to those of a 
childless couple.57 For example, in the McClements scale a single person 
needs 55 per cent of the AHC income of a couple of achieve the same 
living standard as a couple. It can cause problems in analysis if the 
distributional results are sensitive to choice of equivalence scale.58 I 
therefore experimented with an alternative, the square root of the family 
size, to test the sensitivity of my results to choice of equivalence scale
1.4.4. What were the characteristics of people eligible?
It is an advantage of microsimulation analysis that the results can be 
examined at the micro-level to determine what kind of people were
56 See for example Pryke, Richard, Taking the Measure of Poverty (IEA, 1995) p.17; 
Goodman, Alissa, Paul Johnson, and Steven Webb, Inequality in the UK (Oxford: OUP, 
1997) pp.27-28; Goodman, Alissa and Steven Webb, For Richer, For Poorer: The Changing 
Distribution of Income in the United Kingdom, 1961-1991 (London: IFS, 1994) p.5.
57 This scale was derived by McClements (see McClements, L., "Equivalence Scales for 
Children," Journal of Public Economcis 8 (1977): 191-210). It is based on an analysis of the 
spending patterns of households of different compositions. The McClements scale has 
had its critics. One point that could be made it that expectations have changed since the 
scale was devised in the 1970s, which has increased the cost of maintaining a child, so it 
may not reflect perceptions of relative need in the 1990s. However, it is not the purpose 
of this thesis to investigate the merits of different equivalence scales, and the 
McClements scale is widely used by social policy analysts.
58 A wide range of scale is in existence and the relative weights accorded to adults and 
children varies greatly. However, research has shown that that aggregate estimates are 
relatively insensitive to choice of scale, although results for the composition of particular 
groups can be strongly influenced by the scale used. See Goodman, Alissa and Steven 
Webb, For Richer, For Poorer: The Changing Distribution of Income in the United Kingdom, 
1.961-1991 (London: IFS, 1994) p.5.
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potential gainers and losers from means testing policies. For example, the 
numbers eligible under a particular policy can be calculated, and, who 
those people are can also be identified. Results can be categorised 
according to a variety of criteria such as gender, age, household 
composition, income and employment. I therefore looked at the 
breakdown of eligible and non-eligible households by factors other than 
income. This showed if there were any proxies for eligibility e.g. housing 
tenure. Further, I tried to identify the reasons for any change which 
occurred in the types of people eligible.
1.4.4. How did take-up compare to eligibility?
Take-up cannot be explored by microsimulation, because the Family 
Expenditure Survey does not contain full information on actual take-up. 
However, inability to model take-up, whilst unsatisfactory, does not 
invalidate the research method, since the value of a service lies in its 
availability as well as the actual use made of it. Overall eligibility was 
compared with published figures of take-up, where these existed. I 
looked at what data was available on applicants for the means tested 
benefits (only possible for free school meals and prescription medicines), 
and compared it with the data on those theoretically eligible. This 
answered the question: "who was most likely to take up their eligibility?'
1.4.5 Conclusion (Chapter 9)
In this chapter I explore why the definition of need used in the means test 
changed. Did the changes to the means tests reflect population ageing, 
changes in the labour market and family patterns, and spending 
constraints? Or were they the results of ideas and interests of actors in the 
policy-making process? In explaining generosity over time there are 
political factors (ideology, budget priorities), and factors to do with how 
political decisions translated into practice on the ground such as the 
design, how the means test was operationalised -  turned from a general 
concept (e.g. helping the needy) into concrete practice. The reasons why
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the means test changed can be divided into political factors and 
administrative factors. Political factors are high-level decisions, whereas 
administrative factors applies to changes to the rules made by civil 
servants, without strategic political input. To address these issues I bring 
together my quantitative findings and documentary sources. I found that 
pressure on overall departmental budgets was most often the reason for 
changes to the means test, a phenomenon which produced incoherence 
from year-to-year at the level of an individual means-tested benefit.
I also determine how successfully the rules produced outcomes which 
were in line with the objective intended at the outset. I compare outcomes 
to objectives, in terms of both the intended overall numbers eligible and 
the kinds of people eligible. That is to say, I related why politicians (and 
others) thought there should be a means test, to actual outcomes 
achieved. In other words, was the policy effective at identifying the 
needy? We need to ask the question whether the measures used met 
needs. Criteria for evaluating outcomes in terms of overall numbers 
eligible, the income distribution of those eligible and other characteristics 
of eligible people were used to evaluate means testing experience.
In this chapter I use the results of my microsimulation modelling to 
address the question: Was there any coherence which fits with the 
concept of a welfare regime? I also examine whether the pattern of the 
development of my four means tested benefits has mirrored that of 
income-replacement benefits, both means tested and non-means tested.
Finally I show how examination of these particular means tests helps us 
to understand better the issues which confront all means-tested systems. I 
develop an understanding of how to correlate conditions of receipt with 
social objectives. This leads to the assessment and conclusion: what 
general lessons can be derived from past experience?
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1.5 Conclusion
In conclusion, non-income-replacement benefits have been relatively 
neglected in the analysis of social security policy. In the past it was 
virtually impossible to establish patterns of eligibility because computer 
resources were nothing like as powerful as now. Therefore policy makers 
had little indication of the effectiveness of their policies in reaching the 
needy (as defined by their own objectives). However, microsimulation is 
now able to solve that problem. Further, means-testing suffers from the 
problem that 'need' is a slippery concept, but by using micro-analysis to 
find out who was targeted we may be able to clarify how to correlate 
conditions of receipt with social objectives of meeting needs. The 
conclusions about objectives and outcomes of means tested benefits will 
extend to subsistence benefits too. Microsimulation is an ideal tool for 
exposing the issues which face those who seek to identify the needy.
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2 The theory and historiography of the welfare state
This study is concerned with an aspect of the welfare state, but what do 
we mean by "the welfare state7? Neither the scope nor the purpose of the 
'welfare state7 was defined at the time of its conception: the term 'welfare 
state7 was not adopted until 1951.59 Beveridge himself did not use the 
phrase 'welfare state7.60 Instead, it derived from social policy specialists 
such as T.H. Marshall and R. Titmuss.61 The term implies that the state 
has assumed responsibility for the welfare of individual members of 
society, in particular tackling the major problems of society. Welfare state 
broadly involves the use of state power and responsibility towards the 
ends of protecting citizens against economic adversity and ensuring a 
certain standard of living to all.
The term is used to describe an assemblage of social services established 
in the immediate post-war period. By convention these services are social 
security, health, education and housing, in particular the centrally- 
organised aspects of these services. This working definition is reflected in 
most of the literature which sets out to present an over-arching view of 
the welfare state: social security, health, education and housing are the 
main topics covered. However a broad definition could also include full- 
employment policies, tax incentives for pension funds, mandatory work 
safety standards, anti-pollution legislation, minimum-wage legislation 
and so on.
Although the British welfare state is commonly characterised as 
comprehensive in approach, post-war government intervention was
59 Whiteside, N., "Creating the welfare state in Britain, 1945-1960," Journal of Social Policy 
25, no. 1 (1996): 83-103 p.83.
60 Inter-Departmental Committee on Social Insurance and Allied Services, Social 
Insurance and Allied Services: Report by Sir William Beveridge (London: HMSO, 1942).
61 Lowe, Rodney, "The Second World War, consensus and the foundation of the welfare 
state," Twentieth Century British History 1, no. 2 (1990): 152-182 p.154.
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derived from the pre-existing wartime policy regimes.62 In their turn 
these wartime measures had grown out the situation which existed in 
1939.63 This meant that in practice the "welfare state" was based on a 
haphazard collection of statutes and delivered at central and local levels.
The purpose of the welfare state was not clearly defined. Was its aim the 
"abolition of want", or a more egalitarian society? Within the Beveridge 
Committee itself and in the run-up to the implementation of the welfare 
state there was little discussion of the broader principles and overall aims 
of welfare policies.64 Since the purpose of the welfare state is not clearly 
defined, there are no universally accepted criteria of efficiency and 
equality on which the welfare state can be judged. Similarly, the purpose 
of individual non-subsistence benefits has also not been clearly defined, 
nor the role that they should play as a constituent of a welfare state.
Arguably the individual benefits to be studied here are part of the 
welfare state, although their role has often been neglected. Free 
prescriptions and prescription charges are part of the NHS, but much 
analysis focuses on the NHS as a free-at-point-of-use service. Student 
grants are seen as a "fringe" welfare policy, but an important aspect of 
education and opportunity policy. Similarly, civil legal aid is "marginal" 
from the point of view of welfare policy analysts. Goriely stated that: "The 
fact is that the Attlee government perceived legal advice as a marginal 
extra, rather than as an essential part of the welfare state they were
62 Land, Andrew, Rodney Lowe, and Noel Whiteside, Development of the Welfare State 
1939-1951: A  Guide to Documents in the Public Record Office (London: HMSO, 1992) p.5; 
Harris, Neville, "Social Security Prior to Beveridge," in Harris, Neville, ed., Social 
Security Law in Context (OUP, 2000) pp.85-86.
63 McKay, Stephen and Karen Rowlingson, Social Security in Britain (Macmillan, 1999) 
p.57.
64 Land, Andrew, Rodney Lowe, and Noel Whiteside, Development of the Welfare State 
1939-1951: A  Guide to Documents in the Public Record Office (London: HMSO, 1992) p.3.
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engaged in creating/65 Nevertheless, provision of legal aid is important 
because it influences access to justice and makes the idea of legal rights 
meaningful. On the other hand, school meals are more often seen as part 
of the social security system because of their long-standing link to 
National Assistance and family allowances.
2.1 Theories of welfare development
The first aim of this section is to outline the main theories about the 
development of welfare states and draws on historical surveys of the 
welfare state.66 Since my research deals with one aspect of the welfare 
state the second objective is to show where this research lies in relation to 
these theories. This I consider in two directions: what the evidence of 
means testing says about the applicability of these theories; and which 
theories provide the best basis for a method for research into means 
testing. On the first point I find that neither malevolent government nor 
benevolent government is a satisfactory explanation on its own of the 
introduction or amendment of means-tested policies. This is because 
means testing is a mechanism for addressing the general belief that 
government should do something to help the needy, whilst at the same 
time controlling behaviour of marginal groups. On the second point I 
argue that the process by which welfare policy develops is a complex 
one, but pluralist political science is the most useful for my purpose.
Theories of welfare development attempt to address two main problems 
of historical explanation:
65 Goriely, Tamara, "Law for the poor: the relationship between advice agencies and 
solicitors in the development of poverty law," International Journal of the Legal Profession 
3, no. 1 /2  (1996): 215-248 p.225.
66 In particular Baldwin, Peter, The Politics of Social Solidarity: Class Bases of the European 
Welfare State 1875-1975 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Hill, Michael, 
The Welfare State in Britain: A Political History since 2945-(Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1993); 
and "Teaching Units 7 and 8," A A303 Understanding Comparative History: Britain and 
America from 1760 (Milton Keynes: The Open University, 1997).
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1. What are the broad reasons for the long-term growth of welfare scope 
and spending which has been common to all advanced societies in the 
twentieth century?
2. How are we to explain the unevenness in amount and different pace of 
the growth in welfare spending?
Theories about the welfare state may be grouped as follows:
2.1.1 The logic of industrialisatioiVthe logic of capitalism
These macro-level models of welfare development speak of the very basic 
preconditions for a welfare state such as industrialisation, democratic 
participation and a certain level of political mobilisation.67 In these 
theories the welfare state is a functional response to problems of modern 
society and capitalist economy. The thesis of The logic of 
industrialisation' is that welfare development is related to problems of 
industrial development (rather than the structure of power) in capitalist 
societies. It is based on the evidence of broad similarities between the 
welfare programmes of western democracies and socialist states. In this 
theory, to demonstrate that state welfare is beneficial to economic growth 
is sufficient to explain welfare development. Variants on the theory 
include 'the logic of capitalism' which is based Marxist ideology.
These theories are quite generalised, operate at a low level of specificity 
and lack explanatory power. In this schema to demonstrate that state 
welfare is beneficial to capital accumulation is sufficient to explain 
welfare development. This type of reasoning attempts to give a causal 
explanation of something in terms of its consequences, which is an 
ahistorical approach. It is also an unsatisfying approach because it
67 Examples are Wilensky, Harold L. and Charles N. Lebeaux, Industrial Society and Social 
Welfare: The impact of industrialization on the supply and organization of social welfare in the 
United States (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1958) and Flora, Peter, ed., Growth to 
Limits: The Western European Welfare States Since World War II (De Gruyter, 1986).
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imputes needs and requirements to abstract systems. Industrialisation is 
probably only important in the long run which we can see by observing 
the differences in development of welfare in Britain, the US and 
Germany. For this reason these theories are useful for explaining why 
social policy developed at all, rather than its variations and work better at 
answering question (1) above.
Other theories strike the balance between being neither so basic that they 
only apply to the universally shared aspects of state welfare and leave 
differences unaccounted for, nor so proximate that their applicability is 
limited. The goal is a middle range where variations and similarities are 
explicable. Such intermediate-level models of welfare development try to 
answer both questions (1) and (2). They can be grouped as follows:
2.1.2 The logic of democracy -  benevolent government
There is a body of literature which sees the welfare state as a key 
achievement of the labour movement. It has been interpreted as taking 
the step from a basic level of welfare needed by the functional 
requirements of industrialised economies to a more egalitarian form of 
social protection. The "social democratic" welfare state was sought and 
brought about from the bottom up by those who stood to benefit most - 
the working class.68
This theory has been applied to the 1948 British welfare state of 
Beveridge-Bevan-Butler. In the 1970s it was conventional to classify 
Britain as a "social democratic" welfare state, one in which the strength of 
organised labour had brought about an institutionalised commitment to 
universalistic welfare.
68 Van Kersbergen argues that in Germany, Italy and the Netherlands Christian 
Democracy fulfilled the same function as social democracy in Britain in Van Kersbergen, 
Kees, Social Capitalism: A Study of Christian Democracy and the Welfare State (Routledge,
1995).
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A leading exponent of this view was T.H. Marshall. He argued that there 
was a three-stage development of citizenship from civil to political to 
socio-economic rights. Civil rights were established in the eighteenth 
century. Political rights enable citizens to vote and were founded in the 
nineteenth century. Social rights of citizenship which confer economic 
welfare and security and enable citizens to share in the standard of living 
prevailing in society came about in the twentieth century. In 1965 he 
summed up 60 or 70 years of "the story of social policy" with the 
judgement that social welfare, once confined to "the helpless and hopeless 
of the population" had been steadily extended to all citizens.69 Since then 
B.B. Gilbert has similarly traced the origins of welfare reforms principally 
to the extension of the franchise in 188470.
It is arguable whether this theory is applicable to the USA, which is a 
democratic state, but in contrast to Britain embodied a "liberal" or 
"residual" welfare system, and commitments were limited to marginal or 
deserving social groups. Baldwin's is an example of an account which 
attacks the links this theory makes between social services and social 
democracy.71 Another reservation about this theory includes the 
observation that in Bismarck's Germany, welfare was an authoritarian 
state's bulwark against democracy, not a consequence of it. This brings us 
to the "malevolent government' interpretation of state welfare.
2.1.3 Social welfare as social control -  malevolent government
The aspects of state welfare which act against the interests of the working 
class challenge the theory outlined above concerning the influence of 
labour movements. Another hypothesis suggests that welfare measures
69 Marshall, T.H., Social Policy, 2nd ed. (1967) p.97, p.182.
70 Gilbert, Bentley B., The evolution of national insurance in Great Britain: the origins of the 
welfare state (London: Michael Joseph, 1966).
71 Baldwin, Peter, The Politics.of Social Solidarity: Class Bases of the European Welfare State 
1875-1975 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
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were brought in as a response to threats of social disorder and the 
purpose of restrictive policies was to reinforce work norms. This kind of 
theory has been also elaborated by neo-Marxists72. In this interpretation 
welfare is seen as the price of industrial and social peace. Modest 
concessions were granted to the working class to avoid more major 
reform and preserve the status quo. Once established, welfare policies 
reinforce the discipline of the market mechanism for instance as the right 
to benefit is established through work. For instance, Bismarck's Germany 
developed social insurance to prevent workers from being a threat and to 
make them more efficient as workers. The theory has also been applied to 
welfare in America.73
Variations of this approach have analysed the interests of business and 
industry in welfare policy. In extreme cases welfare policy is regarded as 
a form of social control. For example Hay argued that business had an 
interest in economic efficiency and containment of working class 
demands and this influenced welfare reform.74
Historians are much less persuaded now as to the reality of any threat of 
disorder. The puzzle is why there was so little disaffection, protest and 
political radicalism. These explanations cannot account for why welfare 
states developed beyond the minimum necessary to maintain social 
order. Nor can it be proven that the new regulative mechanisms headed 
off more thoroughgoing social change.
72 A Marxist classic is Gough, I., The Political Economy of the Welfare State (Macmillan, 
1979). He was later converted away from these ideas in Doyal, Len and I. Gough, A  
Theory of Human Need (Macmillan, 1991).
73 Piven, Frances Fox and Richard A. Cloward, Regulating the Poor: The Functions of Public 
Welfare (London: Tavistock, 1972).
74 Hay, J.R., "Employers and Social Policy in Britain: The Evolution of Welfare 
Legislation, 1905-1914," Social H istory , no. 4 (1977): 435-55; Hay, J.R., "Employers' 
Attitudes to Social Policy and the Concept of Social Control, 1900-1920," in Thane, P., 
ed., The Origins of British Social Policy (Croon Helm, 1978), 107-25.
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The next three theories operate at an even lower level of specificity. They 
do not explain why state welfare exists, but the differences in timing 
between 'pioneer' and 'laggard' states and the different policy mixes in 
welfare programmes and are therefore most appropriate to answer 
question (2):
2.1.4 Pluralism
Pluralist political science is an elaboration of democratic theory which 
expects political choice to be determined by the action of individual 
voters. Pluralist political science focuses on political interest groups in a 
democracy and how a consensus is achieved. It assumes that individuals 
are rational actors who recognise their stake in policies. Pluralists expect 
that political decisions can be explained through the study of 
participating actors. Thus, pressure groups, trades unions and political 
parties, their ideologies and the nature of their support, are the focus of 
study.
The state may be dominated by a small group which is able to pursue 
interests of its own. Considerable attention has been given to the culture 
of this group.75 Another version of pluralist explanation is Mancur 
Olson's argument about a universal evolutionary trend towards 
increasing political influence of coalitions who bring about public 
decisions in their own favour against the common interest of society.76 In 
an Olsonian world the welfare state is a result of 'rent-seeking' by 
powerful interest groups.
75 For example by Barnett, who attacks prominent members of the British Labour and 
Liberal parties headed by William Beveridge and Clement Attlee and claims they were 
evangelical, nonconformist and humanitarian Christians in Barnett, Corelli, The Audit of 
War (Macmillan, 1986).
76 Olson, M., The Rise and Decline of Nations (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 
1982) cited by Pfaller, Alfred, Ian Gough, and Goran Therborn, "The Issue," in Pfaller, 
Alfred, Ian Gough, and Goran Therborn, eds., Can the Welfare State Compete? A  
Comparative Study of Five Advanced Capitalist Countries (London: Macmillan, 1991) p.10.
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2.1.5 Bringing the State Back In
Pluralist theory tends to treat the state as if it were a passive recipient of 
the outside pressures upon it. There has been a reaction against this 
aspect of the theory -  "bringing the state back in'.77 The establishment of 
the welfare state has involved the creation of a bureaucracy with interests 
of its own. States are 'sites' where bureaucrats and elected officials may 
act independently of wider society. The state formulates responses to 
problems that do not mirror the demands of any particular group. So 
according to this theory who a policy benefits is a different question from 
why it is instituted. Methods rooted in this theory analyse the workings 
of the government and bureaucracy in identifying problems, developing 
solutions and implementing them. The role of politicians and interest 
groups would be diminished and the importance of bureaucrats and 
experts expanded.
The administrative explanation exposes a weakness in accounts that focus 
primarily on social and political variables. But while administrators may 
take crucial decisions on welfare policy, in the final analysis, larger social 
forces have determined the policies adopted.
Esping-Andersen78 and Pierson79 are widely seen as the two most 
important recent theoretical contributors to how welfare states are 
analysed and how changes are to be understood.80
77 See Skocpol, T., "Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current 
Research," in Evans, P., D. Rueschemeyer, and T. Skocpol, eds., Bringing the State Back In 
(Cambridge: Cambrige University Press, 1985); Heclo, H., M odem Social Politics in Britain 
and Sweden (Yale, 1974); Orloff, Ann Shola and Theda Skocpol, "Why not equal 
Protection? Explaining the Politics of Public Social Spending in Britain, 1900-1911 and 
the United States, 1880s-1920," American Sociological Review 49 (1984): 726-50.
78 Esping-Andersen, G., The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
1990), Esping-Andersen, G., The Social Foundations of Post-Industrial Economies (Oxford 
University Press, 1999).
79 Pierson, P., ed., The New Politics of the Welfare State (Oxford University Press, 2001).
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2.1.6 Welfare Regimes
Esping-Andersen attempted comparative work to identify broad 
determinants of welfare state growth. He identified a number of 
distinctive stable welfare regimes around which he suggests most welfare 
states can be clustered:
1. Social democratic regimes. These are characterised by principles 
of universalism, equality and comprehensive service provision. Services 
and benefits are provided at high levels acceptable to the middle class. 
Scandinavian countries provide the best examples of these regimes.
2. Conservative or Corporatist regimes. The welfare state in these 
regimes is used to maintain existing class and status differentials, thus 
encouraging social and political stability and loyalty to the state. The state 
is important in the delivery of welfare, but not in ways which encourage 
redistribution. These welfare regimes tend to dominate in those countries 
in which Catholic parties are strong, parties of the left weak, and there is 
a history of authoritarianism. The policies in these regimes are highly 
influenced by the Church. Esping-Andersen suggests Austria, France, 
Germany and Italy are regimes of this type.
3. Residual liberal regimes. Liberal welfare regimes are principally 
characterised by an emphasis on market-based welfare, social insurance 
and means-testing. Welfare is largely oriented towards a class of poor 
dependent on the state. Benefits are limited and stigmatised. Coverage is 
provided against a limited number of risks. Compensation is at 
subsistence level and on a selective basis, and with no goal of altering the 
market distribution of incomes. Examples are said to be the USA, Canada 
and Australia.
80 E.g. by Taylor-Gooby, Peter, "The Silver Age of the Welfare State: Perspectives on 
Resilience," Journal of Social Policy 31, no. 4 (2002): 597-621 p.601 and Clasen, Jochen, 
"Modern Social Democracy and European Welfare State Reform," Social Policy & Society
1, no. 1 (2002): 67-76 p.71.
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Esping-Andersen makes clear that none of the regimes he identifies can 
be found in perfect or pure form.81 Britain provides a good example of a 
system which does not fit easily into any of the three regimes types, 
although Esping-Andersen suggests that it is closest to the liberal one.82 
Middleton suggests it is perhaps halfway between the American and the 
Scandinavian model.83 Another book also suggests that the British model 
is indeed a mix of universalism and the market, although Esping- 
Andersen's own assessment of this mix seems to substantially 
underestimate the significance of universalism in the British case.84
The concept of welfare regimes has been much used in comparative 
welfare research, but has not been found a useful concept by all 
analysts.85 The alleged problem with this approach is that it assumes an 
internal consistency within a welfare state, yet one should be wary of 
models which suggest a unifying and underlying rationale for 
developments. This is because most countries practise a disjointed set of 
welfare policies owing to typical features such as the cumulative nature 
of welfare policies and the diverse histories of policies in different welfare 
fields. Critics say the theory implies that key policies will reflect a similar 
approach to issues of public welfare and the theory also posits an 
underlying set of values to each welfare regime, such as those deriving
81 Cochrane, Allan and John Clarke, eds., Comparing Welfare States: Britain in International 
Context (London: Sage, 1993) p.9.
82 Esping-Andersen, G., The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
1990) p.26.
83 Middleton, Roger, Government versus the Market: The growth of the public sector, economic 
management and British economic performance, c.1890-1979 (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar,
1996) p.570.
84 Cochrane, Allan and John Clarke, eds., Comparing Welfare States: Britain in International 
Context (London: Sage, 1993) p.13.
85 Including, for example, Kasza, Gregory J., "The Illusion of Welfare 'Regimes1/' Journal 
of Social Polic]/ 31, no. 2 (2002): 271-287 p.271, Middleton, Roger, Government versus the 
Market: The growth of the public sector, economic management and British economic 
performance, c.1890-1979 (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1996) p.571.
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from Scandinavian social democratic parties, or religious traditions in 
southern Europe. Critics state that the point of regime analysis is that it 
assumes that each country's welfare regime makes sense, yet welfare 
policies are unlikely to be the embodiment of one logic or set of 
principles.
However, although some feel that the regime concept collapses if 
individual states embrace contradictory policies, even Esping-Andersen 
accepts that no pure form exists and many states are likely to have a mix 
of characteristics. The way that policy develops tends to make this so. 
Esping-Andersen is not saying that a coherent set of principles brought 
the policies into being, but the policies that resulted can be usefully 
grouped as z/that were the case.
Regime theories provide an account of the growth and diversity of 
welfare states under the formerly benign economic, social and political 
circumstances. Now governments face a tougher climate and interest has 
focused on the political processes of reform. Pierson is possibly the most 
important contributor to that debate.
2.1.7 Polity
Pierson argues that there is a 'new  politics' of welfare state retrenchment, 
unlike the former politics of expansion. Political actors who seek reform 
must find ways of managing things to avoid blame for the contraction of 
services, rather than simply take the credit for the growth of welfare 
services. Taylor-Gooby shows how 'this insight directs attention to the 
detail of government responses to current pressures' and how an 
important development coming out of this has been the growth of 
interest in 'polity' alongside political party in analysis of welfare 
development.86 Pierson has also emphasised the importance of path-
86 Taylor-Gooby, Peter, "The Silver Age of the Welfare State: Perspectives on Resilience," 
Journal of Social Policy 31, no. 4 (2002): 597-621 p.602.
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dependency as particular systems entrench support for their continuance: 
welfare policies are likely to have aspects of long-term continuity.
Internal development and maturing of welfare states is seen by Pierson as 
implying 'permanent austerity' as the cost of commitments entered into 
in the past under rather different political circumstances is brought home 
to governments.87 In analysing the politics of welfare state retrenchment, 
Pierson identified 'systemic' changes, which are reforms which happen 
because of the strength of interest groups which support them.88 This 
applies to services where there is a whole constituency of beneficiaries 
who will strive to retain rights. 'Programmatic' changes, on the other 
hand, do not entrench a particular interest group and are more easily 
reversed. An example would be cutting time-limits to entitlement to 
means-tested welfare, because it does not have major political penalties.
Another important concept is that of veto-points. Veto-points are 
institutional structures which provide opportunities to resist change. A 
typical argument in the literature links pressures on the welfare state to 
institutions which either facilitate or constrain policy adaptation and thus 
lead to change which is path-dependent. In this way, someone like 
Pierson finds socio-economic context to be the most important 
explanation of change to the welfare system, and downplays the role of 
both individual and collective agency.
This perspective leaves relatively little room for partisan politics and has 
been criticised as incorporating a degree of 'm odern functionalism'.89 
Indeed, the link sometimes too readily made between economic or
87 Pierson, P, "Irresistible forces, immovable objects: post-industrial welfare states 
confront permanent austerity," Journal of European Public Policy 5, no. 4 (1998): 539-560.
88 Pierson, P., Dismantling the Welfare State? Reagan, Thatcher and The Politics of 
Retrenchment (Cambridge University Press, 1994).
89 Clasen, Jochen, "Modern Social Democracy and European Welfare State Reform," 
Social Policy & Society 1, no. 1 (2002): 67-76 p.71.
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demographic challenges to the welfare state and the welfare state 
responses tends to underestimate the role played by the interests and 
ideas of actors involved in policy making.
The wider recent literature, too, has seen a shift away from "grand 
theories" (pluralism, Marxism) towards theories of governance. Since 
grand theories are of limited value in explaining the micro-politics of the 
policy process, the classic theories have been sidelined in recent years by 
a different set of concerns found in the literature on polity and 
governance. These offer a more de-centred view of the state. These 
analyse the policy process as a complex series of interactions. The idea of 
the policy process not as something governments do, but as a complex set 
of interactions is becoming increasingly significant.90
2.1.8 Conclusion
W hat insight does the evidence from means testing offer these theories? It 
highlights the contradictory nature of the welfare state. Means testing 
crosses over the interpretations of malevolent government and 
benevolent government. It can be used to serve either agenda. For 
instance, means testing has been described as a system of minimal help to 
the worst off operating as "social control", because applicants have to 
adopt a certain kind of lifestyle to be eligible for benefits.91 Therefore it is 
not a real concession to the needy. On the other hand, whilst the hallmark 
of benevolent government might be an egalitarian "universalist" ideal, the 
desire to create comprehensive policies accessible to all and not 
controlled by means tests could not be realised in practice. This is
90 Newman, Janet, "Putting the 'Policy' back into Social Policy," Social Policy & Society 1, 
no. 4 (2002): 347-354 pp.349-350.
91 Townsend, Peter, The Scope and Limitation of Means-Tested Social Services in Britain 
(Manchester Statistical Society, 1972) p.23; Townsend, Peter, Poverty in the United 
Kingdom: A  survey of household resources and standards of living (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 
1979) p.882.
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especially the case with non-subsistence benefits. Social democracy had 
to find its expression through a system with a high degree of means 
testing, a more limited form of redistributing in a restricted manner.
Therefore neither interpretation is a satisfactory explanation on its own of 
the introduction or amendment of means-tested policies. This is because 
in a fundamental way, means testing is a way that state and society tries 
to resolve the contradiction between the two approaches. Means testing is 
a mechanism for meeting the needs of the needy and the general belief 
that government should do something to help them, whilst also 
controlling behaviour of marginal groups.
What insight does the evidence from means testing offer welfare regimes 
and polity theories? The evidence from the four means tests used in this 
study tends to confirm that the British welfare state is an uneasy mix of 
the social-democratic type and liberal-residual type of welfare regime. 
Two of the benefits I study were provided at a high level and acceptable 
to the middle class (student grants and civil legal aid), whereas the other 
two fit the pattern of limited benefits at subsistence level (prescription 
medicines and school meals). The evidence of means testing denies an 
internal consistency some say is implied by welfare regime theory. These 
four means tested benefits do show contradictory policies co-existing, but 
I do not think that renders the concept of a regime entirely useless.
Pierson asserts that officials tend to adapt welfare policies in piecemeal 
fashion to current circumstances. Although the welfare state is based on 
original legislation passed over fifty years ago, today's policies are the 
result of decades of modification and tinkering, and are therefore 
unlikely to reflect any one set of practical concerns or values. Therefore, 
we should expect the welfare programmes of most countries to be a 
contradictory and disjointed set of policies, not a coherent whole. The 
history of the means tested benefits in this study tends very much to 
confirm this view of how policy evolves from year-to-year.
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What insight into means testing do these theories offer? Since this study 
seeks to explain the way in which a particular part of the welfare system 
evolved -  means tested benefits -  rather than why a welfare system was 
created, the lower level theories provide the most useful basis for the 
research methodology. However, although I would not dismiss regime 
theory, I do not think it can offer this thesis much, other than as an 
example of comparative work which tries to move away from unique 
case studies to make generalisations.
Policy on means tests involves identifiable gainers and losers and this 
tends to foster politics around interest groups. Therefore a pluralist 
methodology can be used to explain the influences on means tested 
benefits. The design of means tests will also produce an element of the 
state and its policy apparatus as disinterested solvers of problems.
Pierson's work suggests that over-arching theories will be of little use. I 
concentrate instead on micro-politics, and the structure of government 
and policy institutions as well as the colour of the party in office. 
Pierson's work has directed me to look at the political penalties of cutting 
means tested benefits and how that might explain the pattern of 
generosity over time. Pierson's ideas about policy evolution by tinkering 
over a time period might also help me to explain some of the pattern in 
eligibility we observe.
These perspectives will be employed in chapters four and five and in 
interpreting my findings about eligibility over time, in which questions 
are raised about the various actors participating in policy decisions. That 
neither one nor the other of the lower level theories is adequate on its 
own for investigating means testing certainly demonstrates the complex 
nature of the welfare state.
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2.2 The historiography of the British welfare state
In recent years, the 'achievement' of the British welfare state has been 
thrown into question. The aim of this section is to show how the ideas 
about the progress and achievements of the welfare state current at 
various times influenced attitudes to means testing and ultimately 
policies on the principle of means testing at that time. Assessments of the 
welfare state have addressed the following questions, each of which I will - 
treat in turn:
On macro-economic growth: what have been the effects of the allocation 
of an increasing proportion of resources to welfare policies?
On poverty: have welfare policies solved the problems they were 
designed to meet?
On inequality: have welfare policies brought about a redistribution of 
incomes from the richer to the poorer?
On gender: have welfare policies counterbalanced the disadvantages 
faced by women?
2.2.1 Macro-economic growth
The effect of the British welfare state has come to be characterised as a 
burden detrimental to economic growth, especially in the international 
context.92 One can question the extent to which the attempts of the 
welfare state to overcome the impact of market failure on individual 
citizens actually created government failure which reduced growth 
overall. There is a tension concerning how much and w hat sort of welfare 
state a country can afford without doing too much harm to its 
international competitiveness. The ability to support a welfare state and 
international competitiveness are very closely linked. The relationship
92 See for example the writings of the Institute of Economic Affairs and Barnett, Corelli, 
The Audit of War (Macmillan, 1986).
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between them runs in two directions: the achievements of the welfare 
state are threatened by pressure to adjust to global conditions. Yet failure 
to maintain competitiveness might undermine the welfare state more 
thoroughly in the long run. However, I am not concerned here with 
whether the welfare state did or did not impede growth. This matter has 
been reviewed elsewhere93. My concern here is how beliefs about this 
affected social policy.
A popular view on the Right has been that the government should not 
penalise through heavy taxation those w ith talent and enterprise, and 
that for maximum efficiency people should be left with the fruits of their 
labour. The Right argues that welfare expenditure is unproductive and 
imposes costs which threaten Britain's efficiency and competitiveness in 
relation to those states which do not have such expansive welfare states.
On the other hand, other theorists argue that the welfare state can advance 
economic competitiveness. For instance, where there is a lack of 
infrastructure 'public squalor' may impede 'private affluence'.94 Peter 
Townsend thought social policy spending could be used as a method to 
overcome the country's economic difficulties in the context of the 1967 
financial crisis, although the government reacted by cutting spending.95 
Also, a consensual pattern of industrial relations depends on workers 
believing that the economic and social arrangements are not grossly 
'unfair' and so welfare states can sometimes actually improve labour co­
operation and flexibility.
93 See for example Atkinson, A.B., Incomes and the Welfare State: Essays on Britain and 
Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) Chapter 6.
94 Gough, Ian, "The United Kingdom," in Pfaller, Alfred, Ian Gough, and Goran 
Therborn, eds., Can the Welfare State Compete? A  Comparative Study of Five Advanced 
Capitalist Countries (London: Macmillan, 1991) p.150.
95 Townsend, Peter, "Introduction: Does Selectivity Mean a Nation Divided?," in 
Townsend, Peter, Mike Reddin, and Peter Kaim-Caudle, eds., Social Services For All? Part 
One (London: Fabian Society, 1968) p.2.
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The pro- and anti-welfare spending ideas have both been concurrent 
since the inception of the welfare state. However, in the face of 
continuous rises in welfare spending, the pressure for retrenchment has 
dominated. When the view that social spending is detrimental dominates, 
this leads to pressure for greater selectivity, including selectivity by 
means testing.
2.2.2 Poverty
Evidence about the extent of poverty and the causes of poverty have 
influenced the vigour of attempts to tackle the problem and the policy 
mix of means tested and insurance benefits which was used to do so. 
Local studies in the 1930s investigated poverty: the New Survey of 
London Life and Labour, the social surveys of Merseyside, Bristol, 
Southampton and Rowntree's 1936 survey of York are examples of such 
surveys. The exposure of want in these studies underlay Beveridge's plan 
for social security, and he cited them in his Report.96 From then on it was 
accepted that the government should do something to tackle poverty.
Immediately post-war it was believed that the welfare state based on 
'universalism' had triumphed over poverty97, due mainly to the 
optimistic outlook of Rowntree's 1951 follow-up survey of York.98 The 
spirit of the time was that a welfare state centred on non-means-tested 
insurance-based benefits had been effective at reducing poverty. In the 
early days of the welfare state it was believed that poverty had been 
eliminated without the need for means testing and means testing would
96 Falkingham, Jane and Sally Baldwin, "Introduction," in Baldwin, Sally and Jane 
Falkingham, eds., Social Security and Social Change: New Challenges to the Beveridge Model 
(Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1994) p.2.
97 Townsend, Peter, "Post-1945 Poverty Research and Things to Come," in Bradshaw, 
Jonathan and Roy Sainsbury, eds., Researching Poverty (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000), 5-36 
p.9.
98 Rowntree, B. Seebohm and G. R. Lavers, Poverty and the welfare state, a third social 
survey of York dealing only with economic questions, (London: Longmans, 1951).
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only have a small role. However, subsequent re-analysis of the data has 
shown that this belief was erroneous and poverty had not diminished as 
much as was thought under the welfare state." Behind the scenes 
national insurance was not effective. However, the belief that it was 
meant that not much was changed in these years.
A period of relative policy contentment in the 1950s was followed by the 
'rediscovery of poverty' in the 1960s.100 In particular, Abel-Smith and 
Townsend in The Poor and the Poorest questioned the effectiveness of 
government policy.101 They used the income level for eligibility for 
means-tested National Assistance as their poverty criterion. They found 
significant numbers living below that level because the 'working poor' 
were not helped by National Assistance and those unwilling to apply for 
National Assistance fell through the safety net. In particular, the incomes 
of pensioners were a focus for concern. It became apparent that state 
pension entitlements were not high enough to meet all needs, but 
pensioners were reluctant to apply for a means-tested top-up from the 
National Assistance Board.
Townsend undertook a national poverty study in 1968-9 (published 
1979).102 The most ambitious poverty study since Rowntree, it was the 
first national survey for the specific purpose of investigating poverty. His 
findings made gloomy reading. By the state's Supplementary Benefit 
standard, between three and five million people were in poverty and
99 Atkinson, A. B. and et al., "Poverty in York: a reanalysis of Rowntree's 1950 survey," 
Bulletin of Economic Research 33, no. 2 (1981): 59-71; Hatton, Timothy and Roy E. Bailey, 
"Seebohm Rowntree and the postwar poverty puzzle," Economic History Review 53, no. 3 
(2000): 517-543.
100 Harris, Neville, "Social Security and Society," in Harris, Neville, ed., Social Security 
Law in Context (Oxford: OUP, 2000) p.43.
101 Abel-Smith, Brian and Peter Townsend, The poor and the poorest: a new analysis of the 
M inistry of Labour's family expenditure survey of 1953-54 and 1960 (G. Bell and Sons, 1965).
102 Townsend, Peter, Poverty in the United Kingdom: A  survey of household resources and 
standards of living (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1979).
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another twelve million near it. The book was also noteworthy for its 
attempt to develop a new deprivation standard.103 Poverty was redefined 
in the 1960s as relativist notions of poverty gained wider currency under 
the influence of people such as Townsend.104 The rediscovery of poverty 
led the government to announce that it would extend national insurance 
benefits. In practice though, concern about poverty led to wider use of 
means-tested benefits (something which is further explored in chapter 4 
below).
2.2.3 Inequality
In British politics, there were varied ideas about the role of the welfare 
state in relation to the market and the capacity and desirability of welfare 
systems in creating equality. "Democratic socialists', such as Marshall, 
Titmuss and Crosland thought state intervention more than just a 
corrective for market failings and a positive means of engineering a more 
fair and equal society. They approved of 'universalist' policies, either 
non-contributory or based on social insurance.
In contrast to the view that a more equal society is necessary for social 
cohesion, an important element of Conservative ideology was the belief 
that in a free society the incentives to make oneself unequal are a 
necessary part of the mechanism of creating wealth and therefore new 
welfare. 'Reluctant collectivism' typified by the conservatism of R.A. 
Butler, consisted of qualified approval for state intervention which 
altered the distributional outcome of markets. At other times the free 
market 'anti-collectivists' dominated Conservative thinking, particularly 
in the 1950s, the later 1960s, and after 1975. They are associated with the 
promotion of means testing.
103 Gordon, David, Poverty and Social Exclusion in Britain (JRF, 2000) p.72; Bradshaw, 
Jonathan, "The Nature of Poverty," in Ditch, John, ed., Introduction to Social Security 
(Routledge, 1999), 11-33 p.16.
104 Dean, Hartley, Welfare Rights & Social Policy (Prentice Hall, 2002) p.23.
65
Paradoxically, although its democratic socialist ideas gave the British 
welfare state an initial high reputation105, the post-war welfare state did 
not show any marked trend towards income redistribution in favour of 
the worst off.106 The lack of vertical redistribution is attributable to the 
following three reasons.
Firstly, one reason why there has not been a straightforward transfer 
from rich to poor is that redistribution can take other form s/such as 
redistribution within the lifetime of an individual107 (for example 
contributory pensions) and 'horizontal' redistribution within broad social 
categories. Examples of horizontal redistribution are flat-rate insurance 
which redistributes from employed to invalid workers and family 
allowances which redistribute from households w ithout children to those 
with children. 'Universal' status benefits are non-means-tested benefits 
(either social insurance-based or non-contributory). They work not by 
reallocating resources, but by reallocating the burden of mischance 
(except the mischance of being poor). Therefore means testing is the form 
of benefit more likely to offer redistribution. Despite the increased role 
for means testing state welfare provision primarily created lifetime 
redistribution and horizontal redistribution.108
Secondly, one of the unintended consequences of universal benefits 
under the welfare state such as free health care and education has been
105 Middleton, Roger, Government versus the Market: The growth of the public sector, 
economic management and British economic performance, c.1890-1979 (Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar, 1996) p.573.
106 See for example Lowe, Rodney, The Welfare State in Britain since 1945, 2nd ed. 
(London: Macmillan, 1999) p.290.
107 Barr, Nicholas, The Welfare State as Piggy Bank: information, risk, uncertainty, and the role 
of the state (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
108 Falkingham, Jane and John Hills, "Redistribution Between People or Across the Life 
Cycle?," in Falkingham, Jane and John Hills, eds., The Dynamic of Welfare: The Welfare 
State and the Life Cycle (Prentice Hall/Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1995).
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that the middle class have got benefits from these social policies.109 When 
you take benefits in kind into account, the record of the welfare state on 
redistribution looks even less favourable.110
Horizontal redistribution and middle class capture promote support for 
the welfare state. That is why both the effects outlined above were 
necessary -  the secret of the success of the welfare state was its ability to 
cater to the middle class as successfully as the working class. Beveridge's 
universalist, egalitarian approach to social policy rested on an appeal to 
the self-reliant classes, who were previously excluded from statutory 
measures. The middle class capture theory shows that the social policy 
areas least likely to experience cuts are those where the middle class are 
users or suppliers.111 It can be inferred from this theory that means-tested 
benefits which are primarily for the poor are more likely to be scrutinised 
for cuts and are more likely to find taxpayer support for them 
undermined.
Thirdly, although benefits and taxes do redistribute vertically at any 
moment in time, access to factor incomes has been the predominant 
influence on distribution. Post war improvements in inequality owe more 
to full employment than the welfare state. The rise in inequality from 
1979 was attributable to the increased inequality of market incomes and 
the way the state budget has not offset this rising inequality in the labour
109 Goodin, Robert E. and Julian Le Grand, eds., Not Only the Poor: The Middle Classes and 
the Welfare State (London: Allen & Unwin, 1987).
110 Propper, Carol, "For Richer, for Poorer, in Sickness and in Health: The Lifetime 
Distribution of NHS Health Care," in Falkingham, Jane and John Hills, eds., The 
Dynamic of Welfare: The Welfare State and the Life Cycle (Prentice Hall/Harvester 
Wheatsheaf, 1995) pp.202-203; Glennerster, Howard, Jane Falkingham, and Nicholas 
Barr, "Education Funding, Equity and the Life Cycle," in Falkingham, Jane and John 
Hills, eds., The Dynamic of Welfare: The Welfare State and the Life Cycle (Prentice 
Hall/Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1995) pp.152-153.
111 Goodin, Robert E. and Julian Le Grand, eds., Not Only the Poor: The Middle Classes and 
the Welfare State (London: Allen & Unwin, 1987).
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market.112 Although the move towards means testing under the 
Conservatives should have been redistributive it was not because it has 
not moved fast enough to counteract market forces -  it has had to run 
harder towards means testing to stay still. In summary, the welfare state 
has made no major change to the income distribution, but has prevented 
some people from falling dangerously behind the rest. Access to market 
incomes is the driving force, and social security has a reactive role in 
limiting the rise in inequality.
Although the welfare state was intended to perform some redistribution, 
officials did not see inequality as one of their concerns.113 Surveys were 
used by Treasury officials to consider the redistributive impact of the 
budget for the first time only in 1964.114
In conclusion, the idea that government should reduce inequality has 
influenced policy, but not in a way which actually reduced financial 
inequality. By 'equality7 democratic socialists meant insurance for all 
income groups and universal benefits which the middle class have access 
to. This did not promote a more equal income distribution. Means testing 
as favoured from the 1970s had more potential for redistribution, but was 
not pursued to such an extent as to outweigh other forces. Discourse on 
inequality did not much influence social security policy generally or 
means testing as a policy. Poverty, rather than inequality has been a more 
influential concept.
112 See for example Goodman, Alissa, Paul Johnson, and Steven Webb, Inequality in the 
UK (Oxford: OUP, 1997) and Atkinson, A.B., Incomes and the Welfare State: Essays on 
Britain and Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995) Chapter 1.
113 McKay, Stephen and Karen Rowlingson, Social Security in Britain (Macmillan, 1999) 
p.57.
114 Brigden, Paul and Rodney Lowe, Welfare Policy Under the Conservatives 1951-1964: A  
Guide to Documents in the Public Record Office (London: PRO publications, 1998) p.31.
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2.2.4 Gender
Means-tested programmes primarily support women (and children), 
while the more generous non-means-tested programmes allow men 
greater access to benefits and reward men more generously.115 The 
eligibility rules of insurance programmes are modelled on male patterns 
of labour force participation, and social insurance benefits replicate 
market inequities between the sexes. Social insurance tended to benefit 
men who had a more stable employment pattern and spent more years in 
full time work. So women were more likely to need means-tested income 
top-ups. However, the gender impact of welfare policies is a relatively 
recent concern.116 Therefore, ideas about gender and welfare have not 
been a strong influence on policy, although the discourse on gender and 
benefits has been used to influence some minor aspects of policy. An 
example is that women rather than men stand to benefit from school 
meals, because in the absence of free school meals women generally have 
responsibility in the family for providing food for the children. This 
argument was used (unsuccessfully) against the scrapping of free school 
meals for families receiving the in-work income top-up in 1986.117
115 Douglas, Gillian, "The Family, Gender and Social Security," in Harris, Neville, ed., 
Social Security Law in Context (OUP, 2000); Lister, Ruth, "'She has other duties' - Women, 
citizenship and social security," in Baldwin, Sally and Jane Falkingham, eds., Social 
Security and Social Change: New Challenges to the Beveridge Model (Harvester Wheatsheaf, 
1994).
116 Alcock, P., Understanding Poverty, 2nd ed. (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 1997) p.134. It has 
been an expanding area of research since in the 1990s, as exampled by Daly, Mary and 
Katherine Rake, Gender and the Welfare State (Polity Press, 2003), Goode, Jackie, Claire 
Callender, and Ruth Lister, Purse or Wallet? (Policy Studies Institute, 1998), Sainsbury, 
Diane, Gender, Inequality and Welfare States (Cambridge: CUP, 1996); various papers in 
Baldwin, Sally and Jane Falkingham, eds., Social Security and Social Change: New  
Challenges to the Beveridge Model (Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1994). An earlier work is 
Pascall, Gillian, Social Policy: A  Feminist Analysis (Tavistock, 1986).
117 E.g. in Family Policy Studies Centre, School meals and social security (London: Family 
Policy Studies Centre, 1986),a paper produced for the Committee Stage of the Social 
Security Bill 1986.
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2.3 Conclusion
This study is concerned with both the pragmatic aspects of means testing 
and the ideological aspects. Consideration of theories of welfare 
development highlighted how the pragmatic side of policy can be 
explored by looking at the various actors participating in policy decisions 
and the role of the bureaucracy. These perspectives will underlie the 
method in the chapters on the development of means tested benefits 
(chapter 4), their objectives (chapter 5) and their design (chapter 6). On 
the other hand, consideration of the historiography of the welfare state 
showed that ideologies have also played their part in the development of 
policy. Ideas about what welfare policy should do and has done will be 
important in chapters 7 to 9, in which I assess the outcomes of means 
tests.
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3 Means testing
3.1 The legacy of means testing in the 1930s
There has been an enduring anathema to means testing principally 
because means testing acquired a bad reputation in the inter-war period. 
The popularity of the Beveridge Report largely stemmed from the fact 
that it seemed to offer a way to remove the means test.118
This section explains why the means test was introduced in 1931 and why 
it was hated so much. It explains how means testing has come to have 
such adverse connotations. It also shows how this experience influenced 
the form of the post-war welfare state, but I argue that post-war policy 
was influenced by wartime events as well as by inter-war developments.
I also argue that means-testing of subsistence benefits was always a 
feature of welfare, despite the emphasis on a shift to 'universalism' often 
found in writings about the post-war welfare state.
3.1.1 How did the means test come about?
The replacement of the deterrence test of less eligibility for admittance to 
the workhouse by a different kind of test was made possible by the 
growth of documentation from the late nineteenth century onward.
When information such as a workman's wages could be readily verified 
documentarily, it made possible a changed approach to relief. However, 
the Ministry of Health, which became responsible for workhouses in 
1919, disapproved of fixed and published scales of relief. In their 1927 
Report they said: 'A  scale creates a presumption that any person with an 
income below that indicated by the scale is destitute and has some sort of
118 Inter-Departmental Committee on Social Insurance and Allied Services, Social 
Insurance and Allied Services: Report by Sir William Beveridge (London: HMSO, 1942).
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claim to relief ... if a scale is once published there is a grave danger lest 
the recipients may begin to regard the gift of relief as a right'.119
The high unemployment of 1931 swamped the unemployment insurance 
system, and imperilled the finances of the British government. During 
1931 the insurance scheme was vastly changed. Insurance benefits were 
strictly limited and the other help available was means-tested and closely 
tied to poor relief. A conflict between an economic and a social response 
to the problem of unemployment encouraged a greater reliance on means 
testing and tightening up of eligibility criteria. Classical economics would 
suggest that unemployment benefits were a cause of unemployment.120 
On the other hand, the clear extent of suffering demanded some form of 
payments.
The Unemployment Fund created with the 1911 National Insurance Act 
was intended to be self-funding. However, the Fund had become 
insolvent during the 1920s and had to borrow from the Treasury because 
employment failed to recover from the 1921-3 depression. Part of the 
problem was that conditions to receive benefits were relaxed in a way 
that weakened the actuarial link between premiums and payments. Most 
damaging to the insurance principle was the development of 
'uncovenanted' or 'extended' or 'transitional' benefits. These were 
benefits to which the unemployed person was not entitled on the basis of 
his contributions record. Between 1921 and 1928 there were several 
amendments which led to benefit being paid beyond the period 
prescribed by the Insurance Commissioners' rules and the extent of long­
term unemployment undermined the intended insurance basis of the 
original National Insurance scheme.
119 Cited in Macleod, Iain and Enoch Powell, The Social Services: Needs and Means 
(London: Conservative Political Centre, 1952) pp.11-13.
120 Benjamin, D. and L. Kochin, "Searching for an explanation of unemployment in 
interwar Britain," Journal of Political Economy (1979).
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The insurance principle was initially allowed to decay because it was 
thought that unemployment was cyclical, and structural unemployment 
in the 'staple' industries was not recognised. In addition, the only 
alternative for the unemployed was the locally financed Poor Law. Given 
the regional concentration of inter-war unemployment, this would have 
placed an intolerable burden on the local rates.
The Fund's finances again deteriorated in the financial and economic 
crises of 1929-31. The subsequent 1931 National Economy Act cut benefits 
by about ten percent. It also imposed a means test for those unemployed 
for more than six months who had therefore exhausted their entitlement 
to insurance benefits. By January 1932 there were nearly one million 
people subject to the means test in order to receive transitional benefit.121
3.1.2 W hy was it resented?
Once entitlement to insurance benefits was exhausted further aid - 
'transitional payments' - would be assessed based on a household means 
test. Aid would only be given to those whom public assistance (i.e. Poor 
Law) authorities certified as being in need. Public assistance officials 
dealt with these insured persons in the same way they did with any 
unemployed able-bodied persons who applied to them.
The 1931 transitional payments produced a hybrid system in which the 
applicant got the worst of both worlds. It was like poor relief in that the 
amount of relief was determined by local PACs and the applicant had to 
prove the extent of his need, to produce any pertinent information that a 
committee might request, and to appear for interviews. It was like 
unemployment insurance in that applicants had to go to an employment 
exchange to prove unemployment and register for work, to meet all the
121 Pearce, Malcolm and Geoffrey Stewart, British political history 1867-1990: Democracy 
and decline (London: Routledge, 1992) p.357.
73
requirements for insurance benefit except those pertaining to 
contributions, and to report to an employment exchange for payment.
The imposition of the means test was particularly resented for four 
reasons. Firstly, insured people thought they should get benefits by right, 
w ithout the stigmatising test of need. Secondly, the historic 
administrative link to the Poor Law and the way in which it was 
administered were causes of resentment. Third was the low level of 
benefit and lastly was the household basis for the means test.
Walter Brierley compared the demeanour of the insured men with those 
on the means test at the labour exchange, which illustrates how the 
applicants viewed insurance and means tested benefits in different lights. 
He described the insured miners:
The men and youths in the pit-queues had an outward 
liveliness about them, laughing boisterously for a moment, 
calling from one rank to another, talking with freedom, not 
afraid to question the clerk boldly, dropping neither voice nor 
eyes of the strolling supervisor or busy manger chanced to 
come near. They had paid their money into the Insurance 
Fund and they were going to have it out when they qualified 
for it, too, and without any bowing and scraping either. Not 
much thanks due when receiving your own money.122
But in the means-tested 'transitional payment' queue:
The very atmosphere about it shouted that it was different 
from all the others, a thin mumble with never an intelligible 
flash of spoken sense clung above i t ... some stared with faint 
sheepishness at the playing about in the other queues ... It 
was by far the shabbiest queue.123
The means test was carried out by the local Public Assistance Committee 
(PAC) which after 1929 was the successor to the Boards of Guardians
122 Brierley, Walter, Means-Test Man, Reprint, Nottingham, Spokesman 1983 ed. (1935) 
p.167.
123 Brierley, Walter, Means-Test Man, Reprint, Nottingham, Spokesman 1983 ed. (1935) 
p.167.
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which had operated under the old Poor Law. Means testing was therefore 
tainted by association with the Poor Law and 'pauperisation'. However, 
the link between unemployment and poor relief was not unprecedented. 
The Poor Law had previously aided unemployed persons outside the 
National Insurance scheme. It had topped up insurance benefits to those 
whose benefit was insufficient to maintain them, for example in the case 
of large families or where rents were high. It had assisted insured 
unemployed persons while they served the waiting period the qualify for 
benefits.124 Nor was the use of a means test outside the Poor Law new: 
payment of 'uncovenanted' or 'extended benefit' pre-1931 had in theory 
been conditional on a means test between 1922 and 1928 (with a break in 
1924-5).125 Nonetheless, the introduction of a means test caused upset 
among the unemployed.
When someone in the insurance scheme had exhausted his rights to 
insurance benefits he was notified by the local employment exchange and 
filled out a form to certify 'I am in need of assistance and hereby apply 
for transitional payments' and the form was dispatched by the 
employment exchange to the proper PAC. In due course the applicant 
would report to the office of the PAC, and complete further forms 
describing the income and expenditure of his household. Soon thereafter 
an officer would visit the home of the applicant. On the occasion of the 
visit the officer would verify the information on the form, and might also 
examine the rent book, insurance premium payments, and any articles on 
which hire purchase instalments were due. He might call on former 
employers to verify the wages and character of the applicant.126
124 Hill, A.C.C. and Isador Lubin, The British Attack on Unemployment (Washington, D.C.: 
The Brookings Institution, 1934) pp.193-4.
125 Garside, W.R., British Unemployment, 1919-1939: A  Study in Public Policy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990) p.66.
126 Hill, A.C.C. and Isador Lubin, The British Attack on Unemployment (Washington, D.C.: 
The Brookings Institution, 1934) pp.200-202.
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The investigation and inquiry involved in carrying out means testing was 
seen as particularly demeaning. All family income, savings and even 
possessions could be taken into account and a recommended reduction in 
benefit could be made:
A Lancashire miner, with a wife and six children, had, before 
his unemployment, managed to save £15, which was banked 
in the Co-op. Under the means test this man received a ruling:
'N ot a case for help so long as this sum is on deposit/127
They felt they deserved to be treated better in return for their sacrifices 
during the war. Walter Brierley described the feelings of a wife of an 
unemployed man about these enquiries:
'It was a big thing for her to swallow the visits of the Means 
Test investigator; she would never have believed such a thing 
could come to her -  never. Fancy demanding to see her rent 
book, insurance policies, sick-club card and bank-book. The 
bank-book; it showed that you weren't much while they 
could pry into that. Enough to make anyone wild; ... She was 
a pauper, riding on her fellow-villagers' backs, waiting until 
they each had given a little before she could be fed. It was as 
bad as th a t/128
At the next meeting of the PAC the public assistance officer would 
present his report as a guide for action. As an aid in determining the 
amount of assistance to be granted, committees would often use a 'scale' 
as ready reference for the income which any sized family is estimated to 
require to relieve destitution. The income of the family would be 
subtracted from the scale and the difference made up. When the 
committee had decided how much the applicant was to receive, the 
employment exchange was authorised to pay this amount weekly. 
Thereafter the application was checked and reviewed by the public 
assistance officer every two months.
127 Hannington, Walter, The Problem of the Distressed Areas (London: Gollancz, 1937) p.47.
128 Brierley, Walter, Means-Test Man, Reprint, Nottingham, Spokesman 1983 ed. (1935) 
pp.190-191.
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Another characteristic of welfare administration was its perceived 
meanness. Many of the recipients were in obvious dire poverty. War 
veterans resented having their war disability pension taken into account 
in the means test. The Medical Officer of Health for Preston said:
Possibly at no period during the last five years has work at 
the Infant Welfare Centre been so difficult as during the latter 
part of 1932 .... One cannot help thinking that the means test 
was the responsible factor.129
In contrast to unemployment insurance, the amount paid out as 
transitional payments or poor relief was subject to local variation. 
Applicants could receive less than the maximum unemployment benefit 
because of differences in local living costs or because of the Poor Law 
principle that the condition of a relieved person should be less favourable 
than that of a self-maintaining labourer in the district. There was no 
agreed schedule of payments -  they would be determined according to 
need, with local authorities acting as if each case was an application for 
public assistance. The means test resulted in many applicants receiving 
considerably less than they formerly received as insurance benefit. From 
November 1931 to January 1933, for example, 37 per cent of rulings on 
transitional payment allowed sums smaller than those paid to recipients 
of insurance benefit, and 7 per cent refused any payment whatever.130
Chamberlain, as chancellor, was worried about the pre-1934 scheme 
which left the assessment of transitional payments to local PACs. Some 
areas were thought to be too generous, and this was a concern since PACs 
were funded by central government. His unease led to the 1934 Act which 
replaced local PACs with the Unemployment Assistance Board (UAB) 
which helped financially, after a means test. It supplanted transitional
129 Hannington, Walter, The Problem of the Distressed Areas (London: Gollancz, 1937) p.50.
130 Hill, A.C.C. and Isador Lubin, The British Attack on Unemployment (Washington, D.C.: 
The Brookings Institution, 1934) p205-206.
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payments and local public assistance. The UAB administered a system of 
relief involving a test of needs, and undertook work previously 
associated with Poor Law officers. The local agents of the UAB carrying 
out the detail of the work were even the pre-existing public assistance 
officials. As a result of the 1934 Act, recipients of transitional relief could 
be required to enter a workhouse, something they had previously been 
protected from.131 This illustrates how the introduction of the UAB 
underm ined all previous attempts to shield otherwise regular workers 
from the taint of the Poor Law.
There was uproar in January 1935 as the benefit rates for the uninsured 
unemployed set by the new UAB would cut the incomes of many 
households. Garside suggests that it was administrative complexity, 
financial miscalculation and bureaucratic insensitivity which imposed 
such reductions, rather than a government conspiracy to enforce 
reductions in benefit.132 But whatever the reason, many people stood to 
have their benefits reduced under the UAB even though their 
circumstances were no different from other unemployed persons except 
in the duration of their unemployment.
However, the main reason means testing was so unpopular in the inter­
war period was because the means test was a household means test. As 
Walter Hannington put it: "Those families which had managed to escape 
the lowest level of poverty by having some member of the family 
working were attacked by the Government in its economy measures of 
1931".133 In 1934 with the new Act the household means test was given 
statutory force. A great grievance against the household means test was
131 Hill, A.C.C. and Isador Lubin, The British Attack on Unemployment (Washington, D.C.: 
The Brookings Institution, 1934) p.204.
132 Garside, W.R., British Unemployment, 1919-1939: A  Study in Public Policy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990) p .77.
133 Hannington, Walter, The Problem of the Distressed Areas (London: Gollancz, 1937) p.46.
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that the household income was aggregated including the income of any 
non-dependant residents. This meant that for an unemployed man, any 
income his wife or adult children living at home brought in was taken 
into account:
A Tyneside man with an invalid wife, seven children of 
school age, and one girl of sixteen years, wages 8s. One boy 
fourteen years not working, and one son in the army sending 
home 5s. 3d. per week. His benefit is reduced from 37s. 9d. to 
21s. 9d. because of the wages of the daughter and the money 
from the son in the army. Therefore two adults, two 
adolescents, and seven children have to live on 35s. a week, 
out of which rent also has to be paid.134
This was threatening to the male household head's status as family 
breadwinner. One South Wales miner described himself as 'a  pauper 
through having to depend upon my children for a living7.135 It was bad 
enough for a man to have to be supported by his son; it was even more 
galling if wives or daughters remained in work. The household means 
test was also criticised for providing an incentive to break up the home in 
order to get assistance:
In the meantime my wife had decided to try and earn a little 
money so we might continue to retain our home. She 
obtained a job as house to house saleswoman, and was able to 
earn a few shillings to supplement our dole income. I felt a 
burden on her .... The final blow came when the Means Test 
was put into operation .... both my wife and my son, who 
had just commenced to earn a few shillings, told me to get 
out, as I was living on them and taking the food they 
needed.136
The means test was widespread in its impact: "For every individual 
applicant for transitional payment, there m ust be, at least, an average of
134 Hannington, Walter, The Problem of the Distressed Areas (London: Gollancz, 1937) p.47.
135 Beales, H.L. and R.S. Lambert, eds., Memoirs of the Unemployed (Gollancz, 1934).
136 Beales, H.L. and R.S. Lambert, eds., Memoirs of the Unemployed (Gollancz, 1934) p.73- 
4.
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four members of the community affected. Every one of them with a 
grouse, which is not only directed against the state, but in like manner 
against his own flesh and blood/'137
3.1.3 The inter-war legacy
The inter-war experience left Britons with a distaste of means testing. The 
popularity of the Beveridge Report largely stemmed from the fact that it 
seemed to offer a way to remove the means test.
Here I consider the relative influence of inter-war and wartime 
developments on the form the welfare state took, in particular the roles of 
national insurance and National Assistance. I also argue that means- 
testing of subsistence benefits (as well as non-subsistence benefits) was 
always a feature of welfare, despite the over-emphasis on a shift to 
'universalism' often found in writings about the post-war welfare state.
The welfare state as a concept was influenced by intolerance of the inter­
war muddle, rather than by wartime solidarity. By the 1930s Britain's 
social policies were due for an overhaul. The unemployment insurance 
system had had its problems and health was in difficulties too: costs were 
rising and health insurance did not cover everyone. Plans had already 
started being made before the outbreak of war for re-organisation. For 
example, schemes for social welfare were outlined in Labour's Immediate 
Programme of 1937 and Labour's War Aims of 1939. Therefore we have to 
be cautious about attributing specific welfare reforms to the w ar because 
in many cases reforms had been proposed before the war and we cannot 
say for certain what would have happened had war not broken out.
The inter-war experience influenced the form of the post-war welfare 
state to the extent that Beveridge was attached to the principal of
137 War bur ton, Edward and Carl Butler, 'Disallowed': The tragedy of the means test 
(London: Wishart and Co., 1935) p.157.
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insurance. He also wanted flat-rate contributions and flat-rate benefits, 
even though this made it hard to finance subsistence-level insurance 
benefits.138 Beveridge and Labour spokesmen hoped that the "broad 
subsistence basis' for National Insurance would largely eliminate the 
needs for means-tested benefits.
For those who failed to contribute, National Assistance would be 
available on a means-tested basis. However, as it turned out Beveridge 
incorrectly assumed that National Assistance would only have a 
transitional role, and in fact its importance grew.139 All the Beveridge 
benefits were always below the 'official' poverty line, as set by the 
National Assistance Board and the Supplementary Benefits 
Commission.140
In contrast to the insurance-based scheme, the changes affecting the 
means tested element of the benefits system had occurred during the war 
because of immediate needs of war, and had nothing to do with the pre­
war debate about poverty and unemployment. For example the 
household means test was abandoned in 1941.141 In its place a new test of 
'personal need' for couples and their dependent children was 
introduced.142 The immediate reason for this was that families were being 
split up by conscription, evacuation and the direction of labour and many 
people were living in 'scrambled' households. It d idn 't make sense to
138 Spicker, Paul, Poverty and Social Security: Concepts and Principles (Routledge, 1993) 
p.138.
139 Dean, Hartley, Welfare Rights & Social Policy (Prentice Hall, 2002) pp.78-80.
140 Abel-Smith, Brian, "Conclusion: the Need for Social Planning," in Owen, David, Peter 
Townsend, and Brian Abel-Smith, eds., Social Services For All? Part Four (London: Fabian 
Society, 1968) p.112; Alcock, P., Understanding Poverty, 2nd ed. (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 
1997) p.220.
141 Bevin, Ernest, The Truth about the Means Test: " The Poor Law is Buried". (London: The 
Labour Party, 1941).
142 Alcock, P., Understanding Poverty, 2nd ed. (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 1997) pp.221-222.
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amalgamate the income of household members any more.143 The concept 
of the 'non-dependant deduction' was brought in. A fixed amount of the 
income of non-dependant wage earners was taken into account. Under 
the new system less investigation was required as non-dependants only 
had to state which bracket their wage was in so that their contribution to 
the rent could be assessed.144 The treatment of a father, mother, son or 
daughter living with the householder was also changed so that the 
householder income had to be much higher before assistance was 
reduced. This offered other family members greater financial 
independence.
Another wartime change to National Assistance was the widening of the 
remit of the NAB.145 This permitted a means test considerably more 
lenient than that of the 1930s. Previously unthought-of categories of 
people needed help in wartime, for example people who were bombed 
out and had no possessions. This was another precedent for post-war 
policy as coverage for those not covered by social insurance was just a 
development of the existing task of the Assistance Board. Broadening the 
client group of the NAB to pensioners, refugees and people who had 
been bombed out was to remain permanently after the war. Payments 
were made directly by the Exchequer and so during the war the work of 
the Poor Law (later PACs) was finally taken away.
It is a common perception that the Second World War changed the 
guiding principle of social policy in Britain from 'selectivity' to 
'universalism'. This was facilitated by the expanded role of social services 
(such as medical services) during the war, participation of the masses
143 Jones, Kathleen, The Making of Social Policy in Britain, 1830-1990, 2nd ed. (London: 
Athlone Press, 1994) p.123.
144 Bevin, Ernest, The Truth about the Means Test: "The Poor Law is Buried". (London: The 
Labour Party, 1941).
145 Deacon, A., "Thankyou, God, For the Means-Test Man," New Society 56, no. 971
(1981): 519-520.
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resulting in a need to boost morale with a 'rew ard', and the consequent 
shift of consensus from a conservative to a more social democratic 
position. 'Universal' as opposed to 'selective' is used to describe post-war 
welfare in Britain, especially in comparison w ith the USA.146
However this classification is not altogether satisfactory. The term 
'universal' can be misleading: some people were excluded from the 
National Insurance scheme, and important distinctions were made 
between employed and self-employed and male and married female 
workers. Not all elderly were entitled to old age pensions. The insurance 
benefits were universal in the sense that receipt of benefit was not 
dependent on income, but on contributions. They were not universal in 
the sense that everyone in society was covered.147 Further, the 
'universalism ' of the British system has been diluted by the system of tax 
allowances. For instance mortgage tax relief reduced the cost of home 
ownership from the late 1960s, but those on lower incomes and therefore 
with low tax liability did not get tax relief.
The description 'universal' also downplays the persistence of selection 
and means-testing after Beveridge. In 1965 T.H. Marshall summed up 60 
or 70 years of 'the story of social policy' with the judgement that social 
welfare, once confined to 'the helpless and hopeless of the population' 
had been steadily extended to all citizens.148 But he was wrong (and soon 
to be proved even more wrong). As J. Harris has pointed o u t: '... to a 
greater extent than is commonly appreciated, post-war welfare provision 
took the form of means-tested transfer payments financed out of general 
taxation. Beveridge's fifth principle of comprehensive insurance was not
146 For example, the 1946 scheme is termed 'universal' by Brown, Muriel, Introduction to 
Social Administration in Britain, 6th ed. (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1985) p.284.
147 Webb, Steve, "Social Insurance and Poverty Alleviation: An empirical analysis," in 
Baldwin, Sally and Jane Falkingham, eds., Social Security and Social Change: New  
Challenges to the Beveridge Model (Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1994).
148 Marshall, T.H., Social Policy, 2nd ed. (1967) p.97.
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achieved, and the share of social welfare spending absorbed by public 
assistance doubled between the late 1940s and the mid-1970s'.149
Benefits introduced under the 1946 National Insurance Act did not provide 
the subsistence level envisaged by Beveridge. In any case the scheme only 
applied to those in employment. So the unemployed, those with large 
families and the elderly poor had to resort to means-tested National 
Assistance. The majority of claimants for National Assistance were 
seeking to top up insurance benefits. Even though insurance benefits 
were raised by 22 per cent just before the 1955 election150, it did little to 
slow the numbers applying for means-tested National Assistance.
Political scientists have constructed an index of social insurance coverage 
to compare national schemes.151 This index gives an indication of 
'universalism7 and 'selectivism' with respect to numbers covered and 
range of benefits -  the higher the index, the more 'universal' is social 
insurance. It consists of a weighted average of the percentage of the 
labour force covered by four systems: work accident insurance, sickness 
insurance, unemployment insurance, and old-age pensions. The weights 
given to the four systems are derived from their financial as well as 
sociological significance The index shows that the UK system had well 
above the European average scope from 1908 when pensions were 
introduced. However, the index at its maximum was 110 (in the late
149 See Harris, Jose, "Enterprise and Welfare States: A Comparative Perspective," 
Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, Fifth Series 40 (1990): 175-195.
150 Institute for Fiscal Studies, Fiscal Facts: Unemployment Benefit Rates [internet site] 
([cited 11 May 2001]); available from w ww .ifs.org.uk/taxsystem/unempben.shtml; 
Institute for Fiscal Studies, Fiscal Facts: Sickness Benefit [internet site] ([cited 11 May 
2001]); available from www.ifs.org.uk/taxsystem /sbben.shtml; Bradshaw, Jonathan and 
Tony Lynes, Benefit Uprating Policy and Living Standards (Social Policy Research Unit, 
1995) p.10.
151 Flora, Peter and Jens Alber, "Modernization, Democratization, and the Development 
of Welfare States in Western Europe," in Flora, Peter and Arnold J. Heidenheimer, eds., 
The Development of Welfare States in Europe and America (New Brunswick, USA: 
Transaction Books, 1981) p.57.
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1940s), which is well below the theoretical maximum scope (300) and is 
below the 130 that Norway achieved in the late 1950s.
Means-tested benefits have become more important in social policy. 
Dependence on National Assistance/Supplementary Benefit rose 
threefold 1948-1971, mainly because of increasing numbers of elderly 
with state pensions below subsistence level (contrary to Beveridge's 
intention). Other contributory factors were the rise in single parenthood 
and unemployment.
The selectivists of the 1960s wrote as if universal services were the rule 
and on the increase and selective services the occasional exception and on 
the decrease, though the reverse was actually the case! More and more 
means-tested schemes were introduced over time. By 1939 there were 18 
separate means tests in operation.152 By 1971 there were at least 38 
separate major means-tested benefits in existence for which central 
government was responsible. Each had their own assessment criteria, 
which involved administering 7 million individual means tests.153 Reddin 
tried to assess the number of means tests administered by local 
authorities in 1968 and found they numbered at least 3,000, of which 
1,500 were unique to each local authority.154 Thus there were some 1,500 
definitions of poverty/financial need / ability to pay; the need to pay out 
some 1,500 different rates of charges or contributions; and the need to
152 Crowther, M. A., British social policy 1914-1939 (Basingstoke: Macmillan Education, 
1988).
153 Mr Pardoe, House of Commons Hansard, v .827,9 December 1971, col.1500.
154 Reddin, Mike, "Local Authority Means-Tested Services," in Townsend, Peter, Mike 
Reddin, and Peter Kaim-Caudle, eds., Social Services For All? Part One (London: Fabian 
Society, 1968) p.9.
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receive some 1,500 different rates of benefit. Poor families were "caged in 
a veritable labyrinth of means tests' as Abel-Smith put it.155
The Conservative government of the mid-1980s itself said: 'the 
Government's aim in the overall social security programme is 
increasingly expressed in terms of targeting resources effectively on the 
most needy in society'.156 However, a DHSS review, initiated in 1985 to 
identify ways of targeting benefits, concluded that Britain already had 
one of the most targeted social security systems in the world.157 Although 
the discourse around means testing benefits has changed over time from 
the (mythical) golden age of Beveridge when 'universalist' solutions were 
favoured, to the supposedly new tendency towards a 'residual' model in 
the 1980s, in practice, means-testing always played a significant role in 
the welfare state.
3.2 The alternatives to means testing
3.2.1 Selective or universal?
The purpose of this section is to examine where a policy of means testing 
stands in relation to other possible policies on the distribution of social 
benefits. In this section I consider: what distinguishes means testing from 
other ways of targeting? What are the intellectual arguments for and 
against means testing as a general approach, and what are the 
alternatives? What was the position of the political parties on means 
testing and its alternatives? The long-running debate over means testing
155 Abel-Smith, Brian, "Conclusion: the Need for Social Planning," in Owen, David, Peter 
Townsend, and Brian Abel-Smith, eds., Social Services For All? Part Four (London: Fabian 
Society, 1968) p.113.
156 Department of Health and Social Security, Reform of Social Security: Programme for 
Action (London: HMSO, 1985) Cited in Corden, Anne, Changing Perspectives on Benefit 
Take-Up (London: HMSO, 1995) pp.1-2.
157 Glennerster, Howard, British social policy since 1945 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995) p.183.
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was generally framed in terms of "universal versus selective benefits'.158 
These sound like they should be very simple principles. However, 
actually determining how to implement them in practice raises many 
questions. Thus, these two concepts are not helpful as a way to analyse 
the arguments or describe the positions of political parties on means 
testing. I conclude that when thinking about alternative distribution 
policies, it is a mistake to rely on such a simplistic distinction.159
3.2.1. Defining selective and universal
The purpose of this section is to draw out what is meant by the terms 
"universal" and "selective". Firstly, to clarify what "selective" means. There 
are various definitions:
1. Choosing priorities. For example between education and health, or 
between institutional provision and care in the community.
2. Selection according to physical or educational criteria. For example 
fatherless families, the blind, or persons aged 80 and over, may 
qualify for benefits irrespective of their incomes.
3. A test of means or income applied to the general population or a 
sub-population, to decide who is poor enough to be provided with 
cash benefits or free services, or to be excused charges or pay 
lower charges. In means testing, specific individuals are classified as
158 See, for example, Seldon, A and H. Gray, Universal or Selective Social Benefits ?
(London: Institute of Economic Affairs, 1967); Titmuss, Richard M., "Universal and 
Selective Social Services," Commitment to Welfare (George Allen & Unwin, 1968); Reddin, 
Mike, "Universality versus Selectivity," Political Quarterly 40, no. 1 January (1969): 12-22; 
Davies, Bleddyn, Universality, Selectivity and Effectiveness (London: Heinemann, 1978); 
Besley, Timothy, "Means Testing Versus Universal Provision in Poverty Alleviation  
Programs," Economica 57, no. 225 (1990): 119-129; Shaver, S., "Universality or Selectivity 
in Income Support to Older People? A comparative assessment of the issues," Journal of 
Social Policy 27, no. 2 (1998): 231-254.
159 In this respect I concur with R. Titmuss who called the arguments surrounding 
universalism and selectivism 'the most trivialised and denigrated' in 'the age of the 
great simplifiers ... who polarise conflicts so as to present them as entertainment', 
quoted in Davies, Bleddyn, Universality, Selectivity and Effectiveness (London:
Heinemann, 1978) p .l.
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eligible or ineligible for benefits according to income-related 
criteria.
This list shows that means testing is but one of a number of selection 
mechanisms - option (3). An alternative ideological position to 
selectivism or targeting of benefits is 'universalism'. 'Universal' can mean 
either a. free service or a service available to everyone,160 When the 
dichotomy between universal and selective is referred to, 'universal' 
means a free service and 'selective' means income an d /o r assets serve as 
a test of eligibility.
However, there are in fact various other positions in-between full 
universality and full selectivity, which means the debate is more intricate 
than the 'universal as opposed to selective' structure suggests. One 
alternative position is to have basic universal services, but give extra 
resources to particularly needy areas. This corresponds to option (2) 
above. This approach was elaborated by R. Titmuss:
'The challenge that faces us is not the choice between 
universal and selective social services. The real challenge 
resides in the question: what particular infrastructure of 
universalist services is needed in order to provide a 
framework of values and opportunity bases with and around 
which can be developed socially acceptable selective services 
aiming to discriminate positively, with the minimum risk of 
stigma, in favour of those whose needs are greatest'.161
He preferred the additional selective services to be selective on the basis 
of area, such as inner city projects, housing subsidies or subsidies to 
schools in deprived areas, rather than individual characteristics:
160 Burns, Eveline M., "Income Testing of In-Kind Transfers: Discussion," in Garfinkel, I., 
ed., Income-Tested Transfer Programs: The Case For and Against (New York: Academic 
Press, 1982) p.344.
161 Titmuss, Richard M., Commitment to Welfare (George Allen & Unwin, 1968) p.135, 
reprinted in Titmuss, R.M., "Welfare State and Welfare Society," in Butterworth, Eric 
and Robert Holman, eds., Social Welfare in M odem Britain (Fontana /  Collins, 1975), 25- 
37.
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'In all the main spheres of need, some structure of 
universalism is an essential pre-requisite to selective positive 
discrimination; it provides a general system of values and a 
sense of community ... it allows positive discriminatory 
services to be provided as rights for categories of people and 
for classes in terms of priority social areas and other 
impersonal classifications'.162
Thus, he proposed a core of services free on categorical grounds, rather 
than based on an income test. His description illustrates how 'targeting', 
or 'selectivity', is different as a concept from means testing. Targeting 'is 
the general process of channelling benefits such as food stamps or 
subsidized health care to a target population such as the poor, females or 
children'.163 Crucially, these kinds of policies are not applied to 
individuals and so do not give rise to the problems and issues of personal 
means tests.164
Yet another intermediate position between total universality and total 
selectivity is to provide universal benefits, but tax them. According to 
E.R. Kingston, this makes it possible to increase targeting of social 
benefits w ithout undermining universality.165 Although income tax is a 
kind of means test, he believes that there is a qualitative difference 
between taxing social security income and means testing it: tax treatment 
is not perceived as means testing and does not carry the same stigma. 
Similarly, M. Rein states that selectivity by income testing can be 
achieved either at the point of consumption or at the point of financing
162 Titmuss, Richard M., Commitment to Welfare (George Allen & Unwin, 1968) p.135.
163 Willis, C. Y. and C. Leighton, "Protecting the Poor Under Cost Recovery - the Role of 
Means Testing," Health Policy and Planning 10, no. 3 (1995): 241-256 p.241.
164 Titmuss, Richard M., "Universal and Selective Social Services," Commitment to Welfare 
(George Allen & Unwin, 1968) p.114.
165 Kingson, E. R., "Testing the Boundaries of Universality - Whats Mean - Whats Not," 
Gerontologist 34, no. 6 (1994): 736-742.
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(where the role of taxation comes in).166 So, it can be seen that "universal 
versus selective" is a somewhat simplistic distinction to make.
The terms "universal" and "selective" are also limited in their usefulness to 
describe models of provision because they do not take account of the 
conceptual difference between public purchase and public provision: 
who pays for the service is a different issue from whether a public or 
private enterprise provides it. Although universalists are associated with 
favouring the public sector and selectivists w ith preferring the private 
sector, whether services should be publicly or privately provided should 
really be regarded as a separate debate from that on universal versus 
selective benefits: a universal service does not have to be publicly 
provided. One can envisage free services provided in the private sector as 
much as free services provided by the public sector. Similarly, a 
distinction can be made between means testing within the public sector 
and means testing with private provision. So, another reason why 
thinking about means testing in the "universal versus selective benefits" 
framework is flawed is that there are more subtleties to service provision 
than this approach highlights.
3.2.1. The sociological arguments
Arguments about universal or selective provision range from practical 
ones, to ideological ones. In this section and section 3.2.11 review the 
main ideological arguments for and against universal and selective 
provision, which I have categorised as broadly "sociological" and 
"economic". The two main practical arguments against selective provision - 
low take-up and incentive traps -  are considered separately in section 3.3 
below. The main issues from social point of view revolve around social 
solidarity, freedom of choice and rights. The economic points of
166 Rein, Martin, "Income Testing of In-Kind Transfers: Discussion," in Garfinkel, I., ed., 
Income-Tested Transfer Programs: The Case For and Against (New York: Academic Press, 
1982) p.352.
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contention concern faith in the market as an allocative mechanism and 
attitude to levels of public expenditure. I argue that the universalist case 
is flawed unless one puts over-riding importance on the moral obligation 
of the government to create a more equal society: the other universalist 
aspirations are not incompatible with means testing.
Universalists argued that means testing would stigmatise the poor, lead 
to a divided society and prevent social expenditures making the 
maximum social and economic benefit. Universalists thought that the 
social services would have a central role to play in the creation of a more 
equal society. P. Townsend stated: 'W hat is at stake is not just the most 
technically efficient or cheapest means of reaching an agreed end. It is the 
kind and quality of society we wish to achieve in Britain'.167 This 
represents a defence of universalism from a moral point of view, rather 
than a practical one. Under universalism, it has been argued, 'there 
would be a reduction of separate services and institutions for rich and 
poor and greater unity'.168 Whereas two services, one for the poor and 
one for others, would allegedly tend to exacerbate divisions in society 
because the result is 'a  poor service for the poor'. Similarly, Titmuss 
argued that: 'If these services were not provided for everybody by 
everybody, they would either not be available at all, or only for those 
who could afford them '.169
Universalism has problems with freedom of choice. Pursuit of social 
solidarity through universalism effectively means that everyone has to 
have the same. Some universalists did not want to see any private 
provision. An example of universalist argument might be that free
167 Townsend, Peter, "Introduction: Does Selectivity Mean a Nation Divided?," in 
Townsend, Peter, Mike Reddin, and Peter Kaim-Caudle, eds., Social Services For All? Part 
One (London: Fabian Society, 1968) p.l.
168 Townsend, Peter, The Scope and Limitation of Means-Tested Social Services in Britain 
(Manchester Statistical Society, 1972) p.3.
169 Titmuss, Richard M., Commitment to Welfare (George Allen & Unwin, 1968) p.129.
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prescriptions for all are preferable to means tested charges, because the 
danger of charging is that it lowers the relative cost of private medicine 
and more and more people will opt for private provision. A more 
moderate universalist position on private spending, also outlined by R. 
Titmuss, was to try and ensure that the state was not indirectly 
subsidising private provision.170 This view lay behind concern in the 
1960s about the status of private education and efforts to end pay beds in 
NHS hospitals. For universalists reduced choice was not a problem. They 
argued that freedom of choice in services is illusory because it is only 
freedom for the better off. However, reducing the viability of private 
enterprise is not incompatible with means-tested access to public sector 
services (as opposed to free access).
Universalists were concerned that access to services should be a 'right'.171 
But belief in rights to services is not necessarily incompatible with 
selective provision.172 All people are potentially needy and assistance is a 
right, not a gift. This is a need-based justification of social policy. In 
intellectual terms, the transition from 'need' to 'right' is difficult.173 
However, a society can define rights in terms of need.
From Townsend's perspective means-testing was a totally flawed 
approach. It assumed that a small diversion of national income was all 
that is needed to solve the problem of poverty. It widened rather than 
narrowed social inequalities. He said: 'It also assumes that the
170 Titmuss, Richard, Social Division of Welfare (1958).
171 It is not possible to say within the scope and method of this thesis whether the view  
of the 'general public' to non-income maintenance benefits was an entitlement or a 
privilege, and whether this attitude changed over time.
172 Welfare rights policies are not as unconditional as the welfare rights theory that , 
validates them might imply. See Barry, Norman, "Neoclassicism, the N ew  Right and 
British Social Welfare," in Page, Robert M. and Richard Silburn, eds., British Social 
Welfare in the Twentieth Century (London: Macmillan, 1999) p.70.
173 Baldwin, Peter, The Politics of Social Solidarity: Class Bases of the European Welfare State 
1875-1975 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990) p.31.
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circumstances of the poor can be greatly improved without changing 
major social institutions and severely limiting the opportunity of the 
prosperous sections of the population to accumulate more privileges7.174
3.2.1. Economic arguments
In terms of economic arguments, the proponents of universal benefits 
posited, in effect, that what the better-off were prepared to pay for - 
'market-forces' - were not an appropriate criterion for establishing the 
level of service to be provided. This can be the case when the gains to 
society as a whole in terms of social solidarity are great. In other words, 
when there are positive externalities. Externalities exist when the benefit 
to society (not just service users) is more important to consider than the 
benefit to the individual recipient. In such cases, the economic benefits of 
universalism "go unrecognised in the conventional cost-benefit analysis 
applied to social expenditure by economists'.175
On grounds of economic efficiency, selectivists argue that it is pointless to 
interfere with people's natural inclination to better themselves and the 
state should only intervene in cases of gross hardship. Furthermore, 
selectivity can be seen in the positive role of providing more resources for 
the poor. For example if the rich tend to use a service more (e.g. post- 
compulsory education) then this suggests that any benefit for the service 
should vary by income. It does not have to be seen negatively as a device 
for reducing expenditure centring on retrenchment rather than 
redistribution. Further, charging the richer may be a way of helping the
174 Townsend, Peter, "Introduction: Does Selectivity Mean a Nation Divided?," in 
Townsend, Peter, Mike Reddin, and Peter Kaim-Caudle, eds., Social Services For All? Part 
One (London: Fabian Society, 1968) p.6.
175 Lowe, Rodney, The Welfare State in Britain since 1945, 2nd ed. (London: Macmillan, 
1999) p.20.
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poorer, if it means that a service which would otherwise not be provided 
at all can be provided.176
The universalists believed more strongly in the case for the redistribution 
of income and wealth, and preferred to use universal benefits to achieve 
it. However, universalism has had peculiar consequences for the 
redistributive record of the welfare state. The middle class have benefited 
a great deal from the welfare state, mainly because they did well out of 
universal provision such as NHS medical services and schooling.177 The 
m iddle classes got services free which they would otherwise pay for. 
However, this was not a problem for the universalist theorist T.H. 
Marshall, who said: 'This is inevitable when services previously confined 
to the lower income groups are extended to the whole population'.178 In 
other words, if the stigma of means-testing was to be removed, then some 
relatively affluent people would benefit: that was the inevitable 
consequence of providing services as right rather than as charity.
Selective provision was preferable to universalism for neo-classical 
theorists on the grounds of cost minimisation. From the Government's 
(particularly the Treasury's) point of view, means testing was desirable 
because it acted as a restraint on public expenditure. Having a means 
tested charge may also be a more attractive option than trying to cut the 
pay of the professionals involved in providing the service.
A defence of universalism concerned the relatively high cost of revenue 
collection compared to the revenue itself. However, free market 
economists such as H. Gray of the IEA posited that opposition to means 
testing on administrative grounds was a weak argument: The lower
176 Lafitte, Francois, "The Right Means Tests," New Society, no. 6 April 1967 (1967) p.498.
177 Goodin, Robert E. and Julian Le Grand, eds., Not Only the Poor: The Middle Classes and 
the Welfare State (London: Allen & Unwin, 1987).
178 Jones, Kathleen, The Making of Social Policy in Britain, 1830-1990, 2nd ed. (London: 
Athlone Press, 1994) p.162.
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volume of services supplied would compensate for the higher 
administrative costs.179 It has also been found that the relatively high 
administration cost of the main social assistance benefit per beneficiary 
per week derives from the instability of individual circumstances leading 
to a frequent need to re-assess claims, and not from the complexity of the 
means test.180 Certainly, in the case of the benefits considered in this 
study, the administrative savings from abolishing means-tested provision 
would in no way offset the loss of revenue from charging those who do 
not get means-tested help.
3.2.1. Conclusion
Commitment to more social solidarity is, essentially, a moral conviction, 
and there is probably little which can be said to dissuade those who hold 
such a view. However, the other universalist aspirations (redistribution, a 
strong public sector, welfare "rights' and, for some theorists, reduced 
freedom of choice) are not incompatible with means testing. A more 
convincing drawback of income-testing is that it carries stigma which 
discourages take-up and it increases cumulative and marginal tax rates, 
creating incentive problems. These problems are discussed in section 3.3 
below. As P. Townsend pointed out: 'In  principle "selectivity" does not 
necessarily have these consequences but they tend to arise in practice.'181 
This is why selectivity needs to be discussed in relation to its actual 
implementation, which I do in this thesis.
179 Gray, H., "Towards a new welfare strategy," New Society , no. 1 February (1968) p.160.
180 Spicker, Paul, Poverty and Social Security: Concepts and Principles (Routledge, 1993) 
p.141.
181 Townsend, Peter, The Scope and Limitation of Means-Tested Social Services in Britain 
(Manchester Statistical Society, 1972) p.3.
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3.2.2 Political parties' positions
To means test or not was a political dividing line. Either side of the line 
were differing perspectives regarding personal responsibility and the 
proper role for the government in a market economy. In this section, the 
division of views about selectivism and universalism in social policy will 
be examined to see what impact it had on the way in which policies were 
designed by the two main parties in government between the 1940s and 
the 1990s. It considers the relevance of party ideology for their policy 
position.
In post-war social policy, the Conservatives were associated with a 
preference for selectivity, and Labour with a drive towards 
universalism.182 Their different views on this depended on the belief that 
the welfare state was a positive force for good whose role should be 
expanded for Labour, as against the Conservative's view that its role 
should be limited to correcting for market failure.
The dominant ideology for Labour was the 'Fabian socialist' viewpoint, 
which took as its goal the achievement of services open to citizens on the 
basis of need, paid for out of general taxation, and not rationed by 
charges.183 Labour activists interpreted universalism as a clear 
commitment to a free health service, an increasing commitment to 
comprehensive education and, at least up to the 1960s, a strong 
commitment to a Beveridge-style insurance scheme to eliminate the need 
for means testing. In particular, there was a view that means tests should 
not be used to restrict access to services or to determine levels of charges 
because these cause stigma, deter take-up and encourage those who can
182 Spicker, Paul, Poverty and Social Security: Concepts and Principles (Routledge, 1993) 
p.119; Middleton, Roger, Government versus the Market: The growth of the public sector, 
economic management and British economic performance, c.1890-1979 (Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar, 1996) p.573.
183 Hill, Michael, The Welfare State in Britain: A  Political History since 1945 (Aldershot: 
Edward Elgar, 1993) p.157.
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pay to use alternative services. The main exponents of the universalist 
case were academic supporters of the Labour party, notably R. Titmuss 
and P. Townsend, rather than Labour political leaders.
Some of the least constructive policies of the period emerged when 
Labour made ideological universalist gestures, for example when 
prescription charges were abolished in 1965, only to be re-instated three 
years later. In addition, when public expenditure cuts became necessary 
in the late 1960s there resulted a fierce debate in the Labour ranks on the 
subject of "universality or selectivity". As the Fabian society put it: "a 
fundamental disagreement about the development of social policy which 
now appears to exist among leading spokesmen of the Labour 
Government and Labour Party".184
Conservative ideology was more ambiguous. Although the universal and 
redistributive nature of family allowances was unpopular with most 
Conservatives, there was strong support in the Party for some form of 
family benefit due its traditional concern for the family as an institution 
and also because family allowances had been enacted by the 
Conservative caretaker government in 1945, so it was part of the post-war 
welfare state the Conservatives could call their own.185
The Conservatives generally endorsed a selectivist approach throughout 
the period. The desire to avoid dependence and the erosion of personal 
responsibility remained a characteristic Conservative theme in both 
theory and practice. Seldon"s remark that "Free or subsidised meals do
184 Townsend, Peter, "Introduction: Does Selectivity Mean a Nation Divided?," in 
Townsend, Peter, Mike Reddin, and Peter Kaim-Caudle, eds., Social Services For All? Part 
One (London: Fabian Society, 1968) p .l.
185 Brigden, Paul and Rodney Lowe, Welfare Policy Under the Conservatives 1951-1964: A  
Guide to Documents in the Public Record Office (London: PRO publications, 1998) p.127.
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not teach parents to be less destitute, less irresponsible or less ignorant' is 
representative of the Conservatives' stance.186
Macleod and Maude writing in 1951, endorsed the general case for a 
social policy, but suggested that the egalitarian and universalist thrust of 
Labour policies had gone too far. They believed that 'Evils result from the 
assumption by the community of the exclusive role of Grand Almoner'.187 
Macleod and Powell in The Social Services: Needs and Means questioned 
why welfare should be provided without a means test. By seeking to 
provide an average standard, it was failing to deal with those in the 
greatest need, nor was the machinery of the welfare state 'helping the 
weak by its repression of the opportunities and independence of the 
strong'.188 The clearest expression of selectivism by Conservatives has 
come from the New Right, especially the IE A, which disseminated that 
view after 1955.
In 1966 the Conservative Party was arguing the need to 'revitalise our 
Welfare State so that those most in need get the most help and so that our 
money is used sensibly and fairly'.189 Targeting was essential to reconcile 
the rising tide of demand for welfare services with the equally vociferous 
demand for lower taxation, now seen as essential for electoral as well as 
economic success. The need not to interfere with the economic machine 
was consistently preached. Most Conservatives linked it with the need 
not to penalise through heavy taxation those with talent and enterprise, 
and the general message that people should be left with the fruits of their 
labour.
186 Seldon, Arthur, Charge (London: Temple Smith, 1977) p.122.
187 One Nation Group, One Nation (1951).
188 Macleod, Iain and Enoch Powell, The Social Services: Needs and Means (London: 
Conservative Political Centre, 1952).
189 Conservative Party, Action, Not Words (London: 1966).
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However, a switch from universal to selective benefits on its own would 
have disadvantaged traditional Conservative and floating voters in the 
middle class and upper working class. Compensation was therefore 
offered by continuing reductions in the standard rate of income tax and 
by offering concessions designed to reward personal initiative and 
savings. Its use of means testing was electorally sound because the tax 
breaks were aimed at the fast growing groups in affluent Britain and 
traditional Conservative supporters.
J. Barnes stated that: 'Conservative exponents of social reform wish to 
avoid making the citizen overly dependent on the state, hence the 
emphasis throughout the party on social insurance, to which the 
individual himself as well as his employer and the state contributes'.190 
However, there is more than one way to 'avoid dependence on the state', 
and selectivity and tightening eligibility criteria was the dominant 
method used by the 1980s. The mood changed such that by the early 
1980s a universal free service for school meals was 'an  idea scarcely 
mentioned, even by the most radical of public figures'.191
In summary, neither party had a clear standpoint. Rather, concerns 
appeared from time to time. In practice the party positions were 
confused, with the Conservatives slightly more inclined to adopt a 
pragmatic attitude. There is no simple way of characterising the 
interaction between the parties on this issue, which varied over time and 
from policy area to policy area. What we find is that different arguments 
were applied to different services.
190 Barnes, John, "Ideology and Factions," in Seldon, Anthony and Stuart Ball, eds., 
Conservative Century: The Conservative Party since 1900 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1994) p.331
191 Bisset, Liz and Jean Coussins, Badge of Poverty: a new look at the stigma attached to free 
school meals (London: Child Poverty Action Group, 1982) p.6.
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There is, only a vague party division which can be perceived along 
universalist/selectivist lines. For example, the Conservatives were 
prepared to go further than Labour and increase charges for prescriptions 
in the 1980s. As another example, the Conservatives were content to see 
charges steadily increase and limited access to school dinners and student 
support.
However, the universal/selective debate only really affected two parts of 
social security - education and health - in other words the basic elements 
of the welfare state. That personal social services and benefits such as 
legal aid should be subject to means tests has hardly been publicly 
contended. Therefore the universalist/selectivist divide is not a useful 
way to characterise the parties' positions on means testing.
3.2.3 Alternative models of provision for non-subsistence benefits
In this section I outline the specific alternatives to means testing which 
have been proposed for the four services which are the subject of this 
study.
For pharmaceutical benefits, the main alternative to means-tested low 
income exemptions which politicians and policy analysts proposed was 
free dispensing of prescriptions for all NHS patients. For school meals, 
the alternative model of free meals for all school children was suggested 
by campaigners. For example, universalism in school meals was the 
policy of the CP AG.192 Within government, replacement of the benefit in- 
kind by a cash payment was suggested and implemented for FIS 
recipients, although FIS itself was a means tested benefit. With student 
support, student leaders would have welcomed a 'liveable' maintenance 
grant for students in higher education, but it was not to be. Civil legal aid 
provided representation by private practitioners paid by public funds.
192 Bisset, Liz and Jean Coussins, Badge of Poverty: a new look at the stigma attached to free 
school meals (London: Child Poverty Action Group, 1982) p.6.
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'The intention was to provide the same representation for low-income 
litigants that they would have obtained if they could afford a lawyer7.193 
An alternative would have been to provide salaried lawyers at people's 
legal centres. Apart from free prescriptions for all, none of these 
alternatives to a means tested benefit were ever seriously countenanced 
by politicians, whether in or out of the government.
3.2.4 Conclusion
Much of the criticism about means testing is directed at the general 
concept, rather than specific means-tested benefits. The analysis of policy 
has tended to be at an abstract level, dichotomising between universal 
and selective benefits. Universal versus selectivity is a 'symbolic7 
argument, as some means-testing is plainly reasonable.
Another device, rather than means-testing, might be to use another filter 
which separates the decision to supply the service and the demand for 
the service. For school meals this could be evidence of malnutrition, as 
used to be the case in the inter-war period. But this is not feasible for the 
other benefits. Income inevitably has to be one of the criteria. How would 
one decide who 'needs' a university education or a divorce, for instance?
Policy makers have assumed that this simplistic distinction is useful in 
designing benefits. But they are vague terms and impede understanding 
of the continuum in policy design. Most so-called 'universal' benefits 
have not been available to everyone, irrespective of income, but depend 
on broad social categories of eligibility. The state retirement pension, for 
example was only for those with a social insurance contributions record. 
There is a separate debate about whether services should be publicly or 
privately provided. A distinction can be made between means testing 
within the state sector and means testing without any assumption about
193 Legal Action Group, A  Strategy for Justice: Publicly funded legal services in the 1990s 
(London: Legal Action Group, 1992) p.5.
public or private provision. In summary, benefits are not adequately 
described by the polar extremes of selectivity and universalism.
Unless we can select those in need of social benefits without investigating 
their income, we need ways to discuss appropriate and practical ways to 
improve the assessment of income, as opposed to debating the merits and 
drawbacks of means testing per se. As one commentator put it: 'Once only 
death and taxes were inevitable. For the time being at least, means tests 
m ust be added to the list' A94 Nevertheless, the political acceptability, the 
economic costs and the social consequences of means tested benefits 
depend to a great extent on their design. Therefore other, more detailed, 
concepts are needed to describe how means tests were designed and how 
they were administered.
To conclude, it is a mistake to rely on the simple dichotomy o f income-tested 
versus universal benefits. An analysis stripped of context and situation 
cannot provide answers to the design problems faced in real life. Much 
depends on the form in which each of these programs is devised. These 
issues of design are critical in determining political acceptability, the 
economic costs and the social consequences of the development of these 
types of programs. It is these aspects that the rest of this thesis is about. 
As a final comment on this section, the study of means tests and their 
administration reveals much which is of direct relevance to the wider 
discussion of the virtues and evils of selectivity. We need to know about 
the operation of selective means tested systems, their utilisation and their 
value to recipients.
194 Piachaud, D., "The Means Test Morass," New Society 59, no. 1006 (1982): 307-308 
p.308.
3.3 Im plem entation problems
There were other barriers to access apart from lack of sufficient income. 
They required a different policy from a means test to address. To focus 
here on the means test side of service provision is not to deny that there 
existed other barriers to the use of the service. Nevertheless, it is still 
relevant to examine the means test, because in all four instances, income 
could be one barrier to access of a service.
Table 3-1 Non-financial reasons for non-take-up: supply factors
Pharmaceutical
benefit
Lack of access to a doctor.
Free school 
meals
Lack of facilities for preparation and serving of meals in schools; 
children's absence from school due to sickness, exclusions or truancy.
Student grants Lack of necessary qualifications to get into university195; parents' refusal 
to pay their assessed contribution196.
Civil legal aid Lack of availability of a solicitor offering legal aid in some geographical 
areas197; ignorance by solicitors of their clients' potential eligibility to 
legal aid198; that the case must not be 'unreasonable'; that legal aid 
unavailable for certain types of case e.g. libel, slander, breach of 
promise199.
In some cases, the issues involved in ensuring access to the means-tested 
service are wider even than take-up. For example, R. Smith points out 
that: "access to justice requires policies that go beyond legal aid and the 
provision of lawyers or advisors".200 As another example, access to school
195 Blaug, M., "Loans for Students?," New Society, no. 6 October (1966) p.540.
196 Abel-Smith, Brian, "Income Testing of In-Kind Transfers," in Garfinkel, I., ed., Income- 
Tested Transfer Programs: The Case For and Against (New York: Academic Press, 1982).
197 Legal Action Group, A  Strategy for Justice: Publicly funded legal services in the 1990s 
(London: Legal Action Group, 1992) p.20.
198 Partington, Martin, The Legal A id  Means-Tests: Time for a Reappraisal (London: Child 
Poverty Action Group, 1978) p.15.
199 Willmott, Phyllis, Consumer's Guide to the British Social Services, 1st ed. 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1967) p.236.
200 Smith, Roger, Justice: redressing the balance (London: Legal Action Group, 1997) p.3.
103
meals is affected by supply factors which include availability of dining 
accommodation and kitchen capacity.201
Table 3-1 describes some of the barriers to use of means-tested services, 
which were not to do with the means test. The factors listed here are ones 
which affect the supply of the means-tested benefit to financially eligible 
people. There are also factors in non-take-up which relate to the demand 
for the benefit. Those factors, such as stigmatisation and ignorance are 
considered below.
3.3.1 Non-take-up
Some people who are in theory eligible for benefits under income test 
schemes do not apply for them, and this lack of Take-up' is the first major 
practical objection to means tests. Take-up is defined as: That proportion 
of overall entitlement actually received, or the percentage of people 
entitled who receive benefit'.202 It is of interest because 'measures of take- 
up provide indicators of effectiveness in implementing social security 
policy'.203 The reasons for non-take-up most frequently cited as important 
in the literature are stigma and ignorance.204
201 Davies, B. and V. Willamson, "School Meals - Short Fall and Poverty," Social and 
Economic Administration January (1968) p.8.
202 Corden, Anne, Changing Perspectives on Benefit Take-Up (London: HMSO, 1995) p .l.
203 Department of Health and Social Security, Reform of Social Security: Programme for 
Action (London: HMSO, 1985) Cited in Corden, Anne, Changing Perspectives on Benefit 
Take-Up (London: HMSO, 1995) p .l.
204 See, for example Townsend, Peter, Poverty in the United Kingdom: A  survey of household 
resources and standards of living (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1979) p.879; "Prescription for 
Ignorance," Poverty 8 (1968); Wootton, Barbara, "Review of 'Reserved For the Poor: the 
Means Test in British Social Policy' by A. Deacon and J. Bradshaw," New Society 66, no. 
1093 (1983): 156-157; Field, Frank, The stigma of free school meals (London: 1974); Kay, S, 
"Problems of Accepting Means-Tested Benefits," in Butterworth, Eric and Robert 
Holman, eds., Social Welfare in Modern Britain (Fontana /  Collins, 1975), 141-144; Weir, S., 
"Stigma with chips," New Society , no. 28 January (1982); Purnell, C., The Prospect for Rent 
Allowances (London: Wandsworth People's Rights, 1973); Purnell, Chris, "Means-tested 
benefit take-up among private sector tenants," Poverty 26 (1973) p.15. Meacher, Molly, 
Rate Rebates: A  Study of the Effectiveness of Means Tests (London: Child Poverty Action 
Group, 1972) confirmed the importance of ignorance, but also showed that it was not the
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Means tests allegedly lead to stigmatisation. For example, a 1981 survey 
showed low take-up of school meals, with only 60 per cent of eligible 
children receiving the free meals because of stigmatisation.205 Similarly, 
of around 1.8m school children entitled to free school meals in 1996-7, 20 
per cent did not take up their entitlement.206 Much of the stigma was to 
do with the way that free school meals were administered at school level. 
It was found that parents' belief that other children would know if their 
child had free meals, or that their child would mind others knowing, was 
an important factor in determining whether eligible families actually 
claimed free meals or not.
Stigma is also affected by whether receipt of the service suggests 
inadequacy on the part of the applicant. Thus there is a greater 
perception of stigma in relation to receipt of free school meals than 
student grants. M. Partington argued that the possibility of stigma is 
greater the smaller the client group subject to the means test.207
only factor in non-take-up. Meacher, Molly, "Simplifying means tests," Poverty 27 (1973) 
notes that 'ignorance of the existing benefits, the income limits and claiming procedure 
accounted for fully 72 per cent of the non-take-up of benefits' and wonders 'once it is 
made easier to claim, the stigma attached to benefits will still keep the take-up rate 
down'. Lister, Ruth, Take-up of Means-Tested Benefits (London: CP AG, 1974) is a literature 
review, which shows that most of the surveys suggested that stigma was a factor, 
although not the only one. Bradshaw, Jonathan, "Tried and found wanting: the take-up 
of means-tested benefits," in Ward, Sue, ed., DHSS in Crisis: Social Security - under 
pressure and under review (London: CPAG, 1985) p.110 acknowledges that stigma and 
ignorance are frequently referred to but says that 'humiliating enquiries' and the 
'confusion of old ladies' are not the only reasons for non-take-up.
205 Wilson, Paul, Tree School Meals: a survey carried out on behalf of the Department of 
Education and Science (London: Office of Population Censuses and Surveys, 1981). Cited 
in Bisset, Liz and Jean Coussins, Badge of Poverty: a new look at the stigma attached to free 
school meals (London: Child Poverty Action Group, 1982) p.12.
206 McMahon, Will and Tim Marsh, Filling the gap: Free school meals, nutrition and poverty 
(London: Child Poverty Action Group, 1999) p .l.
207 Partington, Martin, The Legal A id Means-Tests: Time for a Reappraisal (London: Child 
Poverty Action Group, 1978) p.24.
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Another factor in non-take-up is ignorance of entitlement.208 A survey209 
found that of those eligible for free school meals because of low income, 
only just over one-third were sure of their entitlement, 40 per cent 
thought they would not qualify and 24 per cent did not know whether 
they would or not. Ignorance of entitlement is a particular problem 
among the low paid employed.
Before applying, the applicant needs to know whether he stands a chance 
of being eligible for help. B. Abel-Smith described the causes of ignorance 
in the 1960s: T or many of the existing selective benefits, eligibility 
requirements are a close kept secret: the scales, disregards and 
allowances are not published7.210 This made it impossible for the 
applicant to know why he had been refused benefit. At that time he 
described the system as one in which 'while most of the authorities 
providing selective benefits work on the basis of minimum disclosure of 
their side of the operation, the applicant has to make maximum 
disclosure7.211 However, this was not so true by the 1990s, perhaps 
because of the criticisms of people like Abel-Smith about the systems.
A Department of the Environment survey of take-up of rent allowances 
in Haringey suggested that the two factors of stigma and ignorance were 
intertwined: people seemed far less ignorant of those benefits which did
208 For example, a circular sent out to parents in 1968 increased take-up of free meals by 
100,000, suggesting ignorance of entitlement was a factor in non-take-up. House of 
Commons Hansard v. 722 4 November 1968, col. 489.
209 Wilson, Paul, Free School Meals: a survey carried out on behalf of the Department of 
Education and Science (London: Office of Population Censuses and Surveys, 1981)
210 Abel-Smith, Brian, "Conclusion: the Need for Social Planning," in Owen, David, Peter 
Townsend, and Brian Abel-Smith, eds., Social Services For All? Part Four (London: Fabian 
Society, 1968) p.113.
211 Abel-Smith, Brian, "Conclusion: the Need for Social Planning," in Owen, David, Peter 
Townsend, and Brian Abel-Smith, eds., Social Services For All? Part Four (London: Fabian 
Society, 1968) p.114.
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not involve a means test, even though they tended to be less well 
publicised.212
Kerr clarified ideas about barriers to claiming means-tested benefits, and 
moved beyond the two ideas of stigma and ignorance.213 Kerr's main 
interest was in why some pensioners did not claim the means-tested 
pension that they were entitled to. His approach was to look at the 
psychological determinants of claiming behaviour -  beliefs, attitudes and 
feelings. Kerr identified six conceptually distinct reasons for claiming and 
incorporated them in a model that could be tested and used both to make 
interpretations and predictions. This was a way to cut through the 
'conceptual clutter' that affected research on take-up at the time. Based on 
Kerr's ideas, I classify impediments to take-up as follows:214
1. Perceived need. The individual's perception of the extent to which 
he is having difficulty making ends meet.
2. Basic knowledge. The individual's awareness or ignorance of the 
existence of a benefit.
3. Perceived eligibility. The individual's perception of the likelihood
212 Lewis, T., Haringey Rent Allowance Project (Department of the Environment,) 
unpublished. Cited in Bisset, Liz and Jean Coussins, Badge of Poverty: a new look at the 
stigma attached to free school meals (London: Child Poverty Action Group, 1982) p.15.
213 See Kerr, Scott A., "Deciding about Supplementary Pensions: a provisional model," 
Journal of Social Policy 11, no. 4 (1982): 505-17 Summarised in Deacon, Alan and Jonathan 
Bradshaw, Reserved For The Poor: The Means Test in British Social Policy (Oxford:
Blackwell, 1983) p.139.
214 There is no accepted schema for classifying barriers to take-up in the social policy 
literature, so I developed my own definitions, mainly based on Kerr, Scott A., "Deciding 
about Supplementary Pensions: a provisional model," Journal of Social Policy 11, no. 4
(1982): 505-17 Purnell, C., The Prospect for Rent Allowances (London: Wandsworth 
People's Rights, 1973) distinguishes two sets of reasons for failure to claim, 'technical 
factors' such as ignorance, and 'non-technical factors' such as stigma. Deacon, Alan and 
Jonathan Bradshaw, Reserved For The Poor: The Means Test in British Social Policy (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1983) found that the three barriers of ignorance, complexity and attitudes to 
stigma contain within them a variety of different elements. Meacher, Molly, Rate Rebates: 
A Study of the Effectiveness of Means Tests (London: Child Poverty Action Group, 1972) 
listed seven factors which may affect the attitude to claiming. Bradshaw, Jonathan, 
"Tried and found wanting: the take-up of means-tested benefits," in Ward, Sue, ed., 
DHSS in Crisis: Social Security - under pressure and under review (London: CP AG, 1985) 
found a variety of reasons for non-take-up to do with the complexity of means tested 
benefits.
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that they are eligible for the benefit, misunderstanding of the 
eligibility criteria, misperception caused by repudiation of past 
claims.
4. Perceived utility. The individual's perception of the utility of the 
benefit in meeting his specific needs, the value of the benefit.
5. Beliefs and feelings about the application procedure. Whether they are 
positive or negative, pride and fear of stigma, fear of officials, lack 
of articulate-ness in the face of a complex claims procedure.
6. Perceived stability of the situation. The extent to which beliefs about 
the instability of the individual's situation prevents him from 
applying.
To apply for a benefit, a claimant has to have a positive response to all six 
of these. Each taken alone is not sufficient reason for claiming.
Kerr's model has been criticised because it predicts non-claimants better 
than claimants. Also, its focus is on psychological determinants of 
individual claiming behaviour.215 Much economic work is underpinned 
by theory based on individualism, emphasizing choice and behaviour 
based on conventional ideas of utility maximization. For example, stigma 
could be modelled as a psychological cost.
However, it is not enough to look at the motives, intentions and decisions 
of applicants themselves. Policy makers and administrators have 
significant roles too. Policy makers design the benefit. Elements of design, 
such as the eligibility criteria, the name of the benefit, the amount of 
money available and length of award, and the position of the benefit 
within the overall social security system, will all have some effect on 
take-up. The way in which benefits are delivered will also influence take- 
up. Influences affecting take-up can be systematically classified at three 
levels:
• The benefit scheme
• The administration
215 Corden, Anne, Changing Perspectives on Benefit Take-Up (London: HMSO, 1995) pp.4-6.
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• The applicant.
In this thesis, I use a model which emphasises the design of benefits, 
rather than a model which emphasises administration a n d / or decision 
making by individual applicants. An advantage of this approach is that 
attention is focused on the benefit structure, rather than placing most of 
the responsibility on the claimant.
Stigma, and the other factors that impede take-up under (5) Beliefs and 
feelings about the application procedure, are not ones which this thesis is 
concerned with. Similarly, factors (1) and (6), which are to do with the 
applicant's interpretation of his own situation, are not looked at in this 
study. (4) Perceived utility is also to do with the applicant's interpretation 
of his own situation, which the method of this thesis cannot address. 
However, the statistical analysis of the real value of the benefits over time 
provided in chapter 4 gives an indication of the relative values of the 
particular benefits which are under consideration in this study. The value 
of the benefit influences take-up: the more valuable the benefit, the 
greater the take-up.
The aspects of take-up which I can contribute to with this thesis relate 
mainly to (2) Basic knowledge and (3) Perceived eligibility. These are two 
facets of 'ignorance'. They are affected by the benefit design. As Corden 
says: 'While these effects have traditionally been interpreted at the client 
level in terms of misunderstanding, or inability to make the necessary 
intellectual links, they may be equally well interpreted in terms of the 
characteristics of the benefit itself'.216 This is the approach which this 
study takes. It makes my analysis of the complexity of means tests in 
chapter 6 highly relevant to understanding take-up.
216 Corden, Anne, Changing Perspectives on Benefit Take-Up (London: HMSO, 1995) p.15.
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Van Oorschot and Kolkhuis Tancke217 found a greater probability of non­
take-up in schemes with a design that:
• Has a high density of rules and guidelines
• Contains complex rules
• Contains vague criteria of entitlement
The two criteria of density of rules and guidelines, and complexity of 
rules have some overlap. Their effect is to depress take-up by delaying 
and preventing applications and contributing to dissemination of 
misinformation. It proved hard to maintain levels of take-up of benefits 
with precise and extremely sensitive financial tests. However simple they 
seemed to the assessors, the financial assessment procedures were 
complicated, which made it very difficult for a potential applicant to 
estimate his or her eligibility. There are people who assume (often 
wrongly) that they will not be eligible, and so choose not to be means 
tested. Imprecision also encourages ineligible people to apply, which 
wastes administrative time. It has been pointed out that 'financial 
assessment procedures really are difficult to comprehend at a glance/ 
and that 'intuitive ideas about how they operate can be very 
inaccurate'218
Density of rules and guidelines, and complexity of rules encourage vague 
criteria of entitlement. As Corden puts it: 'It is a paradox that precise and 
complex rules of entitlement have to be summarised or reformulated in 
general terms for promotional purposes'.219 This creates, in turn, the
217 Van Oorschot, W. and P. Kolkhuis Tancke, Niet-gebruik van sociale Zekerheid; feiten, 
theorieen, onderzoeksmethoden (Den Haag: 1989)(Summary in English:Van Oorschot, W., 
"Non-take-up of social security benefits in Europe," Journal of European Social Policy 1, 
no. 1 (1991): 15-30). Cited in Corden, Anne, Changing Perspectives on Benefit Take-Up 
(London: HMSO, 1995) p.13.
218 May, J.S., "Charging for Home Help," in Gibson, J.G., ed., Fees and Charges in the 
Personal Social Services (Birmingham: Institute of Local Government Studies, University 
of Birmingham, 1979) p.28.
219 Corden, Anne, Changing Perspectives on Benefit Take-Up (London: HMSO, 1995) p.14.
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impression of vagueness. For example, free prescriptions may be 
advertised as available to 'families on low earnings'. This is such an 
imprecise concept that it prevents people identifying themselves as 
included. The criteria are not really vague: it is the need to promote the 
benefit in popular terms that produces vagueness. Another kind of 
imprecision is also involved with benefits that incorporate considerable 
discretion in the entitlement criteria.
The difficulties faced by people with low literacy skills is another reason 
cited for low take-up. However, a survey220 showed that the method of 
distribution of forms, rather than the design of the form, is a more 
important factor in the number of applications for a benefit. Door-to-door 
distribution of a simplified form had no more impact on applications 
than door-to-door distribution of a more complex form. So it does seem 
to be important to take-up that information on benefits is made widely 
available.
On the other hand, improving information can only do so much to 
increase take-up. Although experimental campaigns by government in 
1967 and 1968 showed that take-up of free school meals could be 
increased substantially by letters addressed directly to parents and 
advertising,221 advertising only draws attention to the existence of a 
benefit for a short time, and then the effect rapidly dissipates.222 The best 
hope for improvements in take-up is to simplify the process of claiming 
or simplify the benefits themselves.
220 Welsh Consumer Council, One Form for Benefits?: A Welsh Consumer Council Study of 
Multi-Purpose Claim Forms in M erthyr Tydfil (Cardiff: Welsh Consumer Council, 1977) 
pp.44-47.
221 Black, Sir Douglas et al., The Black Report, 1992 ed. (London: Penguin, 1980) p.179.
222 Partington, Martin, The Legal A id  Means-Tests: Time for a Reappraisal (London: Child 
Poverty Action Group, 1978) p.22.
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Van Oorschot and Kolkhuis Tancke223 also found a greater probability of 
non-take-up in schemes that:
• Are aimed at groups in society subject to negative prejudices
• Supplement other sources of income.
There are other factors that might be added to their list. Schemes that:
• Overlap or interact with other benefits
• Challenge cultural norms.
The kind of effect produced by having a target group in society 
negatively valued is usually interpreted at the applicant level, in terms of 
feelings and perceptions of individual claimants. But it can also be 
thought of in association with features of benefit design, such as how 
high up the income scale eligibility reaches. This effect might apply to 
one or more of the non-subsistence benefits which are the subject of this 
study. Student grants were the benefit least likely to have negative 
connotations.224
Non-take-up is greater for benefits designed to supplement other sources 
of income. This is a particular difficulty for the benefits which are the 
subject of the study, since they are all non-subsistence benefits. In other 
words, by definition they supplement other sources of income.
Overlap and interaction in the criteria for eligibility, such as when one 
benefit counts as income in the assessment of another, lowers take-up. It 
is often not easy for the applicant to work out which combination is in 
their overall financial interest. Another example of interaction is where
223 Van Oorschot, W. and P. Kolkhuis Tancke, Niet-gebruik van sociale Zekerheid; feiten, 
theorieen, onderzoeksmethoden (Den Haag: 1989)(Summary in EngIish:Van Oorschot, W., 
"Non-take-up of social security benefits in Europe," Journal of European Social Policy 1, 
no. 1 (1991): 15-30). Cited in Corden, Anne, Changing Perspectives on Benefit Take-Up 
(London: HMSO, 1995) p.13.
224 Townsend, Peter, Poverty in the United Kingdom: A  survey of household resources and 
standards of living (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1979) p.891. Timmins asserts that there 
was 100 per cent take up of student grants. See Timmins, Nicholas, The Five Giants: A  
Biography of the Welfare State (Fontana, 1996) p.285.
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receipt of one benefit is an essential criterion for eligibility for another, 
such as 'passported' benefits. Lowered take-up of one benefit has a 
"knock-on' effect on the second. This is a structurally-produced effect. For 
the applicant, overlaps and interactions are hard to understand. They 
make people confused and contribute to fear of claiming a benefit should 
it lead to a reduction in existing benefits. It contributes to misinformation 
or belief that people are not entitled to two benefits at once. These effects 
are likely to apply to non-subsistence benefits.
Eligible families may be deterred from applying for benefits if structural 
aspects conflict with normal behaviour for the person. For example, free 
school meals may not be accessed by children if their peers do not eat 
school meals.
Is non-take-up actually a problem? It could be argued that it is a m atter of 
self-selection among potential claimants.225 The extent of utilisation of 
services for which people are potentially eligible would be useful to 
know, but it is not part of this study. Another type of survey would have 
to be done to get that information. This would be valuable additional 
information in gauging the effectiveness of a benefit in reaching its target 
group. However, for a couple of the benefits which are the subject of this 
study, was able to make a limited comparison of the published figures on 
the numbers of people who did claim with my calculations of the 
numbers eligible and thus estimate the level of take-up achieved (see 
section 8.4).
3.3.2 Disincentives
The poverty trap and other distortions to incentives created by means 
tests are the second major objection to them. Even if there were 100 per
225 Bradshaw, Jonathan, "Tried and found wanting: the take-up of means-tested 
benefits," in Ward, Sue, ed., DHSS in Crisis: Social Security - under pressure and under 
review (London: CPAG, 1985) p.109.
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cent take-up of means tested benefits, we would still be left with the other 
major objection to them: that of the poverty trap.226 The problem is that 
some individuals may choose to work less than they could in order to 
qualify for benefits. Means testing also introduced another disincentive - 
the 'savings trap'. This is because of the use of wealth holdings to reduce 
or remove entitlement to benefit. A significant role for means tested 
benefits, 'm ay appear attractive in the short-term as a means of 
concentrating available resources on those in greatest need. But in the 
long-term it reduces incentives to work and save'.227 It can be argued that 
means testing is fundamentally at odds with the goal of encouraging self- 
help and independence, although it is superficially attractive because it 
limits expenditure.
The poverty trap and other disincentives is not a new problem. It was 
known to benefits administrators to be a problem in the 1950s. One of the 
first papers to identify and name the phenomenon appeared in 1971.228 
The poverty trap has been described as 'taking on new and more complex 
practical forms, because of the rapidly growing use in the 1990s of means- 
testing to determine access to an ever wider range of benefits and services 
by local, as well as central, government'.229
New Right thinkers are concerned about the poverty trap because it 
means that policies may not be getting people off welfare, which is the 
aim. Traps which lead to a 'dependency culture' are a direct consequence
226 Deacon, Alan and Jonathan Bradshaw, Reserved For The Poor: The Means Test in British 
Social Policy (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983) p.148.
227 Piachaud, David, "Progress on Poverty," New Economy 6, no. 3 (1999): 154-160 p.154.
228 Field, F. and D. Piachaud, "The Poverty Trap," New Statesman , no. 3 December (1971) 
was the first according to Alcock, Pete and Sarah Pearson, "Raising the poverty plateau: 
The impact of means-tested rebates from local authority charges on low income 
households," Journal of Social Policy 28, no. 3 (1999): 497-516 p.498.
229 Alcock, Pete and Sarah Pearson, "Raising the poverty plateau: The impact of means- 
tested rebates from local authority charges on low  income households," Journal of Social 
Policy 28, no. 3 (1999): 497-516 p.498.
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of targeting on the poor. Social security may therefore be reinforcing the 
problem of poverty rather than relieving it. Disincentive effects are much 
worse at the lower end of the income scale than for the middle class who 
are believed to work for other reasons than simply to earn money. 
Another problem is that the existence of poverty traps is a great 
encouragement to fraud.230
The incentive effects of benefits are analysed by the implicit marginal tax 
rate for the benefit recipient. The means tested student grant raised the 
implicit marginal tax rate to very high levels. The means test for assessing 
students' grants gave rise to a middle class 'poverty trap', which may 
have had disincentive effects.
Incentive problems are worse when the tapering of several means tested 
scales overlap and interact. Examining schemes in isolation from each 
other is of less value than examining how they interact for this reason, 
especially when low income families can quite feasibly be involved in 
several different schemes at the same time. This makes the 
microsimulation method an ideal method to investigate means tested 
benefits.
Unfortunately the responsiveness of public demand to these changes in 
marginal tax rates is not easy to measure, but the changes will be in the 
direction the analyst assumes, even if the extent varies. The size of the 
poverty trap will depend on the value of the benefits in question. 
Reference to the table showing the value of benefits in chapter 1 suggests 
that student grants and civil legal aid may affect the behaviour of 
recipients because of the high absolute value of the benefit. The less 
valuable benefits of free school meals and prescriptions might influence 
the behaviour of their recipients, because even though the benefit is
230 Barry, Norman, "Neoclassicism, the N ew  Right and British Social Welfare," in Page, 
Robert M. and Richard Silburn, eds., British Social Welfare in the Twentieth Century 
(London: Macmillan, 1999) p .71.
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worth quite little, it is a relatively large amount to people on the lowest 
incomes.
However, it is not formal economic analysis of the pros and cons of 
different types of provision which has determined social policy, but 
rather the broader social, economic and political forces. This is especially 
the case in forming the governments' preference for means testing.
3.3.3 Conclusion
This chapter has taken for granted that means tests were used, and will 
be used in the future, despite having some drawbacks. I have identified 
three problems: non-financial barriers to take-up, non-take-up, and 
disincentives. Commentators differ as to how fatal they think the flaws of 
selectivity are. What can this study contribute to understanding and 
resolving these problems?
Non-financial barriers on the supply side are not unique to a means 
tested service: they might equally exist in a service which is free to all. 
These are not issues which this study can address. Turning to the 
demand side, my examination of the design and outcomes of means tests 
is relevant to some issues of take-up. Specifically, the aspects of take-up 
to which I can contribute with this thesis relate mainly to basic 
knowledge of the benefit and perceived eligibility of the benefit. These 
are two facets of ignorance and are affected by the benefit design.
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4 The development of means-tested benefits
The purpose of this chapter is to identify the timing and nature of the 
major changes to the specific non-subsistence benefits which are the focus 
of this thesis. This kind of account, which pulls together several non­
income maintenance benefits, is not available in any single published 
source. There exist accounts of the development of benefits individually, 
each spanning various different time horizons, but not a history which 
pulls the story of several benefits together. There are also general works 
on many aspects of the welfare state, for example those by R. Lowe and 
N. Timmins.231 However, the scope of those books means that non­
income maintenance benefits only feature at those moments when they 
were a concern of high politics. In this chapter I fill in the gaps left by 
over-arching accounts of the development of the welfare state. I also 
extend the individual histories already available by relating the changes 
in these benefits to the broader political, economic and administrative 
context in which welfare policy evolved between the 1930s and the 1990s.
The first objective is therefore to outline the main developments in the 
administration of these non-subsistence benefits. The second objective is 
to set these developments against the major political and economic events 
which influenced welfare policy, the policy on subsistence benefits and 
the debates on the welfare state which transcended policy on individual 
benefits. I am interested in whether major changes to non-income 
maintenance benefits fed through to actually make a difference "on the 
ground' to the numbers and types of people eligible. This chapter is one 
half of the answer to that question, which I return to in chapters 7 and 8.
The approach taken was to collect information from as many primary 
and secondary textual sources as I could access. I also used quantitative
231 Lowe, Rodney, The Welfare State in Britain since 1945, 2nd ed. (London: Macmillan, 
1999); Timmins, Nicholas, The Five Giants: A  Biography of the Welfare State (Fontana, 1996).
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data sources. I collated the research into a coherent account of the 
development of each benefit, looking for similarities and differences in 
how the wider context influenced their development. The chapter is 
divided into sections according to years when there were changes in 
government, as these usually correspond to changes in the political and 
economic environment. I first outline the general political and economic 
context. I then consider the developments in individual non-subsistence 
benefits. Not all of the benefits which are the specific focus of this study 
are mentioned for every epoch. Only those for which a substantial change 
occurred are described. In the conclusion to each section I make an 
overall assessment of the governments' records on social policy and of 
the developments in non-subsistence means-tested benefits in that 
period. The last section uses charts to present quantitative information 
relating to the whole period 1930-1997 for the purpose of quantifing the 
significance of the benefits which are the subject of this study
In the final conclusion I consider whether there is any general pattern to 
the timing and nature of major changes to non-subsistence benefits.
4.1 The 1930s
The benefits which are the subject of this study are mainly a post-war 
welfare state phenomenon. However, the inter-war period is very 
important to subsequent post-war developments, which makes it an apt 
starting point for my historical narrative.232
The Liberal government of 1905-15 had introduced many welfare 
measures, such as old age pensions, national insurance and national 
health insurance. The First World War further extended the reach of 
government into everyday life and increased social services expenditure. 
At the same time, the provisions of the Poor Law provided for those who
232 Glennerster, Howard, "Social Policy since the Second World War," in Hills, John, ed., 
The State of Welfare: The Welfare State in Britain since 1974 (Oxford: OUP, 1990) p .l l .
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did not have insurance. The re-organisation of local government in 1929 
meant that the institutions of the Poor Law changed their name, but they 
were still recognisable.
4.1.1 School m eals
In the late nineteenth century there were already charities which fed 
needy children either free or cheap dinners, such as the Destitute 
Children's Dinner Society.233 Compulsory elementary education 
(Mundella Act 1880) brought poor children into school. School meals were 
provided to make sure no children were too hungry to be able to take 
advantage of an education. The provision of school meals was first 
authorised by the Education (Provision of Meals) Act of 1906, which was a 
permissive measure that enabled local education authorities to assist 
school canteen committees, or to defray the cost themselves of providing 
meals. Bentley Gilbert identified the 1906 Act as the most significant 
break with the nineteenth century dominance of laissez-faire and as a 
significant invasion into the sphere of the Poor Law.234 The implications 
of this means test distinguished it from poor relief: the responsibility was 
confined to the parent only; the discretion was given to the education 
authority, not the relieving authority; and the parent was exempted from 
disenfranchisement.235
Administration of the 1906 Act was based on voluntary workers who had 
interested themselves in the welfare of school children. They would visit 
parents, and collect information about the economic circumstances of
233 Charity Organisation Society, "The Feeding of School Children," Occasional Papers of 
the C.O.S. (London: C.O.S., 1896); Council of the Society for Organising Charitable Relief 
and Repressing Mendacity, Report on Soup-Kitchens and Dinner-Tables (London: 
Longmans, 1871).
234 Gilbert, Bentley B., The evolution of national insurance in Great Britain: the origins of the 
welfare state (London: Michael Joseph, 1966)
235 Macleod, Iain and Enoch Powell, The Social Services: Needs and Means (London: 
Conservative Political Centre, 1952) p.15.
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parents whose children appeared to need free meals.236 They assessed 
contributions from those parents able to pay something towards the cost.
Meals were served soup kitchen style. By 1914 only half the education 
authorities were providing meals, but 31,000 children were receiving 
meals.237 During the inter-war period an increasing number of local 
authorities took advantage of their power to provide school meals, and 
the tendency was for less and less to be demanded from the parents 
towards covering costs.238 School meals interacted with the main 
subsistence benefits for the unemployed in the inter-war period. Where 
parents were receiving public assistance or unemployment benefit, the 
cost of school meals received by their children was deducted from PAC 
or UAB grants. The mother had to choose between school meals and a 
little extra money. Regulations issued by UAB in December 1934 
"prescribed that all meals beyond a certain number shall be taken into 
account in assessing an applicant's needs'.239
The provision of school meals continued to gain acceptance in many 
areas up to the start of the Second World War, although there was wide 
variation in provision. Some areas provided three meals a day, others a 
'milk meal' consisting of a glass of milk and a biscuit 240 Still other 
authorities refused to provide a free meal service, arguing that school 
feeding was a public health measure and so should not be the
236 Milnes, Nora, "The Position of Voluntary Social Services in 1918," in Mess, Henry A., 
ed., Voluntary Social Services since 1918 (London: Kegan Paul, 1948) p.21; National 
Council for Social Service, Public Social Services, 8th ed. (London: NCSS, 1939) pp.79-80.
237 Pearce, Malcolm and Geoffrey Stewart, British political history 1867-1990: Democracy 
and decline (London: Routledge, 1992) p.199.
238 Hicks, Ursula K., British Public Finances: Their Structure and Development 1880-1952 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1954) p.53.
239 Hewetson, John, Ill-Health, Poverty and the State (London: Freedom Press, 1946) p.43.
240 Political and Economic Planning, Report on the British Social Services: a survey of the 
existing public social services in Great Britain with proposals for future development (London: 
PEP, 1937) p.66.
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responsibility of an Education Department.241 As Harris states: 'In view of 
the variety of types of arrangement which local authorities were 
empowered to make, it is not surprising that it should be difficult to 
construct a consistent picture of the provisions they made during the 
interwar p e rio d '242
At the outbreak of the war, 110,000 children were receiving free meals 
and 50,000 paid for them 243 The Board of Education aided LEA 
expenditure with a 50 per cent grant. Free meals mainly went to the 
urban poor, affected by poverty, unemployment and industrial disputes. 
Those who paid were mainly rural children who lived too far away to 
travel home at lunch time.244
4.1.2 Prescription medicines
In the 1930s there were four ways for patients to obtain medicines if they 
were not members of a friendly society, provident association or sickness 
club: through private fees, through National Health Insurance, from 
charitable dispensaries, or 'on the parish'.
Private patients paid a fee to the doctor of their choice. Fees varied 
according to income. The lowest fee was often within the grasp of the 
low-paid worker.245 Rent was usually taken as a rough indicator of 
means.
241 Cooper, Steven, The Education and Training Benefits (London: Policy Studies Institute, 
1985) p.9.
242 Harris, Bernard, The Health of the Schoolchild: A  history of the school medical service in 
England and Wales (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1995) p.121.
243 Land, Andrew, Rodney Lowe, and Noel Whiteside, Development of the Welfare State 
1939-1951: A  Guide to Documents in the Public Record Office (London: HMSO, 1992) p.157.
244 Le Gros Clark, Frederick, Social history of the school meals service (London: London 
Council of Social Service, 1948) p.14.
245 Green, David G., "Medical Care without the State," in Seldon, Arthur, ed., Re- 
Privatising Welfare: After the Lost Century (London: Institute of Economic Affairs, 1996)
pp.21-22.
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In 193718 million workers were in the National Health Insurance scheme 
which came into operation in 1912.246 There were no major changes to the 
scheme in the inter-war years such as the overhauls the unemployment 
insurance scheme had received. In return for their contributions insured 
persons were entitled to medical attendance by a general practitioner 
called a 'panel doctor' who worked for the NHI scheme. The doctors 
received a capitation fee per head for each panel patient on their list. 
Patients 'on the Lloyd George', as it was called, were entitled to 
medicines. These were obtained either directly from the doctor or on 
prescription from a chemist.
At this time most doctors used to dispense their own medicines, 
especially in rural areas: it was only the NHS Act of 1946 which gave 
most dispensing to chemists. Doctors who did their own dispensing had 
to cover the cost of any medicines prescribed out of a small additional 
capitation fee they received for this purpose. This gave the doctor an 
incentive to restrict the value of medicines he prescribed.
Alternatively, medicines might be obtained on an NHI prescription from 
a chemist. Money available for paying chemists' bills was known as the 
Drug Fund which was financed on a so-called insurance basis.247 The 
amount of the Drug Fund was arithmetically determined. For example, 
the annual sum available in 1938 for paying chemists accounts was 2s.
11 d. multiplied by the total number of persons entitled to obtain 
medicines or appliances.248 Certain provisions were made in case this 
amount was accidentally exceeded in any one year.
246 Fraser, Derek, The Evolution of the British Welfare State: a history of social policy since the 
Industrial Revolution. (London: Macmillan, 1973) p.198.
247 Martin, J P, Social Aspects of Prescribing (London: William Heinemann Ltd, 1957) p.15.
248 International Labour Office, Economical Administration of Health Insurance Benefits 
(Geneva: ILO, 1938) pp.218-222.
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Under NHI it was hoped that the provision of pharmaceutical benefit 
would enable patients to be treated with appropriate drugs of high 
quality. However financial problems emerged. Efforts to limit drug 
spending were focused on the behaviour of doctors. A National Formulary 
and a Drug Tariff were issued to panel doctors to try and educate them to 
restrict their prescribing.249 Excessive prescribing was identified by the 
ratio of the individual doctor's prescription costs to the averages for the 
area in which he practised. Any unusually high spending on drugs was 
investigated by Regional Medical Officers 250
Participation in the National Insurance scheme was conditional on 
means. Although the introduction of National Health Insurance was 
contentious (unlike the introduction of unemployment insurance), it was 
soon found that the main disadvantage was that the scope of the scheme 
was not wide enough. The contributory insurance scheme covered only 
working people earning under £160 a year.251 The income limit was 
raised to £250 in 1920 and there was frequent demand for a higher limit 
and more extensive coverage. Even so, most of the population including 
dependants, the elderly and children, were therefore not covered by 
National Health Insurance.
Those poorer people not covered could turn to hospital out-patients 
departments which treated the uninsured, as did charitable dispensaries. 
Some GPs ran their own little 'dispensary', supplying medicine in return 
for a small quarterly payment.252 The utterly destitute were treated 'on 
the parish'. The 'Relieving Officer' was the clerk to the parish guardians
249 International Labour Office, Economical Administration of Health Insurance Benefits 
(Geneva: ILO, 1938) pp.225-230.
250 International Labour Office, Economical Administration of Health Insurance Benefits 
(Geneva: ILO, 1938) pp.235-238.
251 Birch, R.C., The Shaping of the Welfare State (Harlow: Longman, 1974) p.31.
252 Barber, Geoffrey, Country Doctor (Ipswich: The Boydell Press, 1974) p.54.
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and decided whether a person qualified for parish relief, including 
entitlement to the parish doctor.
There was a limited range of drugs and those available were not 
particularly expensive because manufacturers did not on the whole 
engage in costly research and development: research only became 
important in the 1940s with the development of synthetic penicillins. 
Nevertheless, evidence shows that the prescription medicines that were 
available were still out of the reach of the pockets of many working class 
people.253 There was also a large measure of informal medical treatment. 
Pre-packaged, branded medicines were widely available from grocers7, 
corner shops and even post offices.
In summary, in the 1930s there was no national scheme for providing 
medicines to needy people. Some people were able to access medicines 
through National Health Insurance. Others had to rely on local charitable 
ventures, or on the parish.
4.1.3 Student grants
In the nineteenth century grants to university students were only made 
by local authorities. By 1911 they were financially assisting 1,400 
students, the average award being £43 per year.254 In 1920 a limited 
number of national state scholarships to universities were introduced. 
There were 200 initially and 360 by 1936 255 Awards given by the LEA 
were seldom the only award held in isolation by a student. In fact, having 
secured some other emolument was often be a condition for receiving
253 Roberts, Robert, The Classic Slum (1973) p.124.
254 Ministry of Education, University Awards: The Report of the Working Party on University 
Awards appointed by the Minister of Education in April 1948 (London: HMSO, 1948) p.3.
255 Ministry of Education, University Awards: The Report of the Working Party on University 
Awards appointed by the Minister of Education in April 1948 (London: HMSO, 1948) p.4; 
Leybourne, Grace G. and Kenneth White, Education and the Birth-Rate: A  Social Dilemma 
(London: lonathan Cape, 1940) p.252.
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additional help from the LEA. Examples were students who already had 
scholarships at universities. Most LEAs also helped students wanting to 
go to university without scholarships. Such candidates for local aid, being 
considered to show less exceptional ability, usually received less. In 1937- 
38, apart from trainee teachers, 3794 men and 1110 women in universities 
and colleges were 'aided7 by LEAs of England and Wales.256 These were 
small-scale schemes, which perhaps explains why there is little 
information about them readily available.
4.1.4 Civil Legal Aid
Before the Second World War arrangements for legal aid were based on 
'organised charity'. It was essentially a voluntary service with no official 
provision.
The so-called Poor Persons' procedure was introduced in 1914. Under the 
Poor Persons' Procedure a rota of volunteer solicitors and barristers 
conducted the case without payment.257 It was used by young lawyers to 
gain experience. The income limit under th6 'poor persons procedure' 
was £2 per week.258 From 1926, administration was by local committees 
of the Law Society, which were responsible for deciding whether to 
accept applications.259 The committees were mainly made up of solicitors. 
The scheme was funded by central government and administered by the 
professional body. The amount the Treasury paid was modest and the 
payments were limited to a narrow range of administrative expenses. In 
addition, the Poor Persons' Procedure was only for High Court cases.
256 Leyboume, Grace G. and Kenneth White, Education and the Birth-Rate: A Social 
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For other cases there were Poor Man's Lawyers, providing free legal 
advice to poor people in various parts of the country.260 A large number 
of bodies provided free legal advice and, in some cases, free legal aid in 
the county courts (such as for cases under Rent Restrictions or Workmen's 
Compensation Acts) and police courts (for cases such as maintenance and 
matrimonial problems) 261 In 1939 there was no single organisation or 
machine for the giving of free legal advice: work was done by scattered 
groups of volunteers. It was, however, possible for the citizen to 
approach a number of organisations or individuals. The approach, the 
organisation and the facilities offered all varied considerably. Some were 
religious bodies, like the Society of Our Lady of Good Counsel. Others 
were voluntary organisations of professionals giving their services 
without payments, such as the Bentham Committee set up in the London 
area in 1931 to arrange for setting up of Legal Advice Centres, and Poor 
Man's Lawyer Associations in Birmingham and Manchester. In Burnley, 
Lancashire, for example, although there was no poor Man's Lawyer 
service, there was a Poor Person's Divorce Committee.262 Many schemes 
worked with the help of the local Law Society. Local Councils of Social 
Service encouraged the provision of free legal advice and trade unions 
also offered a legal advice service.263
In 1928 Lord Finlay's Committee was appointed to inquire into the 
problem of legal aid for poor persons. This committee did not
260 Brooke, Rosalind, Information and Advice Services (London: G. Bell & Sons, 1972)
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recommend a legal aid service paid for or subsidised by the State. 
Instead, the voluntary efforts of lawyers continued.
4.1.5 Conclusion
Analysis of inter-war welfare policy has been dominated by the 
responses to unemployment, but, as I have shown here, there were state 
and private responses to other social problems. In fact, in the 1930s 
Britain had a highly developed welfare sector, albeit residual welfare. 
Nevertheless, it had evolved out of responses to problems and was 
haphazard, varied and there was limited state involvement. Most 
schemes were down to local initiatives by local government and 
charitable efforts.
4.2 1939-1945
Wartime attitudes to welfare went through two distinct phases, with the 
publication of the Beveridge Report in November 1942 marking a break 
in the government's handling of reconstruction.264 At first, non-war- 
related legislation was put on hold in the expectation of a speedy Allied 
victory. Welfare reforms planned pre-war were abandoned. The 
immediate welfare action was to evacuate the cities and set up an 
Emergency Medical Service. The immediate needs of wartime set 
important precedents for post-war welfare policy. For instance, 
universalism in welfare policy was advanced by measures such as the 
free or low cost subsidised milk to expectant mothers and children under 
five in June 1940.265 In another example, the household means test was 
abandoned in 1941.266 In its place a new test of 'personal need' was
264 Inter-Departmental Committee on Social Insurance and Allied Services, Social 
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introduced.267 The UAB was renamed in 1941 the Assistance Board, and 
its remit extended to cover the needs of other groups, such as the 
elderly.268
The publication of the Beveridge Report was in 1942 a significant 
landmark. Before the Second World War responsibility for social security 
was divided between various government departments. Administration 
was badly organised, and the benefits were inconsistent, as was 
demonstrated in the previous section. Consequently Beveridge's Inter- 
Departmental Committee on Social Insurance and Allied services was 
appointed in June 1941 to look at the whole area.269 The Beveridge Report 
proposed that in return for a flat rate contribution from the state, the 
employer and the employee, the state would pay subsistence level 
benefits to the unemployed, the sick, the retired and those suffering 
industrial injuries and diseases. Beveridge proposed flat-rate benefits for 
flat-rate contributions in recognition of the importance of the insurance 
principal.270 His scheme was intended to ensure a universal minimum 
but not discourage individual provision.271 For those who failed to 
contribute, national assistance would be available on a means-tested 
basis. Beveridge assumed that a health service would be created, which 
generated the expectation of an NHS among the public.272
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The Beveridge Report symbolised popular hopes and fundamentally 
altered what was politically possible. Churchill personally was hostile to 
anything which detracted from the immediate waging of the war.273 His 
views were shared by the Conservative majority who warned against 
plans and promises which they regarded as impossible to fulfil in the 
future.274 Furthermore the Labour leaders in the coalition were in a 
relatively weak position and the Treasury was also an impediment to 
reform.
Plans for reconstruction became of crucial propaganda importance and in 
Autumn 1943 a Reconstruction Committee was set up under Lord 
Woolton. The Treasury had fundamental objections to the Beveridge 
Report, even though Keynes had popularised the notion that a depression 
could be offset by increasing welfare expenditure to increase demand 275 
Both major parties adopted the Beveridge scheme into their post-war 
plans, but the Labour Party seemed more committed and the 
Conservatives prevaricated.276 Labour ministers resigned from the 
coalition in May 1945 because they thought the Conservatives were 
insincere about welfare reform. In the Caretaker government under 
Churchill (23 May -  26 July 1945) the decreased priority given to welfare 
was symbolised by the winding up of the Reconstruction Committee.277
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The (Conservative) caretaker government introduced Family Allowances. 
The Government indicated that eventually a free school meal service 
would be introduced as part of the family allowance scheme.278 The other 
main welfare measure which the Conservatives implemented was the 
1944 'Butler' Education A c t  Among other things the 1944 Act accepted the 
development of school meals and milk schemes and extended the 
obligations and powers of local education authorities to provide 
scholarships (grants) for students in higher education 279
4.2.1 School meals
School meals are an example of a service encouraged by the war. The 
impact of total war in 1940 brought a change in Government policy, and 
it enjoined that all school children whose parents desired it should 
receive a school meal, payment to cover cost of food alone, in cases of 
necessity free meals being given as before. Thus, during the war, wartime 
shortages led to school meals being transformed into a general public 
service, rather than 'relief' for poor children only.280 Thus, the decision to 
provide school meals is an example of piecemeal policy made in response 
to immediate needs. From 1940, LEAs were encouraged to extend and 
improve the meals service by the introduction of a Government grant and 
by special priority in the supply of rationed and non-rationed food, 
premises and equipment.
However, problems over supply of buildings and equipment meant that 
a full school meals service was impractical. Nevertheless the number of
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children benefiting from free or subsidised meals increased from 130,000 
in July 1940 to 1,650,000 in 1945.281 In 1942 Labour called for reforms 
including free school lunches282, and in 1943 the Government indicated 
that eventually a free service would be introduced as part of the family 
allowance scheme.283
The 1944 Education Act made compulsory the provision of school meals 
for all primary and secondary school pupils who wanted them.284 Prior to 
the 1944 Act, the permissive powers already given to LEAs had led to a 
varied pattern of provision across the country. One of the aims of the 
1944 legislation was to consolidate LEA meal provision, extending it 
universally and imposing on all LEAs responsibility to make such 
provision. But it left to the future regulations to decide if the service 
should be free. Initially, the Board of Education believed that free 
provision would become part of the family allowances cash payments 
scheme.285 However, the Treasury argued that meals at cost price could 
also be considered a child welfare scheme, as no profit was made. Free 
school dinners were postponed: when the school meals service came into 
operation in 1945 meals were indeed charged at cost price, with 
concessions for those on a low income 286
One of the hallmarks of the 1944 Act was that it clearly attempted not to 
impinge on LEA autonomy. The Act was constructed so that the Ministry
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should have only a limited range of powers over local authorities.287 
Locally determined concessions were given to those on low incomes.288 
This led to protests from parents receiving National Assistance whose 
income still exceeded LEA scales for receiving free meals, who argued 
that they were receiving allowances in one hand and paying them out 
with the other. The service was funded by a 100 per cent Exchequer grant 
to the LEAs 289
4.2.2 Civil Legal Aid
The Law Society had previously promoted voluntary work as part of a 
lawyer's professional duty, rather than a paid scheme. They were 
worried about what sort of lawyers would participate in a paid scheme. 
But the Law Society changed its position during 1939-45. In 1945 the 
provision for legal aid was still the Poor Persons' Procedure. J.E. Terry set 
out the problems of the scheme:
The present difficulty is that the low income limits, which are 
almost the same as they were in 1914, are so low that many 
people whom they exclude are suffering hardship. To raise 
the income limits would only extend the queue of applicants 
and voluntary professional help is already inadequate to meet 
need.290
The Citizens' Advice Bureaux stepped in to meet the needs of the many 
people of small resources who were outside the limits of the legal aid 
scheme because inflation rose during the war, while the income limits
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remained broadly the same. To meet this need a scheme came into 
operation whereby the CABx and provincial Law Societies acted in 
partnership and panels of solicitors were formed to give legal aid at 
reduced fees. Elsewhere the problem was met by direct contact between 
CABx and individual firms who were prepared to make special 
arrangements about fees in appropriate cases.291
Essentially, the disorganised situation was still the same as before the 
war, although by 1945, lawyers were pushing for a state funded service: 
"There is a limit to what private individuals can achieve and some form of 
statutory intervention is needed.'292
4.2.3 Conclusion
In this period welfare provision was in a state of flux, in no small part 
because of the exigencies of 'total war'. The promise of future welfare 
reform played an important propaganda role during the war. However, 
few major changes were actually enacted at this time. The exception is 
provision of school meals which was encouraged by the imposition of 
food rationing during the war.
4.3 1945-1951
Labour won the 1945 election. After six years of war Britain's economic 
position was dire.293 Lend-Lease was ended in August 1945. Britain 
obtained a long-term loan from the United States, and was obliged to 
allow sterling to become freely convertible to dollars. However, the 
economic boom of the immediate post-war years meant that full
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employment was not upset by the demobilisation of four million service 
personnel. With the securing of the American loan and the revival of 
trade and industry, the Labour government was now in a position to 
undertake welfare reform.
Family Allowances, enacted by the Conservatives in early 1945, were 
implemented in 1946 payable of the rate of 5s. per week cash to the 
mother for the second and each subsequent child.294 Family allowances 
were one of the three assumptions of the Beveridge Report.295 Beveridge 
had wanted to pay the allowances at full subsistence rates but, under 
Treasury pressure, compromised on this by excluding the first child 
which he justified by saying that the cost of the first child could be met 
out of normal family income. Beveridge estimated subsistence at 8s. per 
child after the first on the assumption that there would be universal 
provision of free school meals and milk. These aspirations, however, 
were not to be fulfilled as the allowances were set in 1945 at 5s.296 
Moreover, the school meals service was made subject to a charge for all 
but the poorest. Thus the subsistence principle for family allowances was 
dropped on their introduction, and they were justified instead as a 
subsidy by which the community shared responsibility with parents for 
the raising of children.
Pensions were introduced in 1946. Maternity benefits and widow's 
benefits were also introduced. However the National Insurance Act of 1946
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was the corner-stone of the new social security system.297 It was based on 
the proposals of the Beveridge Report. It brought in full coverage of the 
employed (only 60 per cent of the labour force were covered in the pre­
war scheme) and a system of flat-rate contributions 298 There were 
immediate increases in the rates of sickness and unemployment benefits, 
and an increase in the period over which such payments would be made.
Two further major welfare measures followed. Firstly the NHS. Secondly, 
the National Assistance Act was also inaugurated on the 'Appointed Day' 
of 5 July 1948. It reconstituted the Assistance Board as the National 
Assistance Board and gave it the last remaining cash-giving powers of the 
Poor Law to provide a safety net of means-tested benefits for those whose 
insurance benefits were inadequate.299 It abolished most of the previous 
legislation and greatly widened the scope of the assistance which could 
be provided to people in need.
Britain consolidated a 'two-track' social security system with 'first-class' 
National Insurance benefits going primarily to the insured (that is mainly 
male workers) and means-tested National Assistance providing support 
at lower levels for those outside the regular labour market. The 
relationship between the two was problematic as National Assistance 
amounted to more than insurance benefits once rent was taken into 
account.300
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Welfare under Labour had two distinct phases. After the confidence, 
optimism and outstanding legislation of 1945-7, the years from 1947 
marked a period of moderation and restraint. There was a series of 
economic and political crises in 1947.301 The US loan upon which Britain 
had been dependent since 1945 to finance both welfare policy and 
essential imports, began to run out and was not replaced by Marshall Aid 
until the summer of 1948. The convertibility of sterling almost eliminated 
Britain's gold and dollar reserves in August 1947 and had to be 
suspended. Inflation began to increase at an alarming rate. In the 
dreadful winter of 1947 the Great Freeze and subsequent fuel crisis 
severely restricted power to industry and homes.302 The result was 
declining industrial production, heavy unemployment and a balance of 
payments problem. As the new chancellor, Cripps' remedy was shortages 
and restrictions for the sake of an export drive.303 Thus began the 'Age of 
Austerity'.
There was division in the Cabinet.304 Those led by Herbert Morrison, 
along with Cripps and Gaitskell, supported 'consolidation' of past 
achievements because of the constraints of Britain's external economic 
situation. A minority wanted to press on with socialist reforms, such as 
Aneurin Bevan, the Minister of Health who oversaw the introduction of 
the NHS. The most renowned clash over welfare policy was that over the 
finance of the NHS, which started in 1949 and concluded with Bevan's 
resignation from the Cabinet in April 1951.
301 Glennerster, Howard, "Social Policy since the Second World War," in Hills, John, ed., 
The State of Welfare: The Welfare State in Britain since 1974 (Oxford: OUP, 1990) p.15.
302 Morgan, Kenneth O., The People's Peace: British History 1945-1990 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1990) pp.68-69.
303 Alford, B.W.E., British Economic Performance, 1945-1975 (Cambridge: CUP, 1995) p.20.
304 Land, Andrew, Rodney Lowe, and Noel Whiteside, Development of the Welfare State 
1939-1951: A  Guide to Documents in the Public Record Office (London: HMSO, 1992) p.9.
136
The summer of 1949 saw the financial problems increase.305 During 
preparations for the 1949-50 budget, the chancellor, Cripps, argued that 
the limits of taxation had been reached and announced the need for a 
thorough review of social services expenditure. A devaluation crisis in 
the summer increased the need for economy. A Committee to monitor 
NHS expenditure continually began work.306 Hugh Gaitskell became a 
member and immediately began to call for the introduction of charges 
and "hotel charges'. The existence of the committee was resented by 
Bevan and contributed to his increasing isolation and mistrust over the 
handling of NHS finance. Bevan's own inquiry into the NHS under Sir 
Cyril Jones concluded in July 1950 that well over half the increase in costs 
was inflationary and nothing to do with bad management.
The outbreak of the Korean War led to an escalating defence programme 
associated with the 'cold war', whilst exacerbating the existing economic 
problems arising from inflation and the balance of payments. By late 1950 
Bevan had been moved laterally to the Ministry of Labour. Meanwhile, 
Gaitskell was chancellor and Bevan resented his rapid rise.307 Gaitskell 
was aware of the damaging effect rearmament would have on the British 
economy. Nevertheless, he accepted it on the political grounds of 
maintaining American support.308 Along with social security, health 
faced cuts. Gaitskell proposed a half scale fee for dentures and £1 charge 
per pair of spectacles as well as a one shilling prescription charge.309
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Bevan, supported by Harold Wilson, called for reduced defence spending 
and threatened to resign. He thought the communist threat by Korea was 
exaggerated. Bevan also thought the yield from charges would be 
insignificant compared to administrative charges and that to maintain the 
popularity of the service, there had to be a commitment to it, otherwise it 
would become "niggardly and unattractive'.310 Bevan had accepted 
prescription charges in principle 1949, but thought that the dental and 
ophthalmic services had not been available to the poor before the NHS 
and were greatly valued parts of the service311. Only later, after his 
resignation he claimed that it was never his intention to allow a 
prescription charge to be introduced.
The financial ceiling on the NHS was raised slightly to allow the 
suggested prescription charge to be dropped. Gaitskell's budget speech in 
April 1951 announced charges for dentures and spectacles as well as a six 
pence increase in income tax and the raising of purchase tax from 33 per 
cent to 66 per cent.312 Bevan resigned, followed the next day by Wilson. 
This was an important symbolic event in the debate about social policy 
expenditure and the government budget, although Bevan's resignation 
over health charges was connected with wider disagreements concerning 
the rearmament programme.
By the summer of 1951 Britain faced yet another balance of payments 
problem. This was due to a marked increase in the cost of imports, 
especially from Europe, worsened by the American stock-piling of 
materials for rearmament, and by speculation against the pound.
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Gaitskell's budget led to rising prices and wages. Then a general election 
was called for October 1951.
4.3.1 School meals
The development of the school meals service after 1945 was dominated 
by financial considerations. The immediate post-war period saw a steady 
expansion of the school meals service subject to the delaying effects of 
labour and material shortages. Problems over equipment and building 
supplies continued to affect the service. The 1947 balance of payments 
crisis led to pressure to implement cuts in the school building programme 
as part of wider economy measures. The devaluation crisis of 1949 led to 
even more dramatic cuts and an immediate halt to any expansion of the 
service. All new canteen building was indefinitely postponed. The 
outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 deepened the crisis still further. Steel 
and building components were in short supply and the Treasury 
demanded further cutbacks. The service did not regain its momentum 
until well into the 1950s. School dinners were provided for about half the 
children at primary and secondary schools, on payment of a charge (7d.) 
which could be "remitted wholly or in part in case of hardship".313 The 
implied subsidy provided cheap meals for all children. The variation in 
the facilities to provide school meals hampered supply of free food to 
children from low income families. Apart from occasional fluctuations 
caused by increased charges (such as in 1953) the annual number of 
dinners served had stabilised by the early 1950s just below 600 million.
4.3.2 Prescription medicines
The major change to medical provision was the introduction of the 
National Health Service. There was a consensus on the need for a
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universal service and general agreement that it should be 'free'. From the 
patients point of view, the main change was that GP and hospital 
treatment was available to everyone free. Prescription drugs were also 
free.
Under the NHS, there were no official limits to the amount that could be 
spent on drugs as there had been with the NHI Drug Fund. For 
administrative reasons, it was no longer possible to systematically check 
the cost of an individual doctor's prescriptions. Persuasion, education 
and advice to practitioners were used to try and control spending. 
Economy was encouraged by trying to make it easier to prescribe cheaper 
remedies. This was one of the functions of the National Formulary and 
Preservers' Notes, which were issued to practitioners.314 Nevertheless, the 
liberty of doctors to exercise clinical freedom meant that expenditure was 
fundamentally uncontrollable from the centre.
The first indication of financial problems appeared at the end of 1948. The 
Treasury response was to propose charges on certain items. This was 
initially resisted by the Cabinet on the basis of the political damage it 
would cause.315
Once the Cabinet had reached agreement in principle about a 
prescription charge in 1949, problems arose about its administration, in 
particular how to protect the needy from the charges. Rather than 
welcoming the amelioration of charges, Bevan reacted sharply against 
exemptions. He wanted the Ministry of Health to have nothing to do with 
the adjudication of exemptions. Bevan pressed for universal charges, all 
exempted classes being required to re-claim their expenses via the 
National Assistance Board. In the end, all pensioners were to get relief,
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not only those in need.316 The National Assistance Act was amended to 
give the NAB the power to deal with payments for medical purposes in 
cases of hardship.
Although entering the statute books in the National Health Service 
(Amendment) Act 1949, the implementation of the prescription charge did 
not occur until 1952. This was partly because the government wanted to 
delay it until after the general election, and anyway, potential revenue 
from the charge was falling since the exemption of old people reduced 
the potential revenue from £10m to £6m.317 The agreement to charge per 
script rather than per item to reduce the burden on patients requiring 
more complicated treatment reduced the potential revenue still further. It 
was left to the Conservative government to bring in prescription charges 
and the corresponding benefits.
4.3.3 Student grants
There were in 1951 thirteen degree-giving universities in England and 
Wales, and five University Colleges. The Ministry of Education made 
various scholarships and awards from public and non-public funds. A 
guide to the public social services explained that: "There is a limited 
number of State Scholarships awarded by the Ministry of Education for 
honours degree courses and all Universities and University Colleges 
provide exhibitions and scholarships from their own funds. Local 
education authorities make awards to students for a wide variety of 
courses, including those for university courses/318 Standard figures of 
maintenance were laid down by the Ministry of Education, which also
316 Webster, Charles, The Health Services since the War. Vol. I. Problems of Health Care : The 
*National Health Service before 1957 (London: HMSO, 1988) p.144.
317 Land, Andrew, Rodney Lowe, and Noel Whiteside, Development of the Welfare State 
1939-1951: A  Guide to Documents in the Public Record Office (London: HMSO, 1992)
318 National Council for Social Service, Public Social Services: Handbook of Information on 
Services Provided by the State, 9th ed. (London: NCSS, 1951) p.68.
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decided to supplement scholarships awarded by universities up to the 
amount paid to state scholars.319
The maximum value of an award was the standard figure of 
maintenance, plus any additional allowances, and the approved fees for 
tuition, registration and examinations. The value of an award for an 
individual student was arrived at by deducting the amount of the 
parental contribution, and of any other grants held, from the maximum 
value of the award and the amount of earnings or private income 
received by the student was also 'taken into account'. The amount of the 
award was first used to defray the fees which were paid direct to the 
university; the remainder of the award was paid as a maintenance grant 
direct to the student.320
4.3.4 Civil Legal Aid
The Legal Aid and Advice Act 1949 was to provide legal advice or 
representation for applicants unable, because of limited resources, to pay 
for the services of the legal profession. It represented an almost complete 
acceptance of the views of the Law Society.
The Act made legal aid available in courts of law dealing with civil 
proceedings -  legal aid (proceedings) -  and also made provision for legal 
aid and advice in matters not involving litigation -  legal aid (claims).321 
Legal Aid (claims) provided for the services of a solicitor in taking steps 
to assert or dispute a claim short of litigation, but in practice this type of 
legal aid was little used.322 Its financial limits were lower than for
319 Ministry of Education, University Awards: The Report of the Working Party on University 
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proceedings.323 This thesis only considers legal aid (proceedings).
Legal aid could be given in respect of proceedings in the following courts: 
House of Lords, Court of Appeal, High Court, County Courts, Quarter 
Sessions, and Courts of Summary Jurisdiction. The Act made no 
provision for legal aid in criminal cases. Legal aid was funded by the 
state but administered by the Law Society. A person entitled to legal aid 
was generally able to choose his solicitor and barrister from panels 
appointed by the Area Committees. The Lord Chancellor was the 
minister responsible, assisted by an advisory committee.
Applications for legal aid were made to Area Committees of the Law 
Society and, if the Committee was satisfied with the legal merits of the 
applicant's case, it was referred to the appropriate office of the National 
Assistance Board for it to determine the financial position of the 
applicant. The Board's responsibilities were:
a) To determine the applicant's disposable income and disposable 
capital in order to ascertain whether he or she came within the 
financial limits of the Legal Aid Scheme.
b) To decide whether the applicant was entitled to free or assisted 
legal aid.
c) To assess the maximum amount that the applicant could be 
required to pay to the Legal Aid Fund in respect of any 
proceedings.
d) To issue to the Local Committee of the Law Society the 
determination of means in the form of a certificate.
322 Matthews, Edwin James Thomas and Anthony Derek Maxwell Oulton, Legal aid and 
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An officer of the National Assistance Board usually interviewed the 
applicant to satisfy himself of the 'disregards7 and allowances which were 
appropriate to the applicant's situation.
Increasing demand for divorce was an important factor in the 
establishment of the legal aid scheme.324 Divorce could not be made 
simpler, so instead it remained an expensive high court procedure, but 
legal aid would pay. The Law Society wanted a full legal aid scheme 
partly because it was concerned that its members would find it difficult to 
re-establish their practices after the war. It wanted to retain the model of 
private practice.325
4.3.5 Conclusion
This is the period when the institutions of the 'classic' welfare state were 
rapidly put into place. However, after the confidence, optimism and 
outstanding legislation of 1945-7, the years from 1947 marked a period of 
moderation and restraint. School meals were originally conceived as part 
of the overall welfare state scheme, as were pharmaceutical benefits 
under the NHS. Student grants and legal aid, on the other hand, were 
never considered as part of the overall reforms.
4.4 1951-1964
The Conservative government of 1951 had different views on the role of 
state welfare from their Labour predecessors. The new government 
thought that those who could pay should be made to pay.326 However, 
they were constrained by the need to maintain electoral support.
324 Gray, Alistair M, "The Reform.of Legal Aid," Oxford Review of Economic Policy 10, no. 
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On taking up office as chancellor, R. A. Butler inherited a balance of 
payments deficit of some £700 million. He responded with savage cuts, 
especially on imports.327 By 1952 the deficit had been wiped out, although 
this probably had more to do with the ending of the Korean W ar by July 
1953 and a marked fall in import prices. There followed a period of 
economic expansion.328 Income tax was cut in 1952 and 1953. Food 
rationing was abolished and most wartime controls over the economy 
were removed in 1953-4. Defence expenditure declined as a switch was 
made from conventional weapons to a nuclear deterrent, so more could 
be spent on welfare, especially as government revenue rose as a result of 
economic growth after 1954.329 There was a marked rise in living 
standards in the 1950s. However, the economic boom led to inflationary 
pressures.
Iain Macleod as Minister of Health introduced prescription charges in 
1952 without much public outcry. The Guillebaud Committee was set up 
to see what limitations could be placed on the growth of health 
expenditure, but its report three years later supported the findings of the 
earlier Sir Cyril Jones inquiry that the NHS was efficient and cost- 
effective and the rises in expenditure were mainly due to price 
inflation.330 Concern about the annual increase in the cost of the NHS did 
not disappear. Party political arguments over the NHS came to centre on 
the need for far more general hospitals (leading to the 1962 "Hospital
327 Timmins, Nicholas, The Five Giants: A  Biography of the Welfare State (Fontana, 1996) 
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Plan'),331 on the need for more local democracy within the service, on the 
need to protect the taxpayer against excessive prices charged by the 
pharmaceutical manufacturers and on the maintenance or removal of 
charges for prescriptions and appliances.
In 1955 Eden became prime minister. He fretted about the cost of the 
welfare state, but had little interest in domestic policies. Most of his 
energy was absorbed by foreign affairs such as the Suez fiasco.
Harold Macmillan became prime minister in 1957. January 1958 was a 
turning point for his government. Sterling as an international currency 
had been weakened by the war and was vulnerable to currency 
speculators. Macmillan's instincts were expansionist and he preferred to 
risk higher inflation than rising unemployment. This attitude brought 
him into conflict with his chancellor, Peter Thorneycroft. After a generous 
first budget, pressure on the currency reserve developed, and the 
chancellor insisted on sharp deflationary measures.332 This meant raising 
the interest rate, trying to bring down wage increases and cuts of £150 
million in government expenditure, including the social services. For 
example, Thorneycroft and the Treasury proposed that family allowances 
be w ithdrawn from the second child.333 Macmillan was prepared for cuts 
of £100 million and no more, so Thorneycroft resigned in January 1958, 
an incident which Macmillan dismissed as 'a  little local difficulty'.334
Macmillan appointed Heathcote-Amory chancellor. Arnory was happy to 
pursue a more expansionist policy. In his 'give away' budget in the
331 Glennerster, Howard, "Social Policy since the Second World War," in Hills, John, ed., 
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spring of 1959 Amory cut taxes and helped to precipitate an economic 
boom.335 Macmillan's election slogan of 1959 was: 'You've never had it so 
good'. Macmillan was more sympathetic than Eden to welfare policy and 
the traditional precedence given to economic over welfare policy was 
checked by Thorneycroft's resignation.336 There was no overall welfare 
policy, the boundaries were instead set by the limits of the Treasury's 
annual economy exercises. However the resignation of Thorneycroft did 
mark a watershed in that knee-jerk demands for cuts in services were 
replaced by attempts to develop a longer term strategy, such as the 
'Hospital Plan'. However, Macmillan's main concern was with foreign 
and imperial affairs and his years were not a notable for welfare policy.
The early 1960s marked a period of decline for the Conservatives as one 
crisis followed another. The attempt to use Keynesian policies to maintain 
full employment at the same time as managing the balance of payments 
led to so-called 'stop-go' economic policy. Amory's boom was short-lived 
and the economy 'overheated'. He was replaced by Selwyn Lloyd. The 
country faced a massive balance of payments deficit. The 1961 Sterling 
crisis force government to seek a loan from the IMF. A condition of the 
loan was restriction of public expenditure. The ensuing economic 
campaign sought to restrict the rise in public expenditure to 2.5 per cent 
per annum, the predicted rate of economic growth.337 Lloyd responded 
by applying the usual monetary restraints. The 'pay pause' was a 
notorious attempt to deal with rising wages by freezing public sector
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pay.338 Although these policies did help to halt the pressure on the 
currency reserves they also pushed up unemployment.
After the Orpington by-election defeat, Macmillan demanded a "new 
approach' which would require greater government initiative. A 'purge' 
followed in July 1962 in which one third of the Cabinet, was sacked and 
replaced by a younger generation of politicians more sympathetic to 
positive government action. Macmillan returned to a policy of economic 
expansion and in the 1963 budget there were tax cuts and other measures 
to stimulate growth. But there was an upsurge in imports and the policy 
of 'going for growth' collapsed.
The Conservative government introduced a graduated pensions scheme 
in 1961 (as a result of 1959 National Insurance Act) which offered 
additional benefits in return for additional contributions on incomes over 
£9 and under £15 a week, ending the principal of flat-rate contributions 
and benefits.339 The employee's flat rate had been raised several times 
during the late 1950s and could be increased no further without placing 
an intolerable burden on the lower paid. Although superficially this 
measure appeared to enhance the guiding role of government in welfare 
policy, it was actually designed to limit the financial liability of the 
government.340
No provision had been made for uprating National Assistance in the 
original Act and uprating was an erratic process.341 In 1959 government 
accepted the principle that recipients of National Assistance should not
338 Oppenheimer, (1970) p.141.
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only be given increases commensurate with the higher cost of living but 
also a 'share in increasing prosperity'.342 Tax allowances such as child 
allowances to defray the cost of parenthood were also used as a welfare 
measure, and were also designed partly to secure middle class support.343
After 1960 there was a general re-evaluation of the role of school meals, 
welfare foods and allowances in helping to provide for families. During 
the economy campaign of 1961 the Treasury again suggested that family 
allowances be withdrawn from the second child. However, this was more 
a strategy to put pressure on ministers to agree to changes in school 
meals and welfare foods programmes.344
An internal Party inquiry on The Future of the Social Services between 
1961 and 1963 was set up. It acknowledged that existing government 
policy was achieving the desired ends: policies such as increases in 
insurance contributions towards the health service and social security 
and the redistributory element within the new graduated pensions 
scheme combined the Conservative objectives of personal responsibility, 
reduced taxation and compassion.345 However the inquiry did not halt 
the search for cuts in universal policies to reduce taxation and also 
provide much needed help to those whom welfare policy had previously 
overlooked, such as widows and the disabled.
Macmillan retired in October 1963. The appointment of Home as prime 
minister led to economic and defence issues regaining their traditional 
pre-eminence in place of welfare policy.
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4.4.1 School meals
The economic predicaments of the late 1940s caused a freeze in capital 
spending and it remained a low priority throughout the 1950s. In the 
early 1960s supervision of school meals by teachers became a major area 
of contention. The commitment to a free service and the universal nature 
of the subsidy were also questioned. In particular, the Treasury pushed 
repeatedly for a full economic charge (to cover administrative and food 
costs but not capital costs) with assistance to those on low incomes.346 
However, as the pattern of supply and demand for school meals became 
established, provision became largely routine.
The pledge of free school meals for all children was quietly dropped by 
the mid-1950s, but school meals were still subsidised for all children. 
Between 1951 and 1954 pressure to charge the full economic cost of 
school meals was resisted. However, the Ministry of Education re­
evaluated policy from 1955 with the main aim of targeting the school 
meals service on lower income families. The Ministry was prepared to 
make economies on school meals in order to get concessions for 
expansion in areas it considered of greater priority. The review begun in 
1955 concluded that the existing system was illogical because wealthy 
parents were partially subsidised, and very poor parents were fully 
subsidised, but there were many parents in between for whom the service 
was unaffordable. In consequence, the take-up of school meals was 
greater among higher income groups, where need was least.
When the Treasury suggested at the end of 1955 a further increase in 
charges, Eccles proposed instead a more fundamental reform involving 
an examination of The principle of indiscriminate subsidy' and greater
346 Brigden, Paul and Rodney Lowe, Welfare Policy Under the Conservatives 1951-1964: A  
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targeting.347 Enthusiasm waned, however, after a survey of 580 schools 
revealed that demand for school meals would plummet if the reform was 
introduced. Moreover, a nutritional investigation by the Ministry of 
Health suggested that children in large families would be particularly at 
risk if meals were not generally subsidised, so reform was rejected. 
Nevertheless, given that the 1950s were a time of complacency about 
poverty, poverty-related educational issues were regarded as marginal.
A 1956 Report on "the variation in the proportion of children taking 
school dinners at different schools and the factors contributing to these 
differences' found that demand was strongly affected by the distance 
between home and school and whether the mother went out to work. 
There were also considerations of cost.348 Although the meal was 
subsidised, it could still add up to a significant charge for large families. 
However, one point which was not emphasised in the report was the 
variation between LEAs on the policy for free meals.
In 1960 an interdepartmental committee of officials was set up to consider 
the existing provision of subsidised food 'in relation to nutrition'. A 
survey was undertaken of the nutritional value of school meals and milk 
and the Committee concluded that 'there is no clear evidence that on 
nutritional grounds it is necessary to retain (services) at their existing 
levels' 349 Instead they should be focused on those most in need, 
especially poorer families for whom school meals were still considered 
nutritionally essential. On this basis, the Cabinet was asked again in 
January 1962 to consider reforms in the charging system. By this time
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Eccles had come to oppose reform and warned of the development of a 
'fish and chips alternative' to school meals. These views were upheld in 
Cabinet and despite the economy drive in 1961/62, the school meal 
charges system remained unchanged. This remained the case up to 
October 1964.350 Between 1945 and 1963, local authorities were allowed to 
set their own income scales for remission of school meals charges. These 
were replaced by national scales in May 1963.351 On the whole though, as 
far as the education system displayed concern about the position of poor 
children, it was in relation to higher ability children from poor 
backgrounds in grammar schools.
4.4.2 Prescription medicines
The drug bill under the early NHS was much higher than had been 
anticipated. The NHS also coincided with a new era of pharmaceutical 
discoveries, which would have caused financial problems for the old NHI 
scheme too.
A charge on prescriptions of one shilling was imposed from 1 June 1952. 
This did not need new legislation as that had been introduced in 
principle by the previous government.352 Medicines obtained as a 
hospital in-patient were still free. Problems with the administration of the 
exemptions scheme continued. Exemptions for the war disabled were 
unavoidable. But exemptions for school children did not come about, 
even though the Minister of Education thought they should be exempt in
350 Brigden, Paul and Rodney Lowe, Welfare Policy Under the Conservatives 1951-1964: A  
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view of the obligation placed on education authorities to provide free 
treatment under the 1944 Education Act.353
Reflecting a general view in Whitehall, Macleod, as minister of health, 
remarked in 1953 that the ever-rising drug bill 'caused him more concern 
than any other item, including hospitals7.354 The charge was changed in 
1956 to Is. per item.355 The opposition complained that the social services 
were being raided to pay for the Suez expedition.
Various other methods were employed to try to limit expenditure on 
medicines. One of the principles laid down was that drugs advertised 
directly to the public should not be prescribed, on the grounds that it was 
desirable to help the doctor resist patient demands for specific 
preparations. An alternative was to restrict the drugs prescribable on the 
NHS excluding, in particular, expensive preparations. However, this was 
opposed by doctors as an infringement of clinical freedom and it was also 
unclear which drugs should be excluded and on what criteria.
4.4.3 Student grants
By the mid-1950s, the demand for higher education was growing faster 
than had been anticipated. The total number of students entering 
university in 1959 was estimated to be 23 thousand.356 The 1944 Butler Act 
led to more pupils able to complete a full secondary education and full 
employment created less pressure for the young to work. With the 
expansion of university entry, concern was expressed about the system of
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state support for students which, critics claimed, was irrational and 
unfair. It had grown up unplanned and was based on three different 
types of grants paid for by the Ministry of Education and LEAs:
1. State scholarships were awarded by the Ministry to students 
achieving passes in two or more A-levels, and considered by their 
examining boards to be the best candidates. Each board was allocated 
a fixed number of awards in proportion to the number of examination 
entrants.
2. Alternatively, the scholarships were awarded as supplements to 
awards from the university, with allocation decided by the Ministry 
on the instruction of the universities.
3. LEA grants were also awarded on the basis of two or more passes at 
A-level, but not all students who achieved this standard qualified: 
LEAs were given discretion over allocation and there were variations 
in selection criteria between authorities.
Personal case files at the PRO reveal that questions of the interpretation 
of policy and procedure sometimes arose in relation to awards to 
individual students.357 The resolutions of these questions were noted as 
precedents. This shows how policy and procedure was built up over 
time.
Both state scholarships and LEA grants covered tuition fees and 
maintenance, but the maximum value of the award was reduced 
according to the private means of the student or any assistance 'which 
might reasonably be expected from the parent'.358 This latter was based 
on a means test. Rates of grants and contribution rates varied between
357 PRO ED 94 Student Awards, Personal Files.
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LEAs. LEAs in England and Wales administered awards and retained a 
considerable margin of discretion.359
The Ministry responded to the growing criticism of this system by 
suggesting a wholesale re-examination of existing practice. A review 
committee reported in May I960.360 Its main recommendations were that 
all students who reached the necessary standard and were accepted for a 
university course should receive an award and that state scholarships be 
discontinued. However, on the continuance of the means test, the 
Committee could not reach agreement. The majority of the committee 
were in favour of the abolition of the means test together with the income 
tax allowance in respect of award-holders (this was expected to cost 
£101.5 million), but a minority preferred a large reduction in the parental 
contribution instead (this was expected to cost £99 million).361
The principle of grants for all was quickly accepted by the Government. 
There was also reluctant agreement to the ending of state scholarships. 
However, lengthy debate ensued on the means test. The Treasury 
accepted that the existing means test was too severe but argued that 
abolition would be of most benefit to high income earners while a 
revision of its structure would favour middle income groups. The 
Minister for Education, D. Eccles, argued for abolition of the means test, 
because it was 'a  serious hardship on middle class people' and 
incompatible with the view, especially among lower income groups, that 
parents were no longer responsible for the maintenance of their children
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once they had left school.362 Eccles was prepared to accept alternatives to 
the abolition of the means test on conditions including:
1. Uniformity of LEA criteria
2. A scale of parental contribution as generous as the Committee's 
minority report
As a result, a compromise scheme was developed involving a slightly less 
expensive revision of the means test than that suggested by the minority 
report. A minimum grant of £50 to all award-holders, a vacation grant of 
£25 regardless of paid employment, and a new income scale for the 
means test were accepted by the government.363
It was agreed that to ensure the uniformity of grant provision, LEAs 
should have a duty to provide qualified students with grants. In the new 
system LEAs had much less discretion and there were obligatory awards. 
It was still administered by LEAs, though. This was the peak of the real 
value of the g ran t364 The main reform of consequence made as a result of 
the Anderson Report was the acceptance of the principle that any student 
accepted for a University course should receive an award.365 The NUS 
viewed this principle as 'a major advance'.366
Meanwhile the Robbins Committee on Universities had been at work and 
reported in 1963. The whole basis of student finance was re-evaluated, as 
part of investigations into the long-term implications of the Robbins
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Report which recommended expansion in higher education. Robbins 
assumed that uniform mandatory grants would be available, even though 
the Anderson Report had been worked out on the assumption of the 
much smaller system as it existed in 1958.367 It was recognised that if the 
cost of Robbins was to be kept down 'either parents must pay more or the 
beneficiaries themselves must accept loans and repay later'.368 Concern 
was expressed about the deterrent effect of both, but if a choice were to be 
made, a means tested benefit system with an increase in parental 
contribution was seen as more immediately practical.
Under the scheme in operation from 1962 until the 1990s this is how the 
student grant system worked: Anyone who was ordinarily resident in the 
UK who was in full-time higher education studying for a first degree or 
equivalent was eligible. There were two forms of grant both administered 
by the LEA: tuition fees and maintenance grant. For the purposes of this 
study I was only concerned with the maintenance grant. The am ount of 
maintenance grant awarded depended on parental income. The amounts 
payable varied according to where the student studied, and whether 
he /she  lived in the parental home. As well as the basic maintenance 
allowance, supplementary maintenance payments were made for approved 
extra weeks of study, some disabled students, certain mature students, 
approved expenses for travel and equipment. In addition, the 
Department of Education provided a small number of state scholarships 
for m ature students.369 The maintenance grant was paid in full to 
students who were independent i.e. aged over 25, or had maintained 
themselves for 3 consecutive years.
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Where parental income exceeded a certain amount students did not 
receive the full maintenance grant. In this situation parents were expected 
to give a parental contribution equal to the difference between the grant 
actually received and the full grant. The maintenance grant could also be 
reduced in respect of the student's own income. However high was 
parental income or the student's own income, any student who was in 
principle eligible for a grant was entitled to have h is/her tuition fees paid 
and to the 'm inimum grant'. The minimum grant was paid where the 
student a n d / or parent chose not to undergo assessment.
4.4.4 Civil legal aid
By the early 1960s civil legal aid was made available in the county (the 
lower civil court) and magistrate's court. There was a more activist 
approach to improving legal services in the late 1960s. A gathering 
movement of lawyers and academics critical of the limitations of the legal 
aid scheme became involved in various forms of informal advice 
provision.
4.4.5 Conclusion
The notion of 'consensus' has been the most influential concept for 
understanding the direction of post-war politics.370 Consensus was 
evident in relation to Labour and Conservative support for the Welfare 
State. The argument is that as a result of the wartime experience in 
coalition the leaders of the Labour and Conservative Parties came to 
adopt similar attitudes towards post-war reform, embracing the mixed
370 Hughes, Gordon, "'Picking over the Remains'," in hughes, gordon and gail lewis, 
eds., (Routledge, 1998) p.22. Works which use the concept of consensus as a framework 
to dicuss postwar politics include Kavanagh, Dennis and Peter Morris, Consensus Politics 
from Attlee to Major, 2nd ed. (Blackwell, 1994); Jones, Harriet and Michael Kandiah, eds., 
The M yth of Consensus: New Views on British History, 1945-64 (Palgrave, 1996); Dutton, 
David, British Politics since 1945: The Rise, Fall and Rebirth of Consensus (Blackwell, 1997).
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economy, full employment and the welfare state.371 These policies were 
based on the economic ideas of J.M. Keynes and the welfare principles 
embodied in the Beveridge Report. The Conservatives were generally 
content to carry on with the welfare structure bequeathed to them. Thus 
these years are not noted for major changes to welfare policy. There was a 
move away from blanket subsidy to greater targeting of benefits in 
pharmaceuticals, and an unsuccessful attempt to do the same with school 
meals. On the other hand, the student support system was made more 
generous, as universities and higher education were prioritised in a bid to 
provide a highly-educated population.
4.5 1964-1970
In 1964 Harold Wilson became prime minister by a tiny majority. Wilson 
introduced some bold social legislation and then called an election in 
1966 which Labour won with a working majority.372 By the mid-1960s 
social security (national insurance plus means-tested supplementary 
benefits) had replaced defence as the largest single item in the budget.373
Labour retained the principle of graduation and extended it to other 
National Insurance benefits. Under the 1966 National Insurance Act, 
earnings-related supplements were introduced for unemployment, 
sickness and accident benefits and an earnings-supplement for first six
371 Titmuss first argued that wartime experiences heightened government awareness of 
social welfare issues and induced social solidarity, which led to the creation of the 
welfare state. See Titmuss, Richard M., Problems of Social Policy (London:
HMSO/Longmans, 1950). Addison refined the view  that the war helped to forge a new  
political consensus in Addison, Paul, The Road to 1945 (Cape, 1975), as did Harris, Jose, 
"Some Aspects of Social Policy in Britain during the Second World War," in Mommsen, 
W.S., ed., The Emergence of the Welfare State in Britain and Germany 1850-1950 (Croon 
Helm, 1981).
372 Hill, Michael, The Welfare State in Britain: A  Political History since 1945 (Aldershot: 
Edward Elgar, 1993) p.63.
373 Middleton, Roger, Government versus the Market: The growth of the public sector, 
economic management and British economic performance, c.1890-1979 (Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar, 1996) p.573.
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months of a widow's pension.374 The rationale for earnings-related 
supplements was complex, but part of the reason for them was to try and 
reduce the role of National Assistance. Another was to make it easier for 
employers to make workers redundant in over-staffed industries and 
thereby to aid industrial re-structuring. A redundancy pay scheme was 
also introduced.375
Wilson tried to tackle the newly rediscovered problem of poverty and 
accepted the figures that there were 6 or 7 million people at or below the 
poverty line:
The Beveridge insurance principle, combined with a recourse 
to the National Assistance Board for cases of real hardship, 
has not solved the problem, for the National Assistance Board 
operates with a stringent means test, and very many of our 
citizens, even those in greatest need, are too independent and 
too proud to go to a State organization which they (wrongly) 
regard as a charity.376
National Assistance was abolished in 1966 and replaced by 
Supplementary Benefit. Also in 1966 the Supplementary Benefits 
Commission (SBC) took over from the National Assistance Board, and 
became part of the newly formed Ministry of Social Security.377 The SBC 
was responsible to the new ministry, with functions similar to those of 
the NAB. The primary function of the Commission was to decide if 
claimants for supplementary benefit were entitled to it and how much 
they should receive. The Commission was responsible for the general
374 McKay, Stephen and Karen Rowlingson, Social Security in Britain (Macmillan, 1999) 
p.63.
375 Timmins, Nicholas, The Five Giants: A  Biography of the Welfare State (Fontana, 1996) 
p.229; Hill, Michael, The Welfare State in Britain: A  Political History since 1945 (Aldershot: 
Edward Elgar, 1993) p.67.
376 Wilson, Harold, The Relevance of British Socialism (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 
1964) p.103.
377 McKay, Stephen and Karen Rowlingson, Social Security in Britain (Macmillan, 1999) 
p.63.
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direction of the Supplementary Benefits Scheme and the award of 
benefits in individual cases.
Supplementary Benefit was very similar to its forebear, but some 
discretionary powers were curbed. The aim was to make it less 
stigmatising by making benefits more certain and subject to less 
variation. For example, long-term claimants were eligible for a higher 
benefit, instead of discretionary extras. The number of pensioners coming 
forward for Supplementary Benefit increased after the 1966 Social Security 
Act. But it is not clear how much of this was due to raising benefit levels 
and increasing income and capital disregards, or how much to do with at 
last reaching those too proud or uninformed to apply.
Despite curbs on discretion, the disputes about decision-making 
increased. There was also increased political controversy over means- 
testing at this time, illustrated by the setting up of the Child Poverty 
Action Group at this time. The CP AG came to be at centre of the 
emerging welfare rights movement, providing direct advice to claimants 
and disseminating information on the rules relating to means tests.378 The 
CP AG had marked success in improving access to and take-up of 
benefits, and in securing easier conditions for awards. They also 
produced a stream of pamphlets based on research aimed at policy 
makers focusing on one type of benefit after another. But the CP AG 
campaigns produced the adverse long-term effect of 'dis-jointed 
incrementalism': fighting the case for one specific benefit after another on 
narrow front meant that the benefit system grew more complicated, and 
benefits for one type of need got out of step with those for others.379
378 For example Child Poverty Action Group, A  Guide to National Welfare Benefits 
(London: CPAG, 1970).
379 Jones, Kathleen, The Making of Social Policy in Britain, 1830-1990, 2nd ed. (London: 
Athlone Press, 1994) p.169.
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The welfare rights movement promoted the notion of benefits as an 
entitlement, rather than a fall-back in cases of extreme need. They 
encouraged people to rely on non-subsistence benefits as a strategy to 
cope with poverty, especially free school meals and prescriptions. This 
idea is evidenced in CP AG publications, which urged people to apply for 
them.
The Labour governments under Harold Wilson found it impossible to 
abolish dependence on means-tested benefits, despite the suggestion in 
the 1964 Labour manifesto that it would:
"Social security benefits -  retirement and widow's pensions, 
sickness and unemployment pay - have been allowed to fall 
below minimum levels of hum an need. Consequently one in 
four of National Insurance pensioners today are depending 
upon means-tested National Assistance benefits. Labour will 
reconstruct our social security system'.380
In the 1960s the value of benefits improved relative to net average male 
manual earnings, partly because of the lowering of the tax threshold. But 
the National Assistance Board could not be scaled down to a residual 
service. In fact, a government generally opposed to means testing and 
intent on improving insurance benefits actually extended it: there was a 
means tested mortgage option scheme, rate rebates were introduced for 
low income households and local authorities were encouraged to set up 
rent rebate schemes, a type of means tested assistance.381
1967 saw a devaluation and economic problems. Britain's international 
trade position was unfavourable. This led to expenditure cuts. In these 
circumstances no government could afford to continue to expand the
380 Quoted in Hill, Michael, The Welfare State in Britain: A  Political History since 1945 
(Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1993) p.66.
381 Timmins, Nicholas, The Five Giants: A  Biography of the Welfare State (Fontana, 1996) 
p.267.
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social services in response to all the demands being pu t upon it.382 The 
result was a fierce debate in the Labour ranks on the subject of 
"universality or selectivity'.383
By 1970 the welfare state had become a mix of tax-financed universal 
benefits, National Insurance-financed universal benefits, tax allowances 
and tax-based means-tested supplementary benefits. The range of 
providers had expanded, and responsibility was shared between central 
and local government. The establishment of the unified Department of 
Health and Social Security (DHSS) in 1968 was meant to help co-ordinate 
policy.
4.5.1 School meals
The mid-1960s were the peak of the success of the school meals service as 
a general social service.384 LEAs had a duty to provide meals for children 
in maintained schools and the great majority of maintained schools by 
now had facilities for school meals. A charge of Is. was made for school 
dinners, except in the case of hardship, when the cost was 'wholly or 
partly remitted in accordance with the parents' income and 
commitments.'385 The implied subsidy provided cheap meals for all 
children. The £73m subsidy to school meals in 1965-66 could be split into 
two components: £13m being the subsidy to free meals recipients, and 
£60m being the subsidy to children who took meals and paid for them.386
382 Jones, Kathleen, The Making of Social Policy in Britain, 1830-1990, 2nd ed. (London: 
Athlone Press, 1994) p.171.
383 This debate is illustrated by the Fabian pamphlet: Townsend, Peter, Mike Reddin, 
and Peter Kaim-Caudle, Social Services For A ll ? (London: Fabian Society, 1968).
384 Fisher, P., "History of School Meals in Great Britain," Nutrition and Health 4, no. 4 
(1987): 189-94 p.191.
385 National Council for Social Service, Public Social Services: Handbook of Information, 12th 
ed. (London: NCSS, 1965) p.112.
386 Davies, B. and V. Willamson, "School Meals - Short Fall and Poverty," Social and 
Economic Administration January (1968) p.51.
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In the late 1960s, non-take-up of free school meals became a national 
political issue.387 This was the era of the "rediscovery of poverty". 
Experimental campaigns by government in 1967 and 1968 showed that 
take-up could be increased substantially by letters addressed directly to 
parents and advertising.388 A notable increase in take-up in 1968 was due 
to a one-year experiment in which the fourth and subsequent children in 
a family received free meals irrespective of the family's net income.389
From the late 1960s financial retrenchment on school meals was the 
policy of both parties. The 100 per cent grant which subsidised school 
meals was withdrawn and funding only provided for free meals.390 So 
central government withdrew some of its support for the objective of 
provision of school meals to the largest possible number of children. Full 
financial responsibility for the school meals service passed to the LEAs in 
April 1967 and the Ministry of Education Inspectorate ceased to have a 
direct interest in the service. The content of meals and so on was then 
commented on only as part of normal school inspections. Money for the 
school meals was then dependent on the rates support plus parents" 
payments for the food.
4.5.2 Prescription medicines
The 1964 election manifesto said:
"The most serious attack on the Health Service made by 
Conservative Ministers has been the increasing burden of
387 Davies, Bleddyn, Universality, Selectivity and Effectiveness (London: Heinemann, 1978)
p.2.
388 Black, Sir Douglas et al., The Black Report, 1992 ed. (London: Penguin, 1980) p.179.
389 Lynes, Tony, "The dinner money problem," Poverty 10 (1969).
390 Fisher, P., "History of School Meals in Great Britain," Nutrition and Health 4, no. 4 
(1987): 189-94 p.191.
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prescription charges imposed by them on those least able to 
pay. These charges will be abolished/391
Prescription charges were indeed abolished in February 1965, reinstating 
a system of universal pharmaceutical benefits. This policy was important 
to Wilson because he had resigned along with Bevan. However charges 
were reintroduced in 1968 in a package of expenditure cuts following the 
1967 devaluation,392 This reversal of policy was slightly softened by the 
introduction of exemptions for certain categories, such as the chronically 
sick and the elderly.393 In 1968,49 per cent of prescriptions were exempt 
from charge, and a further 2 per cent were supplied free on grounds of 
low income.394
The NHS "stamp' was increased by 6d. to add £25 million and was meant 
to 'm ake good' the £25m which the scheme of exemptions for 
prescription charges would cost.395 The reasoning behind this was strange 
as national insurance contributions were essentially a regressive tax, 
unlike income tax. The supply of contraceptives under the Family 
Planning Act was means-tested to poor families.396
391 Quoted in Hill, Michael, The Welfare State in Britain: A  Political History since 1945 
(Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1993) p.82.
392 Timmins, Nicholas, The Five Giants: A  Biography of the Welfare State (Fontana, 1996)
p.262.
393 Timmins, Nicholas, The Five Giants: A  Biography of the Welfare State (Fontana, 1996) 
p.224.
394 Reply by Mr Ennals to Dr Kerr, House of Commons Hansard v. 722 4 November 1968, 
col. 458.
395 Owen, David, "Selectivity and the Health Service," in Owen, David, Peter Townsend, 
and Brian Abel-Smith, eds., Social Services For A ll ? Part Four (London: Fabian Society, 
1968) p.95.
396 Abel-Smith, Brian, "Conclusion: the Need for Social Planning," in Owen, David, Peter 
Townsend, and Brian Abel-Smith, eds., Social Services For All? Part Four (London: Fabian 
Society, 1968) p.113.
165
4.5.3 Student Grants
The means test for student grants was said to be less rigorous by 1968 
than it was before 1962 and as a result, only 5 per cent of students found 
themselves in receipt of no maintenance grant at all.397 During the 1960s 
the Universities Branch of the Department of Education and Science set 
up a number of small committees, panels and working parties to 
investigate a variety of matters relating to grants and awards to students. 
In 1968 a committee under the chairmanship of Prof. A.J. Brown 
considered changes which were needed to maintain the real value of 
student grants in 1965.398 Brown recommended an increase of £40 on the 
main rate of grant. The Wilson government said that due to economic 
difficulties they were only prepared to increase the grant by £20.399 In 
1970, during the general election campaign, Wilson announced that the 
other £20 which had been delayed for 2 years would be paid.400
4.5.4 Civil Legal Aid
The Law Society controlled the civil legal aid (proceedings) scheme, and 
was responsible to the Lord Chancellor, who was advised by an Advisory 
Committee.401 The scheme was administered from about 13 local offices. 
The duties of the National Assistance Board to determine the financial 
position of applicants were discharged from 1968 through the newly- 
formed Supplementary Benefits Commission. As before, an officer of the
397 Jenkins, Simon and Bill Van Straubenzee, "Introduction," in Jenkins, Simon and Bill 
Van Straubenzee, eds., Student Loans: Pros and Cons (London: Conservative Political 
Centre, 1968) p.9.
398 Department of Education and Science and Scottish Education Department, Advisory  
Panel on Student Maintenance Grants: A Report (London: HMSO, 1968).
399 Jenkins, Simon and Bill Van Straubenzee, "Introduction," in Jenkins, Simon and Bill 
Van Straubenzee, eds., Student Loans: Pros and Cons (London: Conservative Political 
Centre, 1968) pp.4, 7.
400 National Union of Students, Grants Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow? (London: NUS, 1973).
401 Abel-Smith, Brian, Michael Zander, and Rosalind Brooke, Legal problems and the 
citizen: a study in three London boroughs (London: Heinemann, 1973) p.24.
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Supplementary Benefits Commission would usually interview the 
applicant to satisfy himself of the applicant's situation.
Legal aid expenditure increased. One influence was the rising divorce 
rate. In 1968 the divorce rate was 3.7 per 1000 marriages; by 1972, two 
years after the Divorce Reform Act 1969 came into force, it was 9.4 per 
1000.402 In 1970, the scheme was overwhelmingly concerned with the 
consequences of divorce and matrimonial problems. The Legal Aid Act, 
1964, enabled payments to be made out of the Legal Aid Fund to meet the 
costs of successful opponents of legally-aided litigants.
4.5.5 Conclusion
In assessment of the welfare policies of the 1964-1970 Labour 
government, disappointment is the major theme. The government tried to 
do much, but was constrained by the context of low overall economic 
growth. This assessment also holds for their record on non-subsistence 
benefits in which retrenchment forced cutbacks to subsidised school 
meals and free pharmaceuticals for all.
4.6 1970-1979
The period 1970-1979 spans Conservative and Labour periods in power. 
They can be considered together because both parties were forced to 
reappraise social spending due to Britain's economic problems - 
inflation, unemployment, the falling value of the pound on foreign 
exchange markets, and industrial conflict.
In 1970 the Conservatives came to power. Edward Heath was prime 
minister and Barber became chancellor. His 1971 budget was designed to
402 Legal Action Group, A  Strategy for Justice: Publicly funded legal services in the 1990s 
(London: Legal Action Group, 1992) p.8.
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reflate the economy.403 It included tax cuts to stimulate enterprise. The 
first oil shock in 1973 damaged the economy. Stagnant output was 
coupled with high inflation, rising unemployment and a balance of 
payments deficit. The government sought to bring stagflation under 
control through the notorious statutory incomes policies.
The main legacy of this government was its experiment in extending 
means tested benefits to the working poor. It was part of an attempt to 
target benefit support at particular groups not adequately covered by 
past social security protection.404 The new Family Income Supplement 
was introduced in 1971, it created a poverty trap because of the way it 
interacted with national rent rebates and rent allowances introduced 
later.405 Rent rebates and rent allowances were themselves a move away 
from generalised subsidies for public tenants and rent control for private 
tenants towards more targeting help to individuals by way of means 
tests.406 They were accompanied by the expansion of means-tested 
support for a range of other needs such as school meals and clothing and 
health prescriptions and charges.407 There was a 'drift towards 
selectivity'. By 1976 the National Consumer Council counted 45 different 
means-tested schemes operating in Britain.408 Other developments were 
introduction of Attendance Allowance for the severely disabled, a benefit
403 Pearce, Malcolm and Geoffrey Stewart, British political history 1867-1990: Democracy 
and decline (London: Routledge, 1992) p.491.
404 McKay, Stephen and Karen Rowlingson, Social Security in Britain (Macmillan, 1999) 
p.64.
405 Elks, Laurie, "Can w e have a simple means test?," Poverty 31 (1975): 23-25; Harris, 
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Harris, Neville, ed., Social Security Law in Context (OUP, 2000) p.115.
406 Glennerster, Howard, "Social Policy since the Second World War," in Hills, John, ed., 
The State of Welfare: The Welfare State in Britain since 1974 (Oxford: OUP, 1990) pp.19-20.
407 McKay, Stephen and Karen Rowlingson, Social Security in Britain (Macmillan, 1999) 
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408 Alcock, Pete, "Poverty and Social Security," in Page, Robert M. and Richard Silburn, 
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168
for carers, increases in the price of school meals, and increased 
prescription charges.409
In 1974 Wilson formed another Labour administration. The incomes 
policy was replaced by the "social contract", under which trades unions 
agreed to pay restraint in return for an enhanced "social wage" through 
social policy spending and progressive taxation. Taxation was increased, 
but so were benefits and social expenditure, which soared. For example 
in 1975 Family Allowances and Child Tax Allowances were replaced by 
"universal" Child Benefit, payable even for the first child.410 But National 
Insurance contributions also went up as earnings-related contributions 
were made the basis for all insurance benefits.411
A turning point in British social policy was the 1976 sterling crisis in 
which the government had to turn to the IMF for a loan 412 The IMF 
insisted on severe curbs of public spending.413 Wilson retired and was 
replaced by Callaghan in 1976. The Callaghan government abandoned 
the commitment to full employment that had been a central objective of 
social policy since 1944.414 Instead, control of inflation became the central
409 Dean, Hartley, Welfare Rights & Social Policy (Prentice Hall, 2002) p.97.
410 McKay, Stephen and Karen Rowlingson, Social Security in Britain (Macmillan, 1999) 
p.65. This was implemented over three years and fully in place in 1979. The combined 
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The State of Welfare: The Welfare State in Britain since 1974 (Oxford: OUP, 1990) p.280.
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objective of government. Callaghan announced: "government can no 
longer spend its way out of a recession". This policy led to a split between 
the Labour government and the Labour Party and trades unions. As a 
result 1978-1979 saw the "winter of discontent". Public expenditure cuts 
were widespread, for example £280 million came off the education 
budget, 80 per cent of which was accounted for by reductions in spending 
on school milk, school meals and transport.415 Although there was a 
recovery from 1976-1979, in 1979 the British economy was in a bad state 
as unemployment did not fall and inflation still averaged 13 per cent416.
On social security policy, the climate changed with the appointment of 
Donnison as chairman of the Supplementary Benefits Commission in 
1975 417 He took a more active role than his predecessors. He argued for a 
review of the Supplementary Benefit scheme 418 It showed that the use of 
discretionary payments had increased throughout the life of the scheme.
It suggested that strengthening the rules about entitlements would both 
advance welfare "rights' and stabilise costs. The government could not 
implement these ideas before it fell from power, but the incoming 
Conservatives acted on the suggestions of the review.
4.6.1 School meals
LEAs had a duty, "as far as is reasonably practical" to provide midday 
meals a t primary and secondary schools, and at a prescribed charge, but
415 "Goodbye rickets, hello chips," Times Educational Supplement, 31 December 1999,14.
416 Gough, Ian, "The United Kingdom," in Pfaller, Alfred, Ian Gough, and Goran 
Therborn, eds., Can the Welfare State Compete? A Comparative Study of Five Advanced 
Capitalist Countries (London: Macmillan, 1991) p.103.
417 Hill, Michael, The Welfare State in Britain: A Political History since 1945 (Aldershot: 
Edward Elgar, 1993) p.114.
418 Timmins, Nicholas, The Five Giants: A  Biography of the Welfare State (Fontana, 1996) 
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with remission of the charge in the case of hardship.419 The local 
authority carried out the assessment. The policy of the Conservative 
government of 1970-74 of increasing charges for school meals increased 
the importance of means testing, as the benefits for these became more 
valuable. The charge for a school meal was increased from 9 pence to 12
fi^ ®feeparents received Supplementary Benefit, the children were 
automatically eligible for free school dinners. Family Income Supplement 
also provided a passport to free school meals, but a problem was that 
take-up of Family Income Supplement was itself low, and never reached 
much over 50 per cent of those potentially eligible.420 However, it did 
have some impact on the numbers taking free school meals.
For others, charges could be completely or partially remitted "if weekly 
income after payment of rent and rates and certain other expenses is less 
than the national income scale set down in regulations7.421 The 
arrangements for exemption from charges remained unchanged when the 
charge was put up, but the gross income levels for entitlement to 
exemption from charges was increased.
The number of meals served continued to rise to about 5 million a day in 
1972. In October 1976 about 780,000 children (14.2 per cent of those taking 
dinners) claimed free school meals.422 During the 1960s and 1970s reports 
and enquiries showed deficiencies in school meal provision, particularly
419 National Council for Social Service and Phyllis Willmott, Public Social Services: 
Handbook of Information (London: Bedford Square Press, 1973) p.122.
420 Cooper, Steven, The Education and Training Benefits (London: Policy Studies Institute, 
1985) p.43. Families on Family Income Supplement should have qualified automatically, 
but administrative section of the Education Welfare Service did not always accept the 
Family Income Supplement book as proof. See Gillard, Maria, "The other side of the 
counter," Poverty 30 (1974) p.20.
421 National Council for Social Service and Phyllis Willmott, Public Social Services: 
Handbook oflnformation (London: Bedford Square Press, 1973) p.123.
422 Lang, Tim, Now you see them, now you don't: a report on the fate of school meals and the 
loss o f300,000 jobs (Accrington: The Lancashire School Meals Campaign, 1981) p.19.
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the failure to reach all those entitled to free school meals on the grounds 
of low income. The CP AG regularly drew attention to the problem.423
By 1977 the cost of school meals was £547m, of which free meals 
accounted for £119m, and £144m was recovered in charges.424 In order to 
deal with economic troubles, the Government increased the price of 
school meals in 1977, and again in 1979, with the object of cutting the 
subsidy. The subsidy to local authorities for meals paid and free meals 
was reduced. This suggests a less than full commitment to the extension 
of free meals 425
4.6.2 Prescription medicines
Proposals for a graduated charge related to the cost of the drug were 
made in 1971 but not implemented due to administrative difficulties and 
the unpopularity of the idea.426 It was thought that it would introduce a 
barrier between doctor and patient. However, the price of prescriptions 
was increased from 12V2 pence to 20 pence and there were 
"improvements' in exemptions from the increased health charges.
These changes were accompanied by a major advertising campaign from 
April 1971. The number of people receiving free prescriptions on income 
grounds rose from 15,000 in 1970 to 69,000 in 1971, but fell back to 38,000
423 See, for example: "Survey Summary," Poverty 4 (1967): 14-17; "Free School Meals: 
Why Punish the Poor?," Poverty 9 (1968); Lynes, Tony, "The dinner money problem," 
Poverty 10 (1969); Lister, Ruth, Take-up of Means-Tested Benefits (London: CPAG, 1974); 
Field, Frank, The stigma of free school meals (London: 1974).
424 Cooper, Steven, The Education and Training Benefits (London: Policy Studies Institute, 
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425 Cooper, Steven, The Education and Training Benefits (London: Policy Studies Institute, 
1985) p.47.
426 Brown, Muriel, Introduction to Social Administration in Britain, 6th ed. (London: 
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in 1972.427 However, there was no official estimate of the numbers 
entitled to free prescriptions.
4.6.3 Student grants
In May 1973, the government made an increase of £20 to counteract some 
of the effects of soaring inflation, although the NUS argued for the thre- 
yearly review to be rejected in favour of an annual uprating.428 From 
1977-78 tuition fees and the minimum grant were automatically paid.429 
Before, higher-income parents had to contribute to fees 430 In 1977, the 
minimum grant was raised from £50 to £200.431 The contributions payable 
on the parental means test at the higher-income levels were reduced to 
compensate parents for the loss of tax exemptions for students which 
came about as a result of phasing out the Child Tax Allowance and the 
creation of Child Benefit432
4.6.4 Civil Legal Aid
The Legal Aid and Advice Act 1949 was extended by the Legal Aid and 
Assistance Act 1972. Under a 1974 Act administration of Civil Legal Aid 
continued to be by the Law Society and the Supplementary Benefits 
Commission. It is this aspect of legal aid which is analysed in this thesis. 
However, the Act also provided for a Legal Advice and Assistance 
scheme, which was administered by the Law Society through solicitors,
427 Deacon, Alan and Jonathan Bradshaw, Reserved For The Poor: The Means Test in British 
Social Policy (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983) p.94.
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and in which the Supplementary Benefits Commission was not involved. 
Legal Aid for criminal proceedings was administered by the courts.
In 1974 the decision was taken to relate the legal aid limits to 
Supplementary Benefit levels.433 Claimants were required to attend a 
Supplementary Benefits Commission office for an interview. The Labour 
government introduced a dramatic increase in the financial conditions for 
civil legal aid just before it lost office in 1979.
4.6.5 Conclusion
There was a sense of crisis which forced governments (both Labour and 
Conservative) to stabilise public expenditure on social policy. There were 
no major changes to non-subsistence benefits, but the details of schemes 
of charges and means tests were altered in a bid to cut costs.
4.7 1979-1997
The period 1979 onwards can be characterised as one with a "market 
individualist" way of organising welfare. The philosophy of the 1979 
Conservative government was that public expenditure was forced 
consumption, whereas the market place provided individual choice 
consumption. Their aim was to bring back into public consumption some 
features of private provision: the only way to make people make rational 
choices was to start charging the consumer through his pocket rather 
than the taxpayer through the relatively remote system of taxation.
One of Thatcher's aims was to restore Britain's international economic 
competitiveness. The Conservative government was committed to rolling 
back the state, and, in its later terms in office, the welfare state in 
particular. Whether or not welfare spending actually did impede Britain's
433 Partington, Martin, The Legal A id Means-Tests: Time for a Reappraisal (London: Child 
Poverty Action Group, 1978) p.13; 26th Report of the Lord Chancellor's Advisory 
Committee on Legal Aid, p.60, paras. 14-17, and Appendix C; and 27th Report p.63, para. 
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competitiveness, the government of the day believed it did, and acted in 
accordance to reign in the welfare state.
Unemployment rose as the government used monetary policy to curb 
inflation. In 1979-1981 there was the worst industrial recession in British 
history. Unemployment doubled. From 1981-1991 there was a sustained 
recovery and inflation was cut to below 5 per cent for most of the 
period.434 Thatcher wanted cost control and was prepared to accept 
policies which increased inequality.
Thatcher proceeded cautiously in social policy before 1987 435 The new 
free market approach was more evident in economic and industrial 
policy. The main threat to social policy was the general policy to reduce 
the scale of the public sector. The Conservatives abolished the 
Supplementary Benefit Commission in November, because it exerted 
upward pressure on spending.436 Other early reforms included the sale of 
council houses to tenants, the so-called 'right to buy' policy.
'Privatisation' was a major thread of Thatcher policies. Social policies 
were being devised that encouraged the intermeshing of the 'public' and 
'private' in the welfare field, for instance, contracting out and making 
housing benefit payable to private landlords 437 'Quasi-markets' were 
introduced, especially in education and health 438 Bureaucracies and
434 Gough, Ian, "The United Kingdom," in Pfaller, Alfred, Ian Gough, and Goran 
Therborn, eds., Can the Welfare State Compete? A  Comparative Study of Five Advanced 
Capitalist Countries (London: Macmillan, 1991) p.104.
435 le Grand, lulian, "The State of Welfare," in Hills, John, ed., The State of Welfare: The 
Welfare State in Britain since 1974 (Oxford: OUP, 1990) p.351.
436 Barr, Nicholas and Fiona Coulter, "Social Security: Solution or Problem?," in Hills, 
John, ed., The State of Welfare: The Welfare State in Britain since 1974 (Oxford: OUP, 1990)
p.282.
437 Timmins, Nicholas, The Five Giants: A  Biography of the Welfare State (Fontana, 1996) 
p.475.
438 le Grand, Julian, "The State of Welfare," in Hills, John, ed., The State of Welfare: The 
Welfare State in Britain since 1974 (Oxford: OUP, 1990) p.351.
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monopolies were seen as poor methods to deliver services. An ethos of 
customer service and choice was preferred, which was thought to result 
in a more sensitive service to users. As part of this drive professional 
control was attacked.
Various attempts were made to curb social security costs. The main 
changes were making conditions for eligibility for benefits more 
stringent, reducing their real value and "targeting7 benefits on those most 
in need.439 For example eligibility was made more stringent as certain 
groups were prevented from getting benefits at all, for example under 18s 
and students. Others such as the unemployed were more rigorously 
controlled to ensure they were "actively seeking work".440 There were 
changes to the uprating rules, notably for long-term benefits and 
pensions, so benefits only went up in line with prices, not earnings.441 
Child benefits were frozen for much of the 1980s. Other benefits were 
made taxable, which reduced their value 442 Targeting was achieved by 
cuts to insurance benefits, so the earnings-related unemployment benefits 
introduced by Labour in the mid-1960s were abolished, and the scheme 
that began in the late 1970s for earnings-related supplements to the 
retirement pension was restricted in terms of numbers of beneficiaries 
and levels of benefit. Maternity and sickness insurance benefits were 
privatised by shifting them to the responsibility of employers.443 These
439 Barr, Nicholas and Fiona Coulter, "Social Security: Solution or Problem?," in Hills, 
John, ed., The State of Welfare: The Welfare State in Britain since 1974 (Oxford: OUP, 1990)
pp.280-281.
440 Hill, Michael, The Welfare State in Britain: A  Political History since 1945 (Aldershot: 
Edward Elgar, 1993) p.127.
441 Bradshaw, Jonathan and Tony Lynes, Benefit Uprating Policy and Living Standards 
(Social Policy Research Unit, 1995) p.15.
442 E.g. unemployment benefit. See Barr, Nicholas and Fiona Coulter, "Social Security: 
Solution or Problem?," in Hills, John, ed., The State of Welfare: The Welfare State in Britain 
since 1974 (Oxford: OUP, 1990) pp.280-281.
443 Dean, Hartley, Welfare Rights & Social Policy (Prentice Hall, 2002) p.83; McKay, 
Stephen and Karen Rowlingson, Social Security in Britain (Macmillan, 1999) p.67.
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piecemeal changes halted the growth of public welfare spending, but did 
not greatly alter its basic structures of provision.
In 1983, Secretary of State, Norman Fowler, announced a radical review 
of social security. The resulting report recommended a simplified means- 
tested system to better target benefits.444 The 1986 Social Security Bill 
replaced Supplementary Benefit with Income Support and Family Income 
Supplement with Family Credit. Housing Benefit was also changed to 
bring it into line with the other benefits and the earnings-related pension 
SERPS was modified.445 The effect of the 1980s reductions in National 
Insurance protection was to increase dependency on means tested 
benefits.446 By the early 1990s, 8m people were dependent on Income 
Support, and around a third of the population were in receipt of some 
form of means tested benefit.447 The Fowler reforms implemented in 1988 
affirmed the displacement of insurance by assistance.
The replacement of insurance benefits with means tested benefits was 
taken further in the 1990s. Unemployment Benefit was replaced by Job- 
Seekers' Allowance in 1996, under which National Insurance entitlement 
was restricted to the first six months of unemployment.448 Other changes 
encouraged greater dependency within families. For instance, reduced
444 McKay, Stephen and Karen Rowlingson, Social Security in Britain (Macmillan, 1999) 
pp.67-68.
445 Alcock, P., Understanding Poverty, 2nd ed. (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 1997) p.220.
446 Goodman, Alissa, Paul Johnson, and Steven Webb, Inequality in the UK (Oxford: OUP, 
1997) p.223.
447 Alcock, Pete, "Poverty and Social Security," in Page, Robert M. and Richard Silburn, 
eds., British Social Welfare in the Twentieth Century (London: Macmillan, 1999) p.211-2.
448 McKay, Stephen and Karen Rowlingson, Social Security in Britain (Macmillan, 1999) 
p.70.
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rates of benefits were introduced for under-25s and 16- to 18-year-olds 
were excluded from unemployment benefits altogether.449
4.7.1 School Meals
In mid-1979 school meals (and school transport) were holding the centre 
of political debate 450 It was the 'Winter of Discontent' and cuts were to be 
made in school meals provision.451 The election of a Conservative 
government brought about a shift in attitude to school meals. The 
ideology of public expenditure cuts and parental choice was evident in 
policy on school meals. The national and comprehensive nature of the 
service was eroded. The price, type, quality and quantity of free and paid 
for meals came to depend on where you lived. The principal reason for 
this change was to save money. By the early 1980s a universal free service 
for school meals was 'an  idea scarcely mentioned, even by the most 
radical of public figures' 452 However, one of the three recommendations 
of the unreleased Black Report in relation to school meals was 'that meals 
be provided in schools without charge/453
The 1980 Education Act relaxed the obligation to provide school meals. It 
enabled LEAs to provide meals solely for those children receiving them 
free of charge because their family was on Family Income Supplement or 
Supplementary Benefit. In other words, there was no longer a duty to 
provide subsidised meals for all children who want them. Eligibility for
449 Alcock, Pete, "Poverty and Social Security," in Page, Robert M. and Richard Silburn, 
eds., British Social Welfare in the Twentieth Century (London: Macmillan, 1999) p.212.
450 Gibson, J.G. and E.M. Davies, "Local Authority Costs and Pricing Behaviour in the 
Personal Social Services - Theory and Evidence," in Gibson, J.G., ed., Fees and Charges in 
the Personal Social Services (Birmingham: Institute of Local Government Studies, 
University of Birmingham, 1979) p.2.
451 "Goodbye rickets, hello chips," Times Educational Supplement, 31 December 1999,14
452 Bisset, Liz and Jean Coussins, Badge of Poverty: a new look at the stigma attached to free 
school meals (London: Child Poverty Action Group, 1982) p.6.
453 Black, Sir Douglas et al., The Black Report, 1992 ed. (London: Penguin, 1980) p.180.
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free school meals on grounds of low income was at the discretion of the 
LEA. By 1981, 27 per cent of LEAs had decided to go no further than their 
statutory obligations.454 The Audit Inspectorate recommended in 1983 
that authorities "should quantify the additional cost of their discretionary 
provision to children, if they have not already done so".455
Before the 1980 Act, there was a national charge for meals set at 35p per 
day. From 1980, local authorities were able to charge what they like. 
Prices soared quickly. The most common price for a school meal in 1981 
was 50p 456 The 1980 Act also dropped statutory duty on LEAs to observe 
any nutritional standards.
Although the amount spent subsidising school meals ran into hundreds 
of millions of pounds, it was always a relatively small proportion of the 
overall education budget, 3-5 per cent 457 Chart 4-1 shows the breakdown 
of education expenditure for just one year, 1985-1986.
454 House of Commons Hansard, v. 22,26 April 1982, col. 99. Cited in Bisset, Liz and Jean 
Coussins, Badge of Poverty: a new look at the stigma attached to free school meals (London: 
Child Poverty Action Group, 1982) p.13.
455 Department of the Environment Audit Inspectorate. Education: School Meals. London: 
HMSO, 1983. p.7. Quoted in Steven Cooper, The Education and Training Benefits (London: 
Policy Studies Institute, 1985) p.67.
456 Bisset, Liz and Jean Coussins, Badge of Poverty: a new look at the stigma attached to free 
school meals (London: Child Poverty Action Group, 1982) p.31.
457 Blaug, Mark, "Selectivity in Education," in Blaug, Mark, H.D. Hughes, and Bleddyn 
Davies, eds., Social Services For All? Part Two (London: Fabian Society, 1968) p.32; Rose, 
Richard and Peter Falconer, Individual taste or collective decision ? Public policy on school 
meals (Glasgow: University of Strathclyde: Centre for the Study of Public Policy, 1990)
p.28.
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Chart 4-1 Education expenditure, England and Wales, 1985-6
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Source: Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy. Education Statistics: 1985-1986  
A ctuals. London: Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy, 1988. Table 4, p.3.
The Social Security Bill 1986 (which came into operation in 1988) contained 
im portant changes affecting free school meals. Pre-1986, children in 
families receiving Supplementary Benefit and Family Income Supplement 
were entitled to free school meals (and milk) by law. Children in other 
low income families were entitled at the discretion of local authorities.
The Bill ended free school meals except for children in families receiving 
Income Support. LEAs providing school meals were required to charge for 
them in all cases, except where the family was on Income Support.458 For 
families receiving the new Family Credit benefit, the level of cash benefit 
was higher to compensate for loss of free lunches 459 A notional weekly
458 McMahon, Will and Tim Marsh, F illing  the gap: Free school m eals, n u tr itio n  a n d  p o v e r ty  
(London: Child Poverty Action Group, 1999) p.7.
459 Harris, Neville, "Widening Agendas: The Social Security Reviews and Reforms of 
1985-8," in Harris, Neville, ed., Social S e c u r ity  L aw  in C o n te x t (OUP, 2000) p.124.
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amount of £2.55 was added to the cash benefit.460 However, meal prices 
varied between one local authority and another. The extra cash was 
spread out over 52 weeks, not just the school term. Following the changes 
in April 1988 there was a drop of 400,000 to 900,000 (15 per cent) in the 
numbers of school children in England who qualified for free meals 
because their parents received Family Income Supplement, or they lost 
their right to free school meals under an LEA discretionary scheme 461
Table 4-1 gives a breakdown of the reasons for receipt of free school 
meals in October 1984, before the change.
Table 4-1 Children receiving free school meals, England, October 1984______________
Pupils whose parents were in receipt of Supplementary Benefit 59%
Pupils whose parents were in receipt of Family Income Supplement 15%
Other pupils 26%
Source: H ansard, Written Answers, 12 December 1985, Col 703. Reproduced in Family Policy 
Studies Centre. School meals and social security. London: Family Policy Studies Centre, 1986. p.2.
In April 1992 the eligibility conditions for Income Support changed such 
that the hours people on Income Support could work changed from 24 to 
16 a week. Some families moved off Income Support and therefore lost 
the right to free school meals.462
4.7.2 Prescription medicines
For those who paid, prescription charges soared under the 
Conservatives.463 In addition to raising charges, Fowler announced, in 
1983, a lim ited  list' of drugs prescribable under the NHS. The proportion
460 McMahon, Will and Tim Marsh, Filling the gap: Free school meals, nutrition and poverty 
(London: Child Poverty Action Group, 1999) p.20.
461 Cole-Hamilton, Issy, Jo O'Rourke, and Sue Dibb, School meals (London: Child Poverty 
Action Group/Food Commission, 1991) p.8.
462 Cole-Hamilton, Issy, Jo O'Rourke, and Sue Dibb, School meals (London: Child Poverty 
Action Group/Food Commission, 1991) p.5.
463 Precription charges increased at 40 times the rate of inflation between 1979 and 1994. 
Timmins, Nicholas, The Five Giants: A Biography of the Welfare State (Fontana, 1996) p.505.
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of prescription items exempt from charge on the grounds of low income 
was relatively low, as was the proportion of items paid for as Chart 4-2 
shows. Exemption on grounds of low income is included in the category 
'other reasons', which also includes maternity and medical exemptions, 
exemption because of receipt of Family Credit or Disability Working 
Allowance, and holders of pre-payment certificates. The 12 per cent of 
prescription items dispensed free for 'other reasons' numbered some 53 
million items. Chart 4-2 shows that the size of the patient population 
seeking reimbursement on the grounds of low income was small relative 
to those exempt.
Chart 4-2 Proportion of NHS prescription items paid for and exempt from charges, 
1996
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Note: Until 1996 men aged 65 and over and women aged 60 and over were entitled to free NHS 
prescriptions. From 1996 men over 60 years of age were entitled to free NHS prescriptions. 
Sources: Calculated from The Guardian, "Analysis: Prescription charges." 3 March 1998,13.
4.7.3 Student grants
The numbers of students increased in the 1980s, chiefly through 
unplanned expansion of the polytechnics. At the same time, the value of
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the grant had been allowed to fall to the point where the DES admitted 
that 'we would no longer maintain that the maintenance element of the 
m andatory award is sufficient to meet all the essential expenditure of the 
average student'.464 The grant system as it stood in the 1980s was 
unpopular 465 One reason was that an estimated 40 per cent of students 
received less in grant and parental contribution than they should have 
done according to the grant system.466 Sir Keith Joseph, then Secretary of 
State for Education and Science, introduced a Green Paper in 1985 and 
suggested that both student fees and maintenance grant should be means 
tested on parental income. But Tory backbenchers deserted the scheme 
'once they realised the ferocity of the middle-class parents threatened 
with the loss of one of their perks' 467 However, w ith a further expansion 
in student numbers expected, the cost of the maintenance grant could not 
be sustained, even though it had repeatedly been raised by less than 
inflation. Therefore, in 1990 the student grant was reluctantly frozen and 
a top-up loan introduced.468
4.7.4 Civil Legal Aid
From 1986 tol992 there was increasing government concern to hold down 
the growth in legal aid expenditure. The first major sign of a cost- 
reducing approach was in February 1986, when, in a 'panic measure' to
464 The Times, 3 December 1986, p.5. Quoted in Barr, Nicholas, "Alternative Proposals for 
Students Loans in the United Kingdom," in Woodhall, Maureen, ed., Financial Support 
for Students: Grants, Loans or Graduate Tax? (London: Kogan Page, 1989) p.110.
465 Lewis, Alan, Cedric Sandford, and Norman Thomson, Grants or Loans? A  survey of 
opinion on the finance of maintenance costs of university students (London: IEA, 1980).
466 Figures for 1982-83. Barr, Nicholas, "Alternative Proposals for Students Loans in the 
United Kingdom," in Woodhall, Maureen, ed., Financial Support for Students: Grants, 
Loans or Graduate Tax? (London: Kogan Page, 1989) p.UO.
467 Barr, Nicholas, Student Loans: The Next Steps (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 
1989) p .l.
468 Timmins, Nicholas, The Five Giants: A Biography of the Welfare State (Fontana, 1996) 
pp.444-445.
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keep costs down, legal aid eligibility allowances for dependents were cut 
by 17 per c en t469 Then, in the summer of 1986 the government 
announced a scrutiny of legal aid with the following terms of reference: 
'Given the necessary judicial independence of the courts and existing 
reviews of court procedure, to consider the determinants of expenditure 
on the legal aid scheme by looking at its operation and administration in 
practice, and to make recommendations'. Its objective was to ensure that 
the best possible value was obtained for the resources devoted to legal 
aid. It represented a government-led challenge to the legal profession's 
dominance over legal aid.
The origins of the 1988 Legal Aid Act lay in the Efficiency Scrutiny of Legal 
Aid conducted by the government's Efficiency Unit in 1986. The 
centrepiece of the Act was the creation of the Legal Aid Board (LAB) to 
take over the administration of legal aid from the Law Society. In 1990 
children became eligible in their own right, and the effect is that virtually 
all children are eligible for legal aid. In the early 1990s the government 
announced its intention to take serious steps to control spending on legal 
aid.470 Major changes to eligibility took place in 1993 as expenditure rose. 
A white paper, Striking the Balance, which sought to address this problem 
was put out in 1996.
4.7.5 Conclusion
The 1986 Social Security Bill was a firm push in the direction of greater 
'selectivism'. Means-tested benefits were put at the centre of the income 
maintenance system. The idea of social insurance involving some sort of 
contract between state and citizens had gone. Insurance contributions
469 Legal Action Group, A  Strategy for Justice: Publicly funded legal services in the 1990s 
(London: Legal Action Group, 1992) p.3. Smith, Roger, Justice: redressing the balance 
(London: Legal Action Group, 1997) p.21.
470 Bowles, Roger, "Reform of legal aid and the solicitors' profession," in Stephen, Frank
H., ed., Access to Justice (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1996) p.4.
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became a type of tax. Simpler means tests were developed which worked 
in relative harmony with one another, at least compared to w hat had 
gone before. This is seen as a radical restructuring of the welfare state. 
However, it should be borne in mind that the Conservatives did not 
single-handedly 'kill' the Beveridge insurance scheme -  it did not cater 
for everyone's needs because of the social changes which had taken place 
since the 1940s and the low level of benefits payable. Rather, the 
Conservatives 'buried' Beveridge.471
The move towards greater selectivism is equally evident in the changes to 
non-subsistence benefits. The means-testing scheme of one benefit after 
another was tackled in an attempt to reduce eligibility.
4.8 Overview
This last section uses charts to present quantitative information relating 
to the whole period 1930-1997. The aim is to quantify as far as possible the 
significance of the benefits which are the subject of this study.
4.8.1 Prescription medicines
Chart 4-3 illustrates how the price of an NHS prescription has changed 
over time. The vertical lines indicate years when there was a change of 
government. From 1965-1968, prescriptions were free to all, regardless of 
income. It can be seen frpm the chart that from 1980, the Conservative 
government followed a policy of steadily increasing the prescription 
charge. The increased price of prescription items raised the value of free 
prescriptions to the benefit's recipients, as the chart in section 1.3.1 
showed.
471 Hill, Michael, The Welfare State in Britain: A Political History since 1945 (Aldershot: 
Edward Elgar, 1993) p.161.
Chart 4-3 Real price of a NHS prescription, 1952-1998 (1995 pence)
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Chart 4-4 Number of NHS exempt and chargeable prescriptions, UK, 1970-1995
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Sources: Chew, Robert, Compendium of Health Statistics, 9th ed. (London: Office of Health 
Economics, 1995) p.61; Estimate from McGuigan, Sean, Compendium of Health Statistics, 10th ed. 
(London: Office of Health Economics, 1997).
Chart 4-4 illustrates the numbers of prescriptions dispensed. The 
numbers of exempt prescriptions have risen and numbers of non-exempt
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prescriptions have fallen. Exemption rates were generally higher in 
Wales.
The proportion of NHS prescriptions issued exempt from the prescription 
charge has steadily increased from about 62 per cent in 1975, to 81 per 
cent in 1985, to 90 per cent in 1995. This relative increase in exempt 
prescriptions could be because increasing prescription charges 
discouraged people who have to pay from seeking prescriptions. Ryan 
and Birch's results suggest that the charges policy followed in the NHS 
between 1979 and 1985 led to a significant reduction in utilisation by non­
exempt patients.472 This 'revealed behaviour' in response to increased 
charges means that it was, and is, important to protect those on low 
incomes from higher prescription charges. Further evidence of the effect 
of prescription charges on behaviour is the reduction in prescription 
items per capita dispensed to people who pay (see Chart 4-5).
On the other hand, the total number of prescriptions per capita has 
increased, because of the increased number of prescriptions per head 
given to people who do not pay, especially the elderly. As a point of 
comparison, in 1962 the number of prescriptions dispensed per head was 
4.2.
472 Ryan, M. and S. Birch, "Charging for Health Care: Evidence on the Utilisation of NHS 
Prescribed Drugs," Social Science and Medicine 33, no. 6 (1991): 681-7.
Chart 4-5 Prescription items per capita, England, 1979-1995
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4.8.2 School meals
A significant number of children in English and Welsh schools took 
school meals in the post-war period. Chart 4-6 shows that at the peaks of 
the popularity of the school meals service in the mid-1960s and mid- 
1970s, 70 per cent of school children ate school meals. Furthermore, most 
children ate school meals for at least one term during their school career, 
at least in  the mid-1970s.473
473 Davies, Bleddyn, U n iv e rsa lity , S e le c t iv ity  a n d  E ffectiven ess (London: Heinemann, 1978) 
p.31.
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Chart 4-6 Proportion of school children taking school meals, England and Wales, 
1946-1996 (%)
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University Press, 1995).
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There was a sharp drop in the proportion of children taking school meals 
after 1980, when prices went up because schools were allowed to charge 
whatever they wanted for school meals, and changes were made in the 
law to require schools to provide an area for children to eat their own 
packed lunches 477 Chart 4-6 illustrates how in October 1979 64 per cent 
or nearly 4.9m school children in England took school meals, but by 
October 1980 only 48 per cent (2.8m) were taking school meals. The 
proportion receiving free school meals fell from 11.9 per cent to 9.9 per
(fiop in the proportion of school children taking free school meals in 
1980 occurred because eligibility on the basis of low income was at the 
LEAs' discretion from this year onwards. The annual census of school 
meals carried out each October by the DES showed that in October 1980 
more than a third of English education authorities gave free meals only to 
families on the passport benefits 479 Nevertheless, from 1980 to 1984 the 
proportion of children taking free school meals rose by 6 per cent, 
reflecting the economic recession and consequently the rise in the 
proportion of children entitled to free meals from receipt of 
Supplementary Benefit or Family Income Supplement. In 1985 industrial 
action by teachers resulted in changes in lunchtime supervision
475 Townsend, Peter, Poverty in the United Kingdom: A  survey of household resources and 
standards of living (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1979) p.861.
476 Cole-Hamilton, Issy, Jo O'Rourke, and Sue Dibb, School meals (London: Child Poverty 
Action G roup/Food Commission, 1991) p.6.
477 Ivatts, J., "The Case of the School Meals Service," Social Policy and Administration 26, 
no. 3 (1992): 226-44 p.241.
478 Weir, S., "Stigma with chips," New Society, no. 28 January (1982) p.142.
479 Weir, S., "Stigma with chips," New Society , no. 28 January (1982) p.142, Cooper, 
Steven, The Education and Training Benefits (London: Policy Studies Institute, 1985) p.66.
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arrangements and numbers taking free meals dropped.480 Then, in 1988, 
free school meal entitlement was cut back 481 The numbers of parents 
applying for free meals rose again during the early 1990s recession due to 
unem ploym ent482 However, overall, over time, a greater proportion of 
school children were getting free meals.
The figures for the percentage of children getting free meals in Chart 4-6 
includes those getting them by reason of receipt of Supplementary 
Benefit, Family Income Supplement or Income Support, as well as those 
getting them on the grounds of low income. From 1980, many LEAs 
stopped giving free school meals on the grounds of low income, so the 
numbers of children taking free school meals from 1980 onwards reflects 
closely the numbers of children in households on subsistence benefits. 
From 1988, LEAs were required to charge for school meals in all cases, 
except if the parents were on Income Support483 An estimated 400,000 
out of 1.3m children in England who hitherto had received free meals lost 
their entitlement by this change.484
Chart 4-7 shows how the real price of school meals changed. The vertical 
lines indicate years when there was a change of government. Generally, 
school meal charges were lower in Labour years than Conservative years. 
However, comparison with the nominal prices shows that falls in the real 
price of school meals were generated by a failure to put up the nominal 
price, rather than an active policy of cutting prices. Labour did put up
480 Cole-Hamilton, Issy, Jo O'Rourke, and Sue Dibb, School meals (London: Child Poverty 
Action Group/Food Commission, 1991) p.6.
481 McMahon, Will and Tim Marsh, Filling the gap: Free school meals, nutrition and poverty 
(London: Child Poverty Action Group, 1999) p.7.
482 Ivatts, J., "The Case of the School Meals Service," Social Policy and Administration 26, 
no. 3 (1992): 226-44 p.241.
483 McMahon, Will and Tim Marsh, Filling the gap: Free school meals, nutrition and poverty 
(London: Child Poverty Action Group, 1999) p.7.
484 Cole-Hamilton, Issy, Jo O'Rourke, and Sue Dibb, School meals (London: Child Poverty 
Action Group/Food Commission, 1991) p.8.
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school meal prices in 1968, after public expenditure came under harsh 
scrutiny as a condition of an IMF loan. From 1971-1977 school meal prices 
were held down because price increases did not keep up inflation. From 
1950 until 1980 the price of a school meal was fixed by the Ministry of 
Education. The graph shows how the price of school meals shot up after 
1980 under Conservative education policies.
Chart 4-7 Real price of "paid for' school meal per week, England and Wales, 1952-1995 
(1995 £)
6.00
5.00
4.00
I  3.00O''
2.00
1.00 
0.00
Note: The data from 1980 onwards are based on estimates of the price of a meal because no figures 
were published by government on the prices schools were charging. Sources: Bisset, Liz and Jean 
Coussins, Badge o f Poverty: a new look at the stigma attached to free school meals (London: Child 
Poverty Action Group, 1982); Bradshaw, Jonathan, "Tried and found wanting: the take-up of 
means-tested benefits," in Ward, Sue, ed., DHSS in Crisis: Social Security - under pressure and under 
review  (London: CP AG, 1985); Davies, Bleddyn, Universality, Selectivity and Effectiveness (London: 
Heinemann, 1978) Appendix 1.1; Rose, Richard and Peter Falconer, Individual taste or collective 
decision? Public policy on school meals (Glasgow: University of Strathclyde: Centre for the Study of 
Public Policy, 1990); Weir, S., "Stigma with chips," N ew  Society , no. 28 January (1982).
Chart 4-8 shows how fluctuations in the in the proportion of children 
taking paid meals mirrored changes in nationally determined prices.
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Chart 4-8 Relationship between price of meals and proportion of children taking
'paid for' meals, England & Wales, 1952-1996
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The increased price of the 'paid for' school meal raised the value of free 
school meals to its recipients. One would expect more parents to take-up 
any entitlement to free school meals their children had under these 
circumstances. However, Chart 4-9 shows that there is no clear 
relationship between proportion of children having free school meals and 
the value of the benefit. This is probably because other conditions of the
5 how many school children
ils.
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Chart 4-9 Relationship between price of school meals and proportion of children
taking free meals, England & Wales, 1952-1996
 Real price per week (1995 £) % taking free meals
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There was a subsidy on the price of school meals for all children, not just 
those getting free meals. Unfortunately, it is not possible to break down 
the total subsidy between free and paid-for meals after 1983. However, 
the trend away from subsidising paid-for meals is clear. In 1979 the 
subsidy to free school meals was over £400m (1995 prices).
Chart 4-10 Real subsidy to school meals, England and Wales, 1947-1996 (1995 £m)
Sources: Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy, Education Statistics (London: 
Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy); Cole-Hamilton, Issy, Jo O'Rourke, and 
Sue Dibb, School meals (London: Child Poverty Action Group/Food Commission, 1991); Davies, 
Bleddyn, Universality, Selectivity and Effectiveness (London: Heinemann, 1978); Department of 
Education and Science, Statistics of Education, vol. 5: Finance and Awards (London: HMSO); 
Hansard, v. 969,2 July 1979, Written Answers, cols. 467-472; Hansard, v. 81,24 June 1985, Written 
Answers, col. 306; Harris, Bernard, The Health of the Schoolchild: A  history of the school medical service 
in England and Wales (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1995).
Although the amount spent subsidising school meals ran into hundreds 
of millions of pounds, it was always a relatively small proportion of the 
overall education budget, 3-5 per cent.485
4.8.3 Student grants
The following chart, Chart 4-11, shows the numbers of students in receipt 
of student grants. From 1962, state scholarships were phased out, and 
administration of grants was wholly taken over by LEAs. State 
scholarships were prestigious, but LEA awards were always more 
numerous.
485 Blaug, Mark, "Selectivity in Education," in Blaug, Mark, H.D. Hughes, and Bleddyn 
Davies, eds., Social Services For All? Part Two (London: Fabian Society, 1968) p.32; Rose, 
Richard and Peter Falconer, Individual taste or collective decision ? Public policy on school 
meals (Glasgow: University of Strathclyde: Centre for the Study of Public Policy, 1990)
p.28.
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Chart 4-11 Number of students in receipt of awards, England & Wales, 1950-1987
State Scholarships 
Total
Maximum award holders
LEA full value awards 
Minimum award only holders
Note: From 1962, for LEAs, only mandatory awards for 'designated courses' are included. Sources: 
Department of Education and Science, "Student Support," Trends in Education 8 October (1967); 
Department of Education and Science, Statistics o f Education, vol. 5: Finance and Awards (London: 
HMSO); Department of Education and Science, Statistical Bulletin .
Chart 4-12 illustrates how the value of the student grant peaked in 1962. 
From 1962 to 1984, there was a 'm inim um  grant' given to all students, 
regardless of parental income. The vertical lines indicate years when 
there was a change of government. In 1976-77 T F Aq rmirl iFp fid] orant nf
Chart 4-12 Real value of student grant, England & Wales, 1952-1996
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International Centre for Economics and Related Disciplines, 1988); Department of Education and 
Science, Statistical Bulletin ; Department of Education and Science, Statistics o f  Education, vol. 5: 
Finance and Awards (London: HMSO); Hastings, Merle, Grants fo r  Higher Education, 1st ed. 
(London: Cresset, 1964); Matthewman, Jim, Tolley's Social Security and State Benefits (London: 
Tolley); National Union of Students, Grants Year Book and Survey o f Local Education A uthority  
A w ards (London: N.U.S); National Union of Students, Survey o f Local Education A uth ority  A w ards to
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Chart 4-13 Real central and local government expenditure on undergraduate awards,
England & Wales, 1958-1994
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Mote: From 1962, for LEAs, only mandatory awards for 'designated courses' are included. Sources: 
Department for Education, Statistical Bulletin; Department of Education and Science, Statistical 
Bulletin; Department of Education and Science, Statistics o f Education, vol. 5: Finance and Awards 
(London: HMSO).
The total cost of student maintenance (not fees) in 1968-9 was approx. 
£900m (universities and non-university sector i.e. universities, colleges of 
education and technology, including post-graduates). This was 14 per 
cent of the cost of higher education as a whole, and equivalent to 5 per 
cent of national expenditure on education.489 Chart 4-14 shows a 
breakdown of how much expenditure went to maintenance, the 
m inimum award and payment of university fees, respectively.
489 Jenkins, Simon and Bill Van Straubenzee, "Introduction," in Jenkins, Simon and Bill 
Van Straubenzee, eds., S tu d en t Loans: P ros an d  C ons (London: Conservative Political 
Centre, 1968) pp.6-9.
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Chart 4-14 Central and local government expenditure on mandatory undergraduate
awards, England & Wales
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Sources: Department of Education and Science, Statistical Bulletin.
4.8.4 Civil legal aid
Referring to 1970, S. Pollock estimated that: 'The expenditure on legal aid 
has consistently run at about 0.001 per cent of the cost of the social 
services7.490 In 1976-1977 £33m was spent on legal aid, and £4m recovered 
in contributions (13 per cent). About one-third of all contributions paid 
were ultimately returned to assisted litigants. For personal injury, it was 
as high as 77 per cen t491
In the financial year 1955/6, the Exchequer Grant towards legal aid was 
£1,375,000 492 The increase in expenditure on legal aid from 1983-84 to
490 Pollock, Seton, Legal A id : The F irst 2 5  Years (London: Oyez Publishing, 1975) p.86.
491 Partington, Martin, The Legal A id  M ean s-T ests: T im e f o r  a R eappra isa l (London: Child 
Poverty Action Group, 1978) p.15.
492 Benenson, Peter James Henry, The F uture o f  Legal A id  (London: Fabian Society, 1957) 
p.24.
1993-94 was from £74m to £544m.493 In 1995-96 expenditure on civil legal 
aid was £675m.494
I calculated that based on the figures given by Abel-Smith and Stevens, 
over 90,000 legal aid certificates were granted in the year 1963-4 495 As for 
numbers of investigations of means carried out, the Supplementary 
Benefits Commission (SBC) made nearly 170,000 investigations for legal 
aid in 1968 496 In 1969/70144,000 persons were granted legal aid.497 
During 1979, 289,491 applications for civil legal aid (including Scotland) 
were received by the SBC 498 £2m was spent in 1978 by the SBC 
interviewing claimants and checking their eligibility.499
Legal aid was a minor source of income for the legal profession in 1970, 
but by the mid-1970s it made a significant contribution. Legal aid was 7 
per cent of the fees of solicitors in 1975-76 and 11 per cent in 1985-86.500 
This proportion had risen tol2 per cent by 1990/91.
In the early 1990s 11,000 solicitors' offices were recorded as receiving a 
legal aid payment in any one year. The Law Society estimated that this 
represented a payment to 74 per cent of all offices, which indicates that a
493 Gray, Alistair, Paul Fenn, and Neil Rickman, "Monitoring legal aid: Back to first 
principals?," in Stephen, Frank H., ed., Access to Justice (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 1996) p.24.
494 Smith, Roger, Justice: redressing the balance (London: Legal Action Group, 1997) p.22.
495 Calculated from Abel-Smith, Brian and R. B. Stevens, Lawyers and the Courts: A  
Sociological Study of the English Legal System, 1750-1965 (London: Heinemann, 1967) 
pp.344-5.
496 Child Poverty Action Group, A  Policy to Establish the Legal Rights of Low Income 
Families (London: CP AG, 1969) p.6; Brooke, Rosalind, A policy to establish the legal rights of 
low income families: legal aid and advice (London: Child Poverty Action Group, 1969) p.6.
497 The Attorney-General, House of Commons Hansard, v. 822, 5 August 1971, Written 
Answers, col. 468.
498 Supplementary Benefits Commission, Annual Report of the Supplementary Benefits 
Commission (London: HMSO, 1980) p.155.
499 Partington, Martin, The Legal A id  Means-Tests: Time for a Reappraisal (London: Child 
Poverty Action Group, 1978) p.19.
500 Smith, Roger, Justice: redressing the balance (London: Legal Action Group, 1997) p.17.
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broad range of solicitor's practices were involved in the legal aid 
scheme.501 Barristers were even more dependent on legal aid. In 1989 
legal aid accounted for 27% for the total fee income of all barristers. A 
similar proportion was reported to the Royal Commission for Legal 
Services in 1977.502
Between 1973-74 and 1996-97 the percentage of certificates where the 
assisted person was assessed for no contribution rose from 78 per cent to 
85 per cent. This suggests that civil legal aid was increasingly used by 
those with the lowest levels of income, rather than those who were a bit 
better off.503
Chart 4-15 Real average cost of cases brought with civil legal aid, England & Wales, 
1984/5-1994/5
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Sources: Calculated from Legal Aid Board, Annual Report 1994-95 (London: HMSO), Tables Civil 13 
& 14. Reproduced in Bowles, Roger, "Reform of legal aid and the solicitors' profession," in 
Stephen, Frank H., ed., Access to Justice (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1996).
501 Legal Action Group, A  S tra te g y  fo r  Justice: P u b lic ly  fu n d e d  legal serv ices in the 1 9 9 0 s  
(London: Legal Action Group, 1992) p.17.
502 Legal Action Group, A  S tra te g y  fo r  Justice: P u b lic ly  fu n d e d  legal serv ices in the 1 9 90s  
(London: Legal Action Group, 1992) p.17; Smith, Roger, Justice: red ress in g  the balance  
(London: Legal Action Group, 1997) p.38.
503 Smith, Roger, Justice: red ress in g  the balance (London: Legal Action Group, 1997) p.24.
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Chart 4-16 Number of cases brought with civil legal aid, England & Wales, 198^5-
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& 14. Reproduced in Bowles, Roger. "Reform of legal aid and the solicitors' profession." In Access 
to Justice, edited by Frank H. Stephen. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1996.
4.9 The (non)importance of party politics
This chapter was structured around the different parties in government. 
However, the shade of government has made relatively little impact on 
non-subsistence benefits. Party competition was not particularly 
im portant for explaining change in non-subsistence benefits. Economic 
events were more important, particularly the size of the overall budget. 
The main influence on changes to existing means tested benefits has been 
the pressure to cut costs, as part of a bid to slash overall budgets. In some 
ways, the watershed of before and after 1975 is more im portant than 
party politics because after that the mood turned and there was less 
reluctance to make cuts.
□ 1984-85
□ 1989-90
□  1994-95
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The non-subsistence benefits have been changed in response to day-to- 
day pressures, rather than to a co-ordinated plan. These means tested 
schemes have been altered at different times, which explains some of the 
divergence in the operation of their means tests. Only school meals were 
consistently regarded as integrated with social security benefits. 
Pharmaceutical benefits were only briefly part of an overall scheme to 
provide free medical care. The story of the other non-subsistence benefits 
is barely related to that of the main welfare state structures. They are an 
afterthought to the welfare state. Although overall pressure to reduce 
costs is a common factor in provoking changes to the means tested 
schemes, which particular benefit came under attack for cuts depended 
on other factors and priorities at the time. Charges, contributions and 
means tested services have been introduced, abandoned, amended or 
extended in a series of ad hoc bargains between the interested parties.
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5 The objectives of means-tested benefits
In a broad sense, the objective of means testing is to provide for those in 
greatest need at least cost to the rest, to do "the greatest good for the 
greatest number'. The general arguments for and against means testing 
are considered in Chapter 3. This chapter assumes that the alternative to 
providing a means tested benefit is to provide no benefit at all.
Means-tested benefits exist as a device to resolve the uneasy balance 
between assisting the needy whilst excluding as many people as possible 
in order to keep the costs reasonable. But, as this chapter shows, the 
objectives of the non-subsistence benefits system can be 'unpacked' 
further.
This chapter traces the specific purpose of four non-subsistence benefits 
throughout their history: free school meals, free pharmaceuticals, student 
grants and civil legal aid. Looking at the problem which means-tested 
benefits were meant to resolve can help to form a balanced view of the 
record of these benefits and the implications for future policy proposals.
Why provide a means tested benefit? Politicians, civil servants, interest 
groups, 'experts', professionals and potential claimants may have had 
different ideas about what the objective of the means test was. The ways 
these various groups have analysed these benefits and their criteria for 
analysis reveals what they thought were the objectives. It is not possible 
to analyse what 'the general public' thought the intention of the means 
tested benefit was: there is no such homogeneous grouping. This section 
focuses on the internal politics of social policy - the relation between 
politicians, administrators and pressure groups. 'Politics' makes a 
difference, but not always in the way one might expect from superficial 
consideration of each side's arguments.
One cannot assume that the only motivation for a means-tested benefit 
was to 'reach the most needy', and only the most needy, as defined by
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income status. An alternative motivation may have been the protection of 
accustomed living standards to ensure that no one had to face an 
unexpected and unacceptably large drop in their standard of living.504 
Eligibility extending high up the income scale and generous disregards 
against income would be suggestive of a scheme aimed at protecting 
living standards. An example is the means-tested student maintenance 
grant.
Another aim of means testing has been to raise revenue or deter "abuse7 
of a publicly provided service, by making the introduction of charges 
politically acceptable. The means tested benefits considered in this thesis 
are for remission of charges usually made for a service, either by a public 
or private body. Means tests were introduced in an attempt to ensure that 
poor people did not suffer too harshly from policies to reduce general 
subsidies to services. In such instances, means tested benefits appear a 
grudging measure to make provision for low income families without 
trying too hard. For example, take-up depends on the initiative of the 
recipient.
This occurred when NHS prescription charges were introduced in 1952. 
The NHS had found that in a universal scheme, the only weapon to limit 
expenditure was by restricting use. A way to restrict demand is to impose 
charges. The imposition of a prescription charge conforms to the 
economic principle of reducing demand by increasing price, and where 
there is a charge for a service, means testing as a way to protect the poor 
is important. Thus, the means test is incidental to the existence of a 
charge.
504 Barr, Nicholas and Fiona Coulter, "Social Security: Solution or Problem?," in Hills, 
John, ed., The State of Welfare: The Welfare State in Britain since 1974 (Oxford: OUP, 1990) 
p.275; Spicker, Paul, Poverty and Social Security: Concepts and Principles (Routledge, 1993)
p.108.
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I propose that a charge for a publicly-provided service may be made:505
i) To raise money to support the service, especially if it is difficult 
to raise the general level of taxation.506
ii) To foster economy in the use of the service. However, this may 
deter the poor from using the service.
iii) Because it lends itself to variation by income through means 
testing and therefore the possibility of securing other objectives 
such as income redistribution.
Prescription charges and school meal charges were charged for reasons (i) 
and (ii). In other words for reasons to do with restraining government 
expenditure and getting taxpayer support by making charges and 
deterring take-up. Student maintenance and legal services are privately 
provided, and therefore charging was, on the whole, taken for granted.
The means-tests applied to non-subsistence benefits have as one of their 
objectives to "ensure access to the relevant service". But they can also have
505 In order to clarify my analysis, I have developed my own three definitions of the 
reasons for charging because there is no generally used classification of the reasons for 
charging in the social policy literature. Other writers define the reasons differently to 
those I have listed. Willis, C. Y. and C. Leighton, "Protecting the Poor Under Cost 
Recovery - the Role of Means Testing," Health Policy and Planning 10, no. 3 (1995): 241- 
256 cite fee collection and equity goals. Mason, P., "The Charging Debate: no means 
tested charge on principle, or accept the means tested charge and argue for a fair and . 
reasonable level?," Disability & Society 14, no. 2 (1999): 263-267 refers charges to raise 
income and charges to restrict demand. May, J.S., "Charging for Home Help," in Gibson, 
J.G., ed., Fees and Charges in the Personal Social Services (Birmingham: Institute of Local 
Government Studies, University of Birmingham, 1979) focuses on charges as a rationing 
device, but implicitly refers to its redistributive aspects. Gasson, D.M., "Fees and 
Charges in the Personal Social Services," in Gibson, J.G., ed., Fees and Charges in the 
Personal Social Services (Birmingham: Institute of Local Government Studies, University 
of Birmingham, 1979) proposes that charges reduce the taxpayers' burden, discourage 
wasteful demands on the service and redistribute, but also proposes that charges may be 
made to avoid stigma to recipients and promote self-reliance. Bums, Eveline M.,
"Income Testing of In-Kind Transfers: Discussion," in Garfinkel, I., ed., Income-Tested 
Transfer Programs: The Case For and Against (New York: Academic Press, 1982) p.345 
distinguishes fostering economy and deterring use of the service as two separate reasons 
for making a charge.
506 Mason, P., "The Charging Debate: no means tested charge on principle, or accept the 
means tested charge and argue for a fair and reasonable level?," Disability & Society 14, 
no. 2 (1999): 263-267 p.265 points out if charges are levied to raise revenue, that 
effectively means that one group of service users is subsidising other users of the service 
who are less well-off. Perceptions of whether this is fair will depend on the 
characteristics of service users and the nature of the service.
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various other objectives. I propose that these objectives can be classified
as follows:507
1) Means tests can be used to redistribute between rich and poor, 
between those with and those without children.
2) A less ambitious aim than redistribution is that where there is a 
charge for a service, means testing ensures access to certain goods or 
services thought necessary for a purposeful life are fulfilled. Access to 
goods or services is fulfils the aim of social inclusion for the 
individual. However, means tests can aim to ensure access for the 
poor, or they can aim to support both the non-poor and the poor. In 
other words, in su rin g  access to the service7 can be carried out with 
varying degrees of enthusiasm.
3) Means tests can influence people's expenditure patterns: a means- 
tested charge can be introduced with the aim of actively encouraging 
consumption of the service.
4) On the other hand, if you want to reduce the consumption of a 
service, then you can introduce a means-tested charge with the
507 In order to clarify my analysis, I have developed my own five definitions of the 
objectives of means tested benefits because there is no generally used classification of 
the objectives of means tested benefits in the social policy literature. Other writers 
consider different objectives to those I have listed. Ford, P, Incomes, means tests and 
personal responsibility (London: P.S. King and son, Ltd., 1939) p.15 distinguished the 
income maintenance objective from when the benefit 'tries to relieve the family of some 
detailed item of expense'. He also refers to the redistributive effects of means tested 
benefits. Rein, Martin, "Income Testing of In-Kind Transfers: Discussion," in Garfinkel, 
I., ed., Income-Tested Transfer Programs: The Case For and Against (New York: Academic 
Press, 1982) distinguishes compensation for misfortune from reduction of distribution 
inequalities. Northrop, E. M., "Public-Assistance and Antipoverty Programs or Why 
Haven't Means-Tested Programs Been More Successful At Reducing Poverty?," Journal 
of Economic Issues 25, no. 4 (1991): 1017-1027 suggests that 'assistance' and 'anti-poverty' 
is a helpful distinction to make when evaluating means tested benefits. Gasson, D.M., 
"Fees and Charges in the Personal Social Services," in Gibson, J.G., ed., Fees and Charges 
in the Personal Social Services (Birmingham: Institute of Local Government Studies, 
University of Birmingham, 1979) p.46 identified two functions of charging policies, 
which I also find to be possible objectives of means tested benefits. Some of the 
objectives I have generalised from my observations of objectives specific to individual 
benefits.
207
primary aim of restricting eligibility (i.e. rationing), rather than 
ensuring that the needy were protected. This argument was made 
strongly be R. Titmuss: 'The fundamental objective of all such tests of 
eligibility is to keep people out; not to let them in'.508
5) A distinction can also be made between 'assistance', and 'anti­
poverty' measures. Assistance benefits aim to ease the conditions of 
people in poverty.
6) Anti-poverty schemes aim to prevent poverty (or get them off 
subsistence benefits), generally by investment in their human capital 
so that they can find work. Anti-poverty measures would be expected 
to support both the non-poor and the poor in order to achieve their 
aim. In the UK, people move out of poverty more than we thought 
before.509 This has implications for social policy, which could act to 
stop people dropping back into poverty, protecting those people just 
above the poverty line, as well as the poor.
7) Means tests can be used to ensure that no-one has to experience a 
sudden drop in living standards if their circumstances change, 
including those with average or above-average incomes.
8) Externality arguments, which refer to gains that accrue to society in 
general rather than to the individual recipient, can also be used to 
defend the existence of means-tested benefits (as opposed to no 
benefits) on the basis that they promote social cohesion. .
It is difficult to argue for non-subsistence benefits that they aimed to
shame recipients into improving their own situation by stigmatising
them. The only one of the four benefits of this study for which there is
508 Titmuss, R.M., "Welfare State and Welfare Society/' in Butterworth, Eric and Robert 
Holman, eds., Social Welfare in Modern Britain (Fontana /  Collins, 1975), 25-37 p.36.
509 See, for example Noble, Michael and George Smith, "Two nations? Changing patterns 
of income and wealth in two contrasting areas," in Hills, John, ed., New Inequalities 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) pp.300-303.
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strong evidence of stigma is free school meals. Since the potential for 
humiliation of children receiving free school meals depended on the 
procedures used at a particular school, over which the central 
government had little control, there is no evidence that stigmatisation 
was a policy aim.510 On the other hand, giving cash instead of meals in- 
kind to Family Credit recipients could suggest a desire to make Family 
Credit more attractive than Income Support -  it depends on whether 
eating school meals felt like a bonus or a punishment!
This chapter looks at how these objectives came into play with the non­
subsistence benefits of this study, with an analysis of how objectives 
changed over time. This chapter answers the question 'was the policy 
objective of means testing to enable both the poor and non-poor to 
receive the service?' The sources of evidence for this chapter are the 
principles are described in the legislation itself. Government papers 
available at the PRO were another source, and references to secondary 
sources were also used. Finally, in the concluding section, the debates 
about the objectives of these benefits are located in the context of the 
objectives of subsistence benefits and the general objectives of the welfare 
state.
5.1 Prescription medicines
A means tested benefit is a way to protect the poor from a charge and, 
accordingly, pharmaceutical benefits were incidental to the introduction 
of a charge for prescription medicines. Debate about access to 
prescription medicines was dominated by the issue of imposing a charge 
at all.
510 For example, on 4 November 1968, the Secretary of State for Education and Science 
said: 'We have asked local authorities to do all in their power to avoid embarrassment to 
children'. House of Commons Hansard v. 722,4 November 1968, col. 486.
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The introduction of a charge for prescription medicines was highly 
controversial, as described in section 4.3.511 It was introduced to restrict 
patient demand for prescription medicines and as a check on abuse of the 
NHS. For instance, it was to stop people from getting aspirin and 
plasters. Bevan accepted prescription charges, as he conceded 
prescriptions were open to abuse and he referred to the questionable 
value of the 'ceaseless cascade of medicines pouring down British 
throats'.512 How much the prescription charge in fact influenced demand 
was dependent on patient attitudes, a subject about which little is known: 
a charge may penalise the sick, while doing little to discourage the 
hypochondriac.
In practice, the granting of low income exemptions to protect the poor 
was used within government as a way to get agreement to the 
introduction of a charge. For the same reason, there were exemptions 
based on status, as well as on income, for example the exemption of the 
war disabled. The granting of exemptions for old age pensioners and the 
war disabled gained the support of the Minister of Pensions for the 
charges. The government stated in 1968 the objective: 'We have exempted 
those most likely to suffer hardship through paying the charges'.513 Once 
introduced, there was little debate about the objectives of means tested
511 See also, for example Webster, Charles, The Health Services since the War. Vol. I. 
Problems of Health Care : The National Health Service before 1957 (London: HMSO, 1988) 
pp.132-192 and Land, Andrew, Rodney Lowe, and Noel Whiteside, Development of the 
Welfare State 1939-1951: A  Guide to Documents in the Public Record Office (London: HMSO, 
1992) pp.110-132.
512 Webster, Charles, The Health Services since the War. Vol. I. Problems of Health Care : The 
National Health Service before 1957 (London: HMSO, 1988) p.144.
513 Mr Crossman in reply to Mr Dance, House of Commons Hansard v. 722,4 November 
1968, col. 457. Mr Crossman suggested in a reply to Mr Scott-Hopkins about the 
possibility of lowering the age limit for women to 60 that old age exemptions were 
based on the large number of prescriptions required by older people, rather than their 
lower income: 'I do not think there is any evidence that women between the ages of 60 
and 65 are more likely to need frequent prescriptions than men of the same age'. House 
of Commons Hansard v. 722,4 November 1968, col. 458.
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low income exemptions. The issue was very low-key, with the 
Department of Health dictating the remit of the scheme, and hardly any 
input from doctors' or patients' groups.
There were also exemptions based on chronic medical conditions such as 
diabetes, an admission that inability to pay should not be the only 
criterion, and that sickness should not impose an intolerable financial 
burden even amongst the relatively well off. This is how the non-poor 
were protected from high expenditure on medicines: means tested 
exemptions were only for the poor.
On the surface, the aim was to continue the principle that in the health 
service, any treatment could be given to any patient without worrying 
about the cost to the patient. However, bureaucrats devised a method of 
exemption that frustrated access for the groups the scheme was intended 
to help. For people on National Assistance, the prescription charges could 
be reclaimed through the Post Office on presentation of the receipt for the 
prescription medicine and the National Assistance payment book. People 
not receiving National Assistance could get a refund if they could not 
afford, by assistance standards, to pay the charge themselves. The 
chemist had an application form for use with the receipt in such cases.514 
Government records show that civil servants devised a scheme in which 
people receiving National Assistance could get a refund of the 
prescription charge when drawing their assistance payment515 with the 
'hope that many people would not trouble to claim the shilling from the 
Post Office'.516 The Ministry of Health considered also that 'a  repayment 
scheme would put obstacles in the way of demands for the extension of
514 National Old People's Welfare Council, Statutory Provision for Old People (London: 
National Council for Social Service, 1957) p.9.
515 National Council for Social Service, Public Social Services: Handbook of Information on 
Services Provided by the State, 9th ed. (London: NCSS, 1951) Supplement, p i.
s16 PRO AST 7/1015.
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the privilege to this or that class of the community' because 'the trouble 
involved to the patient would act as a deterrent against claims'.517 Thus, 
the aim of the means test seems to have been to restrict eligibility, rather 
than ensure that the needy were covered.
5.2 School meals
The reasons for the provision of school meals must be distinguished from 
the reasons for subsidising them. Catering is provided on school premises 
because of the British tradition of eating a cooked lunch, to keep pupils 
on the site over the lunch break, and to help working families. Another 
aim of school meals was to teach children table manners and etiquette. 
The Parliamentary Secretary to the Board of Education commented in 
1946 that it: 'promotes a sound social spirit in the school [as it does] in the 
public schools and at older universities'.518
The relative emphasis on 'subsidised free' and 'subsidised paid-for' 
school meals has changed over time. Likewise, the main objective within 
each 'stream ' has changed over time. The two policies of 'subsidised free' 
and 'subsidised paid-for' school meals have had different objectives 
including educational, nutritional and family income support objectives, 
which can be summarised as follows:
Free meals for some children: Paid-for (subsidised) meals for all children:
Educational - to help learning 
Nutritional & medical -preventative and 
curative
Assistance for poor children.
To encourage a community atmosphere 
Nutritional & medical - preventative and 
curative
Anti-poverty, assistance for poor children 
Family income support.
517 PRO AST 7/1015.
518 Lang, Tim, Now you see them, now you don't: a report on the fate of school meals and the 
loss o f300,000 jobs (Accrington: The Lancashire School Meals Campaign, 1981) p.18.
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As B. Davies has said, school meals was 'a service with complex 
objectives spanning more than one department of state'519. The 
government's department of education saw meals as having primarily an 
educational objective. Nutritionists saw the goal as providing each child 
with a meal that meets the experts' criteria of what a child should eat. 
Treasury officials evaluated school meals in cost terms: access for the 
poor at least cost. Social policy experts and campaign groups applied 
distributional criteria, asking whether the poorest children benefited. 
These goals were incompatible, and vagueness about the objectives in 
policy resulted. As B. Davies explained: because it is provided in schools 
and administered by education departments (not health or social welfare 
departments), there is lots of opportunity for goal displacement.520
School meals were first introduced for educational reasons because 
pupils were found to be too hungry to learn.521 A 1906 Act enabled 
Education Authorities to provide meals to children in attendance at 
public elementary schools who were 'unable by reason of lack of food to 
take full advantage of the education provided for them '.522 Poorly fed 
children were found to be too tired and lacking in concentration to learn 
properly.
In order to qualify for free meals, it was necessary to demonstrate that a 
child was suffering from a lack of food, not just that the family had a low 
income.523 The Board of Education took a narrow view of eligibility
519 Davies, Bleddyn, Universality, Selectivity and Effectiveness (London: Heinemann, 1978) 
p.3.
520 Davies, Bleddyn, Universality, Selectivity and Effectiveness (London: Heinemann, 1978) 
p.3.
521 Wakefield, H. Russell et al., Royal Commission on the Poor Laws: M inority Report (1905) 
p.154.
522 Hewetson, John, Ill-Health, Poverty and the State (London: Freedom Press, 1946) p.42.
523 Ivatts, J., "The Case of the School Meals Service," Social Policy and Administration 26, 
no. 3 (1992): 226^4 p.230.
which should be on essentially medical grounds, sanctioned by medical 
authority and with reference to manifest clinical symptoms. The Board 
was sensitive to accusations that school meals, if provided generously 
and according to a simple means test, could be said to be but another 
form of poor relief or a subsidy to low wages. In the Board's view this 
was not the purpose of the Act, which was solely for educational 
purposes. This was reflected in the duty given to LEAs to recover the cost 
of the food from the parent 'unless they are satisfied that the parent is 
unable by reason of circumstances other than his default to pay the 
am ount'.524
Some argued that for reasons of humanity, children found to be in need 
of feeding should be fed, and that the State had a duty to ensure children 
were adequately fed, so as to enable them to become useful members of 
society.525 But school meals primarily had educational objectives, and 
only targeted malnutrition to the extent that it hindered education.526
Some authorities preferred to feed children on an income basis alone. 
Their justification was that they wished to avoid the onset of 
malnutrition. On this point there was some conflict between the 
authorities and the Board of Education in 1934. What worried the Board 
was that if feeding on an income selection basis became widespread, the 
cost would soon rise. The Board wanted to avoid attracting the attention 
of the Treasury, which might lead to an economy drive.527
524 Macleod, Iain and Enoch Powell, The Social Services: Needs and Means (London: 
Conservative Political Centre, 1952) p.15.
525 Lubbock, Gertrude, Some Poor Relief Questions (London: John Murray, 1895) pp.194- 
206.
526 Vaizey, John, The Costs of Education (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1958) p.114.
527 Le Gros Clark, Frederick, Social history of the school meals service (London: London 
Council of Social Service, 1948) p.12.
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In the inter-war years, free school feeding was used in some local areas to 
ensure children were fed despite acute poverty and destitution. Kitchens 
were temporarily set up during the winter months and industrial 
recessions. During the unemployment of the 1930s there was a call for 
'Free school meals for all children of unemployed parents' because the 
deficient feeding of mothers and children was causing softening of the 
bones and physical deformities and a general state of proneness to ill- 
health.528 In such cases, school meals were in effect a measure against the 
poor nutrition caused by poverty.
During the Second World War, the school meals service was used as a 
way to ensure that all children received adequate food despite rationing. 
The government's main concern was to ensure that there was an 
adequate supply of 'paid for' meals to evacuated children, and 
consequently decided to make the provision of both free and paid for 
meals a part of its war strategy. The service was regarded as having a 
vital role in child health.529 Behind the new policy lay new biochemical 
research emphasizing the nutritional importance of vitamins.530 The 
Board of Education increased the pressure on LEAs to provide school 
meals in some form, as a means of helping the evacuation programme by 
easing the burden on host families, combating malnutrition, and 
releasing many more women for war work.
During the war, the Board abandoned its earlier policy of insisting on 
proof of both necessitiousness and malnutrition as criteria for the 
provision of free meals. It stated:
528 Hannington, Walter, The Problem of the Distressed Areas (London: Gollancz, 1937) 
p.283.
529 Brigden, Paul and Rodney Lowe, Welfare Policy Under the Conservatives 1951-1964: A  
Guide to Documents in the Public Record Office (London: PRO publications, 1998) p.190.
530 Hicks, Ursula K., British Public Finances: Their Structure and Development 1880-1952 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1954) p.53.
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'Since the aim of these proposals is to maintain a high 
standard of nutrition and to prevent malnutrition, rather than 
to remedy it after symptoms have appeared, Authorities may 
in future base their provision of free milk and free meals or 
part-payment meals solely on evidence of financial need /531
Campaign groups such as the Children's Nutrition Council promoted 
school dinners in the interests of child health:
'School milk and dinners must be put in the forefront of our 
social services. They are preventative, not curative. ... And I 
say to myself, "Now that's the right way to stamp out 
tuberculosis and pernicious anaemia. That's the foundation 
for a better British race".'532
By the mid 1940s, the aim of school meals was discussed in the much 
wider context of supporting family incomes. The 1944 Social Insurance 
White Paper stated that school meals and milk would be dramatically 
extended so as to provide additional help in kind to all families with 
school-age children:
'... the purpose of such a scheme (of assistance to families) can 
best be attained if a substantial part of the benefit is given in 
kind. The school meals and milk services will be so extended 
as to make them available to all pupils in primary and 
secondary schools, in receipt of a grant from the Ministry of 
Education or the Scottish Education Department. These 
benefits in kind will be free of cost to the parents, and will be 
available for all the children in a family attending school, 
including the first'.533
During the debate on the White Paper in November 1944, Butler, the 
Education Minister, placed considerable emphasis on the expansion of
531 PRO ED138/59, Circular 1567: paras 1 ,2 ,9 . Quoted in Harris, Bernard, The Health of 
the Schoolchild: A  history of the school medical service in England and Wales (Buckingham: 
Open University Press, 1995) p.159.
532 Williams, Eddie, School milk and meals: food is the basis for all relief reconstruction, 
regeneration and rehabilitation (Newport: 1944).
533 United Kingdom, Social Insurance Part I White Paper, Cmd 6550 (1944) para. 50. 
Quoted in Cooper, Steven, The Education and Training Benefits (London: Policy Studies 
Institute, 1985) p.12.
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free school meals and milk as a complement in kind to the new cash 
family allowance. The link between family allowances and school meals 
was confirmed by the way that the level of family allowances was fixed at 
8s. rather than 9s. on the assumption that school meals would soon 
become free and universally available (see section 4.3).
However, the incorporation of these in-kind benefits into the 1944 
Education Act suggests the measures were designed to solve what was 
seen as an educational problem, rather than family poverty. Cooper 
describes it as 'a conscious attempt to remove the more obvious 
"barriers" to education that children from low income backgrounds 
might encounter/534 As early as 1948, one commentator remarked that the 
two forms of benefit had developed along their separate paths, 'as though 
they had never been arbitrarily associated together in a single piece of 
legislation/535
By the mid-1950s, school meals had become peripheral to educational 
thinking. The post-war scheme continued to give some emphasis to a 
general nutritional function. This aspect of effectiveness of the school 
meals service must be judged by its contribution to the fight against child 
malnutrition. However, the nutritional contribution of school meals is a 
separate issue, not to be discussed here. The nutritional objective of 
school meals is best measured by using indicators of children's health.
But they have also had the redistributive objective of contributing to the 
budget of all families with children, but especially the poorest families. 
The aim of free school meals was to enable those children from the 
poorest families, who might not even be able to afford the subsidised 
meal price, to take the school meals. By the 1960s, the general nutritional
534 Cooper, Steven, The Education and Training Benefits (London: Policy Studies Institute, 
1985) p.18.
535 Le Gros Clark, Frederick, Social history of the school meals service (London: London 
Council of Social Service, 1948) p .27.
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aims of school meals took second place to consideration of the budgets of 
poorer families, for whom school meals were still regarded as 
nutritionally essential. Provision for the largest possible number of 
children was no longer an objective. The principal function of the school 
meals service was by then to prevent malnutrition caused by poverty.
In 1968 Family Allowance rates were more than doubled in the first 
uprating since October 1956. This increase was tempered by changes to 
other benefits such as the increase in the price of school meals and ending 
the scheme under which free school meals were given to the fourth and 
subsequent children in large families. The link between the increase in 
family allowances and changes with respect to school meals was 
intentional.536 This suggests a conscious relationship between family 
income support and school meals: school meals also became part of a 
family income support package, via their link with Family Allowances.
As w ith pharmaceutical benefits, the existence of a means tested free 
meals scheme was used to make it easier to increase charges. When 
ending the scheme under which free school meals were given to the 
fourth and subsequent children in large families, the Secretary of State 
emphasised that the eligibility criteria for free meals had been 
extended.537 When an increase in the price of school dinners was 
announced in the autumn of 1970, those on low incomes were to be 
protected from these increases by the raising of the income levels for
536 In reply to a question about ending the scheme under which free school meals were 
given to the fourth and subsequent children in large families, the Secretary of State for 
Education and Science stated: 'last month family allowances were increased.' House of 
Commons Hansard v.722 , 4 November 1968, col. 486.
537 In reply to a question about ending the scheme under which free school meals were 
given to the fourth and subsequent children in large families, the Secretary of State for 
Education and Science stated: 'We have also twice this year, increased the parental 
income scale, which relieves certain people from paying for meals ... All the children 
who need free meals can get free meals. There is no need to give the money to quite 
wealthy people with large incomes ... If children need the free meal they w ill get it/ 
House of Commons Hansard v.722 , 4 November 1968, cols. 486-7.
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exemption from payment.538 The aim of that was to encourage 
consumption by poor children.
In 1971 there were further changes to the relationship between family 
income support and school meals. Family Income Supplement (FIS) was 
introduced and school meals prices were increased again. The 
relationship between family income support and reductions in education 
welfare was not quite as explicit and direct as had earlier been the case 
w ith Family Allowance. However, the introduction of FIS was put 
forward as one of the justifications for increases in school meal prices.539
The 1980 Black Report into inequalities in health noted the importance of 
school meals, as a contribution to nutrition, especially for poorer children. 
It also argued that: Tt should be regarded as a matter of importance - on 
education and health grounds - to ensure that all children receive a school 
meal or an adequate substitute at least during term time'.540 But by then 
the government had abandoned their nutritional objectives, as evidenced 
by the dropping of minimum standards for school meals in 1980.
In 1980 the government also seemed to have dropped all except minimal 
redistributive objectives. Low-income families not on Supplementary 
Benefit or FIS were squeezed out as benefits policy became more and 
more concentrated on Supplementary Benefit and FIS recipients: 
eligibility on the grounds of low income was at the discretion of the 
LEA.541 From 1988 the benefit which replaced FIS, Family Credit, gave no
538 Child Poverty Action Group, An Incomes Policy for Poor Families: A  Memorandum to the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer (London: CP AG, 1973) p.5.
539 Cooper, Steven, The Education and Training Benefits (London: Policy Studies Institute, 
1985) pp.51-52.
540 Black, Sir Douglas et al., The Black Report, 1992 ed. (London: Penguin, 1980).
Rona, R.J., S. Chinn, and A.M. Smith, "Height of Children Receiving Free School Meals," 
Lancet (1979): 534.
541 Fewer and fewer LEAs continued to exercise this discretion, see Lister, Ruth, Welfare 
Benefits (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1981) p.139.
219
automatic entitlement to free school meals. The school meals service 
acquired the image of a hand-out for the poor as LEAs reduced school 
meals provision to only those entitled to free meals.542
The role of school meals as ensuring that poor children could benefit fully 
from educational opportunities was not discussed by the 1980s. The DES 
made it clear by its policies that it regarded these benefits as competing 
for resources with mainstream educational programmes.543 There was a 
shift to viewing school meals as purely welfare, with no educational 
content. This was reinforced by the strong link with Supplementary 
Benefit and FIS. School meals were seen as part of the "safety net" for the 
poor provided by Supplementary Benefit and FIS, that is as having a 
social security, rather than education, function. The CP AG thought that 
free school meals were an important way of protecting poor children, 
stating that if poor children did not take free meals, they could either go 
hungry or undernourished, or suffer from cutbacks made elsewhere in 
the family budget.544
In summary, the relative emphasis on subsidised and free school meals 
changed over time. School meals were first introduced as a benefit aimed 
at needy children. During WWII, subsidised school meals for all children 
was the aim. By the 1960s, policy emphasis was back on free meals for 
deprived children. The original idea of Family Allowance and free school 
meals for all children was later converted into Child Benefit for all, but 
free school meals for low-income children only. School meals had
542 Bisset, Liz and Jean Coussins, Badge of Poverty: a new look at the stigma attached to free 
school meals (London: Child Poverty Action Group, 1982) p.32.
543 For example, in a written answer, Sir Keith Joseph (Secretary of State for Education) 
stated:' the Government's plans for education expenditure by LEAs in 1985-86 assume 
economies in the provision of the school meals service ... so as to target resources to best 
educational effect'. House of Commons Hansard, v. 83, 23 July 1985, Written Answers, col. 
509.
544 Bisset, Liz and Jean Coussins, Badge of Poverty: a new look at the stigma attached to free 
school meals (London: Child Poverty Action Group, 1982) p.10.
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potential to lift people out of poverty, but for most of the period they 
were not part of a poverty-prevention policy. Rather they acted as poor 
relief.
Likewise, the main rationale of free school meals changed over time. Pre- 
1941 free school meals were based on educational need and part of 
education policy. However, this educational need arose because poor 
relief failed to provide adequately for families and the education budget 
was left to pick up the pieces. Then, the emphasis moved to counter­
acting poor nutrition associated poverty. Later, it became just a social 
security measure for poor children, without explicit nutrition objectives.
5.3 Student grants
The broad objective of student grants was to ensure access to higher 
education. However, there was tension between emphasis on rewarding 
the academically successful student and promoting social mobility. This 
tension arises because lower income groups fare less well in education. 
How much this was recognised varied over time. The history of student 
grants can be broken down into three phases: pre-1962,1962-1985, and 
after 1985. The main participants in the debate were the Treasury, the 
Ministry of Education and its successors, and the National Union of 
Students (NUS).
The system of means tested state scholarships that existed until 1962 was 
designed to assist those of "high academic promise'.545 From the point of 
view of the NUS the purpose of grants at that time was 'that all persons 
worthy of higher education should be given the means to undertake, and 
to gain the greatest possible benefit from, their chosen course of study'546 
because 'university education must be available to all who can profit
545 National Union of Students, Grants Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow? (London: NUS, 1973).
546 National Union of Students, 1955/56 Survey of Local Education Authority Awards to 
Students and Grants Year Book (London: NUS, 1956) p.6.
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from it'.547 For a time, the NUS even argued that 'that, in all cases where a 
student's training brings financial difficulty to his parents, he should be 
given a maintenance grant sufficient not only to maintain him at college, 
but also to compensate his parents for loss of earning power'.548 They 
broadly agreed with government until the 1960s on a policy that could be 
summarised as 'access for the ablest few'.
The Treasury, as might be expected, was concerned to maintain access, 
but at the least cost. When the system of student finance was under 
review in the late 1950s, the Treasury argued that the middle class were 
the main beneficiaries and that it was not 'in  general harmony with the 
Government's policies on the social services ... that maintenance as 
distinct from tuition fees should be provided without a means test'.549 
The Treasury agreed that a review was necessary, but was determined to 
ensure that it did not recommend the abolition of the means test, which 
would have increased the Exchequer's expense.
The 1962 Education Act accepted the principle that any student accepted 
by a University should receive an award.550 The statutory duty on LEAs 
to provide qualified students with grants ensured geographical 
uniformity of grant provision. There was a minimum grant of £50 to all 
award-holders regardless of parental income, and a new more generous 
income scale for the means test. Thus the objective ascribed to student 
grants by the Ministry of Education dominated, an objective that can be 
summarised as 'access for the many'.
547 National Union of Students, The Future of University and Higher Education (London: 
NUS, 1945) p.4.
548 National Union of Students, The Future of University and Higher Education (London: 
NUS, 1945) p.3.
549 Brigden, Paul and Rodney Lowe, Welfare Policy Under the Conservatives 1951-1964: A  
Guide to Documents in the Public Record Office (London: PRO publications, 1998) p.188.
550 Or a comparable course, and who had two Advanced level passes or the equivalent
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VThe aims of student grants are revealed in the debates surrounding a 
proposed move to a loan system of finance for students. The main 
argum ent of opponents of loans was that loans conflict with the goal of 
equality of educational opportunities. This suggests that the grants were 
thought by social policy analysts to contribute to the goal of equality of 
educational opportunities. However, this opportunity was only open to 
the 10-15 per cent of school leavers who gained 2 or more A-level 
passes.551 Commentators said of the new grants system: "What is this but 
a system of giving to those who already have?'552 They argued that there 
was nothing wrong with the generous grants system if what it sought 
was to support a (middle class) educational elite. However, higher 
education grants could not, in their view, be defended on the grounds of 
social equality.
The objective of student grants next became contested in the mid-1980s. 
Experience had shown that in practice the middle class benefited most 
from the grants system. In the political climate of the 1980s, the 
Treasury's concern to contain costs won out over social objectives of other 
bodies. First the minimum award was scrapped in 1984, and then the 
main grant was frozen before being phased out. As the main grant was 
withdrawn, it was available to students with ever lower family incomes.
Students, as represented by the NUS, objected throughout the post-war 
period that the child from a more affluent family had to remain 
dependent on his or her parents. Thus, means testing of parents could 
obstruct opportunities for the young as the child of well-off parents 
might be subjected to any restrictions his parents may choose to impose. 
But it was never an accepted objective of means-tested student grants to 
help young people leave home and become independent.
551 Figures from House of Commons Hansard, v. 81, 27 June 1985, Written Answers, col. 
460; House of Commons Hansard, v. 83,23 July 1985, Written Answers, col. 510.
552 Blaug, M., "Loans for Students?," New Society, no. 6 October (1966) p.540.
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Educational subsidies can contribute to a stable society by encouraging 
upw ard mobility across income classes and creating the sense that society 
is not divided along rigid class lines. Such an argument for educational 
subsidies was applied by social policy analysts who wanted to redress 
the negative consequences of inequalities for a whole income group. They 
used the number of young people from low-income backgrounds in 
higher education as their way of assessing the success of the means test. 
However, meritocratic arguments were in fact applied throughout the 
period as the aim of student grants was individual mobility. If one 
wanted to encourage some people into university and discourage others, 
then a means tested grant would be one way of achieving this. However, 
student grants were never actively promoted as an incentive, or bonus, to 
attract under-represented groups into higher education. Individual 
mobility, not mass redistribution, was the aim, although the extent to 
which each was embraced varied.
5.4 Civil Legal Aid
The main issue with civil legal aid was how far up the income scale 
eligibility should reach. Government support for the legal aid scheme 
varied depending on whether the concern of the moment was 'the 
mounting cost of legal aid' or 'the unmet need for legal services'. 
Government pronouncements on the purpose of civil legal aid have 
changed, reflecting less commitment to the scheme. The main 
protagonists were lawyers as represented by the Law Society, the Lord 
Chancellor's Department (LCD), and from 1988, the Legal Aid Board 
(LAB).
The objective of legal aid was ostensibly to secure access to justice, or at 
least access to legal services, for those who could not afford it otherwise, 
and proposals for reforming legal aid generally failed to set out explicitly
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the policy objectives of the system, or presented these in terms of broad 
references to "access to justice'.553 As Smith describes it: 'Access to the 
courts, and more broadly to justice, is a constitutional right which the 
government should, in principle, actively make a reality for those for 
whom  poverty or other disadvantage would otherwise be a barrier'.554 
Civil legal aid provided representation by private practitioners paid by 
public funds. 'The intention was to provide the same representation for 
low-income litigants that they would have obtained if they could afford a 
lawyer'.555
The Rushcliffe Committee on legal aid published its report in 1945. Its 
recommendations, an almost complete acceptance of the views of the 
Law Society, formed the basis of the post-war civil legal aid scheme. It 
recommended that legal aid should not be limited to those people 
'normally classed as poor', but should also include those of 'small or 
moderate means': access should be wide.556 S. Pollock of the Law Society 
identified the principles built into the 1940s scheme. According to him 
'These principles can be regarded as the declaration of intent that is 
embodied in the legal aid legislation'.557 They included the following:
1) Irrespective of means, there must be access to all courts within the 
jurisdiction and to the legal services required to make that right
553 Lord Chancellor's Department, Legal A id for the Apparently Wealthy: A  Consultation 
Paper (London: Lord Chancellor's Department, 1994) p.5; Gray, Alistair M, "The Reform 
of Legal Aid," Oxford Review of Economic Policy 10, no. 1 (1994): 51-67 p.66.
554 Smith, Roger, Justice: redressing the balance (London: Legal Action Group, 1997) p.3.
555 Legal Action Group, A  Strategy for Justice: Publicly funded legal services in the 1990s 
(London: Legal Action Group, 1992) p.5.
556 Goriely, T., "Rushcliffe Fifty Years On: The Changing Role of Civil Legal Aid within 
the Welfare State," Journal of Law and Society 21, no. 4 (1994): 545-566 p.547; Legal Action 
Group, A  Strategy for Justice: Publicly funded legal services in the 1990s (London: Legal 
Action Group, 1992) p.4.
557 Pollock, Seton, Legal Aid: The First 25 Years (London: Oyez Publishing, 1975) p.7.
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effective, including such advice and assistance as may obviate the 
need for recourse to a court.
2) Those using services should be required to pay no more than they can 
reasonably afford towards the cost of the services, having regard to 
their actual means.
3) The cost not met by contribution or otherwise should be borne by the 
community.558
However, in 1949 the LCD asserted that the purpose of legal aid was:
'. ..to  provide legal advice for those of slender means and resources so 
that no one will be financially unable to prosecute a just and reasonable 
claim or defend a legal right'.559 Further, in 1955 the LCD stated quite 
clearly to the Select Committee on Estimates that the legal aid means tests 
were designed to show that 'the applicant had no means whatever to 
spend on litigation'.560 In other words, they were for the poor. The Lord 
Chancellor's Advisory Committee, in its comments on the Law Society's 
Sixth Report, wrote that they saw no urgent need to update the income 
scale 'because we are satisfied that the Legal Aid Regulations are still, 
broadly speaking, doing their work'. They also reached the conclusion 
that in time of full employment and higher wages more litigants were 
able to finance their own litigation without resort to the scheme. This 
suggests that they saw the scheme as an emergency one for the poor, 
rather than for the ordinary wage-earner.561
In 1986 the Lord Chancellor initiated the first intentional cuts to civil legal
558 Pollock, Seton, Legal Aid: The First 25 Years (London: Oyez Publishing, 1975) pp.6-7.
559 Lord Chancellor, Summary of the Proposed New Service (1948) Cited in Smith, Roger, 
Justice: redressing the balance (London: Legal Action Group, 1997) p.13.
560 Partington, Martin, The Legal A id Means-Tests: Time for a Reappraisal (London: Child 
Poverty Action Group, 1978) p .l l .
561 Benenson, Peter James Henry, The Future of Legal A id  (London: Fabian Society, 1957) 
pp.19-20.
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aid eligibility, as the government began to prioritise the restraint of the 
budget over access. The debate over the publicly funded legal services 
was dominated by the government's concern over the cost of legal aid. 
Section 1 of the 1988 Legal Aid Act provides a statement of the purpose of 
that A c t
'to  establish a framework for the provision ... of advice, 
assistance and representation which is publicly funded with a 
view to helping persons who might otherwise be unable to 
obtain advice, assistance or representation on account of their 
means.'562
This section was not in the original Bill. It was inserted at the Third 
Reading in the House of Lords following an amendment put down at 
Committee stage and supported by speakers on all sides. The Lord 
Chancellor, Lord Mackay, then devised the statement of the purpose of 
the Bill. This suggests that the LCD would have liked to leave the 
purpose vague.
The LAB was created in 1988 to drive forward an agenda of greater 
administrative and financial control over the scheme. It took over 
running civil legal aid from the Law Society. The LAB was the main 
influence on legal aid policy from its inception: 'The Board controls 
policy because it controls administration'.563 The LAB had the over-riding 
objective of cost control. The Board's political agenda was 'not necessarily 
linked to policy considerations about, for example, the desirable scope of, 
and eligibility for, services'.564 As M. Cousins says, savings were: 'm ade
562 Cited in Matheson, Duncan, Legal Aid: The New Framework (London: Butterworths, 
1988) p.3.
563 Smith, Roger, Justice: redressing the balance (London: Legal Action Group, 1997) p.34.
564 Smith, Roger, Justice: redressing the balance (London: Legal Action Group, 1997) p.34.
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by allowing eligibility to decline7, rather than limiting remuneration to 
lawyers.565
By the time of the 1991 eligibility review566, the tone had changed to "a 
conditional financial support, provided by the taxpayer, for individuals 
whose financial circumstances would prevent them from taking or 
defending proceedings without assistance with their costs7.567 In 1992, the 
Legal Action Group (LAG) could not find any principles in the legal aid 
means test: "Legal aid rates of eligibility ... are, it is true, set nationally. 
However, their levels lack any logic7.568 Smith confirms this view: "There 
is remarkably little consideration of the first principles that should 
underlie policy on the justice system7.569 Policy-making by the Lord 
Chancellor's Department was dominated by the need to set and meet 
spending estimates. Further, concentration on limiting cost was to the 
exclusion of consideration of the purpose of the expenditure. In law there 
is a saying: "Hard cases make bad laws". This means that looking at 
exceptional cases is not the best way to make general rules. But the LAB 
has done just this with a means test which has developed driven by a 
desire to close loopholes in the existing means test, partly because they 
needed to retain public support for this expenditure following a small 
number of high profile and expensive cases in the 1990s where 
individuals with apparently affluent lifestyles were legally-aided. As a
565 Cousins, Mel, "Civil legal aid in France, Ireland, the Netherlands and the United 
Kingdom - a comparative study," Civil Justice Quarterly 12 (1993): 154-66 p.165.
566 Lord Chancellor's Department, Review of Financial Conditions for Legal Aid: Eligibility 
for Civil Legal Aid: a consultation paper (London: Lord Chancellor's Department, 1991)
567 Gray, Alistair M, "The Reform of Legal Aid," Oxford Review of Economic Policy 10, no. 
1 (1994): 51-67 p.51; Legal Action Group, A  Strategy for Justice: Publicly funded legal 
services in the 1990s (London: Legal Action Group, 1992) p.26.
568 Legal Action Group, A  Strategy for Justice: Publicly funded legal services in the 1990s 
(London: Legal Action Group, 1992) p.112.
569 Smith, Roger, Justice: redressing the balance (London: Legal Action Group, 1997) p.4.
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government report put it, a handful of cases had "cast a pall of suspicion 
and discredit over the whole legal aid scheme'.570
The LAG argued that: 'There must also be a coherent policy in relation to 
eligibility, constructed upon a set of clearly expressed principles'.571 They 
proposed the principles they thought should apply. They included 
(among others):
- A relatively high proportion of the population must be 
financially eligible. The lower income limit for free civil legal 
aid and dependents' additions should be set at 50 per cent 
above Income Support levels. Capital limits should also be 
raised to an equivalent level above those applicable for Income 
Support. The upper limit for any means test should be 
sufficiently high to allow for all those who would otherwise be 
unable, for financial reasons, to consider taking or defending 
legal proceedings.
- 'There should be an element of discretion so that limits can be 
raised for particularly expensive types of case, such as medical 
negligence litigation, which are otherwise outside the reach 
even of people with relatively high incomes and capital.'572
According to Benenson, legal aid did not receive a great deal of public
support, even from those people who would be expected to support the
idea. Several Judges made it known that they thought public money
should not be spent on certain types of legal aided person.573
Finally, another argument in favour of legal aid which is sometimes made 
is that although some legal actions are largely private in character, others 
have public good characteristics. For these there may be an externality 
grounds for public provision: the whole community stands to benefit
570 Lord Chancellor's Department, Legal A id for the Apparently Wealthy: A  Consultation 
Paper (London: Lord Chancellor's Department, 1994) p.6.
571 Legal Action Group, A  Strategy for Justice: Publicly funded legal services in the 1990s 
(London: Legal Action Group, 1992) p.117.
572 Legal Action Group, A  Strategy for Justice: Publicly funded legal services in the 1990s 
(London: Legal Action Group, 1992) pp.119-20.
573 Benenson, Peter James Henry, The Future of Legal A id  (London: Fabian Society, 1957)
p.22.
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from the rule of law. However, this was not incorporated into the formal 
aims of the scheme.
5.5 Conclusion: "Means tests had m ultiple aims"
In the introduction to this chapter I put forward eight possible aims of 
means tested non-subsistence benefits as a framework for my analysis. I 
now conclude with a review of whether these objectives applied to the 
benefits which are the subject of this study. Table 5-1 summarises the 
objectives of the benefits and how they correspond with the eight I 
suggested in the introduction.
Table 5-1 Objectives of means tested benefit schemes, 1945-1995
Objective: Free school 
meals
Prescription
medicines
Student grants Civil legal aid
1) Redistribution
2) Access to service V s V s
3) Encourage 
consumption inc. by non­
poor
s
4) Restrict eligibility to 
'poor'
s
From 1980
Y s
From 1990
s
5) Assistance s S V s
6) Anti-poverty
7) Prevent sudden drop 
in living standards
s s
8) Social cohesion
Regarding the first objective, I found that the rationale for non­
subsistence benefits was to do with protecting the consumption of the 
poor as opposed to redistribution. The model was one of compensation 
for poverty or misfortune rather than a broader one of equalisation of 
opportunity or inequalities in distribution.
The extent to which ensuring access to the service was carried out varied. 
For instance, some benefits veered between access to service for a 
relatively large group and then pro-actively restricting eligibility to 
contain costs. Means-testing is a barrier to use of a service. This need not
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be seen as a negative quality of means-testing: it was partly the aim, for 
example with prescription medicines. The means test often reinforced the 
aim of restricting eligibility, rather than ensuring that the needy were 
protected. Turning to the fifth possible objective that I identified, I found 
that there was no aim to get people off benefits: these means tested 
benefits were 'assistance', rather than 'anti-poverty' measures. Even 
student grants were not intended to prevent inter-generational poverty.
Externality arguments, the eighth aim I identified, can be applied to each 
of the four non-subsistence benefits which are the subject of this study. It 
is undoubtedly to the benefit of society in general if children are well-fed 
and people who have medical need for prescription medicines can get 
them. However, these were not prominent arguments in the debate about 
provision of school meals and prescriptions on a means test. With student 
grants, student representatives tried to argue that students who take 
degrees do a service to society, but policy makers tended to see the 
benefits of university study as accruing almost entirely to the student 
himself. This was certainly the dominant point of view from the 1980s 
onwards. The externality effect of legal aid is that it promotes the rule of 
law and may bring forward cases which set a precedent and therefore 
affect other people apart from the immediate beneficiary. Although, 
externality arguments are easy to identify, they did not carry much 
weight with policy-makers.
Some of the objectives that the relevant interest groups imputed to these 
benefits were of a non-financial nature. For example, nutritionists would 
have wanted to measure the success of free school meals using health 
indicators. Analysts who saw student grants as promoting social mobility 
would have used criteria such as the social background of university- 
goers. However, the concern of this study is with the objectives which can 
be evaluated in monetary terms, objectives related to the extent of 
eligibility, income and poverty.
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How did the objectives of these benefits compare with the objectives of 
income maintenance benefits in England and Wales over the same 
period? Subsistence benefits can be characterised as restricted to the poor 
only, as assistance and as a benefit to support family income. They aimed 
for some redistribution, but not enough to completely counteract market 
forces. They were the instrument for income redistribution and family 
income maintenance which non-subsistence benefits were not intended to 
be. Only school meals were seen as definitely linked to social assistance. 
The other non-income maintenance benefits were only linked to social 
assistance in the sense that their coverage was more generous than social 
assistance.
Finally, how were the objectives of these benefits connected w ith the 
general objectives of the welfare state? Unfortunately the purpose of the 
welfare state was never clearly defined. Some analysts assumed its aim to 
be the abolition of want, others assumed something more far-reaching, 
like a more egalitarian society. Within the Beveridge Committee itself and 
in the run-up to the implementation of the welfare state there was little 
discussion of the broader principles and overall aims of welfare 
policies.574 Since the purpose of the welfare state is not clearly defined, 
there are no accepted criteria of efficiency and equality on which the 
welfare state can be judged. Similarly, the role that non-subsistence 
benefits should play in the welfare state has also not been clearly set out.
Arguably the individual benefits to be studied here are part of the 
welfare state, although their role has often been neglected. Free 
prescriptions and prescription charges are part of the NHS, but much 
analysis focuses on the NHS as a free-at-point-of-use service. Student 
grants are seen as a 'fringe' welfare policy, but an important aspect of 
education and opportunity policy. Similarly, civil legal aid is 'marginal'
574 Land, Andrew, Rodney Lowe, and Noel Whiteside, Development of the Welfare State 
1939-1951: A  Guide to Documents in the Public Record Office (London: HMSO, 1992) p.3.
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from the point of view of welfare policy analysts, but influences access to 
justice. On the other hand, school meals are more often seen as part of the 
social security system because of their long-standing link to National 
Assistance and family allowances.
The government could have had a far more pro-active approach to setting 
objectives. The very existence of these schemes at all was an excuse for 
not doing much to improve them. These benefits were all to ensure access 
for the poor, among other objectives. But the definition of "poor7 was left 
vague, and has to be uncovered in the design of the benefit. Similarly, 
formal rights may have existed, but the design of the means test could 
betray the intention of deterring claims. It is to the implicit value- 
judgements revealed in the design of the means test to which I turn next.
233
6 How to means test? The design of means-tested 
benefits
In this chapter I consider the issues which arise once the decision to 
implement means testing has been taken.
We need to understand how means tests were designed. It is not enough 
to discover a need and legislate against it. The actual methods by which 
the legislators' intentions are put into practice are also of importance. The 
way in which the service is delivered is itself part of policy-making, and 
the administration of benefits can affect the quality of the service. There 
are many decisions to make when designing a means test, and these 
decisions often involve embedded values. As an example, the decision 
about whose income to take into account implies a moral judgement. 
Should men and women who are co-habiting have a financial advantage 
over husbands and wives? It is the implicit values revealed in the design 
of the means test to which I now turn.
In order more adequately to describe the variation in design and 
administration of means tests, I have developed a classification system. 
Some features of the means tests are also analysed, and there is a 
quantitative analysis of the complexity of the means tests.
6.1.1 Sources of evidence
For comparison, the operation of the means tests as at 1st October 1965,
1975,1985 and 1995 was studied. This is the mid-point of the financial 
year, so can be seen as representative of the financial year. It is also a 
relevant date to use for free school meals and student grants, for which 
eligibility is usually determined at the start of the academic year.
Finding out the rules of all four means tests at all four dates involved a 
great deal of research. It was necessary to consult many different sources,
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published and unpublished. The means tests are documented in detail in 
the appendices.
I pu t forward a taxonomy of means-tested benefits to set out which 
bodies administered and developed the means tests, and their design 
features. This is described below and summarised in tables in the 
Appendix.
6.1.2 Income-tested or means-tested?
The distinction between means testing and income testing is that in a 
means test, savings and capital, as well as income, are taken into account. 
This makes a big difference to the allowable wealth-holdings of the 
eligible group. However, when the capital disregarded by a means test is 
very high, the practical distinctions between a means-test and an income- 
test dissolve.
6.1.3 Cash or in-kind benefits?
Means tested benefits can be provided as cash or in-kind. Cash versus in- 
kind is a continuum which can include cash with advice and vouchers or 
compulsion to use a service. Means-tested benefits can attempt to serve as 
a general safety net, meeting all economic necessities, or they can be 
restricted and directed towards one specific item of consumption, such as 
non-subsistence benefits. The non-subsistence benefits of this thesis vary 
in how restricted they are. Student grants are the least restrictive in how 
the cash benefit is spent, although it would almost invariably be spent, 
wisely or not, on supporting the lifestyle of the student beneficiary. The 
other benefits can only be directed at a very specific item of consumption, 
although they may release cash in the budget for spending of choice.
In-kind transfers carry a deadweight loss because cash can be spent on 
whatever a consumer wants. One view is that the tax and benefit system 
should give people the purchasing power they need to access services. 
However, there are arguments for in-kind benefits based on the theories
of public goods, merit goods and external benefits. These are not 
captured by the practice of calculating cash equivalents in order to 
determine their contribution to the distribution of income and real 
welfare levels. There is the issue of whether attributing cash values to in- 
kind benefits is appropriate. It is not clear how to value non-transferable 
in-kind income according to the exchange value which money income is.
School meals have a complex and long history of their relationship to 
mainstream social security. In the mid-1980s there was controversy about 
whether to give low income families free school meals automatically, as 
against offering the cash value instead. The problem of replacing free 
meals with cash payments is that cash may get spent on something else. 
The other danger is that the cash payment substitute would be 
insufficient to compensate.
There is a case for social security providing the money to applicants for 
on-going costs such as school meals. At the other extreme, legal costs are 
potentially large, but also a very irregular occurrence: it is not reasonable 
to give people enough money out of regular social security to cover the 
contingency of meeting legal costs.
6.1.4 Rebates
A means test may be applied in different ways:575
- A payment may be made conditionally on showing need. E.g. student 
grant.
- A charge may be recovered, which is graduated according to means. 
E.g. civil legal aid.
- A fixed charge is levied, but assistance can be obtained to cover the 
charge. E.g. free school meals, pharmaceutical benefits.
575 Macleod, Iain and Enoch Powell, The Social Services: Needs and Means (London: 
Conservative Political Centre, 1952) p.3.
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If everyone pays and then one can claim costs back later, this is clearly 
less satisfactory for the applicant. Local authorities or other bodies did 
not see it as their responsibility to relieve poverty; this was the function of 
social security . They preferred to make standard charges for the services 
they provided and direct people facing hardship to apply to the DSS for 
assistance. But even when Supplementary Benefit had considerable room 
for discretion, the SBC tried to prevail on local authorities not to add to 
the financial difficulties of their clients. With Income Support, there was 
much less scope for making discretionary additional payments and 
thereby passing costs of providing services to those on low incomes from 
one public purse to another.
6.1.5 Taper or sudden cut-off?
A service can be free up to a defined level of income and charged for 
according to a sliding scale above that income level. Making a charge 
variable by income avoids 'notch' problems created at the cut-off w ith an 
income-limited 'access' policy. Some services cannot be partially offered 
and have to be 'all-or-nothing', so you offer the entire service, but make 
an income-tested charge.
Whether there is a taper or sudden cut-off for eligibility can have an 
impact on the stigma attached to the benefit. If there is no taper the role of 
the administering staff is that of 'gate-keeping' to keep out those 
ineligible. But where their task is to assess how much should be paid, 
there exists less stigmatising attitude. For example, where parental 
income exceeded a certain amount students did not receive the full 
maintenance grant. In this situation parents were expected to give a 
parental contribution equal to the difference between the grant actually 
received and the full grant. Also, a taper can help mitigate the 'the 
poverty trap', by withdrawing benefit over a range of income.
The income level at which the taper or sudden cut-off comes into effect 
reveals something about the implicit objectives of the means test. For
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example, if the sudden cut-off is at the point where income reaches 
subsistence benefit level, this suggests it is an assistance measure576, 
designed to help those in poverty. On the other hand, if there is a taper or 
cut-off above subsistence benefit level, this suggests that the benefit also 
aims to be an anti-poverty measure to ease the transition into work, 
because not all benefits are immediately removed when income rises 
above subsistence benefit level. One of the problems of means testing is 
that wherever the line is drawn, there will be borderline cases, which may 
cause hardship.
6.1.6 Unit of assessment
In the mid-1990s, it was the income of the immediate family or 'benefit 
unit' which was relevant for most means tested benefits. However in 
principle, income could also be assessed individually, or over the wider 
household. The inter-war means test was unpopular in part because it 
altered the responsible unit from the family to the 'household'. It was 
resented because it implied that unemployed former male 'breadwinners' 
should be supported by their wives and children. The 1941 Determination 
of Needs Act reduced the unit assumed to have a duty of supporting itself 
to the 'family', defined as husband and wife and children under 16. This 
was called the replacement of 'the household means test' by 'the personal 
means test'.577 It was sometimes referred to as the replacement of the 
means test by a 'needs test', which is meaningless as both tests were 
equally tests of means, i.e. of financial needs. The change had some
576 A distinction can be made between 'assistance', and 'anti-poverty' measures. 
Assistance benefits aim to ease the conditions of people in poverty, whereas anti­
poverty schemes help to keep people out of poverty (or get them off subsistence 
benefits), generally by investment in their human capital so that they can find work. 
Anti-poverty measures would be expected to support both the non-poor and the poor in 
order to achieve their aim. See Chapter 8.
577 Bevin, Ernest, The Truth about the Means Test: "The Poor Law is Buried". (London: The 
Labour Party, 1941).
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connection with the general trend of reduction in family size and more 
people living separately.
In relation to student grants, the government stated that: 'One of the 
principles of the awards system is that parents are expected to contribute, 
according to their means, to the higher education of their children'578, and 
'm arriage alone is not considered to signify the degree of financial 
independence which would make it unreasonable to expect such a 
contribution'579. Consequently, the income of a student's wife or husband 
was not taken into account.
For legal aid the resources of a spouse were treated as the applicant's 
own, based on the principle that a husband and wife were under an 
obligation to support each other before having recourse to the taxpayer 
(except where it would be unreasonable to require this e.g. a matrimonial 
case).580 If the applicant was co-habiting with a 'mistress', the same 
allowances would be made for her children, but any maintenance she 
received for them would be taken into account as income. The equivalent 
of the spouse's allowance (£234) would also be made.581
The family may be the appropriate unit for analysis for non-subsistence 
benefits because whether one family member can or cannot get legal aid 
will have a welfare impact on the whole family.
The status of the adult dependent is uncertain, as is shown by the 
evidence of the means tests I studied. There are inconsistencies between 
means tests in how they treat family members aged 16-25. The definition
578 Mr van Straubenzee, House of Commons Hansard, v .826,16 November 1971, Written 
Answers, col.117.
579 Mr Brooke, House of Commons Hansard, v.83, 25 July 1985, Written Answers, col.640.
580 Matthews, Edwin James Thomas and Anthony Derek Maxwell Oulton, Legal aid and 
advice under the Legal A id Acts 1949 to 1964 (London: Butterworths, 1971) p.80.
581 Matthews, Edwin James Thomas and Anthony Derek Maxwell Oulton, Legal aid and 
advice under the Legal A id Acts 1949 to 1964 (London: Butterworths, 1971) p.92.
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of "adult dependent" is unclear. The responsibility of parents towards 
children aged 16-25 in terms of paying for their education etc. is unclear.
6.1.7 Time period of assessment
The "middle class" means tests were expressed in terms of annual income. 
For student grants, it is annual income of some months ago which was 
considered relevant. The means tests for lower income groups were 
expressed in terms of weekly income.
Regulations governing administration of free school meals did not lay 
down a definite period over which weekly pay should be averaged to 
determine eligibility. In practice, LEAs used 4 or 5 weekly pay slips or 2 
monthly pay slips. So parents whose income fluctuated over the year 
could find they were ineligible in periods when their earnings were 
relatively high. LEAs had a free hand in deciding the period of award of 
free school meals. Usually new application forms were sent out twice a 
year. So parents are subject to a means test twice a year and school meals 
represented an uncertain source of income. Parents were meant to inform 
authorities if their circumstances changed. Provision from April 1973 for 
an annual review irrespective of changes may have reduced uncertainty, 
although was unfair for families whose income fluctuates around the 
margin of eligibility.582 Therefore, although a "weekly" assessment period 
might be imagined to enable benefit to be adjusted very quickly in 
response to circumstances, the averaging of weekly earnings and time 
period of award meant it was not. As stated, this might disadvantage 
families around the margin of eligibility, but it also mitigates the 
incentive effects of benefits which immediately respond to a change in 
income.
582 Townsend, Peter, Poverty in the United Kingdom: A survey of household resources and 
standards of living (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1979) p.863.
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6.1.8 Status exemptions
Some groups of applicants for means tested benefits had widespread 
support e.g. war pensioners. Other groups were faced by considerable 
hostility and suspicion irrespective of means e.g. single parents. This is 
shown in the design of the means tests, some which have blanket 
exemptions for war pensioners. LAG advocated more financial eligibility 
for civil legal aid to be defined by subject matter rather than by means of 
individual clients e.g. for landlord and tenant cases, employment, 
immigration, debt and social security, as these were likely, on the whole, 
to involve poor clients.583 Receipt of NA /SB/IS was also used as a status 
exemption, or 'passport' benefit. 'Passporting' is when receipt of social 
assistance benefits gives automatic entitlement to other benefits. 
Generally these kinds of exemptions, if suitable ones can be found as 
proxies to income, make the system simpler and more straightforward. 
Exemptions inspired further demands for concessions.584
Means-tested benefits can attempt to serve as a general safety net, 
meeting all economic necessities, or they can be restricted and directed 
for specific items of consumption. Passported benefits are, in effect, a 
restricted benefit nested within a general income-maintenance scheme. 
Separate claims may have to be made, but it is not necessary to undergo a 
separate means test.
Passporting perhaps emerged unintentionally. For example, the SBC 
normally required the applicants for legal aid to attend an interview. The 
applicant had to bring documents such as wage-slips, bank statements, , 
rent book, and HP cards. But an interview was not normally required
583 Legal Action Group, A  Strategy for Justice: Publicly funded legal services in the 1990s 
(London: Legal Action Group, 1992) p.118.
584 For example, Mr Dempsey, an MP, asked for free prescriptions for long-term sick 
people whose sole income was invalidity allowance. House of Commons Hansard, v .836,9 
May 1972, col.1118.
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where the applicant already received Supplementary Benefit, as the SBC 
would already have details of his resources.585
The government saw passporting as a way to overcome the complex 
arrangements for means testing: 'it is our aim to achieve a greater 
simplicity wherever possible ... One way of doing this is through the 
extension of passport arrangements'.586 At the local level, the introduction 
of passport arrangements for Supplementary Benefit and Family Income 
Supplement for free school meals served to standardise the means test for 
a large portion of recipients. Passporting may have made administration 
easier for the authorities, but it did not wholly resolve the problem of 
take-up of non-income maintenance benefits. For instance in a survey 
carried out in June 1971 in Coventry, of the sample of 40 Supplementary 
Benefit recipients under pension age, 8 paid for prescriptions. 2 of these 
knew that they did not have to pay, but preferred to. The other 6 did not 
realise that they could get prescriptions free.587
Nor did passporting not serve as impetus to simplify the means test for 
families not on Supplementary Benefit or Family Income Supplement.588 
Thus, local authority policies had an important influence on take-up of 
school meals by non-passport families. Local authorities varied in the 
amount of information available to potential applicants, the way 
applicants were treated, and the length of time for which free meals were 
granted. A survey589 found that 71 per cent of families eligible to free
585 Matthews, Edwin James Thomas and Anthony Derek Maxwell Oulton, Legal aid and 
advice under the Legal A id Acts 1949 to 1964 (London: Butterworths, 1971) pp.66-70.
586 Under-Secretary of State for Health and Social Security ( Mr Paul Dean), House of 
Commons Hansard, v .826,15 November 1971v.826, col.184.
587 Bond, N, "Knowledge of Rights," in Butterworth, Eric and Robert Holman, eds., 
Social Welfare in M odem Britain (Fontana /  Collins, 1975), 134-140 p.138.
588 Cooper, Steven, The Education and Training Benefits (London: Policy Studies Institute, 
1985) p.47-48.
589 Wilson, Paul, Free School Meals: a survey carried out on behalf of the Department of 
Education and Science (London: Office of Population Censuses and Surveys, 1981).
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school meals through receipt o f 'passport' benefit were aware of their 
entitlement. But of those eligible because of low income only just over 
one-third were sure of their entitlement.
Income Support is, in effect, a bottom line for defining the minimum 
subsistence level of income.590 If non-take-up of Income Support itself 
was a problem, Income Support could not be safely taken as a 'passport 
benefit' which readily identified and defined the poor. The Welsh 
Consumer Council recommended that non-Supplementary Benefit 
recipients should have the same 'passporting' arrangements for means 
tested benefits as Supplementary Benefit recipients had.591 People might 
not have been claiming Supplementary Benefit because they were only 
just below the level for it and did not think it was worth claiming.
However, passporting can exacerbate the 'poverty trap', if non-income 
maintenance benefits are only available to passported recipients. For 
example, there was no provision for a sliding scale of prescription 
charges, but by withdrawing the free prescriptions entitlement at a higher 
income than the cut-off for Income Support, the 'poverty trap' was less 
deep than otherwise. Nevertheless, such arguments seem to have had no 
influence on the design of the non-income maintenance benefits which 
are the subject of this study.
The other problem with passporting is that it can result in anomalies. This 
is evidenced in my data. The anomalies can be people who appear to 
have incomes below Income Support level and are not eligible and people 
on Income Support, who would not be eligible if they did not receive 
Income Support as a component of their income. On the other hand,
590 Although some would argue that an acceptable standard of living is not possible on 
Income Support.
591 Welsh Consumer Council, One Form for Benefits?: A Welsh Consumer Council Study of 
Multi-Purpose Claim Forms in Merthyr Tydfil (Cardiff: Welsh Consumer Council, 1977) 
p.51.
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passporting Income Support and Family Credit recipients has smoothed 
out some other anomalies, especially those which used to occur to due to 
having a short-term and a higher long-term rate of Supplementary 
Benefit. This will be shown in Chapter 7 by comparing those eligible on 
income only and those passported.
6.1.9 Local or national rules?
One of the major differences between these means tests is the body which 
made the rules. Pharmaceutical benefits were organised by central 
government. School meals were also the subject of national statutory 
regulations from 1964, although LEAs had some additional discretion.
University student grants used to be subject to local authority discretion, 
but later were controlled by national statutory regulations. The Treasury 
agreed that a review of student grants was necessary in the late 1950s, but 
was determined to ensure that it did not recommend the ending of an 
LEA role, which reduced the Exchequer's expense.
Where eligibility is decided by local authorities, families with exactly the 
same incomes, commitments and dependants receive widely varying 
local authority benefits depending on where they live. Variation is the 
keynote of such means tests. Reddin found that in the 1960s there existed 
grossly different criteria of adequacy in operation which bore no relation 
to local differences in need, incomes or costs or any other factor which 
might be a justification for variance.592 In view of the general lack of 
publicity given to these benefits and the concealment of scales it would 
seem likely that the 'non-take-up' problem is even worse for local benefits 
than for national benefits.
592 Reddin, Mike, "Local Authority Means-Tested Services," in Townsend, Peter, Mike 
Reddin, and Peter Kaim-Caudle, eds., Social Services For All? Part One (London: Fabian 
Society, 1968) p.12.
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The Royal Commission on the Poor Laws noted "the inconsistencies of 
policy and inequalities of execution of the different Local Authorities, 
w ith regard to the personal assessments levied on the families with 
whom  they dealt'.593 Their response to this problem was the opinion that 
'we do not think that the policy of charging or not charging ought to be 
left to be determined by the Local Authority at all' 594 For the following 
reason:
'The charge is a compulsory levy, to be enforced by all the power of the 
law. These special assessments upon individuals in respect of particular 
services, as to the acceptance of which they have practically no option, 
amount, in reality, to taxation; and taxation is a matter upon which, if 
only for the sake of geographical uniformity, the decision of the 
Legislature should prevail.... The work of adjudicating upon particular 
cases - of assessing how much each person should pay, or whether he 
should be excused on the ground of poverty - appears to us no less 
unsuitable for a local administrative body than the general decision of 
whether or not the tax should be levied at all'.595
Also, people do not like local variation in rates of benefits. As the NUS 
sta ted :'... it is one of our main aims that the accident of residence will 
make no difference whatsoever to the rate of grant received by the 
student. Just how much the factor of residence influences the grant 
awarded to a student may be gathered from our survey of Local 
Education Authorities ... we look forward to the day when a unified
593 Wakefield, H. Russell et al., Royal Commission on the Poor Laws: M inority Report (1905) 
p.310.
594 Wakefield, H. Russell et al., Royal Commission on the Poor Laws: M inority Report (1905) 
p.310.
595 Wakefield, H. Russell et al., Royal Commission on the Poor Laws: M inority Report (1905) 
p.310.
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system is applied to University Grants'.596 In 1979 academics were still 
recommending that local authorities should agree a common assessment 
scale for their means-tested services.597
6.1.10 Adm inistering body
Another difference between benefits is the nature of the body which 
administers them 'on the ground'. Where the DSS (and its predecessors) 
was involved in administration of a benefit it was traditionally a defender 
of the interests of those on benefits. But these four non-subsistence 
benefits were not all administered by the DSS. LEAs were primarily 
concerned with providing education, and were less interest®^ in 
identifying and following-up apparently needy cases.
Civil legal aid used to be assessed by the Department of Social Security 
(and its forebears), but was transferred in the 1990s to the responsibility 
of the Legal Aid Board, part of the Lord Chancellor's Department, in 
order to exercise more control from within the organisation.
6.1.11 Degree of discretion
Means tests vary in the degree of discretion and sensitivity to individual 
circumstances allowed. This can either operate to make the system more 
generous, or less. The tests administered by the NAB and SBC tended to 
be open to making discretionary allowances for various types of 
expenditure. The Legal Aid Board tended to use discretion to restrict 
eligibility in the case of applicants who seem to have expensive goods, 
such as boats and cars, which are not normally taken into consideration.
596 National Union of Students, 1955/56 Survey of Local Education Authority Awards to 
Students and Grants Year Book (London: NUS, 1956) p .7.
597 Gasson, D.M., "Fees and Charges in the Personal Social Services," in Gibson, J.G., ed., 
Fees and Charges in the Personal Social Services (Birmingham: Institute of Local 
Government Studies, University of Birmingham, 1979) p.57.
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There is a conflict between the goals of meeting individualised need and 
providing uniformity of benefits. The advantage of discretion is that it 
allows sensitivity to individual circumstances. However, use of discretion 
takes up staff time and is a source of grievance among recipients. Another 
drawback is that a greater degree of discretion makes the means test 
harder for people to understand. Discretion was the critical focus towards 
which the welfare rights movement mobilised its efforts. The CP AG 
campaigned for subsistence benefits to have more transparent rules and 
less discretion, in order to make potential applicants more confident to 
apply, and promote the idea of 'welfare rights'. Thus, discretionary 
grants have contributed to the politicisation of means tested benefits.
6.2 Disposable income
How are we to discriminate between those reluctant to pay and those 
who cannot afford it? It is tricky to identify who could not afford the 
item, since different families have different spending priorities. Perhaps 
the only way round this is to use a sample family budget to determine 
reasonable outgoings. Then the issue becomes one of how the 'sample 
budget' is constructed.598 Nevertheless, the basis for many means tests is 
the concept of 'discretionary income'; income whose disposal is at the 
discretion of the applicant. The discretionary income of non-eligible 
people would not necessarily be spent on prescriptions, legal expenses, 
and so on. But that does not matter, as long as the people not eligible for 
benefits could afford it, if they adjusted their spending priorities. The 
next question in designing a means test is: how far should people be 
expected to change their spending priorities?
Nearly all means tests are based on some variant of this structure: 
income - disregards/ - 'requirements'/ = 'discretionary' incom e/
598 The Family Budget Unit has undertaken this kind of research, and uses methods such 
as focus groups to come up with examples of 'reasonable' family budgets.
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allowances income limit 'residual' incom e/ 
'disposable' income
The concept of 'discretionary income' raises the issue of whether 
expenditure on these means-tested services can properly be regarded as 
an optional extra. Most assessment procedures accord this a grudging 
acknowledgement by 'tapering' the amount of discretionary income 
which is counted. In other words they do not insist on all the 
discretionary income being available to pay for the service (see page 237).
The income limit is the element of the means test people would be most 
likely to be aware of. The income limit usually varied according to family 
size and the ages of any children. The income limits of some means tests, 
or 'requirements' as they are sometimes also called, were based on 
Income Support levels. For instance, the requirements levels for free 
prescriptions were based on Income Support. Such means tests adopt the 
principle of using Income Support procedures to establish a subsistence 
level, then disregarding a certain amount above that level to make it more 
generous than Income Support. Income over and above the limit set in 
the means test is assumed to be available for spending on whatever the 
applicant chooses - including the services at issue in this study. This may 
not be appropriate as Income Support is designed as a minimum 
subsistence level income. It may therefore be inappropriately low in other 
contexts, such as paying legal fees.
6.2.1 Requirements
Benefits were affected by the number of children, but in different ways 
for each benefit. Most means tests had some form of minimum income 
which it was assumed that claimants needed for basic living, called 
'requirements'. This varied with age and number of people in the family. 
It is difficult to compare the requirements for adults between means tests, 
because of the different expenses allowances made. For example, the
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student grant means test made no deduction for mortgage capital 
payments or local taxes, but compensated by having a higher income 
limit. It is, however, somewhat easier to compare requirements for 
children.
Table 6-1 Income requirements for children of different ages as allow ed under 
various means tests, 1985 (£)599_____________ ________________ ______________
1985 (£)
Each child aged:
Prescription medicines Civil Legal Aid Student grant
0-4 9.6 14.40 1.73
5-10 9.6 14.40 1.73
11-12 14.35 21.52 1.73
13-15 14.35 21.52 1.73
16-17 17.30 25.94 1.73
18 22.45 33.67 1.73
Dependent over 18 22.45 33.67 21.73
Table 6-1 shows that the means tests take differences in family size into 
account in different ways. Student grants, in particular, have a much 
lower allowance for the cost of children. The requirements for free 
prescriptions are the same as for Income Support. The requirements for 
legal aid have been set at 1.5 times the level for Income Support.
6.2.2 Disregards and allowances
Usually in a means test, some components of income and expenditure are 
disregarded or allowed (not counted). Means tests differ in the way they 
allow for expenses and other outgoings such as work expenses and child­
care costs. It is therefore necessary to look at more than the value of the 
benefit and the income limit to gauge how generous a benefit is: income 
disregards and capital limits matter too. A government can raise the 
'headline' income limits, but if the allowances and disregards are frozen, 
or reduced, this can cancel out the effect of raising the income levels in a 
way which is not apparent. This is one of the reasons why
599 School meals are not shown in the table as eligibility for them was based on SB or FIS 
receipt and there were not income 'requirements' for children under FIS. Instead there 
were 'prescribed amounts' and the amount of FIS payable was half the difference 
between the recipient's income and the prescribed amount.
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microsimulation modelling is an effective way of comparing means tests: 
it enables one to take into account changes in the disregards by actually 
calculating eligibility for many different families in different 
circumstances.
Allowances for expenses in a means test are meant to reflect unavoidable 
expenditure. The items that are allowed can tell us what 'society' regards 
as essential normal expenditure. For example despite the extra 
expenditures of a tropical fish enthusiast they are not regarded as 
disregarded when assessing financial need because society does not 
consider ownership of tropical fish as necessary to take part in our 
society.600 Who determines that some people have unm et needs of such 
importance that the state should step in? In fact, at this level of detail, the 
judgments have been made by a faceless government official, perhaps 
influenced by academics: no survey of what 'society' thinks has been 
carried out. Such policies may be incremental, or clearly defined and 
prescriptive, or may evolve from the continuous activities of 
administrators. But in each case administration process is suffused with 
values.
Means tests also make disregards from income and expense allowances 
out of the desire not to discourage thrift, work and certain other desirable 
behaviours. Essentially, disregards and allowances act to reward certain 
types of behaviour. I have listed below the implications of each disregard 
used in the four means tests I studied.
Income disregards:
- Earnings disregards enable a person to keep an amount of earnings 
without affecting entitlement to benefit. This privileges people who 
work. An earnings disregard recognises work-related expenses and
600 This example is from Butterworth, Eric and Robert Holman, eds., Social Welfare in 
Modern Britain (Fontana /  Collins, 1975) p.72.
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also encourages work by increasing the income gap between those in 
work and those not in work. It also produces a taper as people 
increase their income by moving into work. Giving separate 
disregards for husbands' and wives' earnings puts couples where 
both work at an advantage over those where only one partner does all 
the work, and recognises childcare costs for working mothers.
Earnings deduction disregards cover income tax and National 
Insurance because they are unavoidable expenditure for someone 
who works and not to disregard them might discourage potential 
applicants from paid work.
Unearned income disregards cover investment income, maintenance 
payments, income from lodgers, occupational and personal pensions. 
This privileges people who have got some form of economic 
independence from the state, usually through the ownership of 
capital.
Student grant and loan disregards privilege being a student in receipt of 
state support over being a fully self-funding student. In the case of the 
student loan a disregard may be justified as the income is a loan 
against future earnings, rather than real income. The student grant 
disregard kept students a little bit better off than those on welfare 
benefits. The amount relative to the other income disregards suggests 
how far studying was favoured above other occupations.
- Disability benefit disregards are based on the idea that disability 
benefits exist to cover the extra expenses of having a disability and 
should not be regarded as being available for other expenses. For 
student grant applicants, the applicant's child benefit was not 
counted, because that money was ear-marked for the children of the 
applicant.
- For student grant applicants, pensions and social security benefits were 
not counted. It is not clear why social security benefits should be
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ignored as income, unless it is assumed that the amounts involved are 
so small in relation to the means tests for student grants that they are 
not worth including.
Housing and council tax benefit were not considered income in most 
means tests because they are ear-marked for housing expenses.
Expenditure allowances:
Domestic help allowances to cover the cost of childcare an d /o r cleaner 
where there was only a single adult was to enable a single parent to 
stay in work. In some means tests, single parents or mothers were 
allowed to keep more of their earnings, to compensate for the extra 
costs associated with working for single parents or mothers.
- Housing costs might be allowed because the actual cost of housing 
varies widely in different parts of the UK among otherwise similar 
families. If rent was deducted, it was usually all rent. Some means 
tests deducted mortgage interest and capital, and some only interest. 
Interest is the minimum that a mortgage-holder needs to pay in order 
not to lose the house. The legal aid means test also allowed for 
housing repair costs and house insurance. If housing costs were not 
deducted, or were capped, this would be the equivalent of saying that 
some people were expected to move to cheaper accommodation, 
rather than receive benefits. Some means tests only take into account 
the housing costs of the claimant up to a point. For example, the legal 
aid means test had a cap on the mortgage payments that were 
allowed. In effect, the means test designers decided what was a 
'reasonable' proportion of family income to spend on housing costs.
- Local taxes (council tax, rates) might be allowed because they were not 
discretionary, at least in the short term. Some means tests also 
deducted water and sewerage charges.
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An allowance for maintenance payments to a former spouse enabled 
applicants to meet their legal obligations.
An allowance for life insurance was intended to encourage people to 
make life insurance provision.
An allowance for payments into an occupational or personal pension 
encourages people to make that provision. The prescriptions test in 
1995 only allowed half of such contributions, possibly because they 
are to some extent discretionary expenditure.
- Work related expenses such as travel to and from work and trade union 
subscriptions aimed to preserve the incentive to stay in work, rather 
than have complete benefit dependency.
Ta jle 6-2 Disregards and allowances, 1985
Disregard/
allowance
School meals 
(based on FIS 
receipt601)
Prescription
medicines
Student
grants
Civil legal 
aid
Income disregard
unearned income see note602 S  £4
earned income see note603
S  £4 applicant 
and £4 spouse
social security 
benefits
S  child benefit,
one-parent
benefit
disability benefits 
(e.g. AA /M A )
✓ ? ✓
payments rec'd 
under covenant
capital ✓ S  up to £3000 S  up to £3000
601 Receipt of free school meals in 1985 was based on receipt either of Supplementary 
Benefit or Family Income Supplement. This table is based on FIS receipt, then more 
generous of the two.
602 The adjudication officer had a wide discretion in how s /h e  calculated normal weekly 
income from sources other than earnings for FIS. See Child Poverty Action Group, 
National Welfare Benefits Handbook 1986,15th ed. (CPAG, 1985) p.150.
603 FIS was an in-work benefit, payable on the basis of the difference between the 
recipient's earnings and so-called 'prescribed amounts', so the concept of an earnings 
disregard does not really apply.
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Table 6-2 Cont.
Earnings deduction allowances
income tax ✓
national insurance 
contributions
S S
occupational
pension
contributions
S S
personal pension 
contributions
s
Housing cost allowances
rent S  'reasonable' V s
mortgage interest S  'reasonable' S  up to amount 
for which tax 
relief given
S  'reasonable'
mortgage capital/ 
endowment policy
✓
rates/council tax ✓
Other expenses allowances
work expenses V S ✓
life assurance 
premium
S  'reasonable' ^  half
domestic help / 
child care
V S  for single 
parents
maintenance 
payments made
✓
special diet S
HP repayments ^  'reasonable'
extra heating
house repairs and 
insurance
✓
school fees ✓
One might expect means tests at the lower end of the income scale to 
have more disregards and allowances because it is more important to be 
sensitive to individual circumstances at the lower end of the income scale, 
where the overall income limits are lower. However, although there are 
fewer allowances and disregards for student grants, civil legal aid ( for 
which some 65 per cent of families were eligible in 1985) had as many 
allowances and disregards as the other benefits, which were aimed at 
people on low incomes. Allowances and disregards add significantly to 
the complexity of the means test (see section 6.4 below). They therefore 
contribute to the work involved in administering the means test and the
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lack of transparency for potential claimants, which in turn, lowers take- 
up (see chapter 3).
6.3 Treatment of savings
In some means tests, there was no automatic capital cut-off which 
affected eligibility. Some tests assumed income from capital, which acted 
as a taper, rather than a sudden cut-off. Table 6-3 illustrates the 
maximum capital levels for entitlement of the four benefits which are the 
subject of this study using one family type.
Table 6-3 Maximum capital for a single person aged 40 w ith 11 year old child and no 
earned income still to be eligible_________________________________________________
(1985 prices
(RPI))
1975 1985 1,995
Prescription
medicines
£10050
(tariff for capital 
over £900) 
Affected by no. 
and age of 
dependents.
£2000
(cut-off)
£5080
(tariff between £1900 and 
£5080, and cut-off at £5080)
School meals No maximum Family Income 
Supplement 
maximum capital 
(i.e. no maximum).
Income support maximum  
capital (£1900)
Student
grants
No maximum No maximum No maximum
Civil Legal 
Aid
Full eligibility: 
£2700
Partial eligibility: 
£5330
(cut-off, or taper if 
disposable income 
below £1040) 
Depended on no. 
of dependents and 
disposable income.
Full eligibility: 
£3000
Partial eligibility:
£4500
(cut-off)
Full eligibility: £1900 
Partial eligibility: £4280 
(cut-off, with taper for 
pensioners with disposable 
income below £1540, 
depending on age and 
disposable income.)
There is little pattern in the capital limits for eligibility, either over time or 
for an individual benefit. However, there seems to have been a trend in 
the mid-1990s to set the capital limit for all the means tests at the Income 
Support capital limit (£1900 in 1985 prices). People with low incomes but 
substantial capital did better under the means test for prescriptions in 
1975 than in 1985, because in 1985 there was a cut-off, instead of a tariff
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income. In particular, the automatic cut-off adversely affects retired 
people who live off their income from capital. A relatively large amount 
of capital produces a quite small income. It discriminates in favour of 
people who use a capital sum to buy an annuity, rather than managing 
their investment themselves. Retired people who live off their wealth 
probably do not view the capital as available for spending: they spend 
the interest but do not touch the capital.
Some of the means tests assume an unrealistically high rate of income 
from savings. This discriminates against people who have savings. It is 
one of the biggest weaknesses of the means testing system -  that there is 
little incentive to save unless you will have an income high enough to put 
you out of the scope of benefit receipt.
Table 6-4 Rates of (nominal) interest im plied by income from capital assumed by 
means test604
1975 1985 1995
Prescription
medicines
<£325: 0% N /A < £3000: 0%
£325-£800: 0.7-6.5% £3000-£8000: 1.6-13%
> £800: 6.5-10%
School meals N /A As for FIS i.e. 
actual income.
IS tariff income i.e.:
< £3000: 0%
£3000-£8000: 1.6-13%
In calculating capital, some means tests disregard the value of the 
applicants' dwelling house. This means that the person does not have to 
sell their house in order to be eligible for benefit. It privileges home­
owners because other forms of saving are not protected in the same way. 
In addition, housing wealth is often treated more favourably than other 
forms of saving.605 This reflects the importance of home ownership in
604 Rate of interest on the whole capital amount, not marginal rate of interest.
605 There was an awareness of this bias. For example, Mrs Doris Fisher in a written 
parliamentary question asked the Secretary of State for Education and Science if she was 
satisfied that 'the regulations regarding student awards as it relates to the assessment of 
parental contributions operate fairly as between tenants of property and owner-
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British society. The value of household furniture and personal clothing 
are not counted. A persons' tools of his trade are not counted, because 
they might have to stop work if they had to sell their tools. The legal aid 
means test counted the surrender value of life insurance policies.
6.4 Complexity of the means tests: a statistical analysis
There have been consistent complaints about the complexity of the 
claiming procedure.606 Improving information can only do so much to 
increase take-up. The best hope for improvements in take-up is to 
simplify the process of claiming or simplify the benefits themselves. 'The 
more precisely targeted a means-tested benefit, the greater the complexity 
of rules is likely to be, to make sure it reaches the target population'.607 1 
documented the means test for each of the four benefits as at 1st October
1965,1975,1985 and 1995. Some idea of the complexity of the means test 
can be obtained by using the number of different pieces of information 
the administering body asked the applicant to supply as a proxy for the 
complexity of the means test.
occupiers'. House of Commons Hansard, v.827, 2 December 1971, Written Answers, 
cols.150-1.
606 For example, Mr Murray, in asking a question to the Secretary of State for Education 
and Science referred to 'very long double-sided forms which ask lots of complicated 
questions, such as th a t... issued by the Kent Education Committee.' House of Commons 
Hansard, v. 722,4 November 1968, col. 486.
607 Corden, Anne, Changing Perspectives on Benefit Take-Up (London: HMSO, 1995) p.14.
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Chart 6-1 Number of pieces of information required by means test (by benefit)
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N ote: In 1965 there was no means test for prescription medicines. Information was not available 
about the means test for free school meals in 1965, as each LEA had its own test.
The results (see Chart 6-1) showed no overall pattern in the complexity of 
the means tests. For the student grant, the number of pieces of 
information required was generally fewer than those for civil legal aid 
and pharmaceuticals. Student grants and civil legal aid have not changed 
as much as the other two benefits with regard to complexity.
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Chart 6-2 Number of pieces of information required by means tests in different years
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Note: The results for 1965 need to be treated with caution because 1965 there was no means test for 
prescription medicines and information was not available about the means test for free school 
meals in 1965, as each LEA had its own test.
6.5 Conclusion: "Designing a means test is not just a technical 
exercise -  it is value-laden"
There are good reasons for using means tests, and it seems reasonable to 
target social security benefits on those most in need. The problem is to 
make the means test reasonably good. It has been recognised for some 
time that: 'It is by no means easy to devise a means test that is fair to 
all'.608 Arguably it is impossible. It may appear that identifying those in 
need simply depends on technical know-how. However, means tests 
inevitably favour some sorts of lifestyles over others, and therefore 
involve political decisions.609 Targeting is much more a political exercise,
608 Piachaud, D., "The Means Test Morass," N e w  S o c ie ty  59 , no. 1006 (1982): 307-308 
p.308.
609 This point is demonstrated in Travers, P. and S. Richardson, "The Elusive Quest For 
Those Most in Need," A u s tra lia n  Journal o f  Social Issu es 30, no. 3 (1995): 335-349.
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and less a technical one, than first appears. The differences between 
means tests involve embedded values. As an example, decisions about 
whose income to take into account implies moral judgements. Should 
men and women who are co-habiting have a financial advantage over 
husbands and wives?
It has been shown that there are families who are eligible on one income 
scale, but ineligible on another, equally plausible, one.610 This 
demonstrates how the design of the means test in practice can affect its 
outcomes. It also shows how far subjective judgements are involved in 
means test design. People wrongly distinguish between the political 
judgements of politicians and the rational advice given by civil servants 
on such matters as how to target benefits to the truly needy. Politicians 
do not involve themselves with the detail of the means tests7 rules. 
However, the components of income that are assessed and the allowances 
for expenses that are made are implicitly political decisions.
This does not mean that they are conscious and pro-active values, 
however: it could well be the case that the resulting implicit values are 
mistakes, or were never consciously considered. Unfortunately, it was not 
possible in this research to get "inside7 the details of such policy 
processes. To answer questions such as: "Who changes the rules, and on 
what basis? How well do the policy designers know what the outcomes 
will be, and do they care?" would involve interviewing civil servants. But 
however the implicit values are arrived at, the misconception that means 
testing is a technical exercise to be carried out by civil servants 
nevertheless ignores the varieties of means testing. In conclusion, means 
tests should not be seen as a value-neutral way of helping the most 
deprived.
610 Travers, P. and S. Richardson, "The Elusive Quest For Those Most in Need," 
Australian Journal of Social Issues 30, no. 3 (1995): 335-349.
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7 The outcome of means-tested benefits I
This chapter focuses on the outcomes of the benefit system, as opposed to 
the changing principles and legislation. The study of outcomes is 
important because the way in which a government's intentions are put 
into practice do make a difference. The way in which the benefit was 
delivered was itself part of policy, and reveals who, in practice, was 
thought to be needy. This chapter and the following chapter are primarily 
a quantitative analysis: I examined at the micro-level the outcomes of 
selected means tested benefits, with the emphasis on the numbers and 
kinds of people eligible. I examined in detail the structure and operation 
of the means test at several points in time, namely 1965,1975,1985 and 
1995. To do this I used the technique of microsimulation modelling. In 
this chapter I present the results on the overall numbers of people 
eligible. In the next chapter I give a more detailed breakdown of the 
characteristics of entitled and non-entitled families.
7.1 How many people were eligible?
I calculated actual numbers eligible in the population in 1975,1985 and 
1995. The availability of these figures is necessary to achieve fuller insight 
into the means-testing system. By 'eligibility' I refer to theoretical 
eligibility to receive a benefit and there are many reasons why eligible 
people may not claim their entitlements.611 An example of a question 
which could not be answered at the time, but could now be, based on my 
estimates of eligibility, is: 'w hat would have been the annual cost of the 
take up of their entitlements of all those persons or families entitled to the 
range of available means-tested benefits?'612
611 See Chapter 3 section 3.3.1.
612 Paraphrasing of a question asked by Mr Meacher, House of Commons Hansard, v.828,
17 December 1971, Written Answers, col.217. Sir K. Joseph replied 'I regret... it is not 
possible to provide such an estimate'. I have chosen not to follow up this question in this
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Chart 7-1 shows the numbers of people eligible for my four benefits in 
1985. This establishes the relative reach of the benefits. For comparison, I 
have included the number of families in receipt of social assistance. The 
student grant was the most generous in terms of numbers of people 
theoretically eligible. Free school meals applied to the fewest families, but 
18 per cent is still a relatively large section of the population. The social 
assistance bars show what the lowest conceivable scope of the non­
subsistence benefits would be, if it is accepted that social assistance 
represents the smallest income a family could get by on.
Chart 7-1 % of BUs eligible for means tested benefits in 1985
□ Fully eligible □ Partially eligible
100 %  - 
80% - 
60% - 
40% - 
20%  -  
0 % -
The following charts by benefit type show how eligibility changed over 
time. The results presented here show how many families, so-called 
'benefit units' (BUs), were theoretically eligible, except for free 
prescriptions where it is particularly appropriate to show how many 
individuals were eligible, and school meals where it is informative to
study, however, it would be possible to address this question using my eligibility 
estimates and published sources on the cost of providing the benefits.
Civil legal Free Free school SB or FIS SB or FIS 
aid prescriptions meals recipients recipients
(BUs with a 
school child)
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show  ho w  m any  ch ild ren  w ere eligible.613 W here there  w as a passp o rt 
benefit I p assp o rted  eligible peop le .614
C h art 7-2 show s the p ro p o rtio n  of fam ilies eligible for free school m eals, 
w h ich  increased  over time. H ow ever, it is p robab le  th a t ch ild ren  m igh t be 
d isp ro p o rtio n a te ly  w ith in  w orse-off fam ilies, so C h art 7-3 show s the 
p ro p o rtio n  of ch ild ren  entitled . This does m ake a d ifference an d  reveals 
th a t the  sam e p ropo rtion  of ch ild ren  w ere  eligible after the  incom e m eans 
test w as w ith d raw n , even  th o u g h  the  n u m b er of fam ilies eligible h ad  
d ro p p e d  by  5 p er cent. In o ther w ords, u s ing  as a m easu re  the  p ro p o rtio n  
of ch ild ren  en titled , eligibility w as stable betw een  1975 a n d  1985.
Chart 7-2 Free school meals - % of BUs actually elig ib le  (with a school child) in 1975, 
1985 and 1995
30% - 
25% 
20% 
15% H 
10% 
5% 
0 %
17%
6 %
-0%r
18'
-mr
25'
□  Eligible - means tested 
H Eligible - passported
1975 1985 1995
613 A benefit unit (BU) is a heterosexual couple (married or cohabiting) or a single 
person, and any children they are responsible for. A child is defined as for receipt of 
Child Benefit i.e. as a person under 16 or aged under 19 and in full-time education.
614 Tassporting' is when receipt of one benefit (usually a social assistance benefit) gives 
automatic entitlement to other benefits.
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Chart 7-3 Free school meals - % of school children actually eligible in 1975,1985 and
1995
30% - 
25% - 
20% 
15% 
10% 
5% -\ 
0%
20 .1 %
1975
20 .0 %
26.6%
□  Eligible - passported or 
m eans tested
1985 1995
8%
10%
8 %
13%
1975 1985
14%
Chart 7-4 Free prescriptions - % of BUs actually elig ib le in 1975,1985 and 1995
35%
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5% H 
0 %
19%
□  Eligible - means tested  
Ei Eligible - passported
1995
The n u m b e r of fam ilies eligible for free p rescrip tions has risen  over tim e, 
as sh o w n  in  C h art 7-4. H ow ever, certain  people au tom atically  go t free 
p rescrip tions anyw ay, based  on  the ir age and  w ith o u t a m eans test. 
Therefore, it m akes sense to look  a t changes in  in d iv id u a l eligibility  g iven 
th a t som e peop le  h ad  a s ta tu s exem ption. For C h art 7-5, the  pensioner 
exem ption , w ar p ensioner exem ption  an d  exem ption  for ch ild ren  u n d e r
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19 in full-time education were applied.615 This shows how many more 
people were eligible other than on grounds of income, which 
demonstrates the significance of the status exemptions in raising 
eligibility to between 50 and 60 per cent of individuals. It also shows how 
the scope of free prescriptions exhibited less of an increase over time once 
status exemptions are taken into account.
Chart 7-5 Free prescriptions - % of individuals (adults and children) actually eligible 
in 1975,1985 and 1995
70% 
60% 
50% J 
40% 
30% 
20 % 
10% -] 
0 %
4.0%
17.3%
24.3%
1975
2 .0%
4.0%
6 .6 %
18.3%
22.2%
1985
4.8%
9.8%
20 .0 %
23.0%
1995
□  Eligible - m eans tested
□  Eligible - passported
□  Eligible - pensioners/ war 
pensioners
□ Eligible - children
The numbers of families eligible for a student grant was very high, and 
declined slightly over a twenty year period. These figures only include 
benefit units which had a 17-24 year old living in the household or away 
at university, because this is the type of family most likely to apply for a 
student grant. However, in theory, anyone who could get a place on a 
university degree course could get a grant, even if they were a mature 
student. The proportion of families eligible in the whole population was 
even higher than that for those with a 17-24 year old. My data showed
615 There were also exemptions for contraceptives and certain medical conditions, but it 
was not possible to ascertain eligibility for them from the data source.
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100 per cent eligibility in 1975, which probably due to the relatively low 
size of the sample of families with a 17-24 year old, combined with the 
documented shortcoming of the FES to survey high-income families.616 
Nevertheless, even if the actual proportions need to be treated with 
caution, these reservations do not alter the general conclusion, which is 
that eligibility gently declined.
Chart 7-6 Student grant - % of BUs actually eligible (with a 17-24 year old in parental 
home or a student away from home) in 1975,1985 and 1995
120% 
100% H 
80% 
60% - 
40% - 
20%  - 
0%
55%
45%
39%
47%
42%
40%
1975 1985 1995
□  Eligible for partial student 
grant
□  Eligible for full student 
grant - means tested
Note: The sample consists of benefit units which have a 17-24 year old living in the household, 
who is the son or daughter of the household head, and benefit units which were recorded as 
having paid either school fees, other fees, maintenance or parental contributions for a child aged 
16-24 outside the household in the previous 3 months. This definition is the best I could do with 
the information available in the FES, which only surveys private households, not students living 
in institutions. This definition might introduce a bias because it excludes parents with a child who 
does not live with them and for whom they paid none of school fees, other fees, maintenance or 
parental contributions.
Chart 7-7 shows that actual eligibility for civil legal aid covered 65 per 
cent of the population at its peak in 1985.
616 The sample of benefit units with a 17-24 year old were about 10 per cent of the total 
sample size. They were 1975 796 BUs, 1985 905 BUs, 1995 651 BUs.
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Chart 7-7 Civil legal aid - % of BUs actually eligible in 1975,1985 and 1995
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60% 
50% - 
40% 
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20%  - 
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0 %
40%
16%
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34%
31%
- M r
26%
9%
19%
□ Eligible for partial legal 
aid
□  Eligible for full legal aid 
means tested
□ Eligible for full legal aid 
passported
1985 1995
Note: the means test had higher limits for personal injury cases, but that has not been taken into 
account in these estimates. Also, from 1990 children were eligible in their own right, rather than 
on the basis of their parents' income and capital, but these are family-level estimates and so do not 
take this change into account.
7.2 W h a t w e r e  th e  e f fe c ts  o f  c h a n g e s  to  th e  m e a n s  te sts?
This section answers the question: how have changes to the means tests' 
entitlement rules affected eligibility over time? In particular, I looked at 
how changes affected the entitlement of families at a given level of
income.
1975 or 1995.1 can use this modelling technique to ask "what if the 1965 
means test had been in force in 1985?' I used indices of prices and 
earnings to convert the monetary conditions of the 1965,1975 and 1995 
means tests into their 1985 equivalent. In this way the impact of changes 
in the means test rules on entitlement can be examined in isolation from 
the impact of socio-economic change.
The method of this section is therefore to consider the impact of the 
means test alone, in controlling for changes in the population to which 
the means test was applied. It is the changes in the rules which are of 
interest. All the results in this section are based on survey data from 1985. 
That is, the base population has been held constant. Thus, the results 
shown here (other than for 1985) show the impact on entitlement of 
changes in the means test rules only. The 1965,1975 and 1995 means tests 
have been adjusted into their 1985 equivalent, so if overall numbers 
potentially eligible show an increase against 1985 incomes data, it is not 
that the numbers of poor people increased, but the net income level for 
entitlement, was raised.
The procedure I carried out is like benchmarking against an effective 
income threshold for entitlement; if the net income level for entitlement 
had remained the same, one would expect the percentages eligible under 
different years' means tests to remain the same (against 1985 data). If the 
entitlement threshold had been raised, to reflect the increased prosperity 
of the country as a whole, one would expect the numbers eligible against 
1985 data to increase. Of course, the actual outcome of a means-testing 
system will depend on the means test used and the income characteristics 
of the population subjected to the means test.
The main result is that the effective income threshold for eligibility for 
each benefit changed over time. This can be seen reading across the rows 
in Table 7-1 as a change in the percentage of the 1985 population who 
would have been eligible had the 1960s, 1975 or 1995 means test been in
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use in 1985, compared with the means test which actually was in force in 
1985. In effect, what this shows is that the income level at which people 
were considered to be in need of the benefit varied over time.
Table 7-1 Proportion of the 1985 population w ho w ould have been eligible had the 
1975 or 1995 means test been in use in 1985
1985 population
Mid-
1960s
means
test
(Potential
eligibility)
1975
means
test
(Potential
eligibility)
1985
means
test
(Actual
eligibility)
1995
means
test
(Potential
eligibility)
School meals (% of BUs 
with school children eligible, 
eligibility based on either 
income or benefit receipt)
25% 18% 16%
Prescription medicines 
(% of individuals eligible, 
eligibility based on either 
income, benefit receipt or 
status)
53% 51% 51% 50%
Student grants (% of BUs 
with 17-24 year old in 
parents' hom e/student 
outside home eligible for 
either full or partial means 
tested grant)
73% 98% 86% 89%
Civil Legal Aid (% of BUs 
eligible for either full or 
partial benefit, eligibility 
based on either income or 
benefit receipt)
67% 58% 65% 53%
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Chart 7-8 % of BUs/individuals in 1985 population who would theoretically have 
been eligible under mid-1960s, 1975,1985 and 1995 means tests
□  M id-1960s 
■  1975
□  1985
□  1995
Free School Meals Free Prescriptions Student Grant - % Civil Legal Aid - 
- % of BUs eligible - % of individuals of BUs eligible % of BUs eligible 
(with a school eligible (with a 17-24 yr
child) old in parental
home or a student 
away from home)
I broke dow n the effect of changes in the means test rules on different 
groups of people. For example, I could identify whether changes in the 
rules tended to go in favour of 16-17 year olds, or maybe changes in the 
rules favoured pensioners. However, actual change from decade to 
decade in the number of 16-17 year olds eligible will depend on a 
combination of how the changes in the rules affect the proportion of 16-17 
year olds eligible, the size of the 16-17 year old group, and the incomes of 
the 16-17 year old group. This section of my work identifies only how the 
changes in the rules affect the nronortion of 16-17 vear olds elicnble/Thf^^
depend on number of pensioners relative to the number of 16-17 year 
olds, and the proportion of each group affected by the changing rules. 
Actual change in eligibility will also depend on the change in the size of 
the two groups, and the incomes of the two groups.
7.2.1. School meals
The number of benefit units in the 1985 population which would have 
been eligible for free school meals on the 1975,1985 and 1995 means tests 
dropped from 25 per cent to 16 per cent when they are compared in 1985 
terms. The fall in entitlement from 1975 to 1985 came about by the 
restriction of free school meals to children in families receiving either 
SB/IS or F IS /FC ^.
The limiting of free school meals to children in families receiving either 
SB/IS or FIS/FC effectively meant that the means test for free school 
meals was the same as the means test for those income maintenance 
benefits. I did not take into account in this analysis whether the means 
test for entitlement for SB/IS and FIS/FC had changed between 1985 and 
1995, as my main concern was the separate means tests which exist for 
non-income maintenance benefits.
The further fall in entitlement from 1985 to 1995 was entirely the result of 
withdrawing eligibility for free school meals from families receiving 
FIS/FC. There were no 'winning' types of family from these changes in 
the rules.
617 Supplementary Benefit (SB) replaced in 1988 by Income Support (IS), Family Income 
Supplement (FIS) replaced in 1988 by Family Credit (FC).
Chart 7-9 Free school meals - % of BUs (with a school child) in 1985 population which 
would theoretically have been eligible under different year's means tests (1985 base 
data)
30% n
25%
25% -
18%20% 16%
15%
10%
5%
0 %
1975 1985 1995
The fall in the number of benefit units in the 1985 population which 
would have been eligible for free school meals on the 1975,1985 and 1995 
means tests demonstrates that the definition of those deemed to be in 
need of free school meals became more restricted over time.
7.2.1. Prescriptions
The num ber of benefit units in the 1985 population which would have 
been eligible for free prescriptions on the 1975,1985 and 1995 means tests, 
was about the same. In other words I found that there was hardly any net 
change in the income threshold for eligibility.
However, there were changes to the means test, but in different ways for 
different types of people, and the types of families which Tost out'
between the 1985 and 1995 means tests were balanced bv othp** UinHc nf
majority of potential gainers were pensioner benefit units (96.5 per cent), 
whereas 99.5 per cent of those potentially losing out were non-pensioner 
BUs. The mean age of the benefit unit head in the type of benefit units 
'gaining' eligibility was 72 years. The mean age of the benefit unit head in 
the kind of benefit units 'losing' eligibility was 24 years. This suggests 
that pensioners were starting to be considered more needful, and non­
pensioners, especially 16 to 18 years olds, were regarded as less needy 
than previously.
Chart 7-10 Free prescriptions - % of BUs in 1985 population who would theoretically 
have been eligible under different year's means tests (1985 base data)
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24% 
23% - 
22% 
21% H 
20% 
19% -\ 
18%
25%
23%
21% 21%
1968 1975 1985 1995
However, pensioners automatically got free prescriptions anyway, based 
on their age and without a means test, as previously mentioned. 
Therefore, it makes sense to also look at changes in individual eligibility 
given that certain groups had a status exemption already.
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Chart 7-11 Free prescriptions - % of individuals (adults and children) in 1985 
population who would theoretically have been eligible under different year's means 
tests (including status exemptions) (1985 base data)
54% -I
53%
53% -
52% 51% 51%
51%
50% 49%
48%
47%
1968 1975 1985 1995
The results showed a change from 53 per cent of people eligible in 1985 to 
49 per cent of people eligible in 1995: virtually no net change. There were 
some family types which were gainers and losers, although the numbers 
of each more or less cancelled each other out. The gainers were other 
people living in a benefit unit with a pensioner. Although the pensioner 
themselves had a status exemption anyway, the more generous means 
test towards pensioners benefited the younger members of their family. 
The potential losers were mainly 16-18 year olds. The mean age of losers 
was 23 years.
About 10-18 per cent of the losers had actually received an item on a free 
prescription in the seven days before the survey was held.618 This means 
that these people had actually gone through the means test and had need
618 The number of free prescriptions is only known at the BU level. So, the free 
prescriptions may have belonged to a BU who did not lose out e.g. a child. The figure of 
10% applies if I only count free prescriptions given to benefit units where everyone lost 
out (20 items divided by 192 benefit units in which at least one person lost). The figure 
of 18% applies if I assume that all the free prescriptions were being used by someone 
who subsequently lost out.
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to make use of it in the week in 1985 when the survey was conducted.619 
The results show that these same people would not have been eligible in 
1995. Probably even more than that percentage would have gone through 
the means test and obtained free items on prescription at least once in the 
previous six months or more, because there is more chance of being ill 
over a longer time period. This result is important because it shows that 
eligibility was denied to people who did actually take-up the benefit.620 
Arguably, it is not so critical if benefit is withdrawn from people who did 
not avail themselves of it anyway, at least if you believe that level of take- 
up is an accurate indicator of need for the benefit.
The generosity of the means test rules for free prescriptions increased.
The means test changed in different ways for different types of people: it 
did not become uniformly more or less generous. However, the 
microsimulation method reveals that the number of family types which 
were 'gainers' outweighed the 'losers' in the 1985 population.
7.2.1. Student grant
The number of all benefit units eligible for a student grant remained 
roughly constant: the data indicated a change in eligibility from 99 per 
cent to 96 per cent. This shows that the impact of the rules barely 
changed. Theoretically anyone is entitled to go to university and apply 
for a grant, if they have got a university place. In practice however, most 
people applying for a grant would have been under 25, so it makes sense 
to look at eligibility among benefit units containing a parent of someone 
aged 17-25.
619 If you exclude the possibility that the prescription was for contraceptives or the 
person had a medical condition entitling them to free prescriptions.
620 See previous footnote.
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Chart 7-12 Student grant - % of BUs (with a 17-24 year old in parental home or a 
student away from home) in 1985 population which would theoretically have been 
eligible under different year's means tests (1985 base data)
□  Eligible for full grant □  Eligible for part grant
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40% -
48%20%
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The net change in eligibility between 1975 and 1985 consisted of 305 
gaining benefit units and 434 losing BUs. The changes to the means test 
are so extensive that it was not possible to identify particular 
characteristics of the gaining and losing BUs. There were no family types 
which lost out from the change in the means test from 1985 to 1995.
The generosity of the means test for student grants remained fairly 
constant over time. Political pressure to reduce expenditure went into 
decreasing the value of the grant received by those eligible, rather than 
by cutting numbers eligible.
7.2.1. C iv il legal aid
From 1975 to 1985 there was a net increase in the income threshold for
units to 53 per cent. The tightening of potential eligibility for full legal aid 
was even more dramatic: dropping from 31 per cent of benefit units to 18 
per cent.
Chart 7-13 Civil legal aid - % of BUs in 1985 population which would theoretically 
have been eligible under different year's means tests (1985 base data)
□  Eligible for full legal aid □  Eligible for partial legal aid
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Among the types of families to gain from the rules change would be 
those who would benefit from the introduction of 'passporting' between 
1985 and 1995. These are people who received income support in 1985, 
but were not eligible under the civil legal aid means test in 1985. Some of 
these are people with capital above the limit for legal aid (£4,500 in 1985), 
but below the limit for income support (£8,000 in 1985).621
There are also people in the group gaining from the introduction of 
passporting who are recorded as receiving income support, but who 
seem to have rather high earnings. It is difficult to tell from the data why 
they are receiving it -  their income appears to take them over the limits 
for receipt of income support. This could be because the question asked 
in the FES does not accurately obtain information about the current
621 Although tariff income of £1 per week per £250 between £3000 and £8000 is assumed 
for Income Support purposes.
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income of the self-employed, or of people who have just started or just 
stopped work. In the cases of high earnings, I suspected that the FES data 
may be inaccurate, and therefore such people would not in reality have 
gained from the change to passporting. The other types of people gaining 
by changes to the means test would be pensioners with up to about 
£25,000 of capital, but low incomes, because special capital limits' were 
introduced by 1995 for this group.
Losing family types would be those which were affected by the general 
reduction in the income and capital limits. Another group which lost out 
was benefit units containing a spouse or children, as the allowances for 
family members were cut. Also losing out were people who had 
unearned income, as the disregard given to up to £4 of income from this 
source was withdrawn by 1995.
This result shows the importance of the definition of income and level of 
allowances. Often, it is only the 'headline' levels of the limits for 
disposable income which are reported. But changes in the way that 
disposable income is defined are politically easier to introduce, because 
they are less obvious to the casual observer. Thus, 748 out of 8026 benefit 
units in the sample lost out purely because the definition of disposable 
income had changed to have lower allowances for a partner and children. 
Policy-makers could have made an equivalent cut in eligibility by 
lowering disposable income limits, rather than changing the definition of 
disposable income, but that would, no doubt, have made them appear to 
be making harsher cuts.
The fact that eligibility for civil legal aid decreased in 1995 suggests the 
income boundary for eligibility for civil legal aid was pushed down again 
for political reasons, irrespective of need in the population. The results 
reveal that there was no consistent operational definition of 'need': the 
poverty threshold for the means test moved around, driven frequently by 
the desire to make overall expenditure cuts (see following chapter).
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7.2.2 Sum m ary of change over the period 1975-1995
The nature of changes to the means test as shown in these charts suggests 
two things. Firstly, the differing heights of the columns in Chart 7-8 
shows there are substantial differences in the means tests used in each 
year, but also there was no coherent overall direction of means test 
policy.
Secondly, there was no uniform minimum income threshold for 
eligibility in operation in practice from year to year. In other words, it is 
noticeable that there was no consistent operational definition of 'need': 
the differing heights of the columns in Chart 7-8 show that the average 
income level for entitlement moved around. The scope of the types of 
families who would be eligible under the means test changed. But there 
appears to be no consistency between the benefits in the changes to the 
means test: some tests had their scope raised, and other had theirs 
lowered. Either the understanding of who was in financial need had 
changed, or financial need was not a significant factor in determining 
who would eligible for these benefits. The causes of this changing pattern 
of eligibility are discussed in the following chapter.
Need' for a specific item of consumption was also defined differently by 
different means tested benefits.
In conclusion to this section, the nature of changes to the means test rules 
have been isolated by controlling for changes in the characteristics of the 
population. It is the changes in the means test rules which have been of 
interest in this section. This goes some way to showing the extent to 
which changes over time in the incidence of these means tests were due 
to changes in administrative rules, and how much changes in exogenous 
socio-economic conditions were responsible, an analysis which I develop 
in section 7.3.
It shows that there was no coherent overall direction of policy: some 
means tests became more generous in terms of the average income level
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for eligibility, others became less generous in this respect. There was no 
high point of generosity in the 1970s, an argument I take further in 
section 8.2.6.
The four benefits which I examined demonstrated very different patterns 
of change in entitlement over time. In section 8.1 I consider further the 
change in levels of eligibility over time in my discussion of middle class 
capture.
7.3 W hat drove changes in  num bers of people eligible?
The results in the previous section are only half the story in explaining 
change in numbers eligible -  the impact of changes in the underlying 
population will also be important. Demographic and social characteristics 
have changed significantly since the mid 1960s, and using 
microsimulation allowed me to determine the extent to which changes 
over time in the incidence of these non-income-replacement means tests 
was due to changes in administrative rules, and how much due to 
changes in exogenous socio-economic conditions. In other words, change 
over time in the numbers eligible can be broken down into that 
component accounted for by changes in the means test rules, and that 
component accounted for by changes in the characteristics of the 
population. For example, an increase in the proportion of families eligible 
for free school meals from one decade to the next could either be because 
the means test itself became more favourable, or because there were more 
families on low incomes.
This is an important kind of analysis because the sources of change in 
eligibility have at times been contested and controversial. For example, 
Lord Mackay suggested in a BBC "Panorama7 programme (17 April 1989)
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that any decline in eligibility for civil legal aid might reflect rising living 
standards. The Legal Action Group disputed his assertion as "unlikely7.622
In this section I undertook a "decomposition analysis", which involves 
breaking down the effect of changes in the rules and changes in the 
characteristics of the population using the results from sections 7.1 and 
7.2. For example, comparing actual eligibility in 1975 with the numbers 
which would have been eligible in 1985 if the 1975 means test uprated by 
prices had been in force tells us how many families had their eligibility 
affected purely by changes in incomes and family characteristics. 
Comparing actual eligibility in 1985 with the numbers which would have 
been eligible in 1985 if the 1975 means test uprated by prices tells us how 
many families had their eligibility affected purely by changes in the 
means test conditions.
In what follows I discuss the sources of change in eligibility for each 
means test separately before comparing across benefits. The political 
drivers of change are discussed in the next chapter, chapter 8. In the 
following tables a negative value indicates a reduction in eligibility, a 
positive value an increase in eligibility. The absolute value of both 
sources of change equals 100 per cent.
622 Legal Action Group, A  Strategy for Justice: Publicly funded legal services in the 1990s 
(London: Legal Action Group, 1992) p.24.
Table 7-2 School meals -  Eligibility at BU level (families with school children)
Eligibility based on income or benefit receipt______________________________
Base data 
year
Means test 
rules year
% of BUs 
eligible
Change in 
% of BUs 
eligible
Change in  
eligibility 
accounted 
for (%)
1975 1975 16.8%
8.4% 54.8
Change accounted 
for by socio­
economic changes 
only
1985 1975 25.2%
-7.0% -45.2
Change accounted 
for by means test 
rules only
1985 1985 18.2%
1.5% 100 Overall change 1975-1985
1985 1985 18.2%
-2.1% 19.9
Change accounted 
for by means test 
rules only
1985 1995 16.1%
8.6% 80.1
Change accounted 
for by socio­
economic changes 
only
1995 1995 24.7%
6.5% 100 Overall change
This decomposition analysis of free school meals shows eligibility 
increased from 1975 to 1995 because although rules tightened, there were 
more people on low incomes. The change in the rules between 1985 and 
1995 which restricted free school meals to children in families on income 
support would have removed about 2 per cent of benefit units from 
eligibility. However, in actual fact, despite tightening the rules, more 
families were eligible for free school meals by 1995, because there were 
more families in receipt of Income Support than there had been in 1985.
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Table 7-3 Free prescriptions -  Eligibility at BU level Eligibility based on income or
benefit receip_________ ___________ ___________ _____________ ________________
Base data 
year
Means test 
rules year
% of BUs 
eligible
Change in 
% of BUs 
eligible
Change in 
eligibility 
accounted 
for (%)
1975 1975 17.7%
3.0% 97
Change accounted 
for by socio­
economic changes 
only
1985 1975 20.7%
-0.1% -3.0
Change accounted 
for by means test 
rules only
1985 1985 20.6%
2.9% 100 Overall change 1975-1985
1985 1985 20.6%
2.6% 20.5
Change accounted 
for by means test 
rules only
1985 1995 23.2%
10.1% 79.5
Change accounted 
for by socio­
economic changes 
only
1995 1995 33.3%
12.7% 100 Overall change
In the case of free prescriptions, the changes in the means test rules 
between 1975 and 1995 accounted for some of the increase in the 
proportion of families eligible. However, the changes in the income and 
other characteristics of the population were more significant in increasing 
eligibility levels.
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Table 7-4 Student grant -  Eligibility at BU level (families w ith  a 17-24 year old in  
parents home/student outside home)___________________________ _______________
Base data 
year
Means test 
rules year
% of BUs 
eligible in 
total (full 
or part 
grant)
Change in 
% of BUs 
eligible
Change in 
eligibility 
accounted 
for (%)
1975 1975 100.0%
-1.8% -13.4
Change accounted 
for by socio­
economic changes 
only
1985 1975 98.2%
-11.7% -86.7
Change accounted 
for by means test 
rules only
1985 1985 86.5%
-13.5% 100 Overall change 1975-1985
1985 1985 86.5%
2.8% 27.2
Change accounted 
for by means test 
rules only
1985 1995 89.3%
-7.6% -72.8
Change accounted 
for by socio­
economic changes 
only
1995 1995 81.7%
-4.8% 100 Overall change 1985-1995
For the student grant, the changes in the means test rules between 1975 
and 1985 accounted for most of the decrease in eligibility. However, 
between 1985 and 1995, the means test got slightly more generous, yet 
eligibility decreased still further as a result of changes in the income and 
other characteristics of the population. In particular, during the 1980s 
there was widening income inequality, which led to relatively more 
families on high incomes, high enough to push them outside the remit of 
student grants.
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Table 7-5 Civil legal aid -  Eligibility at BU level Eligibility based on income or
benefit receipt__________________________________________________________
Base data 
year
Means test 
rules year
% of BUs 
eligible in 
total (full 
or part 
legal aid)
Change in 
% of BUs 
eligible
Change in 
eligibility 
accounted 
for (%)
1975 1975 56.4%
1.3% 14.5
Change accounted 
for by socio­
economic changes 
only
1985 1975 57.7%
7.4% 85.5
Change accounted 
for by means test 
rules only
1985 1985 65.1%
8.7% 100 Overall change 1975-1985
1985 1985 65.10%
-12.1% -89.5
Change accounted 
for by means test 
rules only
1985 1995 53.00%
1.4% 10.5
Change accounted 
for by socio­
economic changes 
only
1995 1995 54.4%
-11.34% 100 Overall change 1985-1995
Between 1975 and 1985 the rules becoming more generous accounted for 
most of the increase in eligibility for civil legal aid. Between 1985 and 
1995 the rules were tightened, although some of that effect was counter­
balanced by socio-economic changes which brought more families within 
the scope of legal aid. Table 7-6 shows this effect even more dramatically 
for full legal aid. Changes in the rules between 1985 and 1995 would have 
removed 12.8 per cent of families from eligibility. But, in fact only 2.6 per 
cent were removed from eligibility because the numbers of families on a 
very low income increased in this period.
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Table 7-6 Civil legal aid -  Eligibility at BU level for fu ll legal aid Eligibility based on 
incom e or benefit receipt____________ _____________________________________________
Base data 
year
Means test 
rules year
% of BUs 
eligible for 
full legal 
aid
Change in 
% of BUs 
eligible
Change in 
eligibility 
accounted 
for (%)
1985 1985 30.1%
-12.8% -55.8
Change accounted 
for by means test 
rules only
1985 1995 18.2%
10.1% 44.2
Change accounted 
for by socio­
economic changes 
only
1995 1995 28.3%
-2.6% 100 Overall change
Was Lord Mackay right that any decline in eligibility for civil legal aid 
during the 1980s might reflect rising living standards? Far from it! In 
respect of full legal aid, the stringent cuts made to the financial conditions 
after 1985 would have removed 12.8 per cent of families from eligibility. 
But because the number of people on low incomes increased, hardly any 
decrease in eligibility was in fact achieved. So, the Legal Action Group 
were correct that the financial conditions had got harsher, but ironically, 
this hardly affected numbers eligible because of other changes in the 
economy which had taken place.
Reading across the rows of Table 7-7 highlights how the amount of 
change attributable to changes in the means test and changes in the 
income and other characteristics of the population varied from means test 
to means test. Firstly, this is because the extent of change in the rules of 
each means test varied. Secondly, widening income inequality between 
1975 and 1995 had the effect that the numbers eligible for benefits 
targeted at the lower end of the income scale increased. So, efforts to cut 
eligibility for free school meals or full legal aid were frustrated. On the 
other hand the numbers eligible for student grants actually decreased as a 
result of widening income inequality.
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Table 1-7 Summary of decomposition analysis
School meals Prescriptions Student grant
(total
eligibility)
Civil legal aid
(total
eligibility)
1975-
1985
1985-
1995
1975-
1985
1985-
1995
1975-
1985
1985-
1995
1975-
1985
1985-
1995
% of change 
accounted for by 
rules
-45.2 -19.9 -3.0 20.5 -86.6 27.2 14.5 -89.5
% of change 
accounted for by 
socio-economic 
conditions
54.8 80.1 97.0 79.5 -13.4 -72.8 85.5 10.5
Net change in % of 
BUs eligible 1.5 6.5 2.9 12.7 -13.5 -4.8 8.7 -10.6
7.4 W hat was the nature of interaction among means tested benefits?
I looked at the extent of overlap in eligibility between different benefits. 
This shows how many people were potentially touched by means tests 
under the welfare state. Putting eligibility for all benefits together in 1985, 
it was a relatively small percentage of benefit units -  about 5 per cent, 
which were eligible to receive no means tested benefits. This 
demonstrates that the scope of means testing under the welfare state was 
extremely wide.
Analysing the interaction of eligibility also shows whether there was any 
clear hierarchy in the income levels for eligibility. The number of columns 
in Chart 7-14 suggests a somewhat chaotic system of means testing. It 
does not seem to make sense that a family should be eligible for student 
grant and legal aid, but not free school meals! The 4.6 per cent eligible for 
student grant, legal aid and prescriptions are not eligible for school meals 
because they do not get SB/IS. It is also counter-intuitive that any family 
should get free school meals and prescriptions, yet not get legal aid, not 
even part legal aid. The 0.7 per cent do not get legal aid because of the 
low allowance for savings in the legal aid means test. This analyses 
suggests that there were some anomalies in the means testing system in
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1985, which arose because of compartmentalised decision-making, such 
that the designers of the legal aid means test did not bother to co-ordinate 
their policy with other means tests.
Chart 7-14 Breakdown of BUs eligible for a combination of benefits in 1985 (BUs with 
school children only)
45% 41.5%
40% -
35% -
30% - 26.8%
25% -
17.6%20%  -
15%
.6 %
10%  -
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5% -
0.7% 0 .2 %
o%
'Student grant'Student grant 'All benefits' 'No benefits' 'Student grant 'Student grant 'Legal aid 
& Legal aid' only' & Legal aid & & only'
Prescriptions' Prescriptions 
& School 
meals'
Chart 7-15 Breakdown of BUs eligible for a combination of benefits in 1995 (BUs with 
school children only)
50%
42.4%
40%
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10%  -
0 %
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The reduced number of columns in Chart 7-15 compared with Chart 7-14 
demonstrates the rationalisation brought about by passporting. In 1995 
there was a clear hierarchy in the income limits between these means 
tests; student grants having the highest limits, followed by civil legal aid, 
then the means test for free prescriptions, with free school meals having 
the lowest income limits. Thus, someone receiving free prescriptions 
would be safe to assume that they could also get legal aid. One potential 
problem with the extension of passporting arrangements is that it can 
increase the problem of the 'poverty trap', which in the extreme might 
mean that a family was eligible for either all benefits or no benefits. The 
sudden loss of entitlement to all benefits might be a disincentive to leave 
the passporting benefit. However, the chart shows that there were up to 
9.4% of families in each column. This means that there were fairly wide 
bands of eligibility for each combination of benefit, which can be 
favourably compared with a scenario in which the 'all benefits' and 'no 
benefits' columns had contained the greatest number of people.
7.5 Conclusion
This chapter has looked at how the means test worked in practice. The 
rise and fall in actual numbers eligible for these benefits followed 
different patterns over time for each benefit. There were substantial 
differences in the means tests used in each year, and there was no 
coherent overall direction of means test policy. The results reveal that 
there was no consistent operational definition of 'need': the income 
threshold of the means tests moved around over time. 'N eed' for a 
specific item of consumption was also defined differently in the context 
of different means tested benefits.
Cuts to the income threshold did not always feed through into cuts in 
actual eligibility because there were more people on low incomes. In 
particular, there were more people on Income Support and it would have
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been virtually impossible for a government to justify removing 
entitlement to this non-income maintenance benefits from those people.
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8 The outcome of means-tested benefits II
The previous chapter focused on how changes in the means test and 
socio-economic variables affected the overall proportion of people 
entitled to means tested benefits. In this chapter the emphasis is on the 
detail of the kinds of people eligible. As with the previous chapter, I used 
the technique of microsimulation modelling, which allowed me to 
examine at the micro-level the outcomes
8.1 W hat was the distribution of eligibility by income?
I analysed entitlement by family income, paying particular attention to 
whether the benefits reached the poorest income groups. This helps to 
answer the wider question: 'who benefited from the welfare state?' One 
of the objectives of these non-income maintenance benefits was to ensure 
access to services by the poor. However the definition of 'poor' was 
seldom made explicit, and has to be discovered by the way the benefit 
operated in practice. The change in the incomes of entitled families 
indicates who was considered to be in need at different times and in the 
context of different benefits.
The income level at which the cut-off for eligibility comes into effect 
reveals something about the implicit objectives of the means test. For 
example, if the cut-off is at the point where income reaches subsistence 
benefit level, this suggests it is an assistance measure623, designed to help 
those in poverty. On the other hand, if the cut-off is above subsistence 
benefit level, this suggests that the benefit also aims to be an anti-poverty 
measure, or to help with large and irregular expense. For example, legal 
costs are potentially large, but also a very irregular occurrence and the 
cut-off is correspondingly high.
623 See Chapter 6, section 6.1.5
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I broke down the results by income, to see how well targeted the means 
tests were. The results are shown based on income after housing costs 
(AHC).624 1 equivalised income using the McClements scale.625 In 
particular, I was interested in what proportion of families in the bottom 
two income deciles were eligible.626 The charts show eligibility to be 
spread across more than one decile, as if there is an eligibility band, 
rather than a 'cut-off line'. These results also show that benefits were not 
very well targeted at people with a low income.
The question of how effective means tested non income replacement 
benefits were at maintaining consumption of specific items of 
expenditure has several aspects to it. It depends on the level of take-up of 
the means tested benefit, and on any other obstacles to people taking 
advantage of the benefit. But the aspect most relevant to this research is 
whether the benefit covered all of those people who could not otherwise 
that item of consumption, or would feel that they could not afford it. The 
tricky part is identifying who could not afford the item, since different 
families have different spending priorities. One way round this is to use a 
sample family budget to determine reasonable outgoings, although the 
issue then becomes one of how the 'sample budget' is constructed. Not 
having done this, I cannot determine in this research at what point on the 
income distribution someone 'cannot afford' NHS prescriptions, civil 
legal aid, and so on, and compare that with distributional eligibility. 
Nevertheless, the government's measure of poverty as published in 
Households Below Average Income is households with income below 60 per 
cent of median income. By this measure in 1995/96 the bottom 18 per
624 See Chapter 1 for further details of the method used.
625 See Chapter 1 for further details of the method used.
626 The bottom two income deciles (AHC) roughly corresponds to the group with 
incomes below 50% of the median, which is the poverty measure used in the 
government's Households Below Average Income series.
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cent of individuals were in poverty. This roughly corresponds to all of the 
benefit units in decile 1 on my charts and most of them in decile 2: they 
were benefit units in poverty on the government's own criteria. It is, 
therefore, potentially a cause for concern that a significant proportion of 
people in the bottom two deciles were ineligible.
8.1.1 School meals
Chart 8-1 Free school meals - % of BUs eligible (with school age children) in 1975, by 
income decile (AHC, McClements scale)
□  Eligible - passported □  Eligible - means tested □  N ot eligible
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0 %
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
Income decile
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Chart 8-2 Free school meals - % of BUs eligible (with school age children) in 1985, by
income decile (AHC, McClements scale)
£3 Eligible - passported □ Not eligible
100%
80%
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
Income decile
Chart 8-1 to Chart 8-3 show that eligibility for free school meals was 
concentrated on the lower end of the income distribution, but that there 
were also significant numbers of families on low income that were 
ineligible in the mid-1980s and mid-1990s. The increase in the numbers in 
the bottom deciles not entitled shows that only some on low income were 
considered deserving by the means test, in a change from 1975. The 
numbers in the bottom two deciles ineligible, combined with those in the
receiving SB/IS, but in error.627 There are also self-employed people in 
this group, who are recorded as receiving Income Support, but who seem 
to have rather high earnings. This could be because the question asked in 
the FES does not accurately obtain information about the current income 
of the self-employed.
Chart 8-3 Free school meals - % of BUs eligible (with school age children) in 1995, by 
income decile (AHC, McClements scale)
□  Eligible - passported □  N ot eligible
100% - 
80% - 
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0% -I _ _ _ 1 1 I 1 » i 1 i r
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
Income decile
627 The results of the government's own research on so-called non-entitled recipients can 
be found in DSS Analytical Services Division, Incom e R ela ted  B enefit E stim a te s o f  T ake-U p  
in 1 9 9 5 /9 6  (GSS, 1997) pp.37-46, 62.
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8.1.2 Prescriptions
Chart 8-4 Free prescriptions - % of adults eligible in 1985, by income decile (AHC, 
McClements scale)
□ Eligible on status children □ Eligible on status pensioners □ Eligible - passported
□ Eligible - means tested □ Not eligible
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
C hart 8-4 show s th a t eligibility for free p rescrip tions on  the  basis of 
incom e w as  concen tra ted  on the  low er end  of the incom e d istribu tion , b u t 
tha t aga in  there  w ere significant nu m b ers  of fam ilies on  low  incom e, 
defined  as the  bo ttom  tw o  deciles, th a t w ere  n o t en titled . The chart also
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ta rge ting  to  those on a low  incom e, desp ite  the  concen tra tion  of 
pensioners in  the  second and  th ird  incom e deciles.
8.1.3 Student grant
Chart 8-5 Student grant - % of BUs eligible (with a 17-24 yr old in parental home or a 
student away from home) in 1985, by income decile (AHC, McClements scale)
□ Eligible for full student grant - means tested □ Eligible for partial student grant □ Not eligible 
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D istribu tional resu lts  for s tu d e n t g ran ts  (C hart 8-5 an d  C h art 8-6) show  
th a t th a t those in  the  bo ttom  tw o deciles w ere  fu lly  eligible. But w h eth er 
the v a lu e  of the  benefit w as sufficient en ough  to really  offer access to 
h ig h e r ed u ca tio n  to people on  th a t low  level of incom e w o u ld  be ano ther 
question . C h a rt 8-5 show s th a t in  1985, alm ost all fam ilies in the  bo ttom  
40 p er cen t of the  incom e d istribu tion  w ere  eligible for the  full g ran t, 
w h ils t som e fam ilies in  the top  10 per cent w ere  able to get a p a r t grant.
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Chart 8-6 Student grant - % of BUs eligible (with a 17-24 yr old in parental home or a 
student away from home) in 1995, by income decile (AHC, McClements scale)
□ Eligible for full student grant - means tested □ Eligible for partial student grant □ Not eligible
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8.1.4 Civil legal aid
Chart 8-7 Civil legal aid - % of BUs eligible in 1975, by income decile (AHC,
McClements scale)
□ Eligible for full legal aid - means tested □ Eligible for partial legal aid □ Not eligible
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Chart 8-8 Civil legal aid - % of BUs eligible in 1985, by income decile (AHC, 
McClements scale)
□ Eligible for full legal aid - means tested □ Eligible for partial legal aid □ Not eligible
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60% - 
40% - 
20%  - 
0% -
Chart 8-7 to Chart 8-9 show that the means test for civil legal aid as it 
operated in 1975 and 1985 excluded some families from the bottom two 
income deciles, suggesting that it did not help all those on low incomes.
This is particularly strange considering how far up the income 
distribution eligibility spread. The reason could be that the capital limits 
for most applicants for legal aid were significantly lower than those for 
Income Support (whose recipients were automatically eligible for free 
legal aid). Those not on Income Support face more stringent capital limits 
for legal aid. The Legal Action Group justifiably felt that the result of this 
was 'a  completely illogical system /628 The charts also show that civil legal 
aid encompassed 'm iddle incomes'.
628 Legal Action Group, A  S tra te g y  f o r  Justice: P u b lic ly  fu n d e d  legal serv ices in the 1 9 90s  
(London: Legal Action Group, 1992) p.24.
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Chart 8-9 Civil legal aid - % of BUs eligible in 1995, by income decile (AHC, 
McClements scale)
□ Eligible for full legal aid - passported □ Eligible for full legal aid - means tested
□ Eligible for partial legal aid □ Not eligible
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Chart 8-10 BUs with school age children eligible for a combination of benefits in 
1985, by income decile (AHC, McClements scale)
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Chart 8-10 shows what combinations of benefits families were eligible for 
by income decile. It shows clearly bands of eligibility crossing several 
income deciles. For example, in the fourth deciles there are some benefit
4 5 6 7
Income decile
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units eligible for all four benefits, and others eligible for the student grant 
only, when according to the McClements scale, and after housing costs, 
they have roughly comparable standards of living.
In chapter 6 1 identified the judgements implicit in the deductions and 
allowances made in the design of the means test. Working with the 
micro-data served to further highlight some of the anomalies these 
allowances and disregards produced in practice. For example, the people 
in the upper deciles who are eligible are those with large outgoings on 
allowable expenses. Expense disregards act to reward certain types of 
behaviour or to reflect unavoidable expenditure. The items which are 
disregarded can tell us what the means test designer regarded as essential 
normal expenditure. Work related expenses such as travel to and from 
work and trade union subscriptions aimed to preserve the incentive to 
stay in work, rather than have complete benefit dependency. An 
allowance for payments into an occupational or personal pension 
encouraged people to make that provision.
The families in the bottom deciles who are not eligible have a low income, 
but modest savings. The automatic cut-off adversely affects retired 
people who live off their income from capital because a relatively large 
amount of capital produces a quite small income. Further, some of the 
means tests assume an unrealistically high rate of income from savings. 
This adversely affects people who have savings.
The practice of 'passporting' resulted in anomalies. This is evidenced in 
my data. For example, families who appeared to have incomes below 
social assistance level and were not eligible and people on social 
assistance, who would not be eligible if they did not receive social 
assistance as a component of their income. Another explanation for 
families in the bottom deciles who are not eligible is large families: family 
composition might be treated differently in the means test to in the 
equivalence scale. The means test has an implicit equivalence scale.
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The distributional results by income show that benefits were not very 
well targeted at people with a low income. The definition of a low income 
in practice differed from the definition of income used to construct these 
charts. The means test often veered towards restricting eligibility, rather 
than ensuring all on low incomes were protected.
W hat does the change in the incomes of entitled families tell us about 
who was considered to be in need at different times and in the context of 
different benefits? 'Need' according to income was defined differently 
over time. Not only did actual overall numbers eligible change, and the 
rules of the means test change, they impacted across income groups -  
their effect was not limited to the groups at the margin of eligibilty.
'N eed' for a specific item of consumption was also defined differently by 
different means tested benefits.
The distributional outcomes of the means tests suggest that means tests 
should not be seen as a value-neutral way of helping the most deprived -  
the deprived are not always eligible. The mixture of distributional 
outcomes and the overall eligibility patterns also demonstrate that need 
or poverty were defined in effect differently in different decades and for 
different benefits. The reasons for this are discussed in chapter 10.
This helps to answer the wider question: 'w ho benefited from the welfare 
state?' Certainly some middle income families were able to benefit. 
However, the numbers of benefits unit not eligible in the bottom two 
deciles suggest that securing means-tested benefits for all low-income 
people was not achieved. The explanation is that restricting eligibility 
came before protecting the needy. We should be concerned that some 
needy people could not get access to benefits.
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8.2 W hat were the characteristics of people eligible?
This helps to answer the wider question: 'w ho benefited from the welfare 
state?' by looking at entitlement by categories other than income.629 Also, 
what does the change in the types of people eligible tell us about who 
was considered to be in need at different times and in the context of 
different benefits? The overall finding is that it is difficult to conceptualise 
entitlement using easily observable characteristics.
8.2.1 Tenure type
Chart 8-11 to Chart 8-15 show that tenure is not a good indicator of 
eligibility. In no case is there a close relationship between tenure type and 
entitlement to non-income maintenance benefit. Benefit units with a 
mortgage were less likely to be eligible, and people in Local Authority 
accommodation more likely to be eligible, than people in other tenure 
types. However, the relationship was not strong enough to predict 
eligibility. It might be presumed that the decline in Local Authority 
housing made a difference to tenure as a predictor of eligibility, as more 
people on low incomes were accommodated by Housing Associations or 
the private rented sector. However, Chart 8-14 and Chart 8-15 show that 
the proportion of eligible families in non-LQcal Authority rental property 
did not rise, but remained the same between 1985 and 1995, a period of 
'privatisation' of housing for families on low incomes.
629 1 expected that council tax band or rates paid would be a sensitive proxy to eligibility. 
Unfortunately, detailed data on these is not available in the FES data set in order to 
protect the anonymity of survey respondents.
Chart 8-11 Free school meals - % of BUs eligible in 1985, by tenure type
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Chart 8-12 Free prescriptions - % of adults eligible in 1995, by tenure type
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Chart 8-13 Student grant - % of BUs (with a 17-24 year old in parental home or a 
student away from home) eligible in 1985, by tenure type
□ Eligible for full student grant - means tested □ Eligible for partial student grant □ Not eligible
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Chart 8-14 Civil legal aid - % of BUs eligible in 1985, by tenure type
□ Eligible for full legal aid - means tested □ Eligible for partial legal aid □ Not eligible
Chart 8-15 Civil legal aid - % of BUs eligible in 1995, by tenure type
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8.2.2 Employment
These results make clear the link between employment status and 
eligibility for non-income maintenance benefits. The economic status of 
the benefit unit head and the number of earners in the benefit unit are 
strong predictors of eligibility, as one might have expected. However, the 
link is not hard-and-fast enough to serve as proxy for the means test, 
except for the student grant in the mid-1980s. The problem with replacing
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Chart 8-16 Free school meals - % of BUs (with a school child) eligible in 1985, by 
economic position of BU head
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Chart 8-17 Free prescriptions - % of adults eligible in 1985, by economic position of 
BU head
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Chart 8-18 Free prescriptions - % of adults eligible in 1985, by number of workers in 
BU
□ Eligible - pensioners/ war pensioners 01 Eligible - passported
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80% -
60% -
40%
20%  -
0%
0 50% 100%
Number of earners as a proportion of all adults in the BU
Chart 8-19 Student grant - % of BUs (with a 17-24 year old in parental home or a 
student away from home) eligible in 1985, by economic position of BU head
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Chart 8-20 Civil Legal Aid - % of BUs eligible in 1985, by economic position of BU 
head
□ Eligible for full legal aid - means tested □ Eligible for partial legal aid □ Not eligible
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Chart 8-21 Civil legal aid - % of BUs eligible in 1985, by number of workers in BU
□ Eligible for full legal aid - means tested □ Eligible for partial legal aid □ Not eligible
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Comparing Chart 8-18 with Chart 8-21 it can be seen that the num ber of 
earners in the family has a less strong relationship with entitlement to 
civil legal aid than with free prescriptions.
8.2.3 Age of benefit unit head
Eligibility by age of benefit unit head is of interest because it may reveal 
whether these four benefits produced redistribution of resources over an 
individual's own life cycle. The pattern for free prescriptions is an 
exception and civil legal aid are different, but they each show potential
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for some redistribution according to age. Age of benefit unit head was not 
significant for student grants, because people who have a son or daughter 
aged 17-24 are themselves in a limited age group, and student finance is 
no an on-going need over an individuals life. This is unlike medicines, 
where need may be greater w ith increasing age, but people of any age 
might reasonably expect to use prescription medicines occasionally. For 
school meals, a benefit unit head under age 25 was significantly more 
likely to be eligible, but that is because young parents are more likely to 
be on Income Support than other parents. Therefore the pattern of 
eligibleity for free school meals by age of head corresponds what one 
might have expected.
Chart 8-22 Free prescriptions - % of adults eligible in 1985, by age of BU head
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Chart 8-22 shows that pensioners benefit more from free prescriptions 
than other age groups. This is driven by the status exemption for 
pensioners. This result corresponds with the findings by Falkingham and 
Hills of 'a  pronounced age-related pattern' in the benefit people get out of 
the welfare state.630 The pattern for civil legal aid (Chart 8-23) is less 
pronounced, because there is no status exemption for pensioners.
630 Falkingham, Jane and John Hills, "The Effects of theWelfare State over the Life 
Cycle," in Falkingham, Jane and John Hills, eds., The D y n a m ic  o f  W elfare: The W elfare S ta te  
a n d  the Life C ycle  (Prentice H all/H arvester Wheatsheaf, 1995) p.101.
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Nevertheless, redistribution in favour of young adults and retired people 
can be identified on the chart.
Chart 8-23 Civil legal aid - % of BUs eligible in 1985, by age of BU head
□ Eligible for full legal aid - means tested □ Eligible for partial legal aid □ Not eligible
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Chart 8-24 Civil legal aid - % of BUs eligible in 1985, by no. of pensioners in BU
□ Eligible for full legal aid - means tested □ Eligible for partial legal aid □ Not eligible
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Despite the undoubted relationship between age and entitlement, the 
presence of pensioners in the family was not a good predictor of 
entitlement. Just one instance of this effect, for civil legal aid, is presented 
in Chart 8-24 above. Pensioners in the family had a very direct 
relationship to entitlement for free prescriptions because of the status 
exemption for pensioners. No meaningful pattern existed in relation to 
free school meals and student grants because few pensioners have 
children of the relevant ages.
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8.2.4 Number of children
Families w ith four or more children were significantly more likely to be 
eligible than other kinds of families. Civil legal aid is a typical example of 
this effect. However, there were some families with four plus child that 
were ineligible, which limits the usefulness of this relationship as a 
predictor of entitlement.
Chart 8-25 Civil legal aid - % of BUs eligible in 1985, by number of children
□ Eligible for full legal aid - means tested □ Eligible for partial legal aid □ Not eligible
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8.2.5 Family type
In the analysis by family type, it is little surprise that adults in a family 
headed by a pensioner are nearly all eligible for free prescriptions, given 
the status exemption. However, Chart 8-26 below shows that female lone 
parents were far more likely to be eligible than other family types. The 
same effect was noticeable with civil legal aid (Chart 8-27). Single females 
under 20 were relatively unlikely to receive a passport benefit for 
prescriptions, but were most likely to be eligible on the grounds of 
income. A similar, but less pronounced effect can be observed for single 
males under 30. The other types of families likely to be eligible by 
passport were single men aged 55 to 64 and couples w ith three or more 
children. Couples with up to two children were least likely to be eligible.
This suggests that, although there is a noticeable eligibility pattern by age
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of head (see section 0 above) there is no evident redistribution from 
families w ithout children to families with children.
Chart 8-26 Free prescriptions - % of adults eligible in 1995, by family type
□  Eligible - pensioners/ war pensioners 0  Eligible - passported
□  Eligible - means tested □  Not eligible
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Key to Chart 8-26
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
1 single, female, 1+ child 10 m arried/cohabiting one child
2 single, female, aged less than 20, no 
children 11 married/cohabiting 2 children
3 single, male, aged 55 to 64, no children 12 married/cohabiting, no children
4 single, male, 1+ child 13 married/cohabiting, head retired, aged 
less than 75
5 single, male, aged less than 30, no children 14
married/cohabiting, head retired, aged 
75 or more
6 married/cohabiting 3+ children 15 single, male retired
7 single, male, aged 30 to 54, no 
children 16 single, female retired aged less than 75
8 single, female, aged 20 to 39, no 
children 17 single, female retired aged 75 or more
9 single, female, aged 40 to 59, no 
children
313
Chart 8-27 Civil Legal Aid - % of BUs eligible in 1995, by family type
□  Eligible for full legal aid - means tested □  Partially eligible □  Not eligible
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1 single, female, 1+ child 10
single, female retired aged less than 
75
2 single, female, aged less than 20, no children 11
single, female, aged 40 to 59, no 
children
3 single, male, 1+ child 12 m arried/cohabiting one child
4 single, male, aged 55 to 64, no children 13 m arried/cohabiting 2 children
5 single, male, aged less than 30, no children 14 single, male retired
6 married/cohabiting 3+ children 15 married/cohabiting, aged 75 or more
7 single, female retired aged 75 or more 16 married/cohabiting, no children
8 single, male, aged 30 to 54, no children 17 married/cohabiting, aged less than 
75
9 single, female, aged 20 to 39, no children
The pattern of eligibility by family type for full civil legal aid (Chart 8-27 
above) was very similar to that for free prescriptions. However, when 
considering full and partial legal aid together, retired people were those 
most likely to eligible for some form of civil legal aid.
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
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8.2.6 Benefit receipt
I analysed the receipts of civil legal aid and free prescriptions according 
to receipt of passport benefits. I was interested in how many of those 
eligible had been passported by receipt of subsistence benefits.
Table 8-1 shows which benefits had a passporting facility.
Table 8-1 'Passport' exemptions for means tested benefits, 1965-1995
School meals Prescription medicines Student
grants
Civil legal aid
1965 ?631 N /A . None. None.
1975 Children of 
families on SB632 
and FIS.633
SB and FIS recipients 
and their dependants.
None. None.
1985 Children of 
families on SB634 
and FIS.635
SB and FIS recipients 
and their dependants.
None. None.
1995 Children of 
families on IS636
IS, FC and DWA 
recipients and their 
dependants
None. IS, FC and DWA 
recipients and their. 
dependants
With regard to the civil legal aid scheme in 1995, Table 8-2 shows that 
benefit receipt was not a good proxy for eligibility. Another way of 
putting this is that the means test for civil legal aid was rather more 
generous than that for Income Support and Family Credit. Some 9.5 per
6311 was not able to obtain this information.
632 Supplementary Benefit (1966-1988), the main income maintenance benefit. It has been 
replaced by Jobseeker's Allowance and Income Support.
633 Family Income Supplement (1971-1988), an income maintenance benefit for working 
families with children on a low income. It has been replaced by the Working Families' 
Tax Credit.
634 Supplementary Benefit (1966-1988), the main income maintenance benefit. It has been 
replaced by Jobseeker's Allowance and Income Support.
635 Family Income Supplement (1971-1988), an income maintenance benefit for working 
families with children on a low income. It has been replaced by the Working Families' 
Tax Credit.
636 Supplementary Benefit (1966-1988), the main income maintenance benefit. It has been 
replaced by Jobseeker's Allowance and Income Support.
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cent of benefit units were not passported but fully eligible on the means 
test, and a further 26.1 per cent were partially eligible but not passported.
Table 8-2 % of adults eligible for civil legal aid, 1995
BUs eligible on 
income
Table 8-2 also shows that 3.5 per cent of benefit units were able to get full 
legal aid through receipt of a passport benefit, who would not otherwise 
have been eligible at all under the means test. However, more significant 
is the 10.9 per cent of benefit units which were passported from part legal 
aid to full legal aid. Full legal aid is considerably more valuable than part 
legal aid, because the contributions required for part legal aid are fairly 
high.
There are two possible explanations and implications of this:
i) It might suggest that the means test for legal aid was in fact stricter 
than that for Income Support. This might be concerning if it meant 
that people who were on similar levels of income to Income 
Support recipients were not eligible.
ii) Or, it might be these people were receiving Income Support in 
error (or that the FES recorded them as receiving IS in error). In 
this case there are implications for the accuracy of IS 
administration an d /o r data collection by the FES (see section 8.1.1 
above on this point).
In order ascertain which explanation was more plausible, I analysed 
passporting by income decile, and the results of that analysis are 
presented in Chart 8-28. This shows that most of the benefit units in 
receipt of Income Support but who would not have been eligible on the
316
BUs eligible on benefit receipt i.e. 'passported7
Eligible for full 
legal aid Not eligible
Eligible for full 
legal aid
4.4% 9.5%
Eligible for partial 
legal aid
10.9% 26.1%
Not eligible 3.5% 45.6%
means test were in the upper income deciles. This suggests that the 
second reason is more likely.
Chart 8-28 % of BUs which benefited from passporting of civil legal aid, by income 
decile, 1995
□  Total % of BUs fully eligible - m eans-tested or passported
□  % of BUs which go from partial eligibility to full eligibility by passporting
□  % of BUs which go from ineligible to full eligiblility by passporting
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Table 8-3 % of adults eligible for free prescriptions, 1985
Adults eligible on 
'status exemptions' 
or income
Eligible Not eligible
Eligible 4.7% 28.5%
Not eligible 4.0% 62.7%
Similar conclusions arise from an analysis of eligibility for free 
prescriptions; Table 8-3 shawsdJaaU^jaerxertLoLadiills-wera-ahlg-tQ-gel:
>t or the other otherwise have been eligible under the means tei
umber and most of the exemptions. However, this is a relatively small n
me deciles, as with civil people concerned are probably in the upper inco
raction of the total legal aid in 1995. It also shows that only a small f
if  i<QriQir»f TtiQi*£ifr\vQ nonn lp  plicrihlp wprp plicrihlp nn tTip baQiQ nf hpnpl
passporting is demonstrated by the 28.5 per cent of BUs not on a passport 
benefit who were nevertheless eligible.
8.3 In which year was the means test most generous?
It is interesting to know in which year the means tests were most 
generous because writing on the welfare state in general usually suggests 
that 1975 was the high point of generosity, while the 1980s witnessed cut­
backs. One way to examine generosity is to look at the value of the benefit. 
Those results are discussed in greater detail in chapter 1. Another way to 
study the generosity of these benefits is to look at total government 
expenditure on them (see chapter 4). However, it is the combination of the 
value of the benefit to the recipient, the income level for eligibility, and 
the actual numbers eligible which gives a means tested benefit its 
distinctive character of giving "much to the few' or Tittle to the many'.
I therefore constructed a 'generosity index' based on the multiple of the 
value of the benefit637 and the results on relative coverage of the benefits 
from section 7.2.638 I used 1975 as the base year for the index because that 
was the only year for which I had sufficient data for all the benefits. There 
is an index of zero for free prescriptions in 1965 because everyone was 
entitled to free prescriptions, and there was no means tested benefit.
637 'Value' here refers to the cost of the item had the beneficiary had to pay for it. See 
Chapter 1 for a fuller definition of 'value' in this context.
638 I.e. it is based on numbers eligible at given income levels, rather than actual numbers 
eligible in each year.
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Chart 8-29 'Generosity Index' version 1 (1975=100)
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Chart 8-29 does not suggest any particular year as being a height of 
generosity. However, it shows the worth of looking at the value of the 
benefit and the income threshold for eligibility in combination. For 
example, Chart 8-29highlights that for student grants, although the 
numbers eligible changed little over time once the decrease in the 
monetary value of the grant is taken into account, 1975 was indeed the 
peak of generosity for the maximum grant. Chart 8-29 shows the overall 
effect over time of decreasing the value of the grant received by those 
eligible, yet cutting numbers eligible, a different perspective from that 
offered by looking at actual numbers eligible or income threshold for 
eligibility.
However, it might be argued that the generosity of free school meals and 
free prescriptions was driven mainly by an increase in the charge for the 
service to those people who had to pay, a charge which was not directly 
related to the value of the service and therefore says nothing about the 
quality of the goods provided through the means tested benefit.
319
O
Free School 
Meals
Free NFIS Student grant Student grant Civil Legal Aid 
Prescription (min) (max)
medicines
Similarly, with civil legal aid, some of the apparent increase in generosity 
is dow n to the increase in solicitor's fees per case, but the service to legal 
aid recipients remained essentially the same.
I therefore tried a different version of the generosity index. In this 
instance, the method for calculating the index was slightly different for 
different types of benefit. For free school meals, free prescriptions and 
civil legal aid, the index was based solely on the proportion of people 
eligible. For the maximum student grant, I derived the index using a 
combination of the value of the benefit and the proportion of people 
eligible for the full grant. For the minimum student grant the index is 
based only on the value of the grant, as students did not have to undergo 
a means test to receive it
Chart 8-30 'Generosity Index' version 2 (1975=100)
□ Mid-1960s ■ 1975 D1985 til 1995
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medicines
The combination of value of benefit and income level for eligibility leads 
to the conclusion that there was no obvious peak of generosity in 1975, as
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can be seen in Chart 8-30. The peaks of generosity for civil legal aid were 
1965 and 1985, not 1975.
Does the generosity index say anything about whether middle class 
benefits were cut? The generosity of student grants was cut, so there is no 
evidence of middle class capture there. Legal aid was only cut back after 
a previous large increase in generosity. Prescriptions, a Tow income' 
benefit was an instance where there was not some form of significant cut, 
at least not after the mid-1960s. This confirms the earlier result that 
eligibility for benefits cannot be generalised as either middle class capture 
or restriction to those on the lowest income.
This analysis also shows that there was no coherent overall direction of 
policy, except that 'generosity' was cut for all benefits between 1985 and 
1995. There was no high point of generosity in the 1970s.
8.3.1 Were means tested benefits subject to m iddle class capture?
It has been established repeatedly that the middle class derived benefit 
from the welfare state, and in some areas, such as education, they 
received disproportionate benefit.639 The middle class capture theory 
suggests that services for which the middle class are users and providers 
are less likely to be subject to cuts than benefits used by lower income 
groups.640 Based on public choice theory, the hypothesis is that politicians 
under pressure to make cuts will seek to minimise vote loss, by 
modifying expenditure patterns so as to minimise the dissatisfaction of 
potential users, by cutting services with the lowest demand or needed by
639 Le Grand is associated with this view. See Le Grand, The strategy of equality: 
redistribution and the social services (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1982) and Le Grand, 
Julian and D. Winter, "The Middle Classes and the Welfare State under Conservative 
and Labour Governments," Journal of Public Policy 6 (1987): 399-430.
640 Goodin, Robert E. and Julian Le Grand, eds., Not Only the Poor: The Middle Classes and 
the Welfare State (London: Allen & Unwin, 1987) However, not all evidence supports this 
view. See Glennerster, Howard and William Low, "Education and the Welfare State: 
Does it Add Up?," in Hills, John, ed., The State of Welfare: The Welfare State in Britain since 
1974 (Oxford: OUP, 1990) p.43.
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the smallest group. The theory emphasises the importance of the middle 
class as a pressure group affecting welfare expenditures because of their 
political power. As Le Grand put it: "the extent to which the middle 
classes used or were employee by the service in question would be 
crucial in determining its fate7.641 It can be inferred from this theory that 
means-tested benefits which were primarily for the poor were most likely 
to be subject to cuts.
Le Grand and Winter tested this proposition systematically using data on 
changes in public expenditures and needs across a wide variety of 
welfare services to estimates the relationship between them and 
indicators of middle class benefit over the 1974-1979 Labour government 
and the first Thatcher government.642 The results for the Labour period 
were ambiguous. However the results for the Conservative period 
showed that services extensively used by the middle class (although not 
necessarily with a high percentage of middle class employees) faired 
better relative to need than those use primarily by the less well-off. Did 
middle class capture hold true for non-income maintenance benefits? Or, 
on the contrary, did the benefits become ever more concentrated on the 
lower end of the income distribution? Whether benefits became ever 
more concentrated on the bottom end of the income distribution is an 
important issue because it can reveal whether there was an increasing 
social division between recipients and non-recipients. Any increasing 
social division might undermine taxpayer support for the welfare state, 
whereas retention of middle class benefits might enhance taxpayer 
support for state services.
641 le Grand, Julian, "The State of Welfare," in Hills, John, ed., The State of Welfare: The 
Welfare State in Britain since 1974 (Oxford: OUP, 1990) p.345.
642 Le Grand, Julian and D. Winter, "The Middle Classes and the Welfare State under 
Conservative and Labour Governments," Journal of Public Policy 6 (1987): 399-430.
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To address benefits to the middle class, I considered the changes in 
overall actual eligibility over time (from section 7.1), the changes in the 
income threshold for eligibility over time (7.2), the distribution of the 
benefits by income(8.1), and my 'generosity index'(8.3). This was 
different from the original formulation of the theory, which was couched 
in terms of public expenditure. I defined 'm iddle class' as the top 40 per 
cent of the income distribution although, of course, the contested concept 
of class does not relate solely to income.643 This definition encompasses 
the very well off, the top 5 per cent of incomes, as well as the middle, but 
that does not matter for these purposes. Chart 8-5 to Chart 8-9 establish 
that student grants and civil legal aid were middle class benefits. Student 
grants and civil legal aid went quite far up the income distribution, 
reflecting their aims to protect the lifestyle to which the beneficiary was 
accustomed, and promoting individual mobility for the educationally 
elite.
The analysis in previous sections of this chapter on the change over time 
in the numbers of people eligible (section 7.1) and the income thresholds 
for eligibility (section 7.2) show that middle class benefits were not 
protected from cuts, as suggested by the theory. Student grants did not 
suffer much of a cut in numbers eligible, but did experience a distinct cut 
in the value of the benefit. The distributional results show that 
entitlement to legal aid had crept above the poor by 1985, to cover more 
of the middle class. However, by 1995, eligibility of middle income 
groups had been reduced again. This observation seems to dent middle 
class capture theory. The theory suggests that free school meals might be 
vulnerable to cuts, and my results bear this out. However, free
643 There is no consensus definition of 'middle income', so my definition is inevitably 
somewhat arbitrary. However, it corresponds with Will Hutton's idea of a 'thirty, thirty, 
forty society'. He argues that the first 30% are disadvantaged, the second 30% are 
insecure, and the last category is the privileged. Hutton, Will, The State We're In 
(Jonathan Cape, 1995) pp.106-108.
323
prescriptions also had a narrow scope on the poor, yet were not cut back, 
although theory suggests they might be vulnerable to cuts.
The results suggest that eligibility for benefits cannot be generalised as 
either middle class capture. One might ask whether the explanation is 
that middle class benefits simply suffered less cuts than might otherwise 
have been expected, in a 'softer' version of the theory. For example, the 
middle class benefits continued to cater for the non-poor: legal aid was 
only cut back after a large increase in eligibility. Unfortunately, it is very 
difficult to test this version of the theory.
Le Grand himself accepted that the theory does not entirely hold, 
especially in the health service and higher education, although he 
maintained with regard to public spending on welfare, 'both changes in 
needs and middle-class interests were important influences on the overall 
pattern'.644 Nevertheless, in conclusion, middle class capture is not a good 
explanation of who benefited and how that changed over time. 
Prescriptions were the only case where there was not some form of cut 
between 1975 and 1995. This was non-middle class. In other words, 
benefits for poor were not all cut and middle class benefits were not 
protected from cuts.
8.4 Take-up and comparison w ith other eligibility estimates
Although eligibility is of interest in its own right, take-up is also an 
important issue. By 'eligibility' in the discussion so far I have referred to 
theoretical eligibility to receive a benefit. There are many reasons why 
eligible people may not claim their entitlements, the so-called problem of 
'take-up'.645 1 have not carried empirical research into why people do not 
claim, but I compared the published figures on the numbers of people
644 le Grand, Julian, "The State of Welfare," in Hills, John, ed., The State of Welfare: The 
Welfare State in Britain since 1974 (Oxford: OUP, 1990) p.347.
645 See Chapter 3 section 3.3.1
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who did claim (from chapter 4) with my calculations of the numbers 
eligible and estimate the level of take-up achieved. I compared the 
numbers recorded in the FES data as receiving the benefit with my 
calculations of the numbers eligible for the benefits where this was 
possible.
In addition, I compared my eligibility estimates with the other estimates 
of eligibility which are available. However few such estimates of 
eligibility exist; the absence of such estimates is one reason why the 
microsimulation approach used in this dissertation is necessary.
8.4.1. School meals
The data presented thus far do not indicate what proportion of those 
children entitled to free school meals actually ate them. The take-up of 
free school meals has been called into question frequently throughout 
their history. A 1967 Ministry of Social Security report concluded that 
only 60 per cent of children having school meals and entitled to them free 
did receive their meals free of charge.646 A small scale study in 1971 
found that only 68 per cent of households eligible for free school meals 
were receiving them.647
Wilson found that in 1978-9 20 per cent of school children were eligible 
for free school meals.648 This corresponds with my finding for 1975 that
^ M inistry of Social Security, Circumstances of Families (London: HMSO, 1967) p.15. 
Cited in Townsend, Peter, The Scope and Limitation of Means-Tested Social Services in 
Britain (Manchester Statistical Society, 1972).
647 Meacher, Molly, Rate Rebates: A  Study of the Effectiveness of Means Tests (London: Child 
Poverty Action Group, 1972) Cited in Townsend, Peter, Poverty in the United Kingdom: A  
survey of household resources and standards of living (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1979) 
p.861, and Lister, Ruth, Take-up of Means-Tested Benefits (London: CP AG, 1974) p .ll .
648 Wilson, Paul, Free School Meals: a survey carried out on behalf of the Department of 
Education and Science (London: Office of Population Censuses and Surveys, 1981) Cited 
in Deacon, Alan and Jonathan Bradshaw, Reserved For The Poor: The Means Test in British 
Social Policy (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983) p.127, Cooper, Steven, The Education and Training 
Benefits (London: Policy Studies Institute, 1985) p.62, and Bisset, Liz and Jean Coussins,
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20 per cent of school children were eligible. Wilson found that almost half 
of these children (9 per cent of the total) were eligible through receipt of 
'passport' benefits SB and Family Income Supplement. The remainder (11 
per cent of the total) being eligible according to the national low income 
criteria used at that time. However, I found the ratio to be 6.5 per cent 
and 13.5 per cent of children respectively.
Wilson found only 60 per cent of the eligible children did receive the free 
meals. My estimate for 1975 is more like 50 per cent take-up based on 
others' data on receipt.649 Using information on receipt in the FES I also 
estimated take-up to be around 50 per cent. Wilson reported that take-up 
among those eligible by reason of low income was only 36 per cent. I 
found it to be 30 per cent of children in 1975. However, Wilson found that 
take-up was higher (74 per cent) among families automatically eligible 
through receipt of a 'passport' benefit. I too found that for 1975, take-up 
among those passported was higher at 82 per cent. Like Wilson, I found 
that in more than 25 per cent of 'passported' families the parents were 
paying for their children's school dinners.
Although Wilson and others considered take-up to be no higher than 60 
per cent, The Black Report of 1980 stated that the Department of Education 
estimated that 75-80 per cent of children eligible to receive school meals 
free were in fact receiving them.650 An estimate of take-up of free school 
meals in 1983 showed a 70 per cent take-up rate among all those
Badge of Poverty: a new look at the stigma attached to free school meals (London: Child 
Poverty Action Group, 1982) p.12.
649 Figures on actual receipt from Figure 4-8.
650 Black, Sir Douglas et al., The Black Report, 1992 ed. (London: Penguin, 1980)p.l79.
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eligible.651 Similarly, in 1988 and 1997, take-up was estimated to be 80 per 
cent.652
My estimate was 65-70 per cent take-up in 1985, using FES data on 
recorded receipt, and 75 per cent using data on receipt from other 
sources653. Using FES data I found that 3 per cent of eligible children had 
paid for their meals in the previous 7 days. My estimate of take-up is 70 
per cent in 1995654, based on 18.6 per cent of school children receiving free 
meals, out of a total of 26.6 per cent of children eligible.
In summary, the proportion of families entitled, yet choosing to pay 
diminished over time. However, rather than being a positive 
development, this was probably driven by the restriction of the benefit to 
the poorest families.
8.4.1. Prescriptions
How many people took advantage of free prescriptions? In 1963, before 
prescription charges were abolished, 227m prescriptions were dispensed 
in Great Britain. About 32m went to people on National Assistance and 
195m to people not on National Assistance. The charge was reclaimed 
from the NAB in about 1,650,000 cases, which is well under 1 per cent of 
the total number of prescriptions dispensed. A rough estimate published 
in Poverty suggested that the proportion of prescription charges refunded, 
excluding people on National Assistance, should have been about 5 per
651 Bradshaw, Jonathan, "Tried and found wanting: the take-up of means-tested 
benefits," in Ward, Sue, ed., DHSS in Crisis: Social Security - under pressure and under 
review (London: CP AG, 1985) p.107.
652 Department for Education and Employment, Statistics of Education (London: DfEE, 
1997) Cited in McMahon, Will and Tim Marsh, Filling the gap: Free school meals, nutrition 
and poverty (London: Child Poverty Action Group, 1999) p .l; Cole-Hamilton, Issy, Jo 
O'Rourke, and Sue Dibb, School meals (London: Child Poverty Action Group/Food  
Commission, 1991) p.9.
653 See Figure 4-8.
654 See Figure 4-8. For 1995 I could not estimate take-up using recorded receipt from the 
FES because receipt of free school meals was not recorded in the 1995/6 FES.
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cent and possibly higher.655 Put another way, an article in the same 
journal estimated that in the pre-1965 prescription charges scheme, a fifth 
or less of low paid workers and their families, claimed the refunds on the 
grounds of low income to which they were entitled.656
During 1970,15,000 free prescriptions were issued on grounds of low 
income to those receiving neither Supplementary Benefit nor Family 
Income Supplement. In 1971 this figure rose to 69,000 because of an 
advertising campaign, but it fell again to 38,000 in 1972.657 On 19th 
October 1971, 63,000 people held exemption certificates on grounds of 
low income.658
In 1979,18,828 people held exemption certificates entitling them to free 
prescriptions on low income grounds (other than under passport 
arrangements).659 The number of new claims for exemption or for a 
refund of charges on low income grounds dealt with by the SBC local 
offices was 41,932 in 1979.660
However, the record on take-up of means tested pharmaceutical benefits 
was consistently poor. Although figures did not exist for the numbers 
eligible on grounds of low income for free prescriptions, the numbers of 
recipients were estimated to be only a small proportion of those entitled, 
even by the Supplementary Benefits Commission, which was responsible 
for the administration.661 A survey carried out in 1972 looked specifically
655 "Health and Hardship/' Poverty 6 (1968): 11-13 p.13.
656 "Prescription for Ignorance/' Poverty 8 (1968) p .l.
657 Lister, Ruth, Take-up of Means-Tested Benefits (London: CP AG, 1974) p.6.
658 House of Commons Hansard, v. 827,9 December 1971, Written Answers, col. 375-6.
659 Supplementary Benefits Commission, Annual Report of the Supplementary Benefits 
Commission (London: HMSO, 1980) p.154.
660 Supplementary Benefits Commission, Annual Report of the Supplementary Benefits 
Commission (London: HMSO, 1980) p.154.
661 Child Poverty Action Group, An Incomes Policy for Poor Families: A  Memorandum to the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer (London: CP AG, 1973) p.5; Lister, Ruth, Take-up of Means-
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at those who had used or needed prescriptions in the last 12 months. The 
disparity of take-up between different categories of claimants was 
marked. 'Only two out of 54 (3.7 per cent) of those eligible on a direct 
means test had claimed free prescriptions when they had needed them, 
compared to 63 out of 82 (76.8 per cent) of those able to claim on the 
supplementary benefit/Family Income Supplement passport, and 89 out 
of 92 (96.7 per cent) of those claiming on grounds other than low 
incom e/662 Another survey from the early 1970s in Islington found that 
only 16 per cent of those eligible on grounds of low income had claimed 
free prescriptions.663 The Minister of Health himself admitted in 1979 
that, among those qualifying for free prescriptions on the grounds of low 
income, 'only a very small percentage of those eligible claim 
exemption'.664
After the 1970s, I did not have figures for the numbers of people holding 
exemption certificates. However, I compared the number of free 
prescriptions dispensed with the numbers eligible. According to my 
estimate the number of people eligible for free prescriptions on the basis 
of income, benefit receipt or status exemption rose from 22.3m in 1975 to 
29.4m in 1995. This is shown in Chart 7-5 . However, the number of free 
prescriptions dispensed more than doubled from 225m to 500m between 
1975 and 1995.665 However, the more than proportional increase in free
Tested Benefits (London: CP AG, 1974) p.6; Field, Frank, Poverty: The Facts (CPAG, 1975) 
p.41; Supplementary Benefits Commission, Annual Report of the Supplementary Benefits 
Commission (London: HMSO, 1980) p.154; Lister, Ruth, M oving Back to the Means Test 
(London: CPAG, 1980) p.21; Deacon, Alan and Jonathan Bradshaw, Reserved For The 
Poor: The Means Test in British Social Policy (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983) p.94; McGuigan, 
Sean, Compendium of Health Statistics, 10th ed. (London: Office of Health Economics, 
1997) p.55.
662 Lister, Ruth, Take-up of Means-Tested Benefits (London: CPAG, 1974) pp.11-12.
663 Lister, Ruth, Take-up of Means-Tested Benefits (London: CPAG, 1974) p.12.
664 House of Commons Hansard, v. 968,13 June 1979, col 253. Quoted in Lister, Ruth, 
M oving Back to the Means Test (London: CPAG, 1980) p.21.
665 See Chapter 4 section 4.1.1
329
prescriptions dispensed does not prove that take-up increased 
dramatically: it could be that the people with status exemptions were 
receiving more prescriptions medicines per capita. Given that all 
pensioners are exempt from the prescription charge, this explanation is 
exceedingly likely.
I could also compare my eligibility estimates with take-up as recorded in 
the FES data. The limitation of this is that the question in the survey only 
asked about prescriptions received in the previous seven days, and 
relatively few people would have needed medicines in the previous 
seven days. It would have been useful for my purposes to know about 
free and paid-for prescriptions in the previous 6 months. There were 1 
per cent of benefit units recorded as receiving free prescriptions in the 
previous 7 days in 1985, which were not eligible on the 1985 means test or 
the status exemptions I could test for. I have assumed that these 
prescriptions were for contraceptives or certain medical conditions.
8.4.1. Student grants and civil legal aid
These benefits are hard to fit into the usual concepts and measures of 
take-up. It is more tricky to estimate take-up for these benefits because 
people are likely to need legal services infrequently, and there is no data 
on the financial circumstances of people who pay a solicitor privately.
The SBC stated that during the period 1950 to 1974 the percentage of the 
population qualifying for legal aid on financial grounds had fallen from 
80 per cent to 40 per cent.666 However, I estimated eligibility to have been 
56 per cent in 1975.
666 Supplementary Benefits Commission, Annual Report of the Supplementary Benefits 
Commission (London: HMSO, 1980) p.156. The figure of 40% in 1973 is also offered in 
Smith, Roger, Justice: redressing the balance (London: Legal Action Group, 1997) p.17 and 
Gray, Alistair M, "The Reform of Legal Aid," Oxford Review of Economic Policy 10, no. 1 
(1994): 51-67 p.57.
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The same SBC report stated that from April 1979 the substantially higher 
financial limits made legal aid available to over 70 per cent of the 
population.667 In 1986, the then Lord Chancellor, Lord Hailsham, asserted 
that cuts in dependants' allowances since 1979 had been 'practically 
unobservable' and reasserted that around 70 per cent of the population 
met the income criteria for grant of civil legal aid.668 My figure of 65 per 
cent eligibility in 1985 supports that claim and casts doubt on the claim of 
the Legal Action Group in 1992 that eligibility for civil legal aid had 
'fallen substantially from the levels to which it was raised just before the 
Labour government lost office in 1979.'669 LCD produced statistics which 
indicated a fall from 73.9 per cent (1979) to 66.1 per cent (1990) of the 
population eligible.670 The LCD included the effect of changes introduced 
in April 1990 allowing children to apply for legal aid on the basis of their 
own income and capital, not that of their parents, which would boost the 
post-1990 eligibility figures. This is legitimate in relation to personal 
injury cases, but most legally aided cases actually concern adults. 
Following the LCD method and counting all children as eligible after
1990,1 estimated a slight fall from 62 per cent of people eligible in 1985 to 
59 per cent in 1995.
667 Supplementary Benefits Commission, Annual Report o f the Supplementary Benefits 
Commission (London: HMSO, 1980). Another report estimated eligibility in 1979 to be 
over 79%, see Legal Action Group, A Strategy for Justice: Publicly funded legal services in the 
1990s (London: Legal Action Group, 1992) p.8. The figure of 79% in 1979 is also given in 
Smith, Roger, Justice: redressing the balance (London: Legal Action Group, 1997) p.17.
668 House of Lords Hansard, 18 March 1986, col. 921, quoted in Legal Action Group, A  
Strategy for Justice: Publicly funded legal services in the 1990s (London: Legal Action Group, 
1992) p.24.
669 Legal Action Group, A  Strategy for Justice: Publicly funded legal services in the 1990s 
(London: Legal Action Group, 1992) p.24. Another estimate of eligibility from 1979 to 
1989 was made using the FES by Murphy, Michael, An analysis of the differences in 
eligibility for civil legal aid in 1989 (unpublished,) Unfortunately I was unable to obtain a 
copy of the original report to compare with my estimates. However, Murphy assumes 
housing costs of around £70, whereas I have used the actual housing costs of the family, 
as the legal aid means test does, which suggests my figures may be the more accurate.
670 Review of Financial Conditions for Legal Aid, Eligibility for Civil Legal Aid: a 
consultation paper, Lord Chancellor's Department, 1991, p.85
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However, I would concur with the observation that: "Much of the debate 
about levels of eligibility has been conducted with regard to the 
proportion of the population eligible on grounds of income. No overall 
figures for eligibility can be given because the government produces no 
reliable statistics on savings and other matters relevant eligibility under 
the capital criteria/6711 have estimated capital holdings to produce my 
figures, but they remain estimates.
My estimate of 54 per cent eligibility in 1995 is validated by another study 
which stated that 50-60 per cent of population were entitled to legal aid in 
1993.672 My estimate is more optimistic than the one provided by the 
government of 47 per cent of households eligible in 1995 on income 
grounds.673 Some of this discrepancy may be because of the confusion 
between households and the benefit unit actually used in the means test. 
It also unclear whether passported families were included in these 
figures. However, my figures generally support the story that after a rise 
in eligibility in the late 1970s, eligibility was cut from the mid-1980s.674
In the case of student grants, nearly all students who had been accepted 
would have applied for a grant, especially in the period when a 
minimum grant was payable to all students. A more relevant way of 
measuring take-up would be to look at eligible people who decided not 
to do a degree for financial reasons, and figures are not available on this 
group of people.
671 Legal Action Group, A  Strategy for Justice: Publicly funded legal services in the 1990s 
(London: Legal Action Group, 1992) p.24.
672 Cousins, Mel, "Civil legal aid in France, Ireland, the Netherlands and the United 
Kingdom - a comparative study," Civil Justice Quarterly 12 (1993): 154-66 p.159.
673 Hansard, 21 April 1992, Written Answer, col. 590.
674 See, for example, Smith, Roger, Justice: redressing the balance (London: Legal Action 
Group, 1997), Gray, Alistair M, "The Reform of Legal Aid," Oxford Review of Economic 
Policy 10, no. 1 (1994): 51-67.
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8.5 Conclusion
The results presented in this chapter show that the benefits were not 
effectively targeted on people in the bottom two income deciles, 
especially in the mid-1990s. Analysis of the characteristics of entitled and 
non-entitled benefit units showed that there were no observable 
characteristics which provided a close proxy to entitlement and which 
therefore could have been utilised in place of a means test. The results 
reveal change over time in the generosity of the welfare state. However, it 
shows that there was no coherent overall direction of policy: some tests 
become more generous, other less so. There was no high point of 
generosity in the 1970s. The results also suggest that eligibility for 
benefits cannot be generalised as either middle class capture or restriction 
to those on the lowest incomes: the four benefits which I examined 
demonstrated very different patterns of eligibility.
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9 Conclusion
The purpose of this section is twofold; firstly, I provide a summary 
assessment of how effectively means tests achieved their objectives, and 
secondly, to identify the causes of change in the outcomes of the benefits.
I conclude with the lessons analysts of the welfare state and policy 
makers can learn from that experience.
9.1 Objectives and outcomes
How far did the means tests produce outcomes which were in line with 
the objective intended at the outset? Did changes in the government's 
intentions feed through 'on the ground'? Did political intentions make a 
difference to people in practice? In particular, did the means test target 
the desired groups? This important, because real policy - as opposed to 
stated policy - is what is actually implemented, which may differ from 
what was intended, let alone promised. Answering these questions 
involves bringing together the political history of Chapter 4 and 5 and my 
results on the outcomes of means testing from Chapters 7 and 8.
A stated objective to cut actual eligibility was not always successful. In 
particular, the rising number of people on low incomes, especially on 
Income Support, frustrated desired cutbacks to actual proportions eligible 
for free school meals and civil legal aid. It also meant that numbers 
eligible for free school meals increased, although the policy intention was 
expressed in terms of desire to restrict eligibility to those on a low 
income, rather than to restrict overall numbers eligible, and in lowering 
the eligibility threshold, the government was successful. Where there was 
a stated intention to cut the income threshold for eligibility (as opposed 
to actual eligibility) i.e. for school meals and civil legal aid after 1985, this 
was achieved. On the other hand, the fall in eligibility for the student 
grant 1985-1995 occurred because of rising high incomes, rather than
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because of cuts in the test, but still, the intention of reducing eligibility 
was achieved.
There were deliberate attempts to make cuts to overall spending levels on 
all these benefits (except free prescriptions) from the mid-1980s.
However, achievement of actual savings was limited as the cost of 
providing the service increased (legal aid) or there were more people on 
low incomes (meals, prescriptions, legal aid). Only in student grants were 
there dramatic cuts in generosity, and in that case the cut in the real value 
of the grant saved far more than cuts in eligibility. Political pressure to 
reduce expenditure went into decreasing the value of the grant received 
by those eligible, rather than by cutting numbers eligible.
Another way of looking at this could be that the objective could be desire 
for overall budgets in a given area to be stabilised. The best example of 
this is student grants, followed by civil legal aid. The rising number of 
student grants forced cuts in eligibility. The rising cost of cases forced 
lower eligibility for legal aid. This explains why 'need7 thresholds moved 
around, because policy was driven by an overall budget, rather than 
needs. In other words, it is noticeable that there was no consistent 
operational definition of "need7: the average income level for entitlement 
moved around. The scope of the types of families who would be eligible 
under the means test changed. There appears to be no consistency 
between the benefits in the changes to the means test. The mixture of 
distributional outcomes and the overall eligibility patterns demonstrate 
that need or poverty were defined in effect differently in different 
decades and for different benefits. But the underlying factor in change to 
the income threshold was containment of overall budget. In these 
instances, it was overall budgets, rather than issues of principle, which 
drove changes to the means tests7 eligibility thresholds. Instead benefit 
expenditure on non income maintenance benefits was treated as a flexible 
item by the Treasury and the eligibility levels were adjusted to take 
account of the budget available.
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However, the ambition to make cuts in eligibility did in fact filter through, 
to an outcome 'on the ground', whether that was in actual eligibility 
levels, or simply the income threshold for eligibility. Exceptionally, the 
Labour government did announce a large increase in eligibility for civil 
legal aid in 1979, and the achievement of this objective is borne out by the 
data which show an increase in actual eligibility and income levels for 
eligibility over 1975-1985.
Another way of looking at whether the objectives were achieved is how 
well targeted distributionally the outcomes were, given that means tests 
were justified in the basis that they helped those on low incomes. This is 
worth considering because, as A. Corden has said: 'Social security is 
effective only in so far as provision reaches those for whom it is 
designed.'675 Free meals were meant just as a social security measure for 
poor children, not intended for the middle class. The concentration of the 
distributional pattern of eligibility on the bottom two deciles (see 
previous chapter) corresponds with that aim, although results suggest 
that there were also significant numbers of families in the bottom two 
income deciles that were ineligible. As with free school meals, free 
prescriptions were never intended for the middle class from 1968 
onwards. The government stated in 1968 the objective: 'We have 
exempted those most likely to suffer hardship through paying the 
charges'.676 Did the distributional pattern of eligibility correspond with 
the aims? Results show a concentration of eligibility on the bottom two 
deciles which does correspond with that aim. However, on the question 
of whether free prescriptions reached the poor they were intended for, 
the results show that there were families in the bottom two income
675 Corden, Anne, "Claiming entitlements: take-up of benefits," in Ditch, John, ed., 
Introduction to Social Security (Routledge, 1999), 134-155 p.139.
676 Mr Crossman in reply to Mr Dance, House of Commons Hansard v. 722 4 November 
1968, col. 457.
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deciles which slipped through the net. All those people in the bottom two 
deciles were eligible for student grants, although there is a question of 
whether the value of the grant was enough to make time in higher 
education feasible for people on such low incomes. The objective of legal 
aid was supposedly to secure access to legal services, for those who could 
not afford it otherwise, although 'afford' was not defined, except by 
default within the means test. Nevertheless, it is safe to presume that 
those people in the bottom two deciles could not afford legal costs. In 
1975 and 1985 there were people in the bottom 20 per cent of the income 
distribution who were ineligible for legal aid, but that situation had been 
improved by 1995.
The large proportion of people in the bottom two deciles who were 
ineligible for free school meals, free prescriptions and civil legal aid at 
various points in time suggests that the ambition to target the most needy 
was compromised, even though overall eligibility goals were achieved. 
W hat this study has shown is that even if all those eligible had 'taken-up' 
their entitlements, at various points in time there were ineligible families 
in the bottom two deciles. Although intentions behind provisions may be 
straightforward, policies will have unexpected, as well as expected, 
consequences. I have been able to reveal the unexpected. This finding 
concurs with the remark of M. Mullard, that the discrepancy between 'the 
rhetoric of policy statements and the realities of policy outputs' needs to 
be studied.677
There is evidence of intentions behind means tests for non-income 
maintenance benefits. They were not restricted to helping the most 
needy. This could be the reason for ineffective targeting, which I have 
identified. The existence of non-entitled families in the bottom two 
deciles is suggestive of a priority being placed on restricting eligibility
677 Mullard, Maurice, "Review of Robert F. Drake, 'The Principles of Social Policy'," 
Journal of Social Policy 31, no. 3 (2002): 561-562 p.562.
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rather than ensuring that all the needy were protected. The means test 
often veered towards restricting eligibility, rather than ensuring all on 
low incomes were protected. Meeting objectives therefore depends on the 
extent of conflict among the varying high-level objectives. Another reason 
why the objective of helping all the potentially needy might not have 
been met is that government was always unwilling to form any definition 
of The needy7 in the context of need for any particular item of 
consumption. This also perhaps explains why some of the benefits were 
relatively poorly targeted.
9.2 Explaining the outcomes
As the previous section suggested, there were influences on eligibility 
other than the intentions of policy, which sometimes meant that the 
objectives were not met. Where the outcomes did not meet the objectives, 
or changes were not associated with any major policy announcements, 
then additional explanatory factors are needed. Not all change can be 
explained by high-level policy announcements. There were key points in 
the history of student grants, civil legal aid and school meals, but these 
do not explain change at other times. This section explores these other 
influences further. What, then, are the crucial explanatory factors of 
change in non-income maintenance benefits? What was driving change in 
overall numbers eligible, and the kinds of people eligible, and the 
changing definition of "need7? The causes of change in non-income 
maintenance benefits can be split between three broad elements of the 
policy process:
i) A change in high political objectives, either ideological or 
imposed by external spending constraints, such as high-level 
decisions on the direction of means testing policy. This was the 
main focus of section 9.1 above. At times, high level political 
decisions made in other areas may have an unnoticed knock-on
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effect on the non-income maintenance benefits, especially if overall 
budget is constrained.
Yet outcomes cannot always be attributed to political objectives. 
Moreover, if changes in eligibility were not due to change in objectives, 
then the objectives may not have been met. Another two contributors to 
outcomes are:
ii) A change in the income criteria of the means test, which 
is a 'technical factor', or element of the implementation process. 
Policies are not only the product of decisions in the political arena 
but of administrative procedures which are devised to carry them 
out. At a detailed level, this shaping of policy would usually be 
carried out as a bureaucratic process. The 'technical factors' 
therefore relate to lower level decisions about how political 
ambitions were put into practice. Such choices facing 
implementers of policies were discussed in Chapter 6.
iii) Socio-economic factors in which changes to the means 
tests outcomes reflected population ageing, changes in the labour 
market or family patterns, and so on. They might reinforce or 
operate against political ambitions.
These are in no sense mutually exclusive types of explanations. Indeed, in 
most cases, a mixture of these events explains the changing outcome over 
time. For example, with free school meals, the process of restricting 
entitlement was driven by political considerations (i), put in practice by 
altering the income criteria (ii) and hindered by socio-economic factors 
(iii). In the first two explanations, changes in outcomes were the results of 
ideas and interests of actors in the policy-making process. However, 
point (ii) is important because studies of what happens at the boundaries 
of political authority can tell us as much - if not more - about social policy 
as it is enacted than do idealised models of the policy process in which
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the manner of policy implementation is taken for granted. Unfortunately, 
it was not possible in this research to get "inside7 the details of policy 
processes at stage (ii). But whatever the process, I have been able to look 
at whether it did result in desired outcomes, measured as overall cuts in 
income levels or actual eligibility. In the third explanation, it is wider, 
external forces which are work such that political changes might not 
always feed through into change "on the ground" if socio-economic 
circumstances have changed too. Greater poverty might impede the 
government's intention to make cuts, for example. So high-level political 
intentions may be limited in the change they make.
Taking these three types of causes further, I found that a distinction could 
be made between the explanation of falls in eligibility and of rises in 
eligibility. Firstly, cuts. Cuts in actual eligibility levels were associated on 
the whole with major policy announcements, major changes of direction. 
Actual changes in eligibility levels occurred for free school meals 1975- 
1985, student grants over 1975-1985 and 1985-1995, and civil legal aid 
between 1985 and 1995. Student grants 1975-1985 are the mild exception, 
in that there was not a major policy announcement. Also, the fall in 
eligibility 1985-1995 was because of rising high incomes, rather than 
because of cuts in the test. Thus, falls in actual eligibility tend to occur 
because there has been a deliberate attempt to do so. On the other hand, 
as stated above, stated objectives to cut actual eligibility are not always 
successful.
Cuts to the eligibility threshold (as opposed to proportion of benefit units 
eligible) occurred for school meals in 1975-1995, student grants in 1975- 
1985, civil legal aid in 1965-1975 and 1985-1995. Lowering eligibility 
threshold may not cut the actual numbers eligible, if income inequality 
has increased. However, it will mean fewer people are eligible than had 
the status quo been retained.
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The changes in eligibility threshold for school meals were associated with 
a stated intention to reduce eligibility. On the other hand, the lowering of 
eligibility thresholds for student grants was not associated with a major 
policy announcement to cut eligibility. Similarly, the value of the grant 
had been allowed to fall, but this was not a major policy announcement 
either: not until 1990 was the intention to cut back grants made explicit. 
The cut in eligibility threshold for civil legal aid from 1965-1975 was not a 
high-profile policy either. However, the cut in the income level for 
eligibility from the 1980s was intentional. It can be concluded from this 
that it is possible for the government to lower the eligibility threshold, 
w ithout it necessarily being a major policy announcement or provoking a 
public issue in response.
There was no consistent definition of need with in the means tests over 
time. In making the decision to change the eligibility threshold, either the 
understanding of who was in financial need had changed, or financial 
need was not a significant factor in determining who would eligible for 
these benefits. I suggest that need was understood as those people who 
could be helped, subject to an imposed budget constraint. As such, the 
understanding of need was re-moulded by force. There was no issue of 
principle, of analysing whether people had room in their budget to buy 
certain things. Work on this was carried out by independent 
researchers,678 but a principled poverty line was not a concept used in 
designing benefits. The other objective of the means test, of restricting 
eligibility and thereby keeping down cost, was potentially in conflict with 
protecting the poor. And yet cost drove policy because of governments' 
fear that expenditure might balloon out of control. My conclusions are 
consistent with those of Veit-Wilson for the tax system and the main
678 E.g. The Family Budget Unit (FBU), formed in 1985, which produced publications 
such as Bradshaw, Jonathan, ed., Budget Standards for the United Kingdom (Aldershot: 
Avebury, 1993). This kind of research was carried out from the time of Rawntree's first 
study of York (1899).
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social assistance benefits: that principled identification of the needy did 
not play a part policy-making on the eligibility threshold.679
Why was the government wishing to make cuts in non-income 
maintenance benefits? Most of the cuts occurred from the mid-1980s, 
when this policy on non-subsistence benefits formed part of a wider 
policy of reining back the public sector. With regard to non-income 
maintenance benefits, it is debateable whether irresistible economic and 
demographic factors forced cut-backs on the government of the day. 
However, it is not the central aim of this thesis to investigate how those 
political objectives were reached, but to examine their relationship to 
changes in eligibility. There has been much interest recently in the politics 
of retrenchment (as opposed to the reasons for growth of welfare 
states).680 The main explanations of patterns of government expenditure 
in times of perceived stringency are:
i) Resistance to budget cuts due to inertia and bureaucrats 
seeking to minimise the impact of cuts on their own jobs, which 
means that overall welfare spending might be maintained.
ii) That cuts will fall according to need. In this situation 
political and bureaucratic processes operate in the public interest. 
The need to cut spending would break the pattern of incremental 
increases otherwise observed. There would instead be a systematic 
reappraisal of welfare needs, leading to selective treatment of area 
of welfare policy, depending on its pattern of needs. In this
679 Veit-Wilson, John, "The Tax Threshold: Policy, Principles, and Poverty," Twentieth 
Century British History 10, no. 2 (1999): 218-234; Veit-Wilson, John, "How Governments 
Set Benefit Adequacy Standards," Benefits September/October (1998); Veit-Wilson, John, 
"Poverty and the adequacy of social security," in Ditch, John, ed., Introduction to Social 
Security (Routledge, 1999), 78-109.
680 Glennerster, Howard and William Low, "Education and the Welfare State: Does it 
Add Up?," in Hills, John, ed., The State of Welfare: The Welfare State in Britain since 1974 
(Oxford: OUP, 1990) p.36.
342
scenario we might expect changes in spending to reflect changes in 
perceived needs.
iii) Cuts will fall according to voter pressure because 
politicians seek to minimise vote loss by treating less favourably 
the services with lowest demand and according to the political 
power of the groups affected. The theory of "middle class capture' 
is one version of this theory which emphasises the importance of 
the middle class as a pressure group affecting welfare 
expenditures.
iv) Cuts will be across the board, 'decrementalism', which is 
the opposite of 'incrementalism' that explains creeping increases 
in welfare expenditure. On this hypothesis budget shares would 
remain stable and cuts would be across all areas.
In the case of non-income maintenance benefits, the desire for cuts was 
not resisted, at least not successfully. There were cuts relative to if there 
had been no change in the income criteria even if reducing eligibility was 
impeded increasing income inequality. Turning to explanation (ii), if cuts 
fell where 'need' were greatest, one would have expected income 
thresholds for school meals to have greater protection. What can be said 
is that pressure groups, and in particular the middle class voter 
constituency, were ineffective at preventing cuts in eligibility, as was 
found in the discussion of middle class capture in the previous chapter. 
Cuts spread 'across the board', explanation (iv), seems a more satisfactory 
theory.
Increases in eligibility levels, on the other hand, were not always 
associated with major policy announcements. This is because they mainly 
were a by-product of more families being on Income Support and more 
families being on low incomes generally. This observation could support 
the theory of incrementalism/decrementalism. Exceptionally, the Labour 
government did announce a large increase in eligibility for civil legal aid
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in 1979, and this is borne out by the data which show an increase in 
actual eligibility and income levels for eligibility over 1975-1985.
Prescriptions are a special case because of their relative stability in 
entitlement levels over the period 1975-1995. The stability can be 
explained by the fact that eligibility for free prescriptions did not come to 
be a political target. Once introduced, there was little further debate 
about the objectives of means tested low income exemptions. The issue 
was very low-key, with the Department of Health dictating the remit of 
the scheme, and hardly any input from doctors' or patients' groups. This 
could be where the pensioner and children interest groups have a role: to 
remove their status exemptions would have carried a grave political cost. 
Further, there would not have been much savings to be made from 
scrapping the low income exemption because relatively few are eligible 
for it anyway. Those eligible on a means test were a small number 
compared to the passported and exempt cases, which may have made it 
seem hardly worth the effort and bad publicity to make cuts at a time 
when other benefits were vulnerable. The small increase in numbers 
eligible was mainly driven more people being on low incomes.
In trying to explain the distributional outcomes, lack of objectives and 
conflict of objectives are part of the answer. However, bureaucratic 
factors might have a role too. Rules and conventions devised to make a 
large organisation effective can be in conflict with the aim of providing 
the best possible service and support for clients. We might conclude that 
this is what was going on if rules were simple, but excluded some 
apparently needy people. However, rules were fairly complex, and 
reason for exclusion of some people appear to be levels at which capital 
disregard is set, rather than agencies trying to make their own life easier.
9.3 C onclusion and im plications
The purpose of this final section is to review the main conclusions of this 
study, to draw out their implications for welfare state history and theory
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and to assess the means tests in relation to the wider social security 
structure. Only eligibility for free school meals has followed a very direct 
mirroring the pattern of eligibility for subsistence benefits. That was 
because eligibility was restricted after 1980 to recipients of income-related 
benefits. As with income maintenance benefits, although the criteria were 
tightened during the 1980s, the numbers eligible rose. This pattern has 
not been repeated for the other three non-income maintenance benefits, 
except that where there was passporting, the proportion passported 
changed with patterns of social assistance receipt.
From the mid 1980s, all these benefits were vulnerable in the wider 
context of spending restraints. There was no enduring philosophy to any 
of these benefits, as chapter 5 has shown. Rather, they were each 
individually seen as components of an overall welfare system by the 
government, and none except prescriptions could escape that overall 
environment. Recent literature has seen a shift away from "grand 
theories" (pluralism, Marxism) towards theories of governance in 
explaining change in welfare states.681 These offer a more de-centred view 
of the state and analyse the policy process as a complex series of 
interactions. This research confirms the relevance of governance as a 
framework for analysis, because the eventual outcomes of a means 
testing policy depended on how the policy was implemented by officials 
at lower levels of government. Further, the idea of a coherent "welfare 
regime' is undermined by the lack of evidence of any overall policy for 
non-income maintenance benefits, and the role they were to play in 
income maintenance, which is reflected in the uncoordinated way in 
which changes to the means test rules and the patterns of entitlement 
changed over time.
681 Newman, Janet, "Putting the 'Policy1 back into Social Policy," Social Policy & Society 1, 
no. 4 (2002): 347-354 p.347.
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Policy discourse is dominated by the assumption that the policy process 
is rational and linear. The belief that policies are shaped and 
implemented in a systematic way has been a dominant feature of policy 
analysis despite an extensive critique of such assumptions in much of the 
policy literature. Those who view policy as a rational, linear process are 
sometimes called 'top-down' theorists. They tend to focus on explaining 
the factors that get in the way of policy delivering its intended outcomes. 
Yet much policy is accidental, and not based on evidence or clear 
objectives. It just evolves. Analysis of non-income maintenance benefits 
confirms the view that the policy process is not always rational, and does 
not always even have intended objectives. In some cases the objectives 
were exceedingly vague, and there is also evidence of multiple and 
conflicting intentions behind means tests for non-income maintenance 
benefits, which also perhaps explains why some of the benefits were 
targeted in a muddled way.
How were the objectives of these benefits connected with the general 
objectives of the British welfare state? The distributional eligibility 
patterns fit in with a description of the welfare state as a 'mixed bag'. In 
practice, the government's overall strategy was an uncoordinated 
combination of more and less generous means-tested benefits, combined 
with universal, contributory and status benefits, and a vain hope that this 
combination would, one way or another, result in help for those sections 
of the community which most required it and deserved it.
I have found that political changes do not always feed through into 
change 'on  the ground' if socio-economic circumstances have changed 
too. Greater poverty might impede the government's intention to make 
cuts, for example. So high level political intentions may be limited in the 
impact they make. Also, the results suggest that the distributional pattern 
of eligibility for benefits cannot be generalised as either middle class 
capture, which suggests that in the policy process middle class interests 
can be over-ruled. There was no high point of generosity for these
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particular means tested benefits in the 1970s, even if the rest of the 
welfare state is portrayed as having peaked in its scope at that time.
Although the intention of restricting entitlement for all the benefits was 
achieved, they were not very well targeted on those with the lowest 
incomes, especially in the 1990s. The intention of helping those on a low 
income was inhibited by the way the means test was put into practice. 
This finding shows that the outcome did not meet all the stated 
objectives, with implications for the design of future policy. I also find 
that means tested benefits have embodied values, which are not 
necessarily made explicit as policy objectives. This, along with the failure 
to target effectively, demonstrates that the way a means testing policy is 
implemented does matter.
In means-testing, the devil, and the truth, is in the detail. Therefore the 
way in which legislator's intentions are put into practice does matter. It 
also means that social policy as a discipline should go beyond the study 
of the content of social policy to study the processes through which social 
policies are made and enacted. Descriptions of state institutions and its 
administrative processes are not particularly helpful, which means we 
should study the relationship between policy and implementation. An 
analytical separation between policy and implementation underpins the 
structure of most texts that follow a rational, sequential approach. 
Implementation receives little attention as the final and least significant 
stage. Yet policy-making and administration are not separate activities. 
They cannot be considered in isolation from one another. The policies of a 
social service are what it does -  which may or may not coincide with its 
official aims. Social policy and administration cannot be separated 
because social policy has little meaning without machinery to carry it out. 
However, implementation has continued to be neglected as a field of 
empirical study. This thesis is different from much historical social policy 
literature because implementation is viewed as an integral part of the 
policy process. Secondly it acknowledges the ambiguity of many areas of
347
policy, for instance that objectives may not be precise and different 
objectives may be in conflict.
In conclusion, policy-makers may want to pay more attention to their 
criteria for "need7 in policy-making, if the point of the policy is to help 
those in need. Where helping all those on the lowest incomes is a priority, 
some means tests for non-income replacement benefits may need to be 
redesigned. In summary, designers of means tests should consider how 
to meet their objectives and should ask: "Is there evidence that this policy 
will achieve the intended outcomes?7
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Appendix
I put forward a taxonomy of means-tested benefits to set out which 
bodies administered and developed the means tests, and their design 
features. This is described in Chapter 6 and the position of each means 
tested benefit as at 1st October 1965,1975,1985 and 1995 is summarised in 
Table A1 to Table A4.
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Table A1 Classification of non-subsistence benefits in 1965682
School meals Prescription medicines Student maintenance 
grants
Civil legal aid
Status criteria. Child attending local 
authority maintained 
school (including 
voluntary schools) or free 
place holder at direct 
grant school.
Patient judged by an NHS 
doctor to need a medicine 
on prescription.
Student has a place on a 
'designated' course 
approved for statutory 
grants.
Client has passed a 'merit 
test' to determine whether 
they have a reasonable 
case.
Income-tested or means- 
tested?
? Free to all. Income-tested. Means-tested.
Assessm ent period Week (a month in 
practice)
Week (last week) Year (last financial year) Year (next/last 12 months)
Award period 6 months
Cash or in-kind? In-kind provision without 
compulsion.
In-kind provision without 
compulsion.
Cash grant. 'Voucher' system (the 
legal aid certificate).
Rebate or free at point of 
use?
Free at point of use. Free at point of use. Cash grant i.e. rebate. Free at point of use for 
those fully eligible. 
Otherwise 12 monthly 
contributions from income 
and/or lump sum  
contribution from capital.
Taper or sudden cut-off? 
At what income levels?
? N /A . Taper. Taper.
Status exemptions and 
automatic 'passport' 
exemptions.
? N /A . None. None.
Local or national rules? National statutory rules 
on exemptions, with 
additional local discretion.
National statutory rules. National statutory rules. National rules.
682 Sources: National Union of Students, Grants Hand Book and Survey of LEA Awards 1967 (London: N.U.S., 1967); Phyllis Willmott, Consumer's 
Guide to the British Social Services, 1st ed. (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1967); Edward Moeran, Practical Legal A id  (London: Oyez, 1969).
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Table A 1 cont.
School meals Prescription medicines Student maintenance 
grants
Civil legal aid
Rule-making body ? ? DES.683
Local or national
government
administration?
Local administration. National administration. Local administration. National administration.
Administering body Local Education 
Authority.
Local Education 
Authority.
The Law Society and 
National Assistance 
Board.
Service provider Local Education 
Authority.
National Health Service 
doctor; Pharmacy which 
dispenses NHS 
prescriptions.
University or other private 
provider of 
accommodation.
Solicitor/counsel in 
private practice 'on the 
panel' and willing and 
available to take legal aid 
work.
683 Department of Education (and Science) (1964-1995).
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Table A2 Classification of non-subsistence benefits in 1975684
School meals Prescription medicines Student maintenance 
grants
Civil legal aid
Status criteria. Child attending local 
authority maintained 
school (including 
voluntary schools) or free 
place holder at direct 
grant school.
Patient judged by an NHS 
doctor to need a medicine 
on prescription.
Student has a place on a 
first degree course 
approved for statutory 
grants.
Client has passed a 'merit 
test' to determine whether 
they have a reasonable 
case.
Income-tested or means- 
tested?
Means-tested. Means-tested. Income-tested. Means-tested.
Assessm ent period Week (a month in 
practice)
Week (last week) Year (last financial year) Year (next/ last 12 months)
Award period 6 months
Cash or in-kind? In-kind provision without 
compulsion.
In-kind provision without 
compulsion.
Ear-marked cash grant. 'Voucher' system (the 
legal aid certificate).
Rebate or free at point of 
use?
Free at point of use. Free at point of use, but 
rebates can also be 
claimed.
Cash grant i.e. rebate. Free at point of use for 
those fully eligible. 
Otherwise 12 monthly 
contributions from income 
and/or lump sum  
contribution from capital.
Taper or sudden cut-off? 
At what income levels?
Taper (sliding scale means 
that some, but not all, 
children in a family may 
get free meals).
Sudden cut-off. Taper. Taper.
684 Sources: Phyllis Willmott, Consumer's Guide to the British Social Services, 3rd ed. (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973); Ruth Lister, National Welfare 
Benefits Handbook, 3rd ed. (London: CP AG, 1974); Edward Moeran, Practical Legal Aid, 2nd ed. (London: Oyez Longman, 1976); Department of 
Health and Social Security. "Leaflet PC11: Free prescriptions April 1975." (1975); Department of Health and Social Security. "Leaflet FBI: Family 
Benefits and Pensions." April 1975 (1975).
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Table A2 cont.
School meals Prescription medicines Student maintenance 
grants
Civil legal aid
Status exemptions and 
automatic 'passport' 
exemptions.
Children of families on 
SB688 and FIS.686
SB and FIS recipients and 
their dependants, 
pregnant women, women 
up to 12 months post 
parturition, under 16s,687 
men over 65, women over 
60,688 war or service 
disablement pensioners, 
those with certain medical 
conditions.689
None. None.
School meals Pharmaceutical benefits Student maintenance 
grants
Civil legal aid
Local or national rules? National statutory rules 
on exemptions, with 
additional local discretion.
National statutory rules. National statutory rules. National rules.
Rule-making body DHSS690; LEA691 if 
additional local discretion 
used.
DHSS. DES.692
685 Supplementary Benefit (1966-1988), the main income maintenance benefit. It has been replaced by Jobseeker's Allowance and Income 
Support.
686 Family Income Supplement (1971-1988), an income maintenance benefit for working families with children on a low income. It has been 
replaced by the Working Families' Tax Credit.
687 From 8 April 1974.
688 From 8 April 1974.
689 For example, venereal disease, diabetes, epilepsy.
690 Department of Health and Social Security (1968-1988).
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Table A2 cont.
School meals Prescription medicines Student maintenance 
grants
Civil legal aid
Local or national
government
administration?
Local administration. Local administration. Local administration. National administration.
Administering body Local Education 
Authority.
DHSS local office. Local Education 
Authority.
The Law Society and 
Supplementary Benefits 
Commission.
Service provider Local Education 
Authority/school caterer.
National Health Service 
doctor. Pharmacy which 
dispenses NHS 
prescriptions.
University or other private 
provider of 
accommodation.
Solicitor/ counsel in 
private practice 'on the 
panel' and willing and 
available to take legal aid 
work.
Information available 
from
local Education Office or 
Education Welfare Office 
or Head Teacher
post office, local Social 
Security office
Citizen's Advice Bureau, 
post office, Social Security 
office.
691 Local Education Authority.
692 Department of Education (and Science) (1964-1995).
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Table A3 Classification of non-subsistence benefits in 1985693
School meals Prescription medicines Student maintenance 
grants
Civil legal aid
Status criteria. Child attending local 
authority maintained 
school (including 
voluntary schools) or free 
place holder at direct 
grant school.
Patient judged by an NHS 
doctor to need a medicine 
on prescription.
Student has a place on a 
first degree course 
approved for statutory 
grants.
Client has passed a 'merit 
test' to determine whether 
they have a reasonable 
case.
Income-tested or means- 
tested?
Means-tested. Means-tested. Income-tested. Means-tested.
Assessm ent period Week (a month in 
practice)
Week (last week) Year (last financial year) Year (next/ last 12 months)
Award period Year
Cash or in-kind? In-kind provision without 
compulsion.
In-kind provision without 
compulsion.
Ear-marked cash grant. 'Voucher' system (the 
legal aid certificate).
Rebate or free at point of 
use?
Free at point of use. Free at point of use, but 
rebates can also be 
claimed.
Cash grant i.e. rebate. Free at point of use for 
those fully eligible. 
Otherwise 12 monthly 
contributions from income 
and/or lump sum  
contribution from capital.
Taper or sudden cut-off? 
At what income levels?
Sudden cut-off. Sudden cut-off. Taper. Taper.
693 Sources: Jim Matthewman, Tolley's Social Security and State Benefits 1986 (London: Tolley, 1985); Jim Matthewman, Tolley's Social Security and 
State Benefits 1987-88 (London: Tolley, 1987).
Table A3 cont.
School meals Prescription medicines Student maintenance 
grants
Civil legal aid
Status exemptions and 
'passport' exemptions.
Children of families on 
SB694 and FIS.695
SB and FIS recipients and 
their dependants, 
pregnant women, women  
up to 12 months post 
parturition, under 16s, 
men over 65, women over 
60, war or service 
pensioners, those with 
certain medical 
conditions.696
None. None.
School meals Pharmaceutical benefits Student maintenance 
grants
Civil legal aid
Local or national rules? National statutory rules 
on exemptions, with 
additional local discretion.
National statutory rules. National statutory rules. National rules.
Rule-making body DHSS697; LEA698 if 
additional local discretion 
used.
DHSS. DES.699 LCD.700
694 Supplementary Benefit (1966-1988), the main income maintenance benefit. It has been replaced by Jobseeker's Allowance and Income J 
Support.
695 Family Income Supplement (1971-1988), an income maintenance benefit for working families with children on a low income. It has been 
replaced by the Working Families' Tax Credit.
696 For example, venereal disease, diabetes, epilepsy.
697 Department of Health and Social Security (1968-1988).
698 Local Education Authority.
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Table A3 cont.
School meals Prescription medicines Student maintenance 
grants
Civil legal aid
Local or national
government
administration?
Local administration. National administration. Local administration. National administration 
through Area Offices.
Administering body Local Education 
Authority.
DHSS local office. Local Education 
Authority.
The Law Society and 
DHSS office in Preston.
Service provider Local Education 
Authority/school caterer.
National Health Service 
doctor. Pharmacy which 
dispenses NHS 
prescriptions.
University or other private 
provider of 
accommodation.
Solicitor/counsel in 
private practice willing to 
take legal aid work.
Information available 
from
Local Education Office or 
Education Welfare Office 
or Head Teacher
Post office, local Social 
Security office
Citizen's Advice Bureau, 
post office, Social Security 
office.
699 Department of Education (and Science) (1964-1995).
700 Lord Chancellor's Department.
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Table A4 Classification of non-subsistence benefits in 1995701
School meals Prescription medicines Student maintenance 
grants
Civil legal aid
Status criteria. Child attending state 
maintained school.
Patient judged by an NHS 
doctor to need a medicine 
on prescription.
Student has a place on a 
first degree course 
approved for statutory 
grants.
Client has passed a 'merit 
test' to determine whether 
they have a reasonable 
case.
Income-tested or means- 
tested?
Means-tested. Means-tested. Income-tested. Means-tested.
Assessm ent period Week (a month in 
practice)
Week (last week) Year (last financial year) Year (next/ last 12 months)
Award period Year
Cash or in-kind? In-kind provision without 
compulsion.
In-kind provision without 
compulsion.
Ear-marked cash grant. 'Voucher' system (the 
legal aid certificate).
Rebate or free at point of 
use?
Free at point of use. Free at point of use, but 
rebates can also be 
claimed with a receipt.
Cash grant i.e. rebate. Free at point of use for 
those fully eligible. 
Otherwise monthly 
contributions from income 
and/or lump sum  
contribution from capital.
Taper or sudden cut-off? 
At what income levels?
Sudden cut-off. Sudden cut-off. Taper. Taper.
701 Sources: Jim Matthewman, Tolley's Social Security and State Benefits Handbook 1995-96 (London: Tolley, 1995); Jim Matthewman, Tolley's Social 
Security and State Benefits Handbook 1996-97 (London: Tolley, 1996); Department for Education and Employment, Student Grants and Loans: A  Brief 
Guide for Higher Education Students 1996/97 (London: DfEE, 1996).
Table A4 cont.
School meals Prescription medicines Student maintenance 
grants
Civil legal aid
Status exemptions and 
'passport' exemptions.
Children of families on
IS702
IS, FC and DWA 
recipients and their 
dependants, pregnant 
women, women up to 12 
months post parturition, 
under 16s, under 19s in 
F/T education, men over 
65, women over 60, war or 
service pensioners, those 
with certain medical 
conditions.703
None. IS, FC and DWA 
recipients and their 
dependants
School meals Pharmaceutical benefits Student maintenance 
grants
Civil legal aid
Local or national rules? National statutory rules 
on exemptions, with 
additional local discretion.
National statutory rules. National statutory rules. National rules.
Rule-making body DSS704; LEA705 if additional 
local discretion used.
DSS. DfEE.706
702 Supplementary Benefit (1966-1988), the main income maintenance benefit. It has been replaced by Jobseeker's Allowance and Income 
Support.
703 For example, venereal disease, diabetes, epilepsy.
7<}4 Department of Social Security (1988-).
705 Local Education Authority.
706 Department for Education and Employment (1995-).
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Table A4 cont.
School meals Prescription medicines Student maintenance 
grants
Civil legal aid
Local or national
government
administration?
Local administration of 
free meals; national 
administration of IS.
National administration. Local administration. National administration.
Administering body Local Education 
Authority/DSS local 
office.
Health Benefits Unit, 
Newcastle upon Tyne.
Local Education 
Authority.
Legal Aid Board and 
DHSS office in Preston.
Service provider Local Education 
Authority/school caterer.
National Health Service 
doctor. Pharmacy which 
dispenses NHS 
prescriptions.
University or other private 
provider of 
accommodation.
Solicitor/counsel in 
private practice willing to 
take legal aid work.
Information available 
from
Local Education Office or 
Education Welfare Office 
or Head Teacher
Post office, local Social 
Security office
Schools; LEA offices; DfEE Citizen's Advice Bureau, 
post office, Social Security 
office.
c
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